11

Globalization, Representation, and Attitudes towards Democracy

Kees Aarts, Jacques Thomassen, and Carolien van Ham

11.1 Introduction

One of the main challenges for modern democracies is their supposedly declining support among the citizenry, often referred to as the 'crisis of legitimacy of representative democracy'. In recent years, in the public as well as the academic debate, citizens' growing disillusionment with politics has been a topic of increased concern. Signalling widespread democratic malaise, eroding political support, and ever declining trust in political leaders and politics, the question 'Why we don't trust government?' or even 'Why we hate politics' has been frequently researched (Nye et al. 1997; Norris 1999a, 2011; Pharr and Putnam 2000; Dalton 2004; Hay 2007; Zmerli and Hooghe 2011). However, how convincing the evidence for declining support is, is still a matter of dispute (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995; Norris 1999a; Norris 2011). In addition, the causal mechanisms behind the supposed negative trend in people's support for democracy and its institutions are the subject of an ongoing debate as well (Kaase and Newton 1995; Nye et al. 1997; Dalton 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008; Norris 2011).

Some observers have pointed to a growing gap between citizens' demands of the political system and the system's ability to deliver, resulting in 'system overload' or 'legitimacy gaps' (King 1975; Norris 2011). Others have argued that the changing nature of political parties and the media, acting as intermediaries between citizens and the political system, has negatively affected citizens' political support (Newton 1999, 2006; Mair 2009). Hence, explanations of political support can be found at the micro level of individual citizens and their aspirations for democracy (demand side); at the macro level of political systems and their performance in terms of input and output (supply side);

and at the meso level of political parties and media that mediate between citizens and system, transmitting citizens' preferences as well as shaping them.

At the micro level of individual citizens, the two most important explanations for declining political support are the modernization thesis on the one hand and the globalization thesis on the other hand. The modernization thesis was first introduced by Inglehart (1971, 1977), and subsequently elaborated and empirically tested by Dalton (2004) and Norris (2011). In his 2004 study Dalton rephrases this thesis as the *positive effects thesis*, and contrasts it to the *negative effects thesis*. Both hypotheses refer to the effects of the socio-economic (and concomitant cultural) transformation of advanced industrial societies.

According to the *positive effects thesis* the second half of the twentieth century was a period of rising affluence, expanding education, and improving social opportunities for most citizens. This social modernization gradually transformed the relationship between citizens and the state. Greater political skills and resources—that is, higher levels of cognitive mobilization—led the contemporary electorate towards elite-challenging forms of political action, which places them in conflict with politicians and government officials. These better-educated citizens are inclined to question democratic politics as it is currently practised not because they do not endorse strong democratic ideals but because they demand a greater role in the political process. Therefore, the positive effects thesis claims:

The greatest loss in support should be located among those who are at the upper end of the economic order: the better educated, the more skilled, and those with higher incomes. (Dalton 2004: 86)

The *negative effects thesis* argues, however, that the development of advanced industrial societies created new social and economic problems that have eroded the public support of the citizenry. Social groups on the periphery of the economy, such as the less educated and the unemployed, are becoming increasingly marginalized by the labour structure of advanced industrial societies. Moreover, it is these marginalized citizens that are most strongly affected by processes of globalization, as we will further elaborate below (Dalton 2004; Kriesi et al. 2008; Bovens and Wille 2009). Hence, the negative effects hypothesis posits that:

The greatest loss in support should be located among those who are at the margins of the economic order: the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes. In contrast, upper-status groups also might have become more sceptical about government, but not to the same degree as lower-status groups. (Dalton 2004: 85)

Dalton's own research and Norris's (2011) more recent findings leave little doubt about the empirical validity of these two alternative hypotheses. Both

authors find evidence for the 'positive effects thesis' that locates declining legitimacy among the wealthier, higher educated 'critical citizens'. Dalton (2004) moreover shows that over time the relationship between education and political trust has gradually changed. In most of the countries represented in Dalton's study this relationship has weakened whereas in some countries (the USA and Germany) it has even reversed. In these countries the higher educated citizens are now less trustful than lower-educated citizens.

11.2 Globalization and a New Structural Conflict?

However, we think that recent developments in many modern democracies justify a further discussion of the validity of these alternative hypotheses. In particular in Western Europe the libertarian revolution of well-educated youngsters in the second half of the twentieth century now seems to be succeeded by a populist revolution that is anything but libertarian and is disproportionately supported by the less well-to-do and less educated part of the population. Across the Western world populist parties from the left and in particular from the right successfully appeal to the frustrations of people who feel threatened by the consequences of globalization, by the open economy leading to—at least in their perception—the loss of jobs, and the immigration of people with different economic and cultural backgrounds, often from the Muslim world. This differential effect of globalization seems to be more in line with the negative effects hypothesis, and it has recently been addressed by Kriesi and his collaborators. They argue that at least in Western Europe a new structural conflict is developing, the conflict between 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization, as the consequences of globalization are not the same for all members of a national community:

The 'losers' of globalization are people whose life chances were traditionally protected by national boundaries. They perceive the weakening of these boundaries as a threat to their social status and their social security. (Kriesi et al. 2008: 5)

The likely winners of globalization, in contrast, are those 'who benefit from the new opportunities resulting from globalization, and whose life chances are enhanced' (Kriesi et al. 2008: 5). In terms of social groups, 'winners' include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in sectors open to international competition, as well as cosmopolitan citizens, while 'losers' include entrepreneurs and qualified employees in traditionally protected sectors, all unqualified employees, and citizens who strongly identify themselves with their national community (Kriesi et al. 2008: 8).

According to Kriesi et al., the antagonism between winners and losers of globalization is leading to a new structural conflict between *integration* and

demarcation. They distinguish between an economic and a cultural dimension of the integration–demarcation divide. In the economic domain, a neo-liberal free trade position is opposed to a position in favour of protecting the national markets. In the cultural domain, a universalist, multiculturalist or cosmopolitan position is opposing a position in favour of protecting national culture and citizenship. The authors expect that this new structural conflict will be embedded in the two main dimensions of conflict originally distinguished by Rokkan: a cultural (religion) and a social-economic one (class). The substantive meaning of these dimensions had already been changed by the cultural revolution of the 1960s. The cultural dimension was transformed from a dimension mainly defined in terms of religious concerns to one opposing culturally liberal or libertarian concerns, on the one side, and the defence of traditional (authoritarian) values and institutions on the other. Similarly, Kriesi et al. hypothesize that the new demarcation/integration conflict will be embedded into this transformed two-dimensional basic structure, transforming it once again.

