

Éupolis Lombardia as boundary organization.

By Robert Hoppe

University of Twente
Faculty of Management and Governance
Department of Science, Technology and Policy Studies
r.hoppe@utwente.nl
(14 October, 2013)

GET READY TO BECOME A BOUNDARY ORGANIZATION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

In January 2011 Éupolis Lombardia, the Institute for Research, Statistics, and Training, was established as a merger between three former institutes, each devoted to separate tasks: regional research, training and statistics. The combination in one new organization is hoped to bring about improved policy support, better human resources development, well-focused policy monitoring and surveillance, and productive networking with other policy agencies, non-governmental organizations and national as well as international research and education centres.

Bringing about Éupolis Lombardia was an organizational reform happening against the political background of an experiment in regional governance, ideologically inspired by the subsidiarity principle (Colombo, 2008, 2012). ‘*Subsidiarity*’ is interpreted as a doctrine of “social responsibility that recognizes the priority of the smallest units in society, while censuring interference and excessive intervention by government” (Colombo, 2008:37). Although it embraces features similar to modern public management (freedom of choice of users, welfare services as people investment, quasi-market governance through accountability structures, etcetera), it claims to steer a prudent middle course between the Scylla of liberal anti-interventionism based on market mechanisms and the Charybdis of socialist interventionism relying on state- bureaucratic structures (Colombo, 2008:40).

SELF-ASSESSMENT AND EXTERNAL REVIEW

In this philosophy on governmentality and institutional governance landscape, the leadership of Éupolis Lombardia initiated a self-assessment process (Brugnoli & Colombo, May 2012). Reflecting on the present ‘functions’ and ‘products’ generated by its managers and staff, a *lack of professional training in mainstream policy analysis* and policy-oriented research was defined as a major stumbling block in realizing the benefits of the organizational merger (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 5-6). Hence, the remainder of the self-assessment report sets out the what, who and when of

mainstream policy analysis, followed by listing required competencies and skills (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 14-27).

A small international expert workshop, on 27 September 2012, reflecting on the self-assessment report, arrived at three major conclusions and recommendations:

1. *Link subsidiarity governance to modes of policy analysis.*

Modern governance and policy theory see modes and methods of policy analysis as situated and contextualized in political and administrative governance structures. Policy analysis as set of cognitive activities will only be successful if sufficiently attuned to its political and governance context. To the extent mainstream policy analysis is focused in “advice to the Prince”, it may be out of line with subsidiarity governance as it appears to require a much more socially distributed set of different modes of policy analysis.

2. *A window of opportunity for policy analysis in Italy.*

The present political drive for stricter budget control, citizen dissatisfaction with public service delivery, and the position of regional governments in Italy, and esp. Lombardia, appear to offer fertile soil for reintroducing policy analysis as a mode of governance. However, Italy should take advantage from the possibility to learn from errors and omissions in introducing policy analysis in Anglosaxon and some North-European countries. Appropriate mainstream modes of policy analysis geared to budget control, accountability, and output/outcome evaluation, should be linked to more argumentative or interpretive modes of policy analysis that appear to align more with subsidiarity governance.

3. *Carefully think through the organizational implications*

Relevant implications for the institute originate from all the above listed recommendations, notably for the purpose of reaping the fruits of the organizational merger creating Éupolis Lombardia in the first place. This pertains to required policy-analytic skills and competencies; it also regards organizational restructuring for novel combinations for more effective policy analysis; **and, finally, it involves rethinking Éupolis Lombardia as a boundary organization.**

This means a reflection on *internal boundaries* in Éupolis Lombardia itself: boundaries resulting from the present division of labor between the three original institutes (research, training, statistics), and boundaries between different scientific disciplines represented in the present and future organization. In addition, we should look at *external boundaries*, between the knowledge and policy work done by Éupolis Lombardia itself, and its major end-users and stakeholders (politics, administrations, associations, ngo’s, citizens) in the multi-actor and multi-level networks making up the subsidiarity governance landscape of the eleven regional policy domains (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 5).

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND KEY ANSWERS

This essay will map the contours of rethinking Éupolis Lombardia as a boundary organization. It will sketch out an answer to the **major question**:

What kind of strategic and organizational reforms are necessary for Éupolis Lombardia to embark upon the path towards becoming an excellent boundary organization?

The answer to this question is threefold:

1. Éupolis Lombardia has to *clearly position itself* in the multi-actor and multi-level subsidiarity governance structure.
2. Éupolis Lombardia will have to cover and master all aspects of *hybrid management* of the internal and external dimensions of a knowledge institute-annex-boundary organization.
3. In the next 3-5 years Éupolis Lombardia's management, assisted by external advisers and accreditors, will have to pay continued attention to elaboration of a *detailed implementation plan* for strategic and organizational reforms

The next three sections elucidate and elaborate the answers. Therefore, the next section is devoted to the nature of boundary work, and broadly pictures Éupolis Lombardia as a boundary organization in an institutional landscape of subsidiarity governance.

