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Abstract

In this paper we distinguish two rival theories on the relationship between European citizenship in the sense of a legal construct on the one hand and a European collective identity on the other hand. According to the first theory a collective identity is a necessary condition for the development of a legitimate European political community. The second theory claims that there is indeed an empirical relationship between these two concepts, but the causal sequence is not necessarily unidirectional. Once a political community is established it can breed a sense of community. In this paper we test the hypothesis that formal citizenship breeds both a sense of European citizenship and a sense of European community. Our analyses do not offer firm evidence in support of the hypothesis in either case. The time of entry of the Union rather than the length of membership as such explains differences in the sense of European citizenship. A similar conclusion applies to the development of a sense of European community. Trust in the people from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe among the citizens of the older member states is very low. The 2004 enlargement therefore meant a serious blow to the development of a European community.

Keywords

Legitimacy, European identity, European citizenship, European Union politics

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1. Introduction

In 2004 the European Union was enlarged with ten new member states, eight of them previous communist states in Central and Eastern Europe. This enlargement was without precedent in the history of the Union and its predecessors. It is still to be seen to what extent the institutions as well as the citizens of the Union are able to cope with the consequences of this operation. The referenda on the draft constitutional treaty in France and the Netherlands in 2005 suggested that people across Europe were having their misgivings, not only about an ever closer Union but equally about an ever larger Union.

This paper is part of a larger project trying to assess the effect of the 2004 enlargement on the legitimacy of the European Union¹. In this project we try to assess the effect of the 2004 enlargement of the Union on its legitimacy. In our conceptualization of legitimacy we follow Beetham and Lord (1998; see also (Lord 2004) who distinguish two key normative principles of liberal democracy, *popular sovereignty* and *the proper ends and standards of government*. The first principle refers to the main components of the concept of democracy, *demos* and *kratos*. It assumes that the only source of political authority lies with the people. This belief that the people constitute the ultimate source of political authority makes the question 'who constitutes the people' one of the most fundamental aspects or dimensions of legitimacy, and makes issues of political citizenship and identity equally crucial for political legitimacy (Beetham and Lord 1998: 6). Therefore, in order to study the legitimacy of the European Union we should first clarify what we mean with a European *demos* and *European identity*. This is the first dimension of legitimacy we take into consideration in our study.

In addition to the *demos*, popular sovereignty also refers to the question of what it means for the people to rule. Since modern democracy is nearly identical with representative democracy, this aspect of popular sovereignty refers to the electoral authorisation of government and stipulates the requirements of *representation and accountability* (Beetham and Lord 1998: 6). In order to understand what democracy in a specific context means, we need to specify the mechanisms of representation and accountability that are needed within a given polity with a given *demos*. This we refer to as the second dimension of legitimacy.

The second principle of liberal democracy, 'the proper ends and standards of government', can be summarised in its most classic form as the protection of the Lockean rights (life, liberty and property), complemented more recently with welfare rights and securing the conditions for economic growth (Beetham and Lord 1998: 4-6). This principle yields criteria to judge the third dimension of legitimacy, the *performance* of government.

Summarising, from the main principles of liberal democracy three dimensions of legitimacy can be deduced - *identity, representation and accountability, and performance*. These three dimensions are reflected in most normative theories of

¹ See Jacques Thomassen (ed.), *The legitimacy of the European Union after enlargement*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.

democracy. The most concise summary is Abraham Lincoln's famous triad requiring government *of, by* and *for* the people.

In this paper we try to assess the effect of the 2004 enlargement on the legitimacy of the European Union with regard to the dimension of identity only. For this purpose we should first clarify what we mean by a European demos and a European identity. It is beyond dispute that the very idea of democracy, and of people's sovereignty, presupposes the existence of a people, a *demos*. What is disputed is what 'the people' really means. A basic issue is whether 'the people' is a more or less legal construct, in the sense of all people who are subject to the jurisdiction of a particular polity, or whether the notion of 'the people' is based on a more sociological, or even ethnic concept, which stresses the subjective affiliation of the people with a community as a prerequisite for the constitution of a *demos* as a collective actor. These different interpretations lead to different conclusions with regard to the feasibility of European democracy and possibly to different conclusions with regard to the effects of the 2004 enlargement.

In the next section we present a short summary of this debate. We make a distinction between people's identification with a political community or *sense of citizenship* and their *sense of communal identity*. The latter might enhance the former but the two concepts are not identical. In section three we develop an operationalization of these two concepts and discuss some potential problems with answering our research question. In section four we present an analysis of the degree to which people across the European Union have developed an identification both with the European Union as a political community and with the Union as a social community, focusing on the effect of the 2004 enlargement on this development.

2. European identity and European citizenship

Different views on the feasibility of a legitimate democratic system at the level of the European Union are partly due to different historical views on the relationship between citizenship and nationhood. According to nineteenth century German philosophers like Fichte and Herder (Bruter 2003) nations are based on a common culture, in particular a common language. Part of the literature on the feasibility of a legitimate European democratic political system reflects the view that the establishment of a legitimate democracy requires the pre-existence of a collective identity. According to Graf Kielmansegg (1993) e.g. the concepts of *demos* ('*Volk*'), community ('*Gemeinschaft*') and nation are almost identical. Once one accepts this view, the verdict on the feasibility of a European democracy is obvious. A democratic constitution in itself cannot establish a legitimate European democracy. As long as there is no European community, every attempt to establish a democratic Europe is bound to fail. The European Union is far from being a community with a common identity. The European people do not share a common language; they lack memories of a common history that might help to develop a collective identity; and they do not take part in a common 'European' public sphere ('*Oeffentlichkeit*', Kielmansegg 1993). In a similar vein Scharpf (1999) argues that the democratic principle of majority rule will only be accepted in polities with a 'thick'

collective identity, i.e. in polities based on pre-existing commonalities of history, language, culture, and ethnicity. Because such a collective identity does not exist at the level of the Union, input-oriented legitimacy is out of reach for the EU for the foreseeable future:

Given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic and institutional diversity of its member states, there is no question that the Union is very far from having achieved the 'thick' collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national democracies -- and in its absence, institutional reforms will not greatly increase the input-oriented legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule (Scharpf 1999).