On the social-economic dimension, the new conflict can be expected to reinforce the classic opposition between a pro-state and a pro-market position while giving it a new meaning. The pro-state position is likely to become more defensive and more protectionist, while the pro-market position is likely to become more assertive in favour of the enhancement of national competitiveness on world markets. On the cultural dimension, they expect enhanced opposition to the cultural liberalism introduced by the cultural revolution of the second part of the twentieth century as a result of the ethnicization of politics. In other words, the defence of tradition is increasingly expected to take on an ethnic or nationalist character. Furthermore, new issues should be integrated into the cultural dimension. In the Western European context, central among these are the issues related to European integration, which correspond to the new political and cultural forms of competition linked with globalization. The demarcation pole of the new cultural cleavage should be characterized by opposition to the process of European integration and by restrictive positions with regard to immigration. This two-dimensional space can be represented as in Table 11.1.

Table 11.1. Dimensions of political conflict

Cultural dimension	Social-economic dimension	
	Demarcation	Integration
Demarcation	A	B
Integration	C	D

11.3 Globalization and Political Representation

Now, how might globalization affect citizens' attitudes towards democracy? The causal mechanism connecting globalization processes and citizens' attitudes is not that straightforward, and requires further specification. We propose that the connection might run via changes in citizens' issue positions on the new conflict dimensions discussed above. We expect that *those who are at the margins of the economic order: the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes* will mainly be located in quadrant A of Table 11.1. Being less skilled, they will tend to be on the demarcation side of the social-economic dimension; being less educated they will tend to be on the demarcation side of the cultural dimension as well. But why then should being on this position erode political support, as the negative effect thesis claims? A possible explanation was presented more than 50 years ago by Lipset. He pointed to the location of the working class in this two-dimensional space and the problem of political representation people in this category encounter:

The poorer strata everywhere are more liberal or leftist on economic issues; they favour more welfare state measures, higher wages, graduated income taxes, support of trade unions, and so forth. But when liberalism is defined in noneconomic terms—as support of civil liberties, internationalism, etc.—the correlation is reversed. The more well-to-do are more liberal, the poorer are more intolerant. (Lipset 1966: 101–2)

And:

In some nations working-class groups have proved to be the most nationalistic sector of the population. In some they have been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in countries with open immigration. (Lipset 1966: 99)

Since the political elites tend to belong to the well-to-do and in particular to the better educated, the logical consequence is a problem of political representation among the parties on the left where political elites combine a leftist attitude on social-economic issues with a libertarian attitude on immaterial issues whereas their voters—assuming they vote according to social-economic issues—combine a leftist attitude on social-economic issues with an authoritarian or conservative stand on immaterial issues. As a consequence political elites will hardly be representative of their rank and file on immaterial issues:

The gradual realization that extremist and intolerant movements in modern society are more likely to be based on the lower classes than on the middle and upper classes has posed a tragic dilemma for those intellectuals of the democratic left who once believed the proletariat necessarily to be a force for liberty, racial equality, and social progress. (Lipset 1966: 97)

The cultural dimension introduced by Kriesi et al. is based on the same libertarian–authoritarian dimension Lipset referred to, and his argument still applies.¹ If this is correct, most working class voters will be in quadrant A where—at least in many countries, and at least until relatively recently—no political parties are, whereas the political parties and political elites on the left are in quadrant C.² Moreover, people in quadrant A might presently have even better reasons to feel poorly represented than at the time when Lipset made his observations, for two reasons. First, in the 1990s most of the traditional social-democratic parties have moved towards a more liberal position on the social-economic dimension, leaving their traditional electorate behind. Second, and more importantly, over the last decade the cultural dimension has become more salient (Pellicaan, De Lange and Van der Meer 2007; Aarts and Thomassen 2008b). Therefore, among voters on the demarcation side of the cultural dimension, feelings of not being well represented can only be expected to increase.³ As a consequence they will have little reason to be satisfied with the functioning of democracy. Of course, it is precisely for this reason that populist parties from the left (positioning themselves in quadrant A) and in particular from the right (positioning themselves in quadrant B) are extremely successful in most Western European countries and in particular in consensus democracies with their proportional electoral system where they can easily get access to parliament. This is in line with the general expectation that consensus democracies mainly because of their proportional electoral system and their multiparty system are more responsive to the (changing) needs of the citizens. Thus one might argue that in those countries voters no longer have a reason to feel unrepresented as there are now parties available to represent them on both dimensions, or at least on the increasingly important cultural dimension.

Therefore, it is our expectation that in line with the negative effects hypothesis *those who are at the margins of the economic order: the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes* feel gradually less well represented by any of the political parties and therefore are increasingly dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. We also expect that this effect will be smaller in consensus democracies than in majoritarian democracies.⁴ The well-educated group of the population that was responsible for the cultural revolution of the second part of the twentieth century is in a totally different position. Inglehart's (1977) argument that one of the reasons why well-educated youngsters rebelled against the political establishment of those days was that the established parties did not represent them on post-material issues like the protection of the environment, women's rights, etc. hardly applies anymore. They often found close allies in the established parties of the left and, in due course, spawned a new set of parties—the New Left and Green parties. Mainly located at the borderline between quadrants C and D, these well-educated,

libertarian, and cosmopolitan citizens are among the winners of globalization and are well represented by the libertarian political parties of the left. If they are dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy it is for different reasons, possibly because they are the dissatisfied democrats Dalton and others have been referring to (Klingemann 1999; Dalton 2004). As a consequence we also expect a growing gap between the two groups in terms of how well they feel themselves to be represented and their satisfaction with democracy.

In the framework of this chapter, we approach these propositions in three steps. First of all, we test whether there is a difference in attitudes towards democracy between citizens 'at the margins' and citizens 'at the upper end' of the economic order, using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems. Second, since the modernization and globalization hypotheses refer to changes in attitudes towards democracy, we test whether the two groups have grown apart over time using data from the Eurobarometer. Third and finally, we evaluate to what extent the causal mechanism outlined above connecting globalization to attitudes towards democracy might hold, using the case of the Netherlands as empirical illustration.

11.4 Hypotheses

As outlined above, we expect to find empirical support for the negative effects hypothesis rather than the positive effects hypothesis and more so in majoritarian than in consensus democracies. Hence, our first two hypotheses are:

H1: Those who are at the margins of the economic order—the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes—will have more negative attitudes towards democracy than those that are at the upper end of the economic order: the better educated, the more skilled, and those with higher incomes.

H2: This difference will be larger in majoritarian than in consensus democracies.

Note that while hypothesis 1 is static, specifying differences between social groups, both the positive and negative effects hypotheses seek to explain long-term over-time *changes* in attitudes towards democracy. Here, the positive effects (modernization) hypothesis posits that it is the higher educated citizens that have become increasingly critical of politics, while lower educated citizens have experienced little or no change in their attitudes towards democracy. Hence, the historical gap in political support between high and low educated citizens has become increasingly smaller, and in some countries highly educated citizens now even are less supportive of politics than low educated citizens. This is the process Dalton (2004) finds evidence for. On the other hand, the negative effects (globalization) hypothesis posits that it is the lower educated citizens that have become increasingly critical of

Figure 11.1. Trends in political support by socio-economic status

politics, while higher educated citizens have experienced little or no change in their attitudes towards democracy. Hence, the gap in attitudes towards democracy between high and low educated citizens is becoming increasingly larger over time.⁵ These opposing dynamics are illustrated in Graphs A and B in Figure 11.1.

