


INAUGURAL LECTURE
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FUTURE PROCUREMENT WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT MARKETS

PROF. DR. LOUISE KNIGHT

UNIVERSITY OF TWENTE.



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INAUGURAL LECTURE PROF. DR. LOUISE KNIGHT

COLOPHON

Prof. dr. Louise Knight

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FUTURE PROCUREMENT

WE NEED TO TALK ABOUT MARKETS

Dear Dean, Dear colleagues and students, Dear family and friends,
Dear distinguished guests

INTRODUCTION

Strange as this may sound to those outside our fields, both procurement and marketing scholars have long neglected the topic of markets. And none of us talk much about unsustainability, do we?

Though there is now more talk of markets in procurement policy and practice, for reasons I will explain, I believe that it is not enough. Markets should be a central theme in public and healthcare procurement. Without this, procurement's capacity to contribute will be constrained. It will be substantial, but not what it could be.

SETTING THE SCENE

To set the scene, I will briefly introduce unsustainability, markets and public procurement.

UNSUSTAINABILITY

Where we are now

In the late 90s, the British international political economist Susan Strange declared: "The system is failing Nature - the planet Earth - which is being increasingly pillaged, perverted and polluted by economic enterprises which the state system is unable to control or restrain." [1, 2]

The enterprises to which she referred were the major transnational corporations. She added "The fact that the system survives despite its failures only shows the difficulty of finding and building an alternative."

Her arguments were echoed a decade later by leading US environmental scientist Gus Speth¹ [3]: "Potent measures are needed that address the root causes of today's destructive growth and to transform economic activity into something environmentally benign and restorative."

And yet, another decade on, here we are with ever louder and clearer warnings from responsible leaders; warnings which are persistently being

countered by pervasive ‘discourses of climate delay’ [4]?

Greta Thunberg, 2019 – ‘our house is on fire’ at the World Economic Forum, January 2019

António Guterres, UN Secretary General, at the World Economic Forum, January 2023 – ‘business model inconsistent with human survival... this insanity...’ the 1.5-degree ‘battle is being lost’

Frans Timmermans, Vice-President of the European Commission, responsible for the European Green Deal, at the Munich Security Conference, February 2023: Without action, “there is no doubt in my mind that my kids, my grandkids will be fighting wars over water and food.”

The message is clear. We need to tackle unsustainability³ today, as well as plan for tomorrow’s sustainability. We should pay close attention to activists, not fear them or dismiss them. The people we should fear are the inactivists.

To put the climate crisis in highly unacademic terms – we (society) are in a deep hole. We have been digging ever faster for the last 30-40 years.⁴

Business-not-as-usual

We – by which I mean business and management academics – have played an important part in helping businesses ‘dig the hole’ ever more efficiently. The impact of procurement is arguably even greater since sourcing decisions influence behaviours right up the supply chain [6]. The good news is that this also means we in procurement are well placed to make a huge contribution to improving the situation. In an article published last year, co-authored with colleagues from the editorial team of the *Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management*, we made a start on trying to address procurement’s potential contribution to ‘business-not-as-usual’ [6].

Procurement is doing a lot already, but much of it is about harm reduction [7] – slowing down the digging – rather than about working in radically different, regenerative ways [8] – ie starting to infill the hole. There are many

exciting initiatives designed around regenerative principles. This is important work, but cannot be our sole focus. That would be like trying to understand the dynamics of a business sector by just focusing on the small, exciting start-up firms and ignoring the large, incumbent companies. We have to think about the business system as a whole, and that means looking closely at markets, not just individual organizations and initiatives.

MARKETS

In this lecture, I use the term market in several ways.

First, in talking about 'free market', I refer to the assumption that market forces will deliver greater efficiencies, and the role of government is to stay out of the way unless there is a market failure [9, 10].

Second, a market is a group of buyers and suppliers. In many business-to-business markets, there are relatively few buyers and sellers. Especially in these cases, it is important to understand market shares and dynamics as the long term, cumulative outcomes of buyers' sourcing decisions and sellers' marketing and competition strategies (and in some cases the influence of regulators), rather than as the effect of disembodied 'market forces' [11, 12].