BOUNDARY WORK IN SUBSIDIARITY GOVERNANCE

MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF BOUNDARY WORK

Since the days of Harold Lasswell policy analysis' major task has been conceived as to marshal the best possible (scientific) knowledge for decision making on the public good. Hence, policy analysis is an instance of the meeting of science and politics – usually seen as two very different institutional spheres with their own cultures and practices, best kept separate. Thus, the relationship between science and politics-and-civil society is often depicted as a linear process of knowledge transfer, dissemination, knowledge use or impact. Policymakers and politicians like to picture themselves as 'on top' and call on the decision support services of scientists and experts as just 'on tap'. Scientists and experts rather see their own role as neutral, objective and independent advisers, who 'speak truth to power'. Both parties thus co-produce and highlight a sacred myth of their relationship, always used in front-office public accountability stories for journalists and the wider public.

In so doing, both downplay the more profane, back-office narrative of the two-way, interdependent character of knowledge production and communication in public policymaking. In policy advice practice, the zones of transgression and engagement are inevitably fluid and blurred. Hence, the production of policy advice is not a neat separation and division of tasks between science (dealing with facts and causality) and

politics (engaging values and interests). Rather the production of policy advice is a form of *boundary work*. Boundary work can be more formally understood as the attempt by actors to define activities in contrast to each other through *demarkation*, and simultaneous attempts to find productive *coordination* across these boundaries through a division of labor that is stabilized because, while under constant negotiation, it becomes more or less accepted. Demarcation and coordination are two sides of the same coin. Concern for high-quality performance makes policymakers and experts mutually dependent; yet they have to guard their own identities and formal independence. Therefore boundary work is full of paradoxes and dilemmas; the relationship between science and politics will never be smooth and harmonious, it will always remain contested terrain.

Synthesizing much of the theoretical and empirical literature on boundary work, it can be depicted as science-politics interactions in a multi-level framework or map (see Figure 1.) For the sake of this report, elucidating Eupolis Lombardia’s potential role as a boundary organization, it is already projected in Figure 1 .




Figure 1. A multi-level analytical framework for boundary work

From a micro-perspective, policy analysis on the boundary between science and policy practice is most clearly visible in research-and-advice *projects* around particular policy issues (like health and social services, or housing, or tourism in Lombardia). At meso-level, boundary work is carried out in *boundary arrangements*, a wide variety of organizational forms that straddle and mediate the boundary between professional-academic networks, networks of civil-society type of associations and organizations, and public sector en policy networks. Formal *boundary organizations* (Guston, 2001) are, in fact, just one type of such hybrid arrangements.

At the next-higher level, such boundary arrangements usually cluster around specific (sets of) policy problems and their typical issue or policy networks. These *problem-and-network structures* (Hoppe, 2010) in turn are embedded in a *political-cultural sphere* (or ‘civic epistemology’, in Jasanoff’s terminology, 2005), i.e. the cultural and organizational practices by which politically relevant knowledge is selected, filtered, deliberated, validated or challenged (Lentsch and Weingart, 2009: 7); the characteristics of which permeate and penetrate science-policy interactions at all other levels.

To present a comprehensive picture of the science-politics interface (in this case, regarding regional governance in Lombardia), then, means to understand boundary work at each level and the way these levels interact. Solid lines represent the primary, short- to mid-term causalities and tendencies influencing the nature of these interactions. Dotted lines show how ‘lower’ levels may, in the longer run, have an impact on ‘higher’ levels. To the extent policy actors can influence or, rather, *modulate* these variables, the entire system lends itself to modest and moderate meta-governance or interpolable balancing. To address this meta-governance level, we distinguish between external boundaries or transdisciplinary positioning – the position of Éupolis Lombardia in the entire governance landscape; and internal boundaries – the disciplinary boundaries and interdisciplinary boundary work practices within the organizational set-up of the institute itself.

EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES

Ortwin Renn (1995) devised a useful set of ideal-types to characterize the political cultures governing interaction between policymaking styles and styles of expertise – adversarial (approximated best in the USA), fiduciary (like in Southern Europe), corporatist (like in Northern Europe, e.g. Germany) and consensual (like in Japan). In fiduciary cultures policymaking is confined to a close circle of ‘patrons’ who rely on personalized relationships with particular experts to acquire scientific policy advice. Usually these experts are assembled in quasi-independent, bureaucratic, ‘in-house’ expert centres, where they are supposed to enlighten the patrons and offer scientific background information for official decisions. There are no formal rules for citizen input or oversight of the advisory process. The entire advisory process is hardly constrained by any formal rules. Everything is oriented to producing faith in the system. All this is starkly different from an adversarial civic epistemology governing the world of policy advice. Here there is open conflict between policymakers and policy advice is acceptable only if it is produced by the highest standards of methodological objectivity of evidence. The entire process is as open as possible to public and professional scrutiny; it is governed by multiple procedural rules to ensure this.