If the globalization argument holds, we expect to find empirical support for our third hypothesis (i.e. trends as outlined in Graph B in Figure 11.1):

H3: Over time, those who are at the margins of the economic order (i.e. the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes) have increasingly negative attitudes towards democracy, while attitudes towards democracy of those that are at the upper end of the economic order have remained stable.

While in the positive effects hypothesis the causal mechanism leading well-off citizens to be more critical of politics is rather straightforward, in the negative effects hypothesis the causal mechanism connecting globalization processes to attitudes towards democracy is less obvious and requires further specification. In our discussion above we have proposed one way in which globalization may be connected to attitudes towards democracy, by arguing that citizens with different socio-economic status are differentially affected by globalization, which subsequently alters their issue positions. The degree to which such positions are catered for by political parties subsequently affects the degree to which these citizens feel represented by parties and are satisfied with democracy. This causal mechanism is drawn in Figure 11.2 below.

Note that the link between issue positions and feeling represented is once again mediated by both the party system and the electoral system (not shown

Figure 11.2. The causal connection between socio-economic status and political support

in Figure 11.2), as the availability of parties that match one's positions as well as the chances of such a party entering parliament are likely to affect feelings of representation.⁶ In our empirical analyses, however, we will only test the links between socio-economic position and issue positions, as well as issue positions and feelings of representation and satisfaction with democracy; as a first step to elaborate the causal mechanism proposed. Since the globalization thesis refers to over-time change, hypotheses 4 and 5 are formulated dynamically as well, as follows:

H4: Those who are at the margins of the economic order (i.e. the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes) are increasingly found in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions.

H5: Those who are in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions feel increasingly less represented by political parties and are less satisfied with democracy.

11.5 Data and Methods

11.5.1 *Data*

To test hypotheses 1 and 2, we use the second module of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES).⁷ This CSES module contains measures of some of the key concepts needed for our purposes, although not all relevant variables have been included in all participating countries. Since the CSES data are crosssectional, to test hypothesis 3 we use Eurobarometer data on socio-economic status and satisfaction with democracy for nine European democracies from 1973 until 2010. Finally, to test hypotheses 4 and 5, we rely on the data of the Dutch parliamentary election studies (DPES) from 1971 until 2010 (for specific variables, the time series are shorter and sometimes interrupted). The DPES contains several recurring indicators of citizens' attitudes towards politics. In addition, it also contains a variety of questions on political issues, and information on people's social and economic background.⁸

11.5.2 *Concepts and Measures*

The theoretical arguments outlined in the previous section require that at the very least three sorts of concepts are analysed. These are: a person's socio-economic status, issue positions on the socio-economic and cultural dimension, and attitudes towards democracy. For testing hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, only socio-economic status and attitudes towards democracy are needed; for testing hypotheses 4 and 5, we will also consider issue positions. The following sections describe the indicators used to measure these concepts.

11.5.3 Cross-sectional Comparative Analysis: CSES

In CSES, which has a relatively high comparability of measures within each module, three indicators are available for *socio-economic position*: social class, income, and the level of education. Social class is derived from the respondent's position on the labour market. Kriesi et al. (2008: 349) developed a classification of social class in nine categories, which aims at capturing simultaneously the vertical dimension of social class (lower versus higher and managerial positions in the labour market) as well as the horizontal dimension that is of crucial importance for one's position in a globalizing economy (traditional industrial sectors versus services-oriented sectors). Using the data available in the CSES Module 2, we build on the categories developed by Kriesi et al. (2008) to create an indicator of social class.

The information used is contained in two variables in the CSES module: the respondent's current employment status and his/her main occupation. The first variable is used to distinguish between persons who are currently in the labour market and those who are out of it (because they are currently unemployed, or still studying, or retired, or for other reasons). The second variable, main occupation, classifies a person's type of employment according to the internationally developed ISCO coding.⁹ With the help of this code, the horizontal dimension of socio-economic status, i.e. the sector of the economy where one is employed, can be measured.¹⁰ The resulting classification of social class consists of nine categories (see Table A.11.1 in the Appendix A.11.1).

Education and income have been used to create another indicator of socio-economic status. In the CSES study, the level of education of the respondent has been categorized so as to generate maximum comparability across countries, but the international comparability of education remains problematic. In this chapter a rough distinction is made between respondents with post-secondary (often higher trade or vocational schools) and university-level education (with or without a degree) on the one hand, and all other types of education on the other hand. Household income, which is even less comparable across countries than education, has been coded in quintiles. A simple combination of education and household income results in an indicator with three categories. The middle category serves as a reference; the other categories contain respondents with a clearly lower or higher socio-economic status than the reference group. Details can be found in Table A.11.2 in the Appendix A.11.1.

In conclusion, in the analyses we use two distinct measures of socio-economic status: one that is based on the respondent's type of employment, and one that is based on the combined measurement of education and income.¹¹ We will investigate the relationship between these two measures of socio-economic status and two indicators of attitudes towards democracy in the CSES module. The first indicator, *feeling of representation*, assesses whether

any of the political parties in the country represents the respondent's views reasonably well. The response to this question can be yes or no. The second indicator is *satisfaction with democracy*. This variable has been measured directly in CSES Module 2, with responses on a 1–4 scale running from 'very satisfied' to 'not at all satisfied'.

Using the indicators for social class and for status implies that not all election studies included in the CSES Module 2 can be analysed, leaving us with 28 elections in the analysis (see Table A.11.3 in Appendix A.11.1). With the CSES study, the main propositions to be tested are hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e. those who are at the margins of the economic order—the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes—feel relatively poorly represented by any of the political parties and are, perhaps therefore, relatively dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. Moreover, we expect this gap to be larger in majoritarian democracies than in consensus democracies.

11.5.4 Longitudinal Comparative Analysis: Eurobarometer

In the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file, five indicators are available for socio-economic position: type and sector of occupation, subjective social class, income, and level of education. However, the Mannheim trend file only runs until 2002, and hence for the current analyses we use a more recent trend file of Eurobarometer data created by the University of Amsterdam, that includes data until 2010.¹² The latter dataset only includes education as an indicator of socio-economic status. Education is measured as years at school, and categorized into low, medium, and high education for the purpose of the analysis (see Table B.11.1 in Appendix A.11.1). Attitudes towards democracy are measured by *satisfaction with democracy* in one's country, which in the Eurobarometer is measured on a four-point scale ranging from 'very satisfied' to 'not at all satisfied'. The data set includes 16 Western European democracies. However, for only nine of these (the then member states of the EU) data are available from 1973 onwards, allowing for thorough analyses of over-time trends. Hence in our analyses we focus on the data from these nine democracies, collected almost annually from 1973 until 2010 (33 timepoints). With the Eurobarometer data, we will test hypothesis 3, i.e. that the gap in attitudes towards democracy between those who are at the margins and those who are at the upper end of the economic order has increased over time, due to decreasing support among those at the margins.