According to this view, input oriented legitimacy requires a pre-existing collective identity. This same philosophy is reflected in the famous decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court on the compatibility of the Maastricht Treaty with the German Basic Law (BVerfGE 89, 155 – Maastricht). According to this decision, as no European *demos* has developed yet, democracy cannot be exclusively grounded at the European level (Shaw 1997: 35).

However, the argument that a *demos* and *citizenship* require the pre-existence of a community with a collective or national identity is anything but generally accepted. An alternative view allows for the possibility that European citizenship need not be the political projection of a collective European identity, but can essentially be regarded as a purely legal construct: 'Citizenship should be the ultimate basis of legitimation for institution-building, not ambiguous cultural identities' (Delanty 1995: 163). This seems to be consistent with the history of many nation states. The argument that a shared common identity, a *demos* in the ethno-cultural sense, should precede the constitution of a *demos*, in the sense of a community of citizens sharing the rights and duties of citizenship, has little ground in history. In many European countries the formation of the state preceded the development of the nation (Fuchs 2000: 230).

This view is shared by David Easton. First, he makes a clear distinction between a *sense of social community* and a *sense of political community*. The sense of *social community* is an indication of the cohesiveness of *society*. The sense of *political community* 'indicates political cohesion of a group of persons [] the feeling of belonging together as a group which, because it shares a political structure, also shares a political fate.' (Easton 1965: 185). But in Easton's view even a sense of political community is not a prerequisite for a feasible political system.

[...] this approach does not compel us to postulate that before a political system can exist or even if it is to persist, a sense of political community must first rise to some specified level. Although we may adopt the degree of mutual identification as one kind of measure of the input of support for the political community, it is conceivable that for considerable periods of time, the sense of political community may be low or non-existent. [] It is possible for a political structure to bind a group together before feelings of mutual identification have emerged. We may go further. Frequently the imposition of a common division of political labor has itself made possible the slow growth of sentiments of political solidarity; this reverses normal expectations of the significance of sentiments of solidarity as a pre-condition for the emergence of a political community. A political

community may precede and become a condition for the growth of a sense of community (Easton 1965: 185-6).

While this view explicitly accepts the reciprocal reinforcement of ideas of community and the practice of citizenship, it reverses the causal sequence. In line with this view one may well argue that the constitution of a European democratic polity and the establishment of a European citizenship by the Maastricht Treaty ('Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union' (Article 8.1)), is a prerequisite for the development of a European identity. To borrow a phrase from O'Leary: European citizenship may be regarded as an 'evolving concept': starting from the free movement of persons, through its legal formalisation, to a full-fledged identity (O'Leary 1996).

However, the argument that the *demos* need not be defined in terms of an exclusive identification of the people with a cultural or social community, does not imply that there is no empirical relationship between the two, or that this relationship would be unidirectional. It is generally recognised that the feasibility and stability of a democratic political system are related to its political culture. Notwithstanding a formal definition of a *demos*, a democratic community undoubtedly benefits from citizens identifying themselves with the *demos* as a collective entity and with other members of this *demos* (Fuchs 2000: 219). But the essential thing is that the identification with a European *political* community is not the same thing and might take priority over a cultural identification with a European collective community (Habermas 1994).

Different positions taken in this essentially normative debate can have far reaching implications for the further process of European integration as the verdict of the German Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Maastricht proves. However, the two different views on the meaning of a European *demos* and their mutual relationship have empirical implications as well. The main empirical component of this debate refers to the relationship between the sense of community and the sense of citizenship, and in particular to the causal sequence of this relationship. Does the development of a sense of citizenship depend on the pre-existence of a sense of community, or can it develop despite a lack of a sense of community and can it in turn be instrumental in the development of feelings of community? In this paper we try to answer these questions empirically and we now turn to discussing our data and methods.

3. Conceptualizations, operationalizations and methods

Conceptualizations

The argument in the previous section implies that social, cultural or national identity should conceptually be clearly distinguished from the concept of citizenship. McCrone and Kiely define the difference as follows: 'nationality and citizenship actually belong to different spheres of meaning and activity. The former is in essence a cultural concept which binds people on the basis of shared identity – in Benedict Anderson's apt phrase as an 'imagined community' – while citizenship is a political concept deriving from

people's relationship to the state. In other words, nation-ness and state-ness need not be, and increasingly are not, aligned (McCrone and Kiely 2000: 25). Citizenship is usually conceptualised as a package of rights and duties bestowed on individuals by the state. T.H. Marshall described citizenship as 'a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to rights and duties with which the status is endowed' (Marshall 1950).

In a more or less similar wayⁱ, Bruter makes a distinction between the *civic* and *cultural* component of a European political identity. The European *civic identity* of people can be understood as the degree to which they see themselves as citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life, whereas *cultural identity* refers to citizens' identification with their political system as an institutional frame, that is, their state. Civic identifiers will identify with European integration as a political project whether or not they feel a sense of commonality *a priori* with the citizens of the Union. In Bruter's conceptual framework the 'European cultural identity of citizens is best described as individuals' perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans. That means that cultural identity refers to their identification with their political community as a human group, regardless of the nature of the political system.' (Bruter 2003: 155-6).