Now, no really existing system corresponds exactly to these ideal-types, and any system is in a continuous process of change. Nevertheless, it seems fair to say that the present position of Éupolis Lombardia in the regional governance system can be understood as centralized ‘advice’ in a fiduciary system of political culture or civic epistemology. In terms of political accountability, ideological conflicts, electoral struggles and party politics override scientific input in public policymaking. This may be the case in many other countries as well (Webber, 1992), but in Italy the tendency

appears to be stronger. To the extent non-political expertise plays a role, from old, legal and budget expertises are clearly dominating governance advice and regulation; and it is self-evidently focused on governmental bodies only (see Regonini, 2012:4-5). In the self-assessment paper, Éupolis Lombardia is described as provider of “technical-scientific support” for the Lombardy Executive Council and Legislative Assembly, as well as “government department and other regional agencies” (Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012: 3). In terms of Figure 1, this means that, at present, Éupolis Lombardia interacts with other government actors, administrative centers and policymakers – *not with civil society type of associations and non-governmental policy workers*. Moreover, during and after the expert meeting on 27 September 2012 in Milan, from several independently given personal communications it was stressed that the research-and-advice activities of Éupolis Lombardia were *strongly focused on ‘advice to the Prince’*, i.e. the president of the regional government of Lombardia – regularly bypassing his formal bureaucratic advisers. This may be due largely to the fact that the regional budget (mainly spent on health care, social services and transportation; Colombo, 2008: 33, figure 1) is still under national control for ninety per cent (Colombo, 2008: 32). It may also have to do with an effort to counterbalance, at central government level, the weight of legal and financial-budgetary advice with policy and management advice.

This may testify to the political salience and stature of Éupolis Lombardia’s role as policy adviser and boundary organization, yet this position is not without its problems in the longer run.

First, it is questionable if ‘in-house’ boundary work with merely governmental policymakers is sufficiently in line with the subsidiarity philosophy of governmentality espoused as typical for the Lombardian governance style. At first glance, subsidiarity governance implies policy-analytic capacity not only to be centralized at presidential level, or even politically distributed among several governmental policymakers. It appears to imply embedded and socially distributed policy analysis as multi-actor policy support/facilitation for civil society organizations and associations. Or, the capacity to organize and manage ‘mini-public’ deliberative policy exercises of small groups of citizens; followed by qualitative or interpretive modes of policy analysis in order to ‘abduct’ more centralized policy initiatives or adjustments from such mini-public exercises. But this is a question for the contributions of Parsons and Colebatch, and therefore will not be treated here beyond these preliminary remarks.

Second, although in many countries (e.g. the Netherlands) parliament relies for its needs to expert knowledge on the same ‘in-house’ knowledge institutes and boundary organizations as the government, this apparently ‘efficient’ arrangement is more and more questioned. In most cases, executive requests for expertise far outnumber and outweigh legislative requests; heavily contributing to the information asymmetries between executive and legislative powers in government. In Italy/Lombardia, the problem may be exacerbated by the fact that parliamentarians will habitually rely on legal and budget expertise, and less on policy expertise for strategic decisionmaking and management expertise to control and oversee the implementation of policy programs and projects.

Third, to the extent Lombardian subsidiarity relies on management/policy techniques of benchmarking, democratic experimentalism (Sabel and Zeitlin), performance measurement, and oversight functions in accountability systems, it is questionable whether all these functions could be served (as seems to be the case now, Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012:3) by one and the same boundary organization.

The conclusion here can be limited to raising a fundamental question: is it a good idea to centralize policy-analytic capacity in one boundary organization if the subsidiarity style of governmentality and governance suggests that not one, but many boundaries are involved in securing productive policy coordination? More specifically:

- a. Can there be one boundary organization that provides scientific-technical policy advise and support to both governmental policymakers and nongovernmental and civil-society-based policy workers? If the answer is yes, how should Éupolis Lombardia be (re-)organized so as to credibly serve two very different ‘masters’?
- b. Can there be one boundary organization that serves the knowledge interests of both executive and legislative? Practice in most countries sees parliaments strengthening their capacities for marshalling expert knowledge. How does Éupolis Lombardia serve legislative knowledge interests now; and should this be improved?
- c. Can there be one boundary organization that both advises the central government on strategic policy design, and assists other more decentralized governmental bodies to implement and manage those policies; and, in addition, monitors, evaluates and benchmarks those policies for the purpose of adjusting/terminating public services delivery?

MANAGING EXTERNAL BOUNDARIES UNDER NEO-COPORATISM: THE EXAMPLE OF THE DUTCH PLANNING BUREAUS

In neo-corporatist arrangements, a restricted set of a policy sector’s main actors are formally accredited to enter the arena for policymaking. In now stronger, than weaker forms, neo-corporatist decision-making has always been present in the Netherlands, mostly in socio-economic policymaking. In these fluctuating modes, institutionalized expertise takes one of two forms. First, formally accredited actors mobilize their own expertise. In more technical negotiations, for example on health insurance schemes, experts like university professors may even represent actors, for example patients. This pattern dominated the old system of Dutch national advisory councils. In the second form, experts delineate the playing field for neo-corporatist negotiations among the actor’s representatives. They wave a flag whenever the negotiation game exceeds known budgetary constraints, or when, say, projections of next year’s economic growth become unrealistically high. This second pattern is to be found most prominently in the Dutch planning bureaus.