The third sense in which I use the term market is what economists call factor markets. This is the pool of suppliers available to buyers. Buyers want a 'healthy' factor market [13] in which a sufficient number of suppliers are competing effectively and consistently, are reliably delivering high quality products at a reasonable cost with fair profits and a good rate of innovation. Suppliers' barriers to entry and exit, and buyers' switching costs should be low enough to sustain supplier diversity and market dynamism, without chaotic churn.

As an aside, many of the points I will make today relate to the US and UK industry and regulatory contexts. Rightly, you might wonder to what extent they are relevant to our Dutch and European Union setting. I would argue the connections are significant. For example, in the Dutch public sector outsourcing of services is very high; there are plenty of lessons to learn from UK failures. In the US, market concentration is more extreme but Europe is not immune to the problems faced there, not least because many relate to global companies and their planetary impact.

PUBLIC AND HEALTHCARE PROCUREMENT

Procurement (or purchasing, or purchasing and supply, here I use these terms interchangeably) concerns the acquisition by an organization of the external resources it needs, from raw materials, through complex products and services, to major infrastructure projects. The maturity of procurement in organizations varies hugely within and between sectors. Procurement personnel may be involved in all stages of the acquisition process, working with budget holders and end users, selecting the most appropriate supplier, letting contracts and evaluating supplier performance. Large organizations have many thousands of suppliers. As well as dealing with specific transactions, procurement experts get involved in business strategy and innovation projects, supplier development, and tracking factor market developments.

In the public sector, contracting authorities are subject to regulations designed to ensure procurement processes are efficient, competitive, fair and deliver value for money⁵. Public bodies 'buying decisions are subject to greater scrutiny than firms'. In every sector, buyers balance cost, quality and, as the Covid-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine have highlighted so vividly, security of supply.

Successful procurement is about much more than administrative efficiency. At its best, it is a key means for public contracting authorities and healthcare providers to deliver their policy goals and strategies [14]. Consider, for example, that a municipality will be interested in supporting local businesses, and hospitals want to find and rapidly adopt new technologies which significantly reduce the costs of care and/or improve health outcomes. Leveraging public spend to promote innovation and deliver environmental, social and economic benefits is a key goal among policy makers.

And that spend is considerable. (See table 1)

2019	General government procurement spending as a percentage of GDP	General government procurement spending as a percentage of total government expenditures	GDP
NL	19.6	46.8	€813.06 billion
UK	13.2	32.1	£2,238.35 billion
US	9.6	25.2	\$21,381 billion
OECD-EU	13.7	29.4	-

Table 1: GDP and government spend data for 2019 (sources: OECD and Statista)

It is worth noting how these figures compare to the scale of some of the companies serving the public and health sectors. According to Statista, in 2021, total health and social care costs in the Netherlands amounted to nearly 125 billion euros, while Pfizer had prescription sales of 72 billion US dollars.

Before I move on from this introduction: I suspect that many of the procurement experts in the audience had an instinctive critical reaction to my opening comment that we don't talk about markets. After all, if you do good category management, you will map your critical markets and supply chains, and public procurement of innovation is about promoting competition in markets. My argument is that we can do much more than this.

EXPLORING BUSINESS, UNSUSTAINABILITY AND MARKETS STARTING BLOCKS

My interest in markets goes back a long way [12, 15, 16], but the kickstart to this current work was a study exploring the future of procurement that I did 5 years ago in partnership with the UK's Chartered Institute of Procurement and Supply – known as the CIPS – and Jo Meehan⁶, from the University of Liverpool [17, 18]⁷. This project triggered a lot of questions, related to two observations.

Thinking about the future is difficult

First, from the interviews and workshops we ran with business and procurement leaders, it was clear that thinking about the future is very difficult. We can readily recognise 'megatrend's, but it is very difficult to articulate how, for example, technology or mass migration might connect

to our professional context and daily lives. There's discomfort in thinking of the future. And we certainly don't like to think about how we might be responsible for some of the problems we face.