In our conceptualisation of the *sense of citizenship*, we try to stay as close as possible to Marshall's definition. In our view, the concept of European citizenship implies that European citizens are prepared to accept that all citizens of the (enlarged) Union are entitled to all rights that come with the citizenship of the Union. Examples of these rights are the rights of free movement and residence, voting rights in municipal elections, diplomatic protection and the right of appeal to EU-institutions. The willingness of citizens across the Union to accept these rights as applying equally to the citizens of each and every member state, is a first indicator of a sense of European citizenship. A second indicator of European citizenship is the extent to which people *consider* themselves as citizens of the European Union, in addition to, not necessarily instead of, considering themselves as citizens of their country. Our indicator of the cultural or social component of identity is based on the *sense of community* as originally developed by Deutsch et al. It is defined as 'a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of 'we-feeling', trust and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behaviour, and of cooperative action in accordance with it' (Deutsch et al. 1957; Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1995; Sinnott 1995)

Operationalizations

In the European Election Study 2004ⁱⁱ, which was conducted in 24 of the 25 member states immediately after the elections for the European Parliament in June 2004, a number of questions were included asking to what extent people across Europe are willing to accept citizens from other EU-countries as fellow European citizens, entitled to all the rights coming with European citizenship. In this paper we analyze three statements about citizenship rights, all asking on a four-point scale (strongly agree to strongly disagree), whether the respondent agrees with the statement: 'Please indicate

how strongly you agree or disagree with the following three statements. When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to [COUNTRY] people over citizens from other EU-member-countries who want to work here.’, ‘Citizens from other EU member-countries who live in [COUNTRY] should be entitled to vote in local elections.’, ‘Citizens from other EU member-countries who live in [COUNTRY] should not be entitled to social security or unemployment benefits.’

To measure the respondents’ sense of European citizenship we make use of two questions in the EES survey. First, we use the question, ‘Do you ever think of yourself not only as an [COUNTRY] citizen, but also as a citizen of the European Union?’. Here the response categories are, ‘often’, ‘sometimes’, and ‘never’. Second, we use the question, ‘Are you personally proud or not to be a citizen of the European Union?, where the response categories are, ‘very proud’, ‘fairly proud’, ‘not very proud’, and ‘not at all proud’.

The ‘sense of community’ as introduced by Deutsch has several components. Because of the limited space in the EES questionnaire the operationalization had to be limited to only one of these components, mutual trust. This is an important component as it can be considered as a measurement of European social capital. This aspect of the sense of community is measured by the following question: ‘Now I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in people from various countries. Let’s start with the Austrians: do you trust them a lot or not very much? And the Belgians?’ This question was then repeated for the people of 28 countries in total, including the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the Turks, in addition to the people of the then 25 member states.

Methodological considerations

As mentioned above, the main empirical component of the debate on European identity and citizenship summarized in section 2 refers to the causal sequence of the relationship between the sense of community and the sense of citizenship. Establishing the causal sequence between these two phenomena is not easy. At a single point in time we can establish the correlation between them, but we can never give a definite answer to the question of the direction of causality. Even the access to panel data would not solve the problem. Feelings of citizenship can be assumed to belong to the category of basic attitudes that will not easily change during people’s life time. Basic attitudes and values are mainly developed during people’s adolescence and tend to be persistent during their lifetime (see a.o. Inglehart 1977). As far as changes at the level of society as a whole occur, they are most likely due to generation replacement. The assessment of such a process requires the availability of comparable data over a long period of time. As we will see that requirement is met – at least to some extent - for one of the variables in the equation, the sense of European citizenship, but not for the sense of community.

What we can do is test the validity of the argument on one side of the debate: the question of to what extent formal European citizenship breeds both feelings of citizenship and a sense of community. There are two ways of doing this. Where a longer time series on feelings of citizenship is available, we can test the hypothesis that

feelings of citizenship will gradually increase with the length of membership. Of course, such a longer time series is only available for older member states. In case only cross-sectional data are available, a positive relationship between the length of membership of a country and the feelings of citizenship and community of its citizens can be interpreted as evidence in support of the hypothesis. The more specific question we address is to what extent the 2004 enlargement had an effect on the development of feelings of European citizenship and community. Such an effect might occur either because the enlargement had an effect on these feelings among the citizens of the older member states and/or because the citizens of the new members states had different feelings than their counterparts in the older member states. In the next section we empirically assess to what extent membership does indeed breed feelings of citizenship and a sense of community, as indicated by feelings of mutual trust.

4. An empirical analysis of citizenship and trust

Sense of citizenship

Above, two sets of survey questions on citizenship were introduced, three on people's recognition of the citizen rights of their fellow European citizens, and two on people's self orientation as a European citizen. In order to see to what extent the conceptual difference between these two sets of attitudes is corresponding with the way people's attitudes are constrained in reality, we first computed the correlations between these items and then explored their scalability. The correlation coefficients are presented in table 1. The mutual correlations between the three items on citizen rights are quite low, ranging between .16 and .20. Not surprisingly, the scalability of the items is also low.ⁱⁱⁱ The correlation between the two self-orientations is much higher (.56). Because of the low mutual correlations between the first set of items we do not attempt to scale them. Instead we present our findings for each item separately.

Table 1 Correlations between items on citizenship

Q17: Employment – priority to citizens of [country]				
Q18: Citizens of EU countries entitled to vote in local elections	-.17			
Q19: Citizens of EU countries entitled to social benefits	.19	-.20		
Q23: Not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen	-.21	.19	-.14	
Q24: Proud of EU citizenship	-.16	.20	-.13	.56
	Q17	Q18	Q19	Q23

Note: All coefficients are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

In table 2 a simple descriptive analysis of the variables on citizenship is presented per country. For this purpose the five variables were dichotomised; and here only the pro-European answers are presented. The countries are grouped in order of their admission. A summary measure for each group of countries is also presented.