The Dutch neo-corporatist tradition of ruling by consensus among an elite of relevant actors – the model of recognized employer organizations and labor unions expanded to other sectors of the society – led to an unchecked growth of the number of such councils. In the 1970s and 80s numerous reports advocated a reduction in their number (over 400 in 1976) and the creation of some order. Meanwhile, the nature of expertise in the councils professionalized, in the sense that representation of

interests gradually but significantly shifted to interest-cum-knowledge representation. In 1997 the Ministry of the Interior both initiated the new framework law for advisory bodies, and abolished nearly all of the existing one. Only eleven general advisory councils were left, and seven more technical ones. The Socio-Economic Council excepted – as backbone of the neo-corporatist regime in socio-economic policy – all advisory councils were now considered expert councils. Another reorganization principle was that councils were to become less specialist and more generalist, covering more than one policy field. However, in practice the logic of diverse government departments, each with its own professional strongholds, style of operation, and governance networks, proved stronger than the logic of legal reorganization. Turning the logic of performance measurement into a tool for disciplining the advisory councils and planning bureaus to deliver more actionable and instrumental advice, in 2009 there followed a second round of shrinking expert policy advice. Top-level civil servants and ministers desired to get rid of too much unsolicited, strategic advice emerging from the (modest) scope of advisory councils to set their own agendas (Hoppe, 2008). This time even one planning bureau, the National Bureau for Spatial Research (RPB), was eliminated and amalgamated with the Environment and Nature Planning Bureau (PBL).

This brings us to the second mode of institutionalized expertise under neo-corporatism, the planning bureaus (see also Halffman, 2009). Different from suspicions raised by their being called ‘planning’ bureaus, these knowledge institutes are not involved in planning the economy or social service provision through state-controlled resource allocation. They provide government departments with assessments of states of affairs and of future developments in their policy sectors and relate these to policy options. Although each of the three presently functioning planning bureaus (Center for Economic Policy Analysis or CPB; the Netherlands Institute for Social Research or SCP; the Netherlands Environmental and Nature Bureau or PBL) are formally agencies at arm’s length of government but answering to departments whose ministers bear political responsibility for their finances and research agenda, through skilful performance of independence and political neutrality and fairness “they can provide policy makers with knowledge which is considered reliable and neutral to an extraordinary degree.” (Halffman, 2009: 41).

However, independence clearly has its limits, acknowledged by the planning bureaus themselves. The CPB, the oldest, most prestigious one, has close relationships with civil servants of the ministries of Economic Affairs and Financial Affairs, often with shared training in economics, econometrics, or accountancy, and career patterns that switch between the department and planning bureau” (Halffman, 2009:48). The central mission of the CPB is to discipline politics in terms of budgetary constraints and sound economic science. The other planning bureaus were actually modelled after the CPB, as other departments mobilized their own knowledge and expertise. The environmental planning bureau, with experts from many more different disciplines, is also engaged in quantitative monitoring of policy instruments and impacts, and modelling the relationship between them. But it has as a mission to monitor and remind the government of its commitments and promises in environmental policy. Where the CPB is willing to negotiate unexpected developments and resulting policy uncertainties with civil servants, and will never question intended government policy, the MNP experts insist on their scientific independence in defining uncertainties and are far less willing to uncritically accept government environmental policy (De Vries, 2008). The SCP is concerned with description and assessment of current conditions in society, and less with projections

of trends and future developments. Like CPB, the SCP prefers numbers and calculations as input for its interpretative expertise about what is happening in Dutch society, and instrumental advice which follows dominant policy frames without questioning them (e.g. Scholten, 2008, on integration policies).

Nevertheless, in spite of their devotion to ‘serviceable truth’, the planning bureaus’ status in the Dutch polity is exceptionally commanding. The degree of acceptance by government and most policy actors of assessments as reliable, independent and for all practical purposes ‘uncontested’ is remarkable. Even political parties now routinely submit their election manifestoes to the CPB and PBL for a calculation (“doorrekenen”) and assessment of the likely outcomes, reported by these institutes to the media and the voters as school report marks (Huitema, 2004). As such, planning bureaus occupy positions of obligatory passage points for Dutch politics that would be considered unacceptably technocratic in most other democratic countries.

There appears to be a contradiction here. The planning bureaus are producers of serviceable truths and instrumental advice for various government departments that promote their different policy agendas in the normal turf fights over government policy. In spite of being ‘*on tap*’ to policymakers in neo-corporatist governance networks and culture, frequently it looks like they are ‘*on top*’: they rationalize political debate, enforce budgetary constraints (even on political parties before elections), and contribute to transparent accountability for the government’s policy performance. They manage to do this because of a number of reasons. They are in a privileged position regarding access to (government) data and calculative resources (user-oriented modelling; e.g. Van Egmond and Zeiss, 2010; Petersen, 2006). They successfully exploit the image and rhetoric of numbers as objective and neutral. They not only discipline the policymakers, but are also mobilized by the policymakers themselves to discipline each other. Their most important political function for a neo-corporatist polity may well be in creating a shared definition of reality without which accommodation of policy conflicts through negotiation would be near impossible Halfman (2010:54). In other words, the advisory councils and especially the planning bureaus are a bulwark against ‘fact-free politics’. Even unstructured problems are turned into structured or moderately structured problems with supposed value and goal consent.