11.5.5 Unpacking Causal Mechanisms: DPES

In the DPES, *socio-economic status* is operationalized in two ways: a person's highest level of completed education, and the self-image of his/her social class.

Throughout 1971–2010, education has been measured with several scales (and the school systems in the Netherlands have changed as well). It is possible though to use a consistent rough distinction between those respondents who have completed only primary and/or basic secondary school (usually circa four more years of school after primary school), and those who obtained a diploma from a more advanced type of school or university.¹³ Social class self-image has been asked consistently throughout the 1971–2010 period, with a five-point scale. In the analyses, a trichotomy has been applied between those respondents considering themselves as (upper) working class, middle class, and upper-middle or upper class. Attitudes towards democracy are measured with two indicators: satisfaction with democracy and external efficacy. External efficacy approximates the CSES item ‘feelings of being represented’ best, and is constructed as an index based on three survey items (see Appendix A.11.1). These variables have been included in every election study since 1971. *Satisfaction with democracy* has been asked in the Dutch studies only since 1998, and therefore only a relatively short time series is available for this key indicator.

In addition to socio-economic position and attitudes towards democracy, in order to test hypotheses 4 and 5, we also need issue positions. We have picked two political issues that measure respondents’ positions on the socio-economic and cultural dimensions outlined in the theoretical section, i.e. the desirability of larger or smaller *income differences*, and the desired extent of *European integration*. Respondents have been asked to place themselves on these issues, which have together been included in the DPES from 1994 onwards. Based on these issue positions, we can position respondents in one of the four quadrants outlined in Table 11.1. Using the DPES data, we will test hypotheses 4 and 5, i.e. those with lower socio-economic status are increasingly found in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions, and those in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions, feel increasingly less represented by political parties and are less satisfied with democracy.

11.6 Results

11.6.1 Cross-sectional Comparative Analysis: CSES

In the cross-sectional comparative analyses we test hypotheses 1 and 2, focusing on the effects of socio-economic status on feelings of being represented and satisfaction with democracy.

We first look at the feeling of being represented. In Table 11.2 the percentage differences are presented between contrast groups on the indicators of social class and education/income (see above and Appendix A.11.1). In order to be able to test hypothesis 2, consensus and majoritarian democracies are

Table 11.2. Differences in percentage feeling represented by a political party between contrast groups

High income economies			Middle and low income economies		
Election	% difference social class	% difference education–income	Election	% difference social class	% difference education–income
<i>Consensus democracies</i>			<i>Consensus democracies</i>		
Czech Rep (2002)		–0.9	Brazil (2002)	3.9	12.7**
Denmark (2001)		10.3***	Romania (2004)		23.9***
Finland (2003)	4.0	8.2*			
Israel (2003)	3.4	7.8			
Italy (2006)		10.8			
Japan (2004)	9.6*	6.5			
Netherlands (2002)	0.1	0.6			
Norway (2001)	3.6 +	5.3 +			
Poland (2001)	10.3*	10.2*			
Slovenia (2004)	–9.8*	–8.7			
Sweden (2002)	2.7	–2.9			
Switzerland (2003)	4.0	–2.6			
<i>Average</i>	3.10	3.72	<i>Average</i>		18.30
<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>			<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>		
Australia (2004)	–0.7	–4.6 +	Albania (2005)		14.5**
Canada (2004)	9.3**	13.7***	Bulgaria (2001)		13.8**
France (2002)		0.8	Chile (2005)		10.5*
Germany (2002)	8.5**	14.3***	Mexico (2003)	–2.6	2.7
Great Britain (2005)	3.5	1.8	Peru (2006)		9.6**
Hungary (2002)	2.6	22.3***	Philippines (2004)	9.5	15.0***
Iceland (2003)	3.0	7.9 +	Russia (2004)		0.2
Ireland (2002)	3.1	2.2			
New Zealand (2002)	6.1*	–7.1*			
Portugal (2002)	0.3	12.2			
Portugal (2005)	7.0*	18.3***			
South Korea (2004)	8.8	12.5**			
Spain (2004)	0.3	–7.0			
Taiwan (2001)	1.8	3.6			
Taiwan (2004)	3.1	4.5			
United States (2004)	5.2	8.7*			
<i>Average</i>	4.13	6.51	<i>Average</i>	3.45	9.47

Notes: Bivariate logit regression results. P-values: + 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

presented separately. If our indicators are valid and it is true that persons in disadvantaged socio-economic positions also feel less well represented, we expect to find *positive* percentage differences in Table 11.2.

A large majority of the percentage differences is indeed positive, as expected.¹⁴ This means that the better-off social classes and those with higher scores on the income-education indicator do feel represented by a political party more often than persons on the other side of these social divides. The contrast is especially clear in Canada and Germany. In other countries, however, the differences are very small or negligibly close to zero. These include

Ireland, Britain, and the Netherlands. Grouping these countries in consensual and majoritarian democracies, using the executive-parties dimension of the two-dimensional classification developed by Bernauer et al. in this volume, does not seem to demonstrate significant differences in the effect of social class on feelings of representation. Apparently, other factors, not included in our analyses, are (also) important for the extent to which class differences occur in the extent to which people find themselves represented by a political party. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is rejected.

The second dependent variable in the analyses of CSES data is satisfaction with the way democracy works in one's country. In Table 11.3, percentage differences corresponding to those reported in Table 11.2 are shown for the percentage of respondents who state that they are very satisfied or satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Again, it is expected that the less well-off in social-economic terms will also be less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, resulting in positive differences. All the percentage differences in Table 11.3 are indeed positive—except in Israel and Ireland—but again the differences in majoritarian democracies are not larger than in consensus democracies. Therefore, there is some support for hypothesis 1 but not for hypothesis 2.¹⁵

In summary, the evidence of differing feelings of representation, and of different levels of satisfaction with the functioning of democracy among different social-economic groups, by and large conforms to our expectations. This lends support to the negative effects hypothesis outlined in hypothesis 1, i.e. those at the margins of the economic order are less positive about the functioning of representative democracy than those at the upper end of the economic order. However, those differences are not larger in majoritarian than in consensus democracies as hypothesis 2 would predict.

11.6.2 Longitudinal Comparative Analysis: Eurobarometer

As we outlined in the hypotheses, the globalization argument is an over-time argument, predicting decreasing political support among those at the margins of the economic order and as a consequence, an increasing gap over time between citizens of low and high socio-economic status in terms of their attitudes towards democracy. To investigate whether this hypothesis (hypothesis 3) holds, we analysed Eurobarometer data for nine European democracies from 1973 until 2010.