Buyers' lack of sense of agency

We also noticed a distinct sense of fatalism and a perceived lack of agency in markets. Most notably, these procurement leaders recognised the increasing importance of tech platforms – that the likes of Amazon would move from selling to consumers to become very important in business-to-business settings. They recognised inherent risks to competition in supply markets with this Amazonification process, but they saw it as inexorable. There was no sense that how supply markets develop is a function of the cumulative decisions of buyers (as well as of suppliers and regulators). Most saw it as inevitable that big, powerful companies would become ever more dominant.

Why? What implications?

So, I brought these sources of inspiration and questions with me when I arrived to work at UT in January 2020. Within a matter of weeks however Covid-19 struck. Whereas some took up baking, my indulgence was online book shopping. I took to reading widely, and delving into the related scientific evidence across many disciplines, around two broad themes – the climate crisis and, second, market concentration, competition and anti-monopoly in the business system.

I will now very briefly sketch out several key insights from this reading, as they relate to the need to talk about unsustainability and about markets. And then I will discuss how these connect – or at least potentially connect – to procurement, especially procurement from a public or healthcare perspective.

1 CHALLENGING ECONOMIC ORTHODOXIES

Since the 2008 financial crash, there are increasing calls to “rethink” capitalism, from diverse sources including the OECD's New Approaches to Economic Challenges initiative to authors such as Mariana Mazzucato [20], Michael Jacobs [21, 22], Robert Reich [23]⁸ and Mark Carney [24], former Governor of the Bank of England. All highlight the inadequacy of existing economic theories and the values that underpin them.

The debate is often framed in political as well as economic terms, with the turn to capitalism in its current, unsustainable form attributed the Reagan-Thatcher era. A recent contribution from Elizabeth Popp Berman [25] provides a more nuanced analysis showing how what she calls the “economic style of reasoning” became institutionalised through various mechanisms across social policy, market governance and environmental regulation. She argues it is wrong to attribute this just to a political shift to the right. In the US, this change was driven by centrist Democrats as well as Republicans. (There is a similar story to tell in the UK, and I suppose in many other countries too.) Importantly, she also highlights how this economic style of reasoning is widely taken up by technocrats, and is “often perceived as politically neutral” despite containing values of its own – “values like choice, competition and, especially, efficiency”. These compete with values of rights, universalism, equity and limiting corporate power – values which often are not seen as politically neutral. [25]⁹

2 THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BUSINESS FOR CREATING THE CLIMATE EMERGENCY

As consumers, we hear a lot about actions that we can take to be more green and socially responsible. This ‘good citizen’ thinking was the starting point for much of the early action in greening business. It suits businesses all too well [27] for us to consider that “individuals and consumers are ultimately responsible for taking actions to address climate change” [4]. What we hear less about and yet what was already being discussed back in the 90s [1] is that business, and specifically big business, bears great responsibility for our current situation. Especially since the 1980s, transnational corporations and globalisation have served as the engine of rising carbon emissions and the accelerator of climate change [3]. Every company must act, but we also need to recognise and act on the system failure this represents.

3 COMPANIES ACTIVELY BLOCK AND SLOW CLIMATE ACTION

ExxonMobil has been back in the media recently. It turns out that carbon emissions and temperature forecasts made by Exxon company scientists in the 1970s were highly accurate [28]. Exxon leaders could have led the way on averting the climate crisis. And yet they chose not just to hide this knowledge, but to actively deny climate change. In *Merchants of Doubt*, Naomi Oreskes and Erik Conway explain how Exxon’s playbook replicated tactics that were devised for the tobacco industry, and which are also reflected in practices across various other sectors today.

One might think that these problems are limited to certain industries. They are not. There is increasing recognition of the power of lobbying and the disproportionate voice given to dominant incumbent firms in markets. Many major firms that are taking positive environmental measures are members of industry associations which are pulling in the other direction¹⁰. Consider for example evidence from the think tank InfluenceMap on the companies most relevant to climate change in Europe¹¹ and their industry associations (see Figure 1)¹².