Both in the advisory councils and through the planning bureaus the neo-corporatist logic of interest-cum-knowledge representation has changed into one of representation of the issues and the state of ‘relevant’ knowledge. This does not mean that the barriers to policy access to just a handful of major policy players, typical for neo-corporatist politics, has disappeared. Rather, experts have been repositioned in such a way that especially the executive has stronger leverage to break through corporatist deadlocks.

INTERNAL BOUNDARIES

The present form of Éupolis Lombardia, a merger of three formerly separate institutions, is the result of combined powering and puzzling in Lombardian politics. Next to an obvious political drive for more regional autonomy (*powering*), it requires a considerable leap of faith in expertise (*puzzling*) to lump together in one organization three such *very different knowledge functions for very different end-users* (cf. Dunn & Holzner, 1988):

- Research-and-advice for regional and sub-regional governmental policymakers as end-users (*knowledge interpretation and use*);
- Statistics and regional observatories (*fact production and statistical analysis*), so far vertically tied into national statistical systems for national audiences; but obviously to be made more usable for regional (strategic and implementation/management) end-users as well;
- Regional administrative capacity building through human resource development and training/teaching (*knowledge storage and transfer*) for high-level management in regional government, policing, health management, and civil protection.

Maybe the underlying thought is to use this window of opportunity for re-introducing policy analysis in Italy (see papers by professors Regonini, Rugge, and Secchi) to concentrate all relevant policy-analytic and public management knowledge under one organizational umbrella? As a way of creating enough ‘mass and focus’ around policy analysis to successfully challenge the still dominant influence of legal and (public) financial expertise in bureaucratic advice? In that case, some *caveats* are necessary, resulting from the many disciplinary boundaries now conjoined in Éupolis Lombardia¹.

The general organizational solution to the multi- and interdisciplinarity problem is in managing Éupolis Lombardia as a *matrix organization*. However, selecting key competencies around the substance of particular policy products is a relatively minor problem. E.g., it is rather self-evident that statisticians will be part of almost any project (see also Table 1 in Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012:13). But statisticians who proactively and productively cooperate with strategic policy analysts are not necessarily the same statisticians who do a good job at supporting projects in which performance measurement, benchmarking, or risk analysis (for public health, or civil protection) is pivotal.

Another stumbling block maybe the stark differences between the trained attitude of scholars in dealing with knowledge interpretation in policy analysis as opposed to fact production and statistical analysis, and the teachers/trainers adept in knowledge storage and dissemination. Tellingly, the term ‘boundary work’ was coined by Thomas Gieryn (1983) for the purpose of analyzing how scientists demarcate and defend the integrity of their own turf against both non-scientists and *scientists from other disciplines*.² E.g. teachers/trainers and statisticians tend to see (policy) problems as structured and therefore amenable to a predefined set of doable and teachable professional solution techniques. Well-trained policy analysts are aware of the open or unstructured or only moderately structured nature of policy problems; hence, they are more willing to spend time at problem finding and looking for alternative, sometimes

¹ This paper cannot go into the question what kinds of new expertise are needed for Éupolis Lombardia to cover the full spectrum of contemporary modes of mainstream and interpretive policy analysis and different modes of public management; and how this capacity can be developed. That is the topic of other contributions, e.g. by Park and Howlett.

² For the Netherlands, Annick de Vries (2008) has shown that the lack of advisory impact of the Environmental and Nature Agency (MNP) as compared to the Center of Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) was at least partially due to the fact that the former is made up of scholars from very different disciplines who find it difficult to cooperate, and are reluctant to engage in policy-analysis, whereas the latter is made up of a homogeneous set of economists and econometricians trained for economic policy analysis.

non-traditional ways of problem solving, using a wide array of possible methods and techniques (Lasswell, 1970; Hoppe, 2010).

As Brugnoli and Colombo already observed, however, even the scholars who are working in the strategic policy-analytic wing of Éupolis Lombardia lack thorough training as (mainstream) policy analysis and public management. Not to mention that the spectrum of modern modes of policy analysis is much broader than what is being taught in mainstream US policy analysis: it also includes the different strands of interpretive policy analysis for mapping competing policy frames and belief systems of policy actors (Yanow, 1999; Fischer and Gottweiss, 2011), risk analysis (for public safety, transportation, infrastructure and environmental protection, but also for legal and financial risks), health (technology) assessment, benchmarking and performance measurement and other forms of accountability in public management work.

The key to success is productive coordination between all these divergent disciplines and subdisciplinary streams in projects run by the same organization. In the literature on boundary work and boundary organizations this topic is treated under the label of hybrid management.

HYBRID MANAGEMENT FOR BOUNDARY ORGANIZATIONS

Boundary organizations are by definition hybrids in which political and scientific activities are contained, and sufficiently interwoven to make a clear division of labor an impossibility. Given the naturally self-defensive or demarcation tendencies of politics/policy on the one hand, and different scientific disciplines on the other, managing such hybrid organizations is a tough challenge. This section will briefly outline the major dimensions of hybrid management. Given the author's limited knowledge of the details of Éupolis Lombardia as an organization, it is not the intention of this section to go beyond a list of topics to be covered, only occasionally illustrated by its detailed implications. This would be the task for a detail implementation planning (see final section).