The trend graphs presented in Figure 11.3 appear to show that, first, the differences between educational groups in satisfaction with democracy are very small in most countries. Contrasting high educated with low educated citizens, the average difference in proportion of satisfied citizens varies between 1.3 per cent and 12.2 per cent. In six out of nine countries, on average higher educated citizens are more satisfied (once more corroborating

Globalization, Representation, and Attitudes towards Democracy

Table 11.3. Differences in percentage very/fairly satisfied with the democratic process between contrast groups

High income economies			Middle and low income economies		
Election	% difference social class	% difference education–income	Election	% difference social class	% difference education–income
<i>Consensus democracies</i>			<i>Consensus democracies</i>		
Belgium (2003)	0.5		Brazil (2002)	14.1***	12.5**
Czech Rep (2002)		15.5**	Romania (2004)		–0.7
Denmark (2001)		6.8***			
Finland (2003)	8.1*	12.7**			
Israel (2003)	–6.6 +	–6.5			
Italy (2006)		3.3			
Japan (2004)	1.0	3.9			
Netherlands (2002)	7.2*	14.0**			
Norway (2001)	1.3	10.3**			
Poland (2001)	17.3***	29.3***			
Slovenia (2004)	8.1 +	17.6*			
Sweden (2002)	5.7 +	1.4			
Switzerland (2003)	5.4 +	13.3***			
<i>Average</i>	4.8	10.13	<i>Average</i>		5.9
<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>			<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>		
Australia (2004)	3.7	4.5	Albania (2005)		8.1 +
Canada (2004)	3.2	2.7	Bulgaria (2001)		21.0***
France (2002)		9.9*	Chile (2005)		6.2
Germany (2002)	10.1**	16.4***	Mexico (2003)	1.9	–6.3 +
Great Britain (2005)	3.3	13.5**	Peru (2006)		3.6
Hungary (2002)	6.7	–3.5	Philippines (2004)	7.6	2.3
Iceland (2003)	1.7	5.3	Russia (2004)		–7.0
Ireland (2002)	–4.7*	0.8			
New Zealand (2002)	1.8	3.1			
Portugal (2002)	13.1**	21.1*			
Portugal (2005)	10.2**	19.6***			
South Korea (2004)	–3.0	–1.8			
Spain (2004)	–4.2	–4.9			
Taiwan (2001)	–3.7	–6.1 +			
Taiwan (2004)	–0.1	–3.2			
United States (2004)	–5.8	2.5			
<i>Average</i>	2.15	4.99	<i>Average</i>	4.75	3.99

Notes: Bivariate logit regression results. P-values: + 0.1, * 0.05, ** 0.01, *** 0.001.

Figure 11.3. Trends in satisfaction with democracy by education in nine European democracies

hypothesis 1). However, in three out of nine countries differences between educational groups are either very small or reversed, with the lower educated on average being more satisfied.

Considering trends over time, Figure 11.3 appears to show that trends follow a rather similar pattern for all educational groups, suggesting that the explanatory power of education is quite moderate and that other causes explain the over-time variation in satisfaction with democracy. When the difference in satisfaction with democracy between high educated and low educated citizens is regressed on time, this gap between educational groups appears to have increased significantly in six of nine cases. In all these cases the gap appears to be rather small, though. These analyses and Figure 11.3 provide some support for hypothesis 3, but the graphs make clear that this support is feeble.

11.6.3 Unpacking Causal Mechanisms: DPES

We argued above that globalization might affect the connection between socio-economic status and attitudes towards democracy by changing the issue positions of citizens at the margin of the economic order, subsequently affecting those citizens' attitudes towards democracy as well. Using the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies we test hypotheses 4 and 5, the former testing the link between socio-economic status and issue positions, and the latter testing the link between issue positions and attitudes towards democracy. We expect that over time, those at the margins of the economic order are increasingly found in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions as sketched in Table 11.1, and that those who are in quadrant A of the socio-economic and cultural issue dimensions, feel increasingly less represented by political parties and are less satisfied with democracy.

We set out by examining the trends of the main variables. Figures 11.4 and 11.5 show the trends in the indicators of socio-economic status used here: level of completed education and social class self-image.¹⁶ In accordance with the expectation, the percentage of respondents who only completed lower or medium education dropped from over 90 per cent in 1971 to just over 30 per cent in 2010. This means that, through a combined process of increased participation in higher education and population replacement, persons with lower or medium education only have become a small minority of the electorate in the 2000s. Similarly, as Figure 11.4 shows, the percentage of respondents who consider themselves to be working class or upper working class has over the same period decreased from almost half of the electorate to circa 30 per cent.¹⁷

How are these indicators of socio-economic status related to attitudes towards democracy over the years? In Figures 11.6 and 11.7, the trends in external political efficacy (taken as an indicator of feelings of being

Source: Dutch National Election Studies, weighted data

Figure 11.4. Level of completed education, the Netherlands, 1971–2010

Source: Dutch National Election Studies, weighted data

Figure 11.5. Social class self-image, 1971–2010

represented) and in satisfaction with democracy are depicted according to level of education and social class, respectively.

In Figure 11.6 external efficacy and satisfaction with democracy are broken down to lower/medium and higher levels of completed education. Several observations should be made. First, the sense of external efficacy (the belief

Figure 11.6. Level of education and attitudes towards politics

Figure 11.7. Social class self-image and attitudes towards politics

that politics is responsive to citizens like oneself) and satisfaction with democracy do not show clear upward or downward trends in the time intervals for which data are available. It is also clear that the lower- and medium-educated respondents have a consistently lower sense of external efficacy than the higher-educated respondents. While this does demonstrate that the negative effects hypothesis holds in the Netherlands when considering static differences between social groups, confirming hypothesis 1 for this specific country, it also indicates that the gap between the socio-economic advantaged and disadvantaged does not seem to be widening, disconfirming hypothesis 2 in the case of the Netherlands. Rather, Figure 11.6 seems to show class differences in attitudes towards democracy that appear to be rather stable over time.¹⁸ The only period in which the gap between socio-economic groups briefly narrows is around the 2002 election (in which Pim Fortuyn's LPF participated with much success). The time series for satisfaction with democracy is shorter than that for the other variables in Figure 11.6, as the question was only included in the DPES from 1998 onwards. It is still remarkable that in 1998 and 2002, the first two time points for this variable, the difference between lower/medium-educated and higher-educated citizens is barely noticeable. Only since 2003, differences in satisfaction with democracy are observed for people with different educational levels, with higher-educated people being relatively more often satisfied.

