

# INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON GAME THEORY

Organized by Sylvain Sorin

July 13 to July 17, 1992

Stony Brook, New York

## PROGRAM

### MONDAY, JULY 13

*Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Joachim Rosenmüller*

9:30- **S. Hart:** Polite Talk

10:45

11:00- **C. Harris:** Equilibria in Extensive Form Games

12:15

*Information -- Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair: John Hillas; Organizer: Beth Allen*

2:00- **B. Allen:** Cooperative Game and Full Implementation with Asymmetric Information

2:45

2:50- **S. Morris:** Revising Knowledge and Beliefs: A Decision Theoretic Approach

3:35

4:00- **S. Muto and M. Nakayama:** The Resale-Proof Trade of Information as a Stable Standard  
of Behavior: An Application of the Theory of Social Situations

4:45

*Equilibria -- Harriman Hall, Room 108*

*Chair and Organizer: Jean-François Mertens*

2:00- **W. Leininger:** Hotelling's Location Game Revisited

2:45

2:50- **C.-Z. Qin:** On a Potential Game for Endogenous Formation of Cooperations Structures

3:35

4:00- **L. Zhou:** The Set of Nash Equilibria of a Supermodular Game is a Complete Lattice

4:45

### TUESDAY, JULY 14

*Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Lloyd Shapley*

- 9:30- **D. Abreu:** Implementation Theory: A Selective Survey of Recent Results  
10:45
- 11:00- **A. Maitra and W. Sudderth:** Stochastic Games with Limsup Payoffs  
12:15

*Two-Sided Matching -- Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Dilip Abreu; Organizer: Marilda Sotomayor*

- 2:00- **A. Roth:** First Jobs and College Bowl Bids: Problems and Pathologies in the Timing of  
2:45 Market Transactions
- 2:50- **M. Sotomayor:** Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided  
3:35 Matching -- A Unified Treatment
- 4:00- **S. Barberà and J. Alcade:** Strategic Aspects in Matching Games  
4:45

*Learning and Renegotiation -- Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair and Organizer: Sylvain Sorin*

- 2:00- **E. Lehrer and E. Kalai:** Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games  
2:45
- 2:50- **V. Krishna:** Learning in Games with Strategic Complementarities  
3:35
- 4:00- **E. Einy and B. Peleg:** Coalition-Proof Correlated Equilibria  
4:45

## WEDNESDAY, JULY 15

### Contributed Papers

*Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Beth Allen*

- 9:30- **C. d'Aspremont:** Moral Hazard in Risk-Neutral Teams  
10:00
- 10:05- **A. Okada:** Noncooperative Bargaining and the Core of an N-person Characteristic  
10:35 Function Game
- 10:55- **G. Chichilnisky:** Markets, Arbitrage and Social Choices  
11:25
- 11:30- **E. Winter and M. Wooders:** An Axiomatization of the Core for Finite and Continuum  
12:00 Games

*Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair: Ehud Kalai*

- 9:30- **J. Bergin and A. Sen:** Extensive Form Implementation in Incomplete Information  
10:00 Environments
- 10:05- **J. Abdou:** Solvability of Game Forms -- The Infinite Case  
10:35
- 10:55- **N. Schofield:** Probability and Convergence for Supra-Majority Rule with Euclidean  
11:25 Preferences
- 11:30- **R. Gilles and G. Owen:** Games with Permission Structures: The Disjunctive Approach  
12:00

*Harriman Hall, Room 108*

*Chair: Michael Maschler*

- 9:30- **S. Pechersky**: Core in Superlinear Fuzzy Games -- Axiomatic Approach  
10:00  
10:05- **A. Nowak and T. Radzik**: On Axiomatizations of the Weighted Shapley Values  
10:35  
10:55- **J. Hirshleifer and J. Martinez-Coll**: Selection, Mutation and the Preservation of  
11:25 Diversity in Evolutionary Games  
11:30- **J. Koza**: Genetic Evolution and Co-Evolution of Game Strategies  
12:00

*Harriman Hall, Room 108*

*Chair: Ehud Lehrer*

- 2:00- **S. Govindan**: A Backward Induction Property of Stable Equilibria  
2:20  
2:25- **O. Gossner**: Folk Theorems with Mixed Strategies  
2:45  
2:50- **J. Ma**: Noncooperative Foundation of Strict Core in an Economy with Indivisibility  
3:10

*Chair: Joseph Abdou*

- 3:30- **A. Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens**: Relative Utilitarianism  
3:50  
3:55- **J.-M. Coulomb**: Stochastic Games with Absorbing States and no Signals  
4:15  
4:20- **M. Kaneko and J. Kline**: Behavior Strategies, Mixed Strategies, and Perfect Recall: Part  
4:40 I

*Chair: Jean-François Mertens*

- 5:00- **D. Balkenborg**: The Notion of a Strict Outcome Path and Repeated Games with Common  
5:20 Interest  
5:25- **A. Blume**: Equilibrium Refinement in Sender-Receiver Games: An Application of  
5:45 Persistence  
5:50- **R. van den Brink and R. Gilles**: Axiomatizations of the Conjunctive Permission Value  
6:10 for Games with Permission Structures

*Physics, Room P 126*

*Chair: Christopher Harris*

- 2:00- **P. Coughlin**: Concave-Convex Candidate Payoff Functions  
2:20  
2:25- **D. Housman**: Values for Partially Defined Games  
2:45  
2:50- **A. Schotter**: An Experimental Study of Learning in One- and Multi-Person Decision  
3:10 Problems