The first managerial challenge, of course, is to create a management structure that genuinely reflects the hybrid character of the organization itself. This requires shaping dual accountability and dual membership. The second managerial challenge is to work out an accepted, but flexible division of labor around a number of typical boundary objects, as template for working routines and reflexivity of the organization. Finally, the managerial challenge is to pay continued high-level attention to issues of meta-governance and capacity building.

DUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

The management of boundary organizations needs dual accountability structures to both representatives of politics and of science. They need accountability to politics for the sake of *legitimacy and salience* or *political robustness*; and to science for the sake

of *epistemic quality* and *credibility*. In discursive balancing acts, easier communicated in fiduciary than in adversarial political cultures and civic epistemologies, they have to define a stable and acceptable mission for their organization. All activities of the boundary organization are continuously tested on alignment or compliance with this overall *mission statement*.

Usually this means to have a relatively small (5 – 9 members) *executive board* composed of representatives from politics, major governmental users (government departments, other regional government bodies), a small selection of the major societal and economic stakeholders in the institution as such, and, of course, from science (universities, other relevant research or educational bodies).

Next to a small executive board, many boundary organizations have a larger *advisory board* (see e.g. Lentsch & Weingart, 2009; 2011). It is larger because the representation of all stakeholders can and should be more comprehensive. In the case of Éupolis Lombardia a careful coverage of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in the regional subsidiarity governance structure is called for.

The management is held accountable for the annual and (preferably) longer term budget, (multi-)annual work plans, and major projects the organization initiates or will be engaged in.

In a number of countries it has become customary to invite ‘peers’ from related boundary organizations or knowledge institutes to review and benchmark one’s own activities over the past, say, 3 – 5 years. Such ad-hoc review committees usually have an international composition, thereby adding an important comparative aspect to accountability. Frequently, these review activities result from or are the beginnings of professional communities of, in the case of Éupolis Lombardia, regional knowledge institutes of centers of regional policy analysis.

DUAL MEMBERSHIP

A crucial tasks for hybrid management in boundary organizations is to see to dual membership. People from both the political/policy world and the scientific sphere should be represented and take part in the organization’s activities. A good example is the production and consultation processes preceding the publication of the politically very sensitive Dutch government’s 2007 White Paper on Water Management and the Delta Commission’s 2008 advisory report on ‘Living with Water’. The blue ribbon commission was chaired by a former minister of agriculture and consisted of member with high political, administrative and/or scientific status. Another example would be the well-known International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). What is less well-known about IPCC is that government-appointed scientists, diplomats representing national governments who are signatories to UNFCCC, NGO and business representatives interact in varying configurations in performing its major tasks of drawing up chapter summaries for policymakers (Shaw 2005; Petersen 2006).

Recently, Dutch ministries resort to so-called “*knowledge chambers*” for ascertaining the appropriate scientific expertise in dual membership policy projects. Per issue or topic, lists of the best available current experts are produced and regularly updated. Of

course, such a practice depends on the willingness of scientific experts to engage in boundary work; a practice which itself depends not only on the individual scientists' inclinations, but also on the civic epistemology dominating a particular country, region, or, sometimes, policy domain or even issue (see e.g. Jasanoff, 2005; Hoppe, 2008).

ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF CO-PRODUCTION OF BOUNDARY OBJECTS

The major activities for which dual membership is required is the co-production of *boundary objects*. Expert advice or policy-analytic reports are good examples. Boundary objects can be textual, conceptual, mathematical or graphical in nature, like e.g. geo-spatial information contained in maps, indicator systems, econometric or other types of social and physical modelling, bi-annual reports, report series, evaluation studies, benchmark reports, etcetera. Crucial is that boundary objects are “plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a common identity across sites. They may have different meanings in social worlds but their structure is common enough to more than one world to make them recognisable, a means of translation. The creation and management of boundary objects is a key process in developing and maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds” (Starr & Griesemer, 1989: 393).

Boundary objects that immediately feed into budget decisions in the executive or legislative appear to be the best guarantee for successful boundary work. E.g. the Center for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) – in co-production with the National Center for Statistics (CBS) - in the Netherlands produces two standard economic outlooks for both government and parliament; one in spring for preparing departmental budget allocations and as early-warning for parliamentarians' debates; and one in summer, containing next year's definitive figures and prognoses, and forming the basis for the annual overall policy review by parliament. Because of its authoritative status for both departmental policymaking officials and their political masters, for MP's, for representatives of labor unions and employers' associations in the Social-Economic Council, as well as for university-based economist, these two reports are tremendously useful in reducing political transaction costs and enabling scientific input and review in the budget-making process (Halffman & Hoppe, 2005; De Vries, 2008; Den Butter, 2011).

Thus, well-chosen boundary objects not only represent *hybridization* of political and scientific work in a very specific way, they also enable reflexivity about the quality of boundary work itself. Both stakeholders and scholars, in discussing boundary objects, open them up as hybrid products where scientific insights and practical, often politico-administrative constraints on timing or counting procedures (see Stone, 1997), are intertwined, but deserve *deconstruction* and un-packing in order to critically assess and discuss tacit, often value-laden assumptions embedded in their construction.