The European Climate Lobbying Landscape

The diagram below charts the Total Score and global Engagement Intensity for the companies and industry associations operating in Europe that are most significant to climate change.

Companies in the top right exhibit active and supportive policy engagement, while those in the top left are active and oppositional. Companies towards the bottom of the quadrant are less actively engaged on climate policy.




Figure 1: Climate lobbying in Europe. Source: InfluenceMap.org <https://europe.influencemap.org/>

4 THE POWER AND POLITICS OF BUSINESS(ES)

Drawing in particular on Susan Strange's prescient writings¹³ on firms, markets, states and authority [1, 32-39], the power¹⁴ [40] and political agency of large firms [32, 41, 42] are very clear¹⁵. Transnational corporations are not just economically powerful, they are political actors in their own right [32, 43]. As Philippon explains concerning US firms:

“on average, the top four firms control 15% of the revenues in their industries. But they account for 35% of campaign finance contributions and 45% of lobbying expenditures... this means that large firms play an even more outsized role in the political system than they do in the economy itself”[44].

Colin Crouch points out that lobbying is a term whose origins imply waiting in the ante-room to the decision making chamber to plead a cause, but not having access to the chamber itself. However, “the representatives of today’s TNC’s are not in the lobby, outside the real decision-making space of government, at all. They are right inside the room of political decision-making. They set standards, establish private regulatory systems, act as consultants to government, even have staff seconded to ministers’ offices.” [32]. Firms are far better represented than civil society.

And this does not just concern the high profile, publicly listed multinationals. Given wheat has been in the news since Russia invaded Ukraine, perhaps you know that just 4 companies trade more than 70% of the global wheat supply¹⁶. If you want (and here I quote the Economist) an “entertaining story” of “how a few commodity-trading firms quietly reconfigured the world economy, making fortunes, juggling embargoes and swaying geopolitics” then I recommend this book by two Bloomberg journalists (Javier Blas and Jack Farthy): *The World for Sale: money, power and traders who barter the world’s resources* [45, 46]. If you share Frans Timmermans’ concerns, you should read it!

5 THE PREVALENCE AND POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF HIGHLY CONCENTRATED MARKETS

Market concentration is high and rising¹⁷ [44, 49]. A concentrated market is not necessarily a problem [29, 44, 47]. However, in the US, between 1980 and 2016 markups rose from 21% above cost to 61%, though the median is constant, which means a few large firms have benefitted the most. Profits have risen, and so has inequality as wages have suffered [29, 50]. Business investment relative to operating surplus has been going down, particularly for tangible assets [44]. The share of young firms (<=5 years) in the economy has declined [44]. According to Philippon, the situation in Europe is much better. Nonetheless there are still major areas of concern, in particular relating to digital markets [51].

6 BUILDING AND EXPLOITING MARKET POWER

Authors describe multiple mechanisms by which firms from tech titans [42, 52], to food companies [53], to commodity traders [45], care home operators [2] and so on build and exploit their market power through aggressive competition [54, 55] and financial engineering [see for example, 2, 56, 57].

Brett Christophers' analysis of rentier capitalism [58, 59] among UK firms is cross-sectoral. Rent is "income derived from the ownership, possession or control of scarce assets and under conditions of limited or no competition" [58]. As you can see on the left, these assets can take several forms. His analysis shows how 'rentier capitalism' is alive and well in the UK economy.

Table 1. Forms of contemporary UK rentierism.

Asset	Primary means of gaining asset control	Principal rental streams	Examples of prominent rentiers
Financial	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creation of credit money by private banks • Acquisition of financial assets in primary and secondary markets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interest • Dividends • Capital gains 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Barclays • HSBC • Lloyds
Land	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Acquisition in markets • Privatization of landholdings of formerly state-owned enterprises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground rent 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British Land Company • Land Securities Group • Tesco
Natural resource reserves	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leasing agreements with mineral rights owners 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Product sales 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BP • Glencore • Royal Dutch Shell
Intellectual property	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Registration of rights (to e.g. patents, trademarks) with state intellectual property offices 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Product sales • Licensing of intellectual property 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GlaxoSmithKline • Diageo • Unilever
Radio spectrum	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bidding for licences through state-run spectrum auctions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service charges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Vodafone • CK Hutchison • Telefónica
Digital platforms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Organic creation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service charges • Advertising fees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Facebook • Google • London Stock Exchange
Natural monopolies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Privatization of state-owned enterprises 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service charges 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BT • Cadent • Arqiva
Service contracts	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bidding processes (various) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service fees 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capita • Serco • ISG

Figure 2: Overview of UK rentier capitalism: Source: Christophers, B., 2019. The rentierization of the United Kingdom economy. Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space.