The percentages in the first column of table 2 leave little doubt about people's attitudes towards a free labour market. In all member states, but Germany and Denmark, a majority is against it – in some countries this majority is even close to a 100%. There is a clear difference though between the older member states in North-western Europe and the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe. All six founding member states are among the ten most liberal countries of the enlarged Union. Therefore, it is tempting to attribute this difference to the longer process of socialisation into the idea of a European political community that the people of these countries have been subjected to. However, since Austria, Britain, Denmark and Sweden are also part of this group of ten, this interpretation is disputable. The more positive attitudes in these countries might just as well be due to a longer tradition in liberal democracy with its self-evident value of equality for all citizens. But an equally plausible explanation is that the differences are due to differences in economic development.

Table 2 Attitudes on European citizenship (% pro-European)

Country	European Citizenship				
	Labour market	Elections	Social Benefits	European Citizen	Proud to be European citizen
Belgium	34		57	67	62
France	48	60	66	73	75
Germany	54	60	75	61	54
Italy	31	60	81	78	76
Luxembourg	31	63	82	70	79
Netherlands	28	59	72	49	29
Original six	38	60	72	66	63
Britain	43	61	55	40	47
Northern Ireland	25	33	43	36	32
Ireland	26	71	61	69	76
Denmark	51	63	62	57	54
1973 enlargement	40	65	59	55	59
Greece	18	60	68	75	63
Portugal	27	70	69	79	77
Spain	19	74	76	59	77
1980s enlargement	21	68	71	71	72
Austria	37	62	65	56	41
Finland	20	64	70	66	38
Sweden	30		49		38
1990s enlargement	29	61	61	61	39
Cyprus	9	46	81	84	77
Czech Republic	9	48	48	46	36
Estonia	16	47	58	46	28
Hungary	5	40	41	24	59
Latvia	11	37	53	42	26
Poland	10	79	71	53	54
Slovakia	8	63	59	51	46
Slovenia	15	55	63	60	46
2004 enlargement	11	53	56	46	42

Note: The percentages for the summary measures for each group are the unweighted averages of the country percentages. For the 1973 enlargement, Northern Ireland was excluded because otherwise its weight compared to Britain would have been too high. For the 2004 enlargement, Cyprus was excluded to avoid giving it too much weight in the summary measure.

It is remarkable that despite the fact that ‘Polish plumbers’ have become proverbial for the fear that after enlargement Western Europe will be flooded by cheap labourers from Central and Eastern Europe, this fear is not reflected in these figures. It is not the people in Western Europe, but those in Central and Eastern Europe that are most inclined to reject a free labour market. On average not more than 10% of the people from these

countries are willing to accept this. It is not unlikely that a general feeling of being economically behind Western Europe is responsible for this more negative attitude. Compared to the attitudes on an open labour market, a surprisingly large number of Europeans accepts the entitlement of people from other EU-countries to national social security and unemployment benefits. The length of membership does not really make a difference. Also, the right to vote in local elections is accepted by a clear majority of the people across Europe.

The percentage of people who see themselves, at least sometimes, as European citizens, in addition to being citizens of their own country is on average above 50%. Also, in just above half of the countries a majority of the people are proud to be a citizen of the European Union. However, for both questions there is a huge variation across countries. There does not seem to be much of a pattern in the extent to which people across Europe differ in their reaction to either question, at least not if we try to interpret the existing differences in terms of the length of membership of people's home country. In general, the people from the new member states in Central and Eastern Europe are less inclined to see themselves as a European citizen, or to be proud of being a citizen of the Union, than people in the older member states, but this is not a uniform pattern. The differences between some of the founding member states (the Netherlands and Luxembourg for instance) are as large as between any other pair of countries. In particular the low percentage in the Netherlands on the second question is strikingly low.


Summarizing, these cross sectional data do not clearly support the hypothesis that formal citizenship breeds feelings of citizenship. The Eastern enlargement does not seem to have contributed to the development of a European political community. On all variables but one (proud to be a European citizen), this group has the lowest score of all successive enlargement groups. The question is whether this result holds when we study citizenship across time.

Only on the question of whether people consider themselves as European citizens (in addition to being a citizen of their country) a longer time series is available. In the Eurobarometer, a question asking whether the respondent feels as a citizen of the European Union (besides feeling like a citizen of their own country) has frequently been asked since 1984^{iv}. In figure 1 the trend of the answers to this question is shown separately for each of the successive enlargements. The graphs present the percentage of people in a country in a given year saying that they often or sometimes feel like they are citizens of the EU.

What is most striking in this figure is the clear difference between the groups of countries that joined the Union in the successive enlargements. The percentage of people willing to think of themselves as European citizens is highest in the original six member states. This is what we should expect if the sense of citizenship, or the sense of political community, is a function of the length of membership, i.e. if formal membership breeds a sense of citizenship. However, we should then also expect that the sense of citizenship in new member states would gradually increase and move towards the level of the older member states. This, however, is not the case. There are no linear trends towards an ever higher level of citizenship, but only fluctuations that affect the

several groups of countries to more or less the same extent. As a consequence, the differences between these groups of countries are not becoming smaller over time. On the contrary, they seem to become even larger. The first enlargement in 1973 brought in three new member states two of which (Britain and Denmark) were exceptionally eurosceptic and have remained so ever since. Only since the turn of the century they seem to move somewhat in a more positive direction, but because this is a general turn, the differences remain at least as large as they were. The southern enlargement countries entered the Union with on average a much higher level, at about the same level as the original six, and remained close to them ever since.