Similar patterns as observed in Figure 11.6 appear when we consider the relationship between attitudes towards democracy and social class self-image. Figure 11.7 shows the trends for three levels of social class: upper (middle), middle, and (upper) working class. Almost without exception, people with a higher self-image of their social class have a higher sense of external efficacy. Again, social class appears to have a much weaker impact on people's satisfaction with democracy, at least until 2003. After 2003, social class is associated with different levels of satisfaction with democracy as well, with the higher classes being the most satisfied. Taken together, Figures 11.4–11.7 have made it clear that in the case of the Netherlands, which serves here as a *pars pro toto*, ever fewer citizens have a lower or medium level of education and ever fewer citizens consider themselves as working class. At the same time, education and social class are clearly associated with attitudes towards democracy (external efficacy and satisfaction with democracy), with higher education and class leading to higher efficacy and higher satisfaction with democracy.¹⁹

11.6.4 Issue Positions

The next step is to assess the impact of the trends just outlined on people's positions on political issues—income differences and European integration—and the relationship of socio-economic status and positions on these issues as

well as the relation between these issue positions and attitudes towards democracy. The goal of this analysis is to test the causal mechanism by which globalization might affect the relation between socio-economic status and attitudes towards democracy, as outlined in Figure 11.2. We focus first on the relationships between socio-economic status (education and social class) and these issue positions over the 1994–2010 period, testing hypothesis 4, and then consider the relation between issue positions and attitudes towards democracy, testing hypothesis 5.

Table 11.4 shows the results for level of education. As a *reading example*, consider the penultimate column in Table 11.4. This column shows the proportion of respondents with issue positions in quadrant A as outlined in Table 11.1, i.e. those respondents who were in favour of demarcation on both the socio-economic and cultural dimensions. These issue positions are measured here as being both in favour of smaller income differences and less European integration. Of respondents with a lower–medium education in 1994, 13 per cent placed themselves in this quadrant. By 2010, this proportion had increased to 39 per cent (and it was even higher in 2006). Among the respondents with higher education, the percentage of respondents placing themselves in quadrant A also increased, but these percentages are much lower (11 to 23 per cent respectively), indicating a clear effect of education on these issue positions. Several other aspects of the results in Table 11.4 are worth noting. First, consider the relative sizes of the different groups of respondents over the five election years. The first column of Table 11.4 shows the group of respondents that take middle or don't know positions on one or both issues. This group appears to have shrunk, from 55.5 per cent in 1994 to 35.2 per cent in 2006, and then went up again somewhat in 2010. The underlying reason for this trend is that fewer respondents ended up in the middle or the 'don't know' category of the European unification issue. European unification provoked more people to take a for- or against-position in these years. In practice, this development favoured the camp against further integration. Again, the largest change can be found in quadrant A. Table 11.4 shows that the group of persons who want less integration and also smaller income differences grew from 13.0 per cent in 1994, to 39.0 per cent in 2006, and then decreased again to 29.8 per cent in 2010.²⁰ Citizens chose sides on European unification, and those who opposed larger income differences also tended to oppose further European integration. The other three groups show some changes in relative size, but much less.

A similar analysis has been conducted for social class self-image and the issue typology, and the results are shown in Table 11.5. The table can be read in the same way as Table 11.4. Again, the largest change appears to have occurred in the group of respondents in quadrant A, i.e. those who support smaller income differences and less European integration: the higher one's

Table 11.4. Level of education, and position on income differences and European integration

		Neutral or don't know	Larger differences, more integration D	Smaller differences, more integration C	Larger differences less integration B	Smaller differences, less integration A	N
1994	All	55.5	8.9	15.3	7.2	13.0	1,522
	Lower/medium education	58.0	7.6	14.0	7.1	13.3	1,227
	Higher education	45.4	14.6	20.7	7.8	11.5	295
1998	All	47.6	7.1	19.7	4.9	20.6	1,811
	Lower/medium education	44.4	7.0	17.7	5.7	25.2	968
	Higher education	51.2	7.2	22.1	4.0	15.4	843
2002	All	48.2	5.5	18.7	7.1	20.5	1,562
	Lower/medium education	47.9	4.0	16.7	6.6	24.8	580
	Higher education	48.4	6.3	20.0	7.4	17.9	982
2006	All	35.2	3.9	15.8	6.0	39.0	2,040
	Lower/medium education	31.4	4.8	18.7	5.5	49.8	656
	Higher education	38.2	4.8	18.7	6.4	31.9	1,384
2010	All	41.0	4.8	18.8	5.6	29.8	1,927
	Lower/medium education	38.3	3.0	14.8	4.4	39.5	608
	Higher education	43.4	5.8	21.0	6.2	23.7	1,319

subjective class, the smaller this group is and vice versa. Among respondents who identify themselves as working class the proportion supporting issue positions in this quadrant in 1994 is 15 per cent and increases over time to reach 41 per cent in 2010. Tables 11.4 and 11.5 thus show that the socio-economic position of citizens matters for how they think about political issues, confirming hypothesis 4. How are people's positions on these issues related to attitudes towards democracy?

Table 11.6 reports the percentages of respondents with a high level of external efficacy and satisfaction with democracy among the various groups defined on the basis of their position on the issues of income differences and European integration. For example, of the persons in quadrant A, i.e. those who preferred smaller income differences and less European integration in 1994, 37.7 per cent had a high score on the index of external efficacy. This compares with 59.8 per cent of persons with high external efficacy among those who prefer smaller income differences and more integration.

Table 11.5. Social class self-image, and position on income differences and European integration

		Neutral or don't know	Larger differences, more integration D	Smaller differences, more integration C	Larger differences less integration B	Smaller differences, less integration A	N
1994	All	55.6	9.1	15.3	7.1	12.8	1,480
	(Upper) working class	57.3	3.8	17.2	5.9	15.8	443
	Middle class	56.1	8.9	14.8	7.4	12.7	795
	Upper (middle) class	50.8	19.4	13.6	8.3	7.9	242
1998	All	47.4	7.1	19.7	5.0	20.8	1,786
	(Upper) working class	37.7	4.5	18.1	3.9	35.8	509
	Middle class	51.5	7.4	20.0	5.0	16.1	999
	Upper (middle) class	50.7	10.8	21.2	6.8	10.4	278
2002	All	47.2	5.4	19.1	7.3	20.9	1,505
	(Upper) working class	45.9	2.1	18.2	3.8	30.1	292
	Middle class	46.5	5.9	18.3	8.3	21.0	867
	Upper (middle) class	50.0	7.2	22.0	7.8	13.0	346
2006	All	35.0	3.8	16.0	6.1	39.1	2,123
	(Upper) working class	27.8	1.4	13.0	4.5	53.3	733
	Middle class	37.0	3.5	15.4	6.9	37.1	980
	Upper (middle) class	42.7	9.0	22.7	7.1	18.5	410
2010	All	41.0	4.8	18.8	5.6	29.8	1,927
	(Upper) working class	34.8	1.4	16.2	5.8	41.7	635
	Middle class	41.2	4.7	19.6	5.4	29.2	1,008
	Upper (middle) class	48.4	10.2	22.7	6.8	12.0	384

The patterns in Table 11.6 are clear. Citizens who think that European integration has already gone too far tend to feel less well represented, as measured by external efficacy, than the persons belonging to the other groups (with a single exception in 2002). This is regardless of whether they favour larger or smaller income differences. As for satisfaction with democracy, in 1998 it appears to be still uniformly high among all groups (with a low of 75.5 per cent among those who want smaller differences and less integration). In the more recent years (2002–10), however, it appears that satisfaction with democracy is markedly lower among persons who oppose further European integration. With some delay, satisfaction with democracy thus shows the same pattern as external efficacy. External efficacy and satisfaction with