*Chair: Ezra Einy*

- 3:30- **H. Chin**: Advisory Group Games Based on Common Knowledge Using Evidential  
3:50 Reasoning

- 3:55- **A. Taylor and W. Zwicker:** Quasi-Weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in  
4:15 Simple Games (I)
- 4:20- **A. Taylor and W. Zwicker:** Quasi-Weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in  
4:40 Simple Games (II)

*Chair: Abraham Neyman*

- 5:00- **T. E. Armstrong:** Generalized Values  
5:20
- 5:25- **J. M. Esteban and J. Sakovics:** Intertemporal Transfer Institutions  
5:45
- 5:50- **T. Driessen:** Relationships Between Bankruptcy Games and Minimum Cost Spanning  
6:10 Tree Games

*Physics, Room P 128*

*Chair: Claude d'Aspremont*

- 2:00- **K. Nehring:** Rational Decision with Vague Beliefs  
2:20
- 2:25- **G. Bonnano:** Set-Theoretic Equivalence of Extensive-Form Games  
2:45
- 2:50- **C.-L. Yang:** Cooperation by Credible Threats: On Social Cost of Transfer Contest under  
3:10 Uncertainty

*Chair: Andrzej Nowak*

- 3:30- **I. Dragan:** Multiweighted Shapley Values and Random Order Values  
3:50
- 3:55- **H. Haller:** Collusion Properties of Values  
4:15
- 4:20- **C. Chang:** The Bound of the Kernel  
4:40

*Chair: Pradeep Dubey*

- 5:00- **F. Bloch:** Sequential Formation of Coalitions with Fixed Payoff Division  
5:20
- 5:25- **M. Shubik and D. Tsomokos:** A Strategic Market Game with a Mutual Bank with  
5:45 Fractional Reserves and Redemption in Gold (A Continuum of Traders)
- 5:50- **T. Radzik and A. Wieczorek:** Measuring Initiative and Attraction by Means of  
6:10 Deviations from the Shapley Value

*Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair: Marilda Sotomayor*

- 2:00- **S. Li:** A Unified Framework for Implementation, Revelation Principle, and Optimal  
2:20 Approximation
- 2:25- **T. Quint and L. Quintas:** The Shapley Value of Resale-Proof Trade  
2:45
- 2:50- **T. Solymosi:** A Two-Phase Method for Finding the Nucleolus of Assignment Games  
3:10

*Chair: Robert Anderson*

- 3:30- **W. Guth and K. Ritzberger:** On Durable Good Monopolies and the (Anti) Coase  
3:50 Conjecture
- 3:55- **C.-P. Fan:** Strategic Information Revelation in Duopoly Market Games  
4:15
- 4:20- **E. Hendon, B. Sloth, and T. Tranaes:** Tie Stable Equilibria -- Threats and Promises in  
4:40 Strategic Form Games

*Chair: Yair Tauman*

- 5:00- **B. Chakravorti, L.C. Corchon, and S. Wilkie:** Credible Implementation  
5:20
- 5:25- **A. Manelli and D. R. Vincent:** Optimal Procurement Mechanisms  
5:45

## THURSDAY, JULY 16

*Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Robert Aumann*

### In Honor of Olga Bondareva

- 9:30- **L. Shapley:** The Structure of Authority in Organization  
10:45
- 11:00- **J. Rosenmüller:** Equivalence Theorems via Nondegeneracy  
12:15

*Cooperative Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair and Organizer: Yair Tauman*

- 2:00- **A. Sobolev:** The Nucleolus of Cooperative Game with Arbitrary Bounds of Individual  
2:45 Rationality
- 2:50- **R. McLean and W. Sharkey:** A Game Theoretic Approach to the Internal Pricing of  
3:35 Computer Resources
- 4:00- **M. Maschler:** Application of the Reduced Game Property to Networks, Flows and  
4:45 General Linear Production Game

*Incomplete Markets -- Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair and Organizer: Pradeep Dubey*

- 2:00- **D. Cass:** Some Further Results on Sunspots with Incomplete Financial Markets  
2:45
- 2:50- **J. Geanakoplos:** Monetary Equilibrium with Incomplete Markets  
3:35
- 4:00- **P. Siconolfi:** Incomplete Asset Market and the Information Revealed by Prices  
4:45

## FRIDAY, JULY 17

*Harriman Hall, Room 137*

*Chair: Sergiu Hart*

9:30- **D. Levine:** Discounted Repeated Games with Signals

10:45

11:00- **A. Dhillon and J.-F. Mertens:** Perfect Correlated Equilibria

12:15

*Game Theory and General Equilibrium Theory --*

*Harriman Hall, Room 104*

*Chair: Myrna Wooder, Organizer: Robert Anderson*

2:00- **L. Zhou:** Consistent Solutions in Atomless Economies

2:45

2:45- **C. Shannon:** Increasing Returns in Infinite Horizon Economies

3:30

3:45- **M. Shubik:** An Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Game with a Continuum of Traders:  
4:30 Trade with and without Banking

4:30- **R. Anderson:** An Example of a Non-Converging Bargaining Set

5:15

*Repeated Games -- Harriman Hall, Room 108*

*Chair and Organizer: Abraham Neyman*

2:00- **E. Lehrer:** Repeated Games with Partial Monitoring

2:45

2:50- **A. Nowak:** Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games -- A Survey

3:35

4:00- **N. Vieille:** Equilibria in Stochastic Games

4:45