Figure 1 Successive enlargements and feelings of European citizenship



The general conclusion suggested by these findings is that feelings of being part of a European political community have historical roots and are hardly affected by the duration of membership. Therefore, admitting new member states with a eurosceptic citizenry might have a persisting effect on the development of a European political community. In order to fully investigate whether EU membership affects the sense of European citizenship, we have also performed a multivariate analysis, where we control for a number of factors that vary across time and across countries. The dependent variable used in this analysis measures the percentage of people in a country in a given year saying that they often or sometimes feel like they are citizens of the EU (until 1992) or see themselves as at least partly European (after 1992). Covering all of the EU-25 countries over the period 1984–2005 (but only during the time that the countries have been members) gives us a data set of over 300 country-year cases. The main

independent variable in our analysis is a variable measuring the number of membership years that a country has experienced at a specific point in time.^v The other independent variables are taken from different data sources and describe the economic situation in a country at the same point in time.^{vi} The results from this analysis are presented in table 3.

Model 1 presented in table 3 shows that when we only include the variable measuring EU membership years, this variable exerts a significant and positive effect. This gives some support to the hypothesis that the duration of membership increases the sense of European citizenship. In model 2 the control variables measuring the economic situation in the country are included, in order to gauge whether the effect of membership years is a spurious correlation, created by the fact that economically advanced countries are more likely to be in the EU and citizens of these countries are also more likely to identify themselves as European citizens. Even when these variables are included, we see a positive and significant effect of the length of membership. Thus, we so far find support for the membership hypothesis.

Table 3 Regression analysis with European identity as dependent variable

	Percentage sometimes/often identifying as European		
	(1) bivariate	(2) multivariate	(3) country fixed effects
Membership years	0.003** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.001 (0.002)
Net EU transfers	–	-0.665 (0.269)	0.728 (0.457)
GDP per capita (logged)	–	0.002 (0.020)	-0.041 (0.042)
Growth	–	0.000 (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)
Inflation	–	0.006*** (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Unemployment	–	0.004** (0.002)	-0.007*** (0.002)
EU trade	–	0.356*** (0.069)	0.052 (0.112)
Number of observations	313	313	313
Number of countries	25	25	25
Adjusted (overall R ²)	0.206	0.262	0.699 (0.052)

Note: Significant at ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses (panel corrected standard errors obtained using STATA:s xtpscse command). Fixed effects regression results obtained using STATA:s xtreg, fe option.


However, in these models we cannot separate the effect of entering the EU at a specific point in time and the continuous effect of being an EU member. Therefore, we include a set of country dummies in model 3, i.e. we perform a country fixed effects regression, focusing only on the variation across time.^{vii} In this model, length of membership no

longer exerts a significant effect on sense of European citizenship. Thus, the effect of length of membership (in models 1 and 2) is probably explained by the fact that early entry into the Union gave a country's citizens a high identification with the European Union, whereas the level of identity does not seem to increase continuously with the number of years that a country has been a member.^{viii} Therefore, we find no convincing evidence in support of the hypothesis that formal citizenship breeds feelings of citizenship. Since the 2004 enlargement brought in a number of countries with a low sense of citizenship this might have a lasting effect on the development of citizenship in the Union.

Sense of community – mutual trust

As we observed above, mutual trust is one of the main components of Deutsch's concept of a sense of community. A sense of European community can only exist if the people of the EU evaluate each other positively, i.e. if they trust each other. The level of trust flowing within the European community is a good indicator of how integrated this community of a still increasing number of national citizenries potentially is (Delhey 2005). Again, we are particularly interested in the question of to what extent the 2004 enlargement affects the mutual trust among the peoples of the Union.

Figure 2 Trust in other peoples



Previous research shows that it is highly unlikely that people from older member states will immediately embrace the people from the 2004 accession countries. In the 1994 European Election Study people from the then 15 member states were asked whether they would welcome each of a number of countries as new member states of the EU. Whereas countries like Switzerland and Norway would have been most welcome, most

candidate member states in Central and Eastern Europe, let alone Turkey, were not. These countries were hardly, or not at all, part of the 'mental map of Europe' of the people of the, at that point, mostly West-European Union (Scheuer 1995: 41). Therefore, we expect that the recent enlargement will have a negative effect on the sense of community in the European Union as a whole.

In figure 2 countries are ordered according to the level of trust people across Europe have in the people of these countries. The figure contains one very clear message. The further East we move in Europe, the less peoples are trusted by their fellow Europeans. The left part of the figure is occupied by West-European countries. In particular the people from the Nordic and Benelux countries are highly trusted. All of them are relatively small countries. Among the older member states the Italians and British are least trusted. With the exception of the Maltese, the people of all new member states are found in the right tail of the figure. But the very tail of the figure is occupied by the people from the then candidate countries Bulgaria and Romania and from Turkey. Trust in the people from these countries is very low. The figure clearly indicates that the 2004 enlargement had a negative impact on the level of integration of the Union by admitting countries whose people are far less trusted than the people from the older member states. Why this is the case is not immediately clear. Is it because these countries have only just entered the Union, is it because of their weak economy, or is it for the simple reason that from the perspective of Western Europe they are far(ther) away and unknown?

Our main research question is to what extent membership breeds trust. The answer to that question is highly relevant for the future development of European integration. If it does, the present low level of trust in the people from the new members states might be a temporary phenomenon that will gradually disappear. In table 4 we show the level of trust among different member states, grouping the states according to length of membership. The table is asymmetric because people in EU countries were asked to what extent they trust the Bulgarians, the Romanians and the Turks, but not the other way around as no survey was conducted in these three countries.