Table 11.6 Position on income differences and European integration, and attitudes towards democracy

		Neutral or don't know	Larger differences, more integration D	Smaller differences, more integration C	Larger differences less integration B	Smaller differences, less integration A
High external efficacy	1994	50.5	67.2	59.8	38.5	37.7
	1998	54.6	49.6	69.5	47.2	41.7
	2002	49.6	46.5	64.5	33.3	33.3
	2006	59.5	79.3	66.6	48.1	44.8
	2010	60.5	64.0	65.0	44.9	37.2
High satisfaction with democracy	1998	87.0	90.2	89.9	90.9	75.5
	2002	51.4	56.0	54.6	28.3	34.5
	2006	81.6	86.0	86.1	67.7	67.3
	2010	77.9	84.5	82.9	60.2	62.8

democracy are highest among those who want further integration. While this partly confirms hypothesis 5, i.e. those with issue positions in quadrant A have less positive attitudes towards democracy, the relationship is weakened by the fact that citizens with issue positions in quadrant B share these attitudes.

So far we have been able to reconstruct in part the process that leads to lower satisfaction with democracy. It involves socio-economic changes, which affect issue positions on both socio-economic and cultural dimensions, which subsequently affect attitudes towards democracy. It appears to be especially the position on the cultural dimension, exemplified here by European integration, that is related to attitudes towards democracy.

11.7 Conclusion

This chapter aimed at assessing the validity of the claim that a new structural conflict dimension in the politics of industrialized democracies is gradually affecting the legitimacy of democracy among specific social-economic groups in these democracies. We have analysed this claim via three sets of analyses: cross-nationally using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, cross-nationally and longitudinally using the Eurobarometer, and longitudinally using the Dutch parliamentary election studies.

In the cross-national analysis based on CSES data we have assessed to what extent disadvantaged socio-economic positions go together with the feeling that one is not represented by any political party, and with dissatisfaction with democracy. With some notable exceptions, a large majority of

the percentage differences for the feeling of being represented in Table 11.2 point in the expected direction, confirming the negative effects hypothesis. Hence, in the majority of democracies in our sample, the positive effects hypothesis is refuted. Instead, it is those citizens on the margin of the economic order that feel less well represented and are less satisfied with democracy. However, it must be noted that the differences are generally not very large, indicating that socio-economic status is most likely only one of multiple factors explaining attitudes towards democracy. Moreover, we did not find evidence for a larger gap between citizens of different socio-economic backgrounds in majoritarian democracies than in consensus democracies. Furthermore, in the longitudinal analysis based on Eurobarometer data, we have shown that the gap between different social groups has not increased, as the globalization argument proposes (nor has it decreased, as the modernization thesis posits). Rather, class differences in attitudes towards democracy appear to follow similar fluctuations over time, and the gap between groups appears to fluctuate over time, rather than consistently increase or decrease.

In the analysis based on DPES data from the Netherlands we attempted to unpack the causal mechanism connecting globalization processes to attitudes towards democracy. We found that in the case of the Netherlands the level of education has clearly risen and self-identification as working class has become ever more rare. Higher education and social class are also associated with higher external efficacy, and—after 2002—also with satisfaction with democracy. This is in line with the negative effects hypothesis. The case of the Netherlands thus bears out the central expectations formulated in the first section of the chapter: those who are at the margins of the economic order: the less educated, the less skilled, and those with lower incomes have lower external efficacy and are relatively dissatisfied with the functioning of democracy. As regards the causal mechanism implied by the negative effects hypothesis and the globalization argument, the analysis of the Dutch case sought to demonstrate how socio-economic characteristics affect citizens' positions on old and new political issues, which subsequently affect attitudes towards democracy. Here, we found that indeed those at the margin of the economic order tend to increasingly favour 'demarcation' positions on both the socio-economic and the cultural dimension. Moreover, those issue positions appear to be also related to more negative attitudes towards democracy.

Finally, though we discussed a variety of relationships that seem to confirm our expectations, it must be noted that practically all of those relationships were weak to modest. We are observing tendencies, not molar causation (to borrow a term from Shadish, Cook and Campbell 2002: 10). Future analyses should seek to further examine the causal mechanisms connecting processes of globalization to attitudes towards democracy.

Appendix—A.11.1: Indicators and sample used

A. CSES

Table A.11.1. Construction of CSES social class indicators

Name		Employment status (B2010)	Occupation (B2011)	Group size
Self-employed farmers	1	≤ 3	61, 62, 92	33.66%
Other self-employed, non-professional	2	≤ 3	94	
Semi- or unskilled workers	3	≤ 3	81–84, 91, 93	
Skilled workers, foremen	4	≤ 3	51–53, 71–74	
Routine non-manual workers (white collar)	5	≤ 3	41–43	
Managers and other professionals in socio-administrative occupation	6	≤ 3	1, 11–13	21.30%
Professional with technical expertise	7	≤ 3	21, 22, 24, 31, 32, 34	
Social-cultural specialists	8	≤ 3	23, 33	
Not in labour force	9	> 3 & < 11	–	45.04%

Note: * For the purpose of the analyses in Tables 2 and 3, these more fine-grained indicators of social class were regrouped into lower social class (1–5), higher social class (6–8), and not in the labour force (9).

Table A.11.2. Construction of CSES socio-economic status indicator

Name		Education (B2003)	Income (B2020)	Group size
Low status	1	Secondary, or lower	Lowest two quintiles	32.89%
Medium status	2	(all other respondents)		48.03%
High status	3	Post-secondary, or higher	Highest two quintiles	19.07%

Table A.11.3. CSES Module 2 elections included in the analyses

Country	Year	Country	Year
<i>High income economies</i>		<i>Middle and low income economies</i>	
<i>Consensus democracies</i>		<i>Consensus democracies</i>	
Belgium	2003	Brazil	2002
Czech Republic	2002	Romania	2004
Denmark	2001		
Finland	2003	<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>	
Israel	2003	Albania	2005
Italy	2006	Bulgaria	2001
Japan	2004	Chile	2005
Netherlands	2002	Mexico	2003
Norway	2001	Peru	2006
Poland	2001	Philippines	2004
Slovenia	2004	Russia	2004
Sweden	2002		
Switzerland	2003		

(Continued)

Table A.11.3. (Continued)

Country	Year	Country	Year
<i>High income economies</i>		<i>Middle and low income economies</i>	
<i>Majoritarian democracies</i>			
Australia	2004		
Canada	2004		
France	2002		
Germany	2002		
Great Britain	2005		
Hungary	2002		
Iceland	2003		
Ireland	2002		
New Zealand	2002		
Portugal	2002		
Portugal	2005		
South Korea	2004		
Spain	2004		
Taiwan	2001		
Taiwan	2004		
United States	2004		
<i>Not classified</i>			
Hong Kong	2004		

Source: Two-dimensional factor solution Bernauer et al., executive-parties dimension. Scores below 0 were coded as majoritarian and scores above 0 as consensus. Classification of economies into high income economies and middle and lower income economies based on the World Bank classification by GNI per capita 2011 (see: <<http://data.world-bank.org/about/country-classifications>>).