Boundary objects serve as the most specific forms of co-production of social-political and cognitive-scientific order in boundary work. As such they also serve as the most likely space for resolving the conflicts between the norms and criteria for political and

scientific practices. This frequently means *confrontation, negotiation and mediation* – the profane or back-office counter-part to the official, sacred and front-office presentation of linear interaction from science to politics. Experience shows that premature consensus-seeking and compromise-building are perhaps the most serious dangers in productive boundary work. They can only be avoided through deconstruction and reflexive analysis of the key assumptions contained in novel policy concepts and inscribed in promising scientific and technological developments. This requires steps neither politicians nor scientists are necessarily comfortable with: the identification of critical scientists, counter-experts, visionaries, dissenters even; and sometimes confrontation of global and codified with local, less-codifiable knowledge. E.g. experts' model building for integrated assessment of options in environmental pollution abatement can be supplemented by parallel participatory assessments involving local inhabitants (Siebenbuehner & Barth, 2005).

META-GOVERNANCE ISSUES

Metagovernance of boundary work and boundary organizations involves cross-jurisdictional, cross-level (regional – municipal – local) and cross-scale orchestration of distributed production of policy-analytic and public management knowledge. Particularly, it might involve coordinative action among several boundary organizations. E.g., in the Netherlands the four national centers for policy analysis and advice to the government formally coordinate their activities – both in the sense of undertaking shared projects, and in the sense of clear demarcation of tasks (Halfman, 2009).

Since major aspects of this dimension of hybrid management was already covered in the subsections above on external and internal boundaries, here the importance of this task is stressed from a quality of policymaking perspective. *Metagovernance is essential to avoid the incrementalist seduction an all policymaking.* Part of this seduction is the almost irresistible urge among politicians and high-level administrators for cherry-picking and venue shopping. Their political motives drive them to claim and assert problem ownership of projects with visible, easily deliverable, short term results ('cherries'). To achieve this, they steer policy programs and projects towards decision areas and procedures ('venues') that will most likely realize the politically desired results without necessarily producing to much real change. They steer clear of decision areas and procedures that may produce politically 'adverse' outcomes. In terms of intelligent trial-and-error learning, these political strategies lead straightaway into the pitfalls of incrementalist policy change: (1) misguided policy trials produce very expensive policy outcomes; (2) policy projects prematurely declared successful retain too little flexibility to correct errors; and (3) learning from errors becomes very slow, if not impossible.

Against such normal political tendencies, the effective boundary organization engages in alert metagovernance. Metagovernance resists the bias inherent in cherry-picking by keeping alive a holistic picture of the policy problem. It counters venue shopping through careful design of procedures for deliberation and participation and by monitoring progress along these lines.

CAPACITY BUILDING

The expansion and building up of specific skills and competencies for policy analysis and public management is dealt with by other authors. Here it should be remarked that organizational infrastructure for capacity building seems to be an important task for Éupolis Lombardia already. It delivers training, life-long learning education and focused seminars for personnel and top management of the Lombardy Regional Council, Regional Executive, other Regional Agencies (policy, civil protection), Local Authorities and Social and Health Services Management, staff of Non-Governmental Organizations, and even for educational institutions. This extensive human resource development infrastructure could well become a key organizational vehicle or venue for disseminating policy-analytic and public management skills and competencies in regional governance in Lombardia.

Here it should be stressed that especially the *relationship with universities deserves attention*. In these traditional bulwarks of scientific learning disciplinary boundaries are very strong still. If policy analysis and public management knowledge is to become a recognized interdisciplinary body of knowledge, with its own faculties/departments, publication outlets and professional associations in Italian academe, detailed arrangements for cooperation with boundary organizations like Éupolis Lombardia are essential. As a site for participant observation for interested professors, or as a site offering internships for students, the institute could play a vital role in the institutionalization of policy analysis and public management in universities by offering a 'safe haven' for interdisciplinary work near political and administrative practice. *Vice versa*, the institute could profit from available expertise and manpower at universities.

CAVEAT: THE DANGEROUS DIALECTICS OF SACRED AND PROFANE COMMUNICATING ABOUT BOUNDARY WORK

In any democratic polity, hybrid management, and especially the public accountability giving of boundary work is tricky. Decisionism, or political primacy, is the sacred norm to be upheld at all costs in presenting the boundary organization and the results of boundary work to parliament, the media and the larger public. Yet, as was argued above, worldly, 'sordid' reality requires deviating from the sacred norm in everyday, profane co-production if boundary work is to be creative and productive. In other words, science-policy interactions are continually endangered by a double bind: to be successful, you must do something that is formally 'not done'; the left hand has to be deliberately in the dark about the doings of the right hand. Swedish organization expert Nils Brunsson (1993) therefore speaks of '*management by hypocrisy*'. Again, in fiduciary political cultures and civic epistemological systems like Italy seems to have, this problem may seem less urgent. Yet the Wikileaks and Climategate episodes, not to mention the mad-cow troubles in the UK longer ago and the present problems of the Japanese government around the nuclear plants after last year's tsunami, testify to the extreme vulnerability to credibility loss of regular science-politics interactions.