Apart from the clear difference between the newcomers and the older member states, the length of membership does not seem to explain very much. If social integration were an effect of EU membership, of the existence of a European polity, we should expect to find the highest levels of mutual trust among the people from the six founding member states. This, however, is not the case. Although trust among them is relatively high (80%), it is somewhat lower than the trust people from these countries have in the people from Austria, Finland and Sweden, countries which did not join the Union until the 1990s. Therefore, any attempt to explain these differences in trust in terms of a clear distinction between those who belong or do not belong to the political community of the EU is disputable.

The data in table 4 are from a single point in time. Longitudinal data seem to suggest that membership does indeed breed community. Delhey (2005) observes that in the early 1970s mutual trust between the people from the then six member states was at about the same level as the present trust in the people from the Eastern enlargement countries. Also, the mutual trust between the people of EU countries substantially

increased during the 1970s and 1980s, but fell somewhat back in the early 1990s (Niedermayer 1995; Scheuer 1995). In particular, trust in the people from the countries of the second enlargement (Greece, Portugal and Spain) increased during this period. This again suggests that the establishment of common political institutions does indeed enhance a sense of community as was suggested by a.o. David Easton. But this does not necessarily mean that history will repeat itself. The figures in table 4 clearly demonstrate that there is no linear relationship between length of membership and mutual trust. As the Nordic enlargement indicates, other factors, like geographical and cultural proximity seem to be at least as important. And because the European Union gradually spread over the European continent it is difficult to disentangle the effects of membership from other factors like geographic proximity.

In table 5 countries are classified according to their geographic location. The reason to do so is that as far as mutual trust is mainly based on familiarity and a common culture, geographic vicinity is a proxy for familiarity and a certain commonality of cultural traditions. We have grouped together the original six minus Italy but including Austria, Britain and Ireland (Western Europe), the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland), the Southern European countries (Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain), the new member states in Central Europe, and the Baltic states^{ix}. These results show that geographic proximity seems to be related to trust^x. In particular the countries in the North-West form a community of countries where mutual trust is very high. Mutual trust between these countries and the Southern European countries is somewhat lower but still clearly on the positive side. But as we observed above, the relationship between the people of the 'old' European Union and the people from the new member states is a totally different story.

Table 4 Levels of Trust by Admission Year

	Original six	1973 Enlargement	1980's Enlargement	1990's Enlargement	2004 Enlargement	Bulgaria & Romania	Turkey
Original six ^a	77.74	72.46	75.89	83.56	51.73	29.28	24.02
1973 ^b Enlargement	74.22	75.92	68.45	84.17	50.74	35.35	28.05
1980's Enlargement	65.54	56.71	64.47	66.94	45.27	33.97	22.2
1990's Enlargement ^c	74.74	77.57	70.45	85.92	57.24	30.8	28.7
2004 ^d Enlargement	62.46	64.84	64.13	67.38	52.62	34.02	23.11

Note:

^a Question not asked in Belgium

^b Question not asked in Great Britain

^c Question not asked in Sweden

^d Question not asked in Malta and Lithuania.

Table 5 Levels of Trust by Geographic Location

	Western Europe	Nordic countries	Southern Europe	Central Europe	Baltic States	Bulgaria & Romania	Turkey
Western Europe ^a	75.05	86.32	71.56	50.87	55.57	31.65	26.75
Nordic countries ^b	84.06	93.72	67.31	56.85	55.22	37.03	30.65
Southern Europe	62.95	71.81	64.57	43.87	40.42	29.16	19.6
Central Europe	65.88	75.25	65.38 ^d	62.21	49.38	43.07	28.96
Baltic ^c States	63.37	73.56	43.55	46.38	73.75	35.12	18.2

Note:

^a Question not asked in Belgium and Great Britain.

^b Question not asked in Sweden.

^c Question not asked in Lithuania.

^d Hungarians did not rate the Portuguese

As most possible explanatory factors of these varying levels of trust, like length of membership, geographic vicinity and cultural similarity are highly correlated, it is difficult to disentangle their separate effects. Delhey (2005) found that trust between nations is not significantly related to either length of membership or spatial distance, if other determinants are controlled for, especially cultural similarity. The most important determinant of trust that comes out of his analysis is the degree of modernity of the rated nationality, followed by cultural affinity and perceived threat (as indicated by the size of the country: larger countries form a threat for their smaller neighbours). In order to fully test our main hypothesis, that common membership years breed trust, we replicate Delhey's analysis on data from the 2004 European Election Study. For his analysis of 1997 Eurobarometer data, Delhey constructed a data set where a unit is each nationality's rating of the trustworthiness of each of the other nationalities, i.e. a data set where country-dyads are the units of analysis. Following the same approach, we constructed a data set consisting of country-dyads where citizens of most of the EU-25 states indicate how much trust they have in citizens of other member states.^{xi} The trust variable we use as dependent variable measures the proportion of individuals in the 2004 European Election Study stating that they have a lot of trust in the people from a specific country.