Table B.11.1. Eurobarometer education indicator

Name	Education in years		Proportion of respondents
Low education	1	Up to 14 years	24.93%
Medium education	2	15–19 years	44.79%
High education	3	20 or more years, still studying	30.28%

B. Eurobarometer

Table B.11.2. Eurobarometer sample: countries and time period included

Country	Time period
France	1973–2010
Belgium	1973–2010
The Netherlands	1973–2010
Germany (West & East)	1973–2010
Italy	1973–2010
Luxembourg	1973–2010
Denmark	1973–2010
Ireland	1973–2010
United Kingdom (Great Britain & Northern Ireland)	1973–2010

C. DPES

Table C.11.1 Indicator for ‘feelings of representation’ in DPES

Feelings of representation have been measured in DPES by the external efficacy index, an index consisting of three survey questions. The external efficacy score is calculated by a count of the number of ‘not true’ answers to the following questions:

- Members of parliament do not care about the opinions of people like me.
- Political parties are only interested in my vote and not in my opinion.
- People like me have no influence on governmental policy

Citizens with scores of 2 or higher are considered to have high external efficacy.

Notes

1. See also Kitschelt (1994) and Flanagan and Lee (2003).
2. See for the same argument van der Brug (2004) and Van der Brug and Van Spanje (2009).
3. A third reason may be that the composition of electorates in advanced industrial democracies has changed, and the lower-educated now constitute a much smaller proportion of the population. This might further increase their sense of marginalization.
4. What speaks against this expectation, though, is that one of the defining characteristics of populist parties is that they are anti-system parties agitating against the established political parties and therefore encourage rather than accommodate negative feelings toward the political institutions and its main actors. As a consequence even in those countries where populist parties have been successful in gaining representation the losers of globalization might still feel estranged from the system of representative democracy.
5. Note that in order to make plausible that it is globalization processes that affect political support, the gap between high and low educated should be *increasing* over time; if the gap is static it reflects class differences in political support that are stable over time.
6. Moreover, note that the causal link between issue positions and feelings of representation might run in the opposite direction as well. For example, feelings of not being well represented may drive demarcation issue positions such as Euroscepticism and anti-immigrant positions.
7. The final, 2007 version of CSES Module 2 is used, which can be obtained from <<http://www.cses.org>>.
8. An integrated data set for the 1971–2006 Dutch elections is available from Data Archiving and Networking Services (DANS—<<http://www.dans.knaw.nl>>), and documented in Todosijevic, Aarts and van der Kaap (2010). The 2010 DPES data are available from DANS as well. Data have been weighted with a structurally identical model over the various studies, including voting behaviour.

9. ISCO stands for International Standard Classification of Occupations and was developed by the International Labor Organization ILO. Refer to <<http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/index.htm>>, accessed 4 November 2012.
10. In order to measure the vertical dimension of social class, a third variable contained in the CSES, socio-economic status, could be used, as it distinguishes between white- and blue-collar workers, farmers and self-employed persons. However, since the combination of occupation and social class resulted in many missing cases (as not all relevant information is available for all countries), we rely only on the main occupation of the respondent and do not use socio-economic status. This is acceptable since the horizontal distinctions of social class are likely to be more relevant to test the effects of globalization.
11. Social class, education, and income are multidimensional; each indicator contains distinct information about a person's socio-economic status. To be sure, there is a medium-to-strong positive correlation between education and income, but the correlation of both education and income with the respondent's social class (which here refers to his status on the labour market) is low or even absent. This means that social class, education, and income cannot simply be added to form a single composite measure of socio-economic status. Instead, we use the two distinct measures of socio-economic status separately: one that is based on the respondent's type of employment, and one that is based on the combined measurement of education and income.
12. This data set is described in Hakhverdian et al., forthcoming.
13. Only in the election studies of 1989 and 1994, this basic dichotomy is deceptive, since in those studies a different coding scheme has been used. Therefore, in describing the trend in educational level in the Netherlands we decided to drop 1989 and 1994. For explanatory purposes, the deviant coding schemes in 1989 and 1994 do not pose serious problems, and the 1989 and 1994 studies have consequently been adopted in bivariate analyses.
14. More precisely, considering social class, we find positive differences in 25 out of 28 democracies, i.e. those with higher social class are more likely to feel represented by a political party. However, the differences are small and only in seven out of 28 democracies was the bivariate regression of social class on feeling represented positive and significant. Considering the combined education/income indicator, we find positive differences in 31 out of 38 democracies, i.e. those with higher education and income are more likely to feel represented by a political party. The differences appear larger than with social status, and in 17 of 28 democracies the effect of combined education/income is positive and significant in a bivariate regression predicting feelings of representation.
15. More precisely, considering social class, we find positive differences in 21 out of 29 democracies, i.e. higher social status respondents were more satisfied with democracy in those countries. In ten of 29 cases, a bivariate regression of social status on satisfaction with democracy demonstrated a positive and significant coefficient. However, there were also eight countries with negative differences (most notably, the USA), and some of those were also significant. Turning to education, we find positive differences in 18 out of 28 democracies, 16 of which are significant.

16. The Dutch election studies data cover varying time periods. For some variables, the full 1971–2010 period is available, for other variables the period is shorter.
17. Although the data have been weighted before the analysis, the relatively low percentage of (upper) working class respondents in 2002, 2003, and perhaps even earlier, may at least partly be attributed to selective non-response. The response rates in the Dutch election studies had markedly deteriorated after the mid-1980s, to recover only in 2006 as a result of a set of measures aimed at improving response quality.
18. Note that the changing composition of the Dutch electorate in terms of socio-economic groups as demonstrated in Figures 11.4 and 11.5 might nevertheless affect the overall level of attitudes towards democracy. While group differences are rather stable, the size of the group with lower socio-economic status has declined over time, contributing to an aggregate slight increase in levels of political support.
19. Note that the findings for satisfaction with democracy need to be interpreted with some caution because the time series is relatively short. It seems that education and social class had a hardly noticeable impact on people's satisfaction with democracy between 1998 and 2002. The Eurobarometer data for the Netherlands appear to indicate that the narrow gap between 1998 and 2002 was temporary, however. After 2002, indeed, satisfaction with democracy appears to follow a similar pattern as external efficacy: the well-educated and the higher classes tend to be more often satisfied with democracy than the less well educated and the lower classes.
20. The peak in 2006 is probably due to the heated discussion around the referendum on the European Constitutional Treaty in 2005 when 60 per cent of the Dutch voters voted against the treaty.