It may therefore be a good idea to *establish a special communication branch* in any boundary organization such as Éupolis Lombardia. Being able to deal with the old, written and new internet media is becoming more and more important – as Berlusconi's

long reign in Italy has amply demonstrated. Many boundary organizations and think tanks, therefore, devote more and more attention to their relations with the press and the media. One does not have to go so far as some US think tanks who devote up to half of their budgets on hiring communication experts for creating fancy websites, and writing executive summaries and press releases of any product of boundary work coming out of their organization. However, some systematic attention to the communication strategies, both towards government, stakeholders in subsidiarity governance, the general public and the media seems more than worthwhile.

IMPLEMENTATION

Due to limited local knowledge of the author of this advice on Éupolis Lombardia as boundary organization, this report is rather abstract and superficial. It only scratches the surface of a topic that deserves treatment in depth by the leadership and management of the organization itself. At the same time, realizing how difficult it is in practice to monitor and critically self-assess one's own progress and performance, it makes sense to in a sense *continue the outsider's expert review* initiated around the first self-assessment report of May 2012. A small group of external experts could annually assess progress made in implementation, and give advice on corrective or new reforms to be undertaken for a next year, on the basis of annual progress reports produced by staff of Éupolis Lombardia itself. It is not necessary that new written reports are produced. Assessment and advice could be given orally during a workshop in the presence of the organization's leadership. This would also guarantee genuine debate and dialogue on critical issues, that demand the productive mixture of local and more cosmopolitan knowledge about policy analysis, public management, and the workings of boundary organizations.

REFERENCES

Brugnoli & Colombo, 2012

Brunsson, N. 1993. Ideas and actions: justification and hypocrisy as alternatives to control, *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 18, 489-506

Colombo, A., 2008. *Subsidiarity Governance: Theoretical and Empirical Models*, Palgrave-MacMillan

Den Butter, F.A.G., 2011. The industrial organization of economic policy preparation in the Netherlands, in Lentsch & Weingart (eds.), 177-214

De Vries, A., 2008. *Towards Do-ability: Dealing with Uncertainty in the Science-Policy Interface*, Faculty of Management and Governance, University of Twente, PhD dissertation

Dunn, W.N. & B. Holzner, Anatomy of an emergent field. *Knowledge in Society*, 1(1), 3-26

Fischer, F., and H. Gottweiss, 2011. *The Argumentative Turn Revisited: Policy as Communicative Action*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge

Guston, D., 2001. Boundary organizations in environmental policy and science: an introduction, *Science, Technology and Human Values*, 26, 4, 339-408

Halfman, W. & R. Hoppe, 2005. Science/Policy Boundaries: A Changing Division of Labor in Dutch Expert Policy Advice, in Maassen, S. and P. Weingart, *Democratization of Expertise? Exploring Novel Forms of Scientific Advice in Political Decision-Making*, *Sociology of Sciences*, vol. 24, 135-151

Halfman, W., 2009. Measuring the Stakes: the Dutch Planning Bureaus, in Lentsch & Weingart, 41-65

Huitema, D., 2004. Calculating the political. Election manifestoes as meeting point for experts and politicians in the Netherlands: the case of RIVM, *Public Proffs: Science, Technology and Democracy*, Paris

Hoppe, R., 2008. Scientific advice and public policy: expert advisers' and policymakers' discourses on boundary work, *Poiesis and Praxis*, 6, 3-4, 235-263

Hoppe, R. 2010. *The Governance of Problems. Puzzling, Powering, and Participation*, Policy Press, Bristol

Jasanoff, 2005. *Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States*, Princeton UP, Princeton

Lasswell, H., 1970. *Design for Policy Sciences*, Elsevier.

- Lentsch, J. & P. Weingart (eds.), 2009. *Scientific Advice to Policy Making. International Comparison*, Verlag Barbara Budich, Opladen and Framington Hills
- Lentsch, J. & P. Weingart (eds.), 2011. *The Politics of Scientific Advice. Institutional Design for Quality Assurance*, Cambridge UP, Cambridge
- Renn, O., 1995. Styles of using scientific expertise: a comparative framework, *Science and Public Policy*, 22, 3, 147-156
- Scholten, P., 2008. *Constructing Immigrant Policies: Research-policy relations and immigrant integration in the Netherlands, 1970-2004*, University of Twente, Enschede, PhD
- Siebenhühner, B. & V. Barth, 2005, The role of computer-assisted modelling in participatory assessments, *Environmental Impact Assessment Review*, 4, 367-389
- Shaw, A., 2005. *Imbued Meaning: Science-Policy Interactions in the IPCC*, University of British Columbia, PhD dissertation
- Starr, S.L., & J.R., Griesemer, 1989. Institutional ecology, 'translations' and boundary objects: amateurs and professionals in Berkeley's Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907-1939, *Social Studies of Science*, 19, 387-420
- Stone, D., 1997. *Policy Paradox. The Art of Political Decision Making*, W.W. Norton, New York
- Van Egmond, S., and R. Zeiss, 2010. Modelling for Policy. Science-Based Models as Performative Boundary Objects for Dutch Policy Making, *Science and Public Policy*, 58-78
- Yanow, D., 1999. *Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis*, SAGE