Our main independent variable describes how many years the rating and the rated nation have simultaneously been members of the European Union. This variable varies between 0 and 55, with the lowest values given when the rated country was not a member of the European Union in 2004, and the highest value given when both the rated and the rating country are one of the original six members. We also include a number of other variables describing the relationship between the rated and the rating

nationality. More specifically, we measure the distance between the countries' capitals, whether the people of both countries belong to the same family of religions and the same family of languages, and whether the two countries were allies in WWII. We also measure some features describing the economic and political situation of the rated and the rating nationality (GDP per capita, level of inequality, quality of government, e.g. corruption, and level of democracy). The idea is to control for as many features as possible that could account for a potential correlation between common membership years and mutual trust.^{xii}

In models 1, 2 and 3 in table 6, we present the results from a bivariate regression with common membership years as the independent variable, and two multivariate regressions controlling for features describing the relationship between the truster and the trusted nationality and features of the rated nationality. In all three models, the length of membership exerts a positive effect, giving support to the hypothesis that the longer countries have been members of the European Union, the more likely they are to trust each other. Several other variables also exert significant effects on the level of interpersonal trust, for example, countries located far away from each other display a lower level of trust between their citizens, people belonging to the same language family trust each other more, and people from countries with a higher quality of government and higher levels of democracy are trusted more.

In model 4 we also include a number of features of the rating nationality, such as the GDP per capita and quality of government. The reason for including these features in our model is that such characteristics of the rating country may influence the ratings indirectly through the general trust level among its citizens (Delhey and Newton 2005). Some people may simply be more trusting than others, and we need to control for this in order to be sure that the apparent effect of EU membership years is not a result of the fact that early EU members are more trusting in general. Another way to control for this is of course to gauge the general trust level in the rating country, which we do in model 5 by including a measure of general trust based on a question in the World Values Survey, asking respondents to state to what extent they believe that most people can be trusted.^{xiii}

Table 6 Regression analysis with trust as dependent variable, 474 country-dyads

	Percentage having a lot of trust				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
<i>Relationship features</i>					

Common years of EU membership	0.667*** (0.054)	0.509*** (0.052)	0.355*** (0.053)	0.437*** (0.054)	0.322*** (0.054)
Distance between capitals (km)	–	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Same family of religions	–	10.457*** (1.662)	1.475 (1.733)	-2.286 (1.618)	1.015 (1.731)
Same family of languages	–	7.817*** (1.977)	7.682*** (1.771)	7.523*** (1.539)	7.598*** (1.759)
Allies in WWII	–	1.775 (1.649)	0.456 (1.477)	2.680** (1.306)	0.707 (1.470)
<i>Features of the rated nationality</i>					
GDP/Capita (1000 USD)	–	–	-0.091 (0.115)	-0.096 (0.101)	-0.000 (0.000)
Level of inequality (Gini)	–	–	0.278* (0.148)	0.031 (0.132)	0.293** (0.147)
Quality of government (ICRG)	–	–	4.603*** (0.691)	4.641*** (0.601)	4.663*** (0.687)
Level of democracy (Polity/FH)	–	–	5.160*** (1.506)	6.356*** (1.317)	5.358*** (1.498)
<i>Features of the rating nationality</i>					
GDP/Capita	–	–	–	0.416*** (0.090)	–
Level of inequality (Gini)	–	–	–	-1.446*** (0.145)	–
Quality of government (ICRG)	–	–	–	-0.425 (0.592)	–
Level of democracy (Polity/FH)	–	–	–	-5.025* (2.679)	–
General trust level (WVS)	–	–	–	–	11.349*** (4.242)
Number of dyads	474	474	474	474	474
Adjusted R ²	0.247	0.374	0.502	0.628	0.508

Note: Significant at * the 0.10 level, ** the 0.05 level, *** the 0.01 level. Entries are unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Abbreviations: GDP/capita = Gross Domestic Product per capita, USD = US dollars, Gini = Gini coefficient, measure of inequality of income distribution, ICRG = International Country Risk Guide, Polity/FH = Measure of the level of democracy created as an average of the Polity and Freedom House indexes, WVS = World Values Survey.

In both of these models, we find that a high number of common membership years positively affects the level of interpersonal trust.^{xiv} But it is also clear that mutual trust does not only depend on the experience of common membership. Other factors like cultural distance, economic development, the quality of democratic institutions are important as well. None of these factors is immune to change and all of them are probably positively affected by EU-membership. Therefore, as much as the collective

identity of the people across the EU, as measured by mutual trust, was negatively affected by the 2004 enlargement, this effect will not necessarily last.

5. In conclusion

In this paper we distinguished two rival theories on the relationship between European citizenship in the sense of a legal construct on the one hand, and a European collective identity on the other hand. According to the first theory, a collective identity is a necessary condition for the development of a legitimate European political community. The second theory claims that there is indeed an empirical relationship between these two concepts, but the causal sequence is not necessarily unidirectional. Once a political community is established it can breed a sense of community.

In order to test the relative empirical validity of these theories, we operationalized the concepts *sense of citizenship* and *sense of community*. Unfortunately, the data available makes it impossible to clearly establish the causal sequence between the development of a sense of community and a sense of citizenship. However, we were able to test the hypothesis that formal citizenship breeds both a sense of European citizenship and a sense of European community. Our analyses do not offer firm evidence in support of the hypothesis in either case. A superficial analysis of longitudinal data on the sense of citizenship suggests an increase of such feelings with the length of membership of a country. However, a more refined analysis reveals that it is the time of entry of the Union rather than the length of membership that explains differences in the sense of European citizenship. Since the 2004 enlargement brought in a number of countries with a low sense of citizenship, this might have a lasting effect on the development of citizenship in the Union.

The evidence with regard to a sense of European community is mixed. In a multivariate analysis, length of membership turned out to have a significant effect on the sense of European community, as measured by mutual trust. In Western Europe, mutual trust in general is high, but there is little evidence that this is due to European Union membership as such. The 2004 enlargement meant a serious blow to the development of a European community. Among the citizens of the older member states, trust in the people of at least some of the accession countries, not to speak of (then) candidate countries like Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, is very low, whereas the low level of interpersonal trust in most of the new member states is reflected in low levels of trust in the people from other member states, in whichever part of Europe.

Our analyses of the causes of this lack of mutual trust suggest that it might be a temporary phenomenon. But this offers little comfort in the short run. The feasibility of the European Union as a polity strongly depends on the consent of the people. The lesson to be learned from our analyses is that if the Union extends too fast beyond the borders within which its citizens feel more or less comfortable, this is bound to have a

negative effect on people's support for the European project. This might be at least part of the explanation for the misgivings people across Europe apparently have with the development of the Union, as became so obvious in the 2005 referenda on the draft Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands.

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ⁱ More or less because what Bruter defines as the cultural component of European identity still refers to the *political* community.

ⁱⁱ For information on the European Election Study, see <http://www.europeanelectionstudies.net/>

ⁱⁱⁱ A possible explanation of the low correlations between these items and their poor scalability is that they are suppressed by the aggregation of different patterns at the national level. However, this does not seem to be the case. The analysis of these items for countries separately yields similar results.

^{iv} Unfortunately the wording of this question has been changed in 1992. Since 1992 the wording of the question is: 'In the near future do you see yourself as (nationality) only, (Nationality) and European, European and (Nationality), European only?' The figures in figure 1 refer to the sum of the last three categories. Until 1992 the question asked was: 'Do you ever think of yourself not only as an [COUNTRY] citizen, but also as a citizen of the European Union?' (often, sometimes, never). The figures in figure 1 refer to the sum of the first two categories.

^v Marsh and Mikhaylov (2008) argue for logging the membership years variable. We obtain similar results when we take the log of membership years (significant effect in a bivariate and multivariate analysis, but not significant when country dummies are included). We have, for simplicity, decided to keep the (unlogged) membership years specification.

^{vi} The independent variables included in our models are: net transfers from the European Union, GDP per capita (logged), growth, inflation, unemployment, and the proportion of trade within the EU. All of the variables included in this analysis are described more thoroughly in the appendix of Marsh and Mikhaylov 2008. We would like to thank Slava Mikhaylov for making these data available to us.

^{vii} By adding a dummy for each country on the right-hand side of the regression we focus on the variation across time (within countries), i.e. we are no longer studying the variation across countries (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini 2003).

^{viii} We have also run a model including all the control variables and the lagged dependent variable, (European identity measured at $t-1$). When we include the lagged dependent variable, the membership years variable fails to exert a significant effect. The effect of the lagged identity variable is positive (0.816) and significant at the 0.01 level, suggesting that if a country's citizens identify as European one year, they are likely to do so the next year also. There are several reasons for including the lagged dependent variable when working with time-series cross-section data, for example, it helps to control for serial correlation in the error terms (see e.g. Beck and Katz 1996; 2004). We have also used another method for controlling for autocorrelation, using STATA's `,c(a)` option, which means that we assume that there is a common serial correlation for all panels (AR(1)). When we use this method (applied to model 1 and 2), the membership years variable exerts a positive and significant effect, whereas none of the control variables exert a significant effect in this model specification.

^{ix} Cyprus and Malta were left out. They might be included in the group of South Western Europe, but given their size they would have a disproportionate effect on trust in these countries.

^x The reverse side of the proximity argument is of course that neighbouring countries often have a long history of wars. It is obvious indeed that the Irish hardly trust the British. In principle the same argument might be applied to the rest of Europe, in particular to Germany and its neighbouring countries. However, taking into account that bigger countries in general are less trusted, 60 years of peaceful cooperation in Western Europe apparently had a very positive effect on trust. As figure 2 shows, Germans are pretty well trusted, in particular in Western Europe.

^{xi} Countries included in the analysis as rating nations (19 countries) are: Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Finland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia. Rated nations (26 countries) are the rating countries plus Sweden, Belgium, United Kingdom, Lithuania, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.

^{xii} Most of the variables that we include have been proposed as explanations to generalized/interpersonal trust (see e.g. Delhey 2005; Delhey & Newton 2005; Rothstein & Uslaner 2005). The operationalizations of all variables are further described in the appendix.

^{xiii} The results in these two models (models 4 and 5) are similar in most respects, but the R^2 is higher in model 4, which may indicate that the features of the rating nationality do a better job at measuring a general trust level among the rating citizens than the WVS variable included in model 5.

^{xiv} Jan Delhey (2005) does not find a significant effect of common membership years on the level of trust when controlling for a number of variables, e.g. the level of modernization of the rated nationality. There are four main differences in our specifications that could account for this difference in the results: (1) We do not measure trust exactly the same way as Delhey, who uses an index of trust ranging from +100, indicating that all people in a country tend to trust people from another country, to -100, indicating a complete lack of trust. We do not believe that this can explain the difference in the results, since the

variation in trust levels across countries should still be the same, regardless of how the dependent variable is specified (both our variables are based on the same type of survey question). (2) Delhey uses the 1997 Eurobarometer data to measure trust, whereas we use the 2004 European Election Study. This could potentially explain the difference in the results, for example since trust levels may have changed in some countries during the past years. (3) Delhey does not include exactly the same independent variables as we do. In order to control for this we have run a model including almost the same variables as Delhey, measuring the distance between capitals, common EU years, same family of religions and same family of languages, variables measuring the level of modernization of the rated and the rating nationality (we have chosen to include separate measures of democracy, quality of government, e.g. corruption, and GDP per capita instead of creating a modernization index), the population size of the rated nationality and dummies specifying if the countries were allies or enemies in WWII. The result that common membership years has a positive and significant effect still holds in this model specification. (4) We do not have exactly the same sample as Delhey (we have more rating and rated countries). However, we have tried to replicate Delhey's analysis, by only including the countries also included in his sample, and the membership years variable still exerts a significant effect in this analysis.