Three of these categories are of particular interest in the health and public sectors - intellectual property in pharma and medtech, digital platforms and service contracts. For the latter, he refers to the major companies which take on outsourced service contracts such as catering and prison services. The consequences of such dependencies become most apparent in times of crisis, as we saw in the UK in 2018 when Carillion collapsed with debts

of £7bn, over 400 contracts with the public sector and 3000 job losses [57]. And as we also witnessed when governments scrambled to secure covid vaccines.


7 THE ROLE OF ANTI-MONOPOLY REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT

An increasingly influential, loose coalition of advocates for radical change in anti-monopoly policy in the US and in Europe [42, 52, 55, 60-62]¹⁸ argues that the persistent and rising monopoly problem (especially as it occurs in the US and in digital markets¹⁹) is systemic, and that it has not only economic consequences for suppliers and customers, but is a threat to democracy and worker welfare [41, 50, 62, 65, 66].

The original logic of regulation was to curb companies' market and political influence. Since the 1980s, this has been replaced by what is known as the consumer welfare test – basically if it is not obvious that customers will pay more then a merger is permitted. It's under this logic, which is about short-term price for customers not long-term welfare at community level, that the power of the tech titans emerged, not because legislation changed but the way it has been enforced by the courts and regulators [67]²⁰. With the appointment of Lina Khan as Chair of the US Federal Trade Commission by President Biden in 2021, curbing corporate power is back on the agenda in the US.

8 THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT IN INNOVATION

Mariana Mazzucato [68, 69] makes a powerful case that, contrary to commonly held assumptions, government has played a central role in revolutionary innovations²¹. Looking to the future, she articulates seven approaches for reframing the way government and business should work together. According to this view, governments should define innovation missions and 'tilt' the playing field²² in ways that will help tackle big societal problems such health crises, climate change and digital disruptions [71, 72].



Six Myths

- Myth 1: Innovation is about R & D
- Myth 2: Small is beautiful
- Myth 3: Venture capital is risk loving
- Myth 4: We live in a knowledge economy - just look at all the patents!
- Myth 5: Europe's problem is all about commercialization
- Myth 6: Business investment requires 'less tax and red tape'

Mariana
Mazzucato



Seven Pillars

1. **value** and the collective process through which it is created
2. **markets** and market shaping
3. **organizations** and organizational change
4. **finance** and longterm financing
5. **distribution** and inclusive growth
6. **partnership** and stakeholder value
7. **participation** and co-creation

https://www.broadbentstitute.ca/mission_economy

Figure 3: Six myths about innovation and seven pillars for co-creating value.

Sources: Mazzucato (2015 and 2021)

9 NEW ECONOMIC THINKING: IN PURSUIT OF 'HEALTHY' MARKETS ACHIEVING PUBLIC VALUE FOR PUBLIC PURPOSE, THROUGH CO-CREATION

Closing the circle back to my initial point about economic orthodoxies, many authors articulate positive alternatives to the approaches and issues I have briefly outlined. The themes they address include:

- **Purpose-driven corporations** with a fundamental commitment to all stakeholders, rather than solely a commitment to maximizing shareholder value [73]²³
- Recognition of the positive role of government beyond just efficient provision of public services²⁴, to also articulating **public purpose** [20, 72]
- Business, government and civil society focused on co-creating public value defined in terms of broad and widely accepted societal goals [20]²⁵
- **Sustainable/healthy markets** are "inclusive, equitable, green and profitable where sustainable principles drive growth; a market that will generate long-term value across society through the integration and balance of natural, social, human and financial capital. Sustainable markets help to drive systems-level change by focusing on consumer demand, disruptive innovation, sustainable alternatives and enhanced partnerships between the public and private sectors." [74, 75, see also: 76]
- A radical vision of **stakeholder capitalism** and sustainability which entails

much more than a concern for the shorter-term interests of proximate stakeholders [8, 20, 69, 71, 72, 77], and which recognises that, when value “is created collectively, it should be shared collectively” [71]

- Ambitions for growth centred on **regenerative principles** and not the blind pursuit of GDP growth²⁷, instead seeking **intergenerational justice** and guided by cathedral thinking [77] to overcome the tragedy of the horizon [80]

SUMMARISING

So, it seems that all too often the very processes and tactics that are supposedly positive manifestations of competition actually deliver less dynamic markets, outcomes that are detrimental to all but shareholders’ short term interests, and are unsustainable in both ecological and societal terms. Although, in some quarters, firms are showing a greater sense of urgency and willingness to invest in a business transition, achievements and plans are far from sufficient²⁸.

We continue to dig the hole...

In summary, I have come to recognise:

1. Just how deeply embedded values of choice, competition and efficiency – i.e. the economic style of reasoning – are in governance and social policy [25, 72].
2. How much the sustainability transition depends on fundamental change not just in individual firms and sectors, but across the business system [1, 34]
3. This is not just a matter of business being more responsible, but also of government and civil society doing a much better job of holding business to account [32]. “Corporate power is not benign” [55]²⁹
4. The importance of government and society co-creating public value with the private sector
5. That, outside of our field, the role of government is seen as investor and regulator, and its influence as purchaser gets little attention.

We need to proactively address markets, and this is where procurement comes in, as I will outline next.

CONNECTING MARKETS AND PROCUREMENT

It's notable that only one author I encountered, Mariana Mazzucato [72], has explicitly recognised the potential role of public procurement. This reflects the connection between her work and the well established topic of public procurement of innovation [81].

ADDRESSING THE UNPALATABLE: TACKLING EXCESSIVE PROFITS AND UNACCEPTABLE PRACTICES

To borrow a phrase from Nik Gowing and Chris Langdon [82, 83], in the world of procurement we need to get to grips with the unpalatable. Here's a few suggestions, some of which are intentionally framed to be provocative. For each, I will try to be clear about why it's a matter for procurement, the relevance of a market view and how it connects to unsustainability. I will mention healthcare in many examples – the issues tend to be more visible in this domain but it's important to note they are rarely unique to the sector.


The unsustainability of high profits and increasing margins

There has been a lot of media attention on excessive profits, most recently around vaccines [84] and energy [85]. A recent study of leading pharmaceutical companies [86] found their earnings as a fraction of revenue was almost twice that of other companies in the S&P 500 Index [see also 84]. The largest medtech firms have margins of 20-30%, and they charge vastly different prices for exactly the same product in different countries. And yet generally, in procurement, we do not routinely talk about profit levels in markets or distribution of value in supply chains, nor whether they are acceptable in the long run in relation to pressures on – for example – the affordability of healthcare (see Figure 4) or cities' need to prioritise investment in environmental initiatives. On the other hand, we do often hear about protecting companies' margins in order to incentivize innovation (see example in Figure 5).

Government health expenditure as a share of GDP, 1975 to 2019

This metric captures spending on government funded health care systems and social health insurance, as well as compulsory health insurance.

Our World
in Data



Source: Our World In Data based on Lindert (1994), OECD (1993), OECD Stat

OurWorldInData.org/financing-healthcare • CC BY

Note: Health spending includes final consumption of health care goods and services (i.e. current health expenditure). This excludes spending on capital investments.

Figure 4: Rising health expenditure (1975 to 2019) Source Our World in Data

	DEFINITION	SAMPLE METRICS	POTENTIAL MARKET SHORTCOMINGS
Affordability	Extent to which the price point maximizes market efficiency between payers and suppliers to support health outcomes	Prices are low enough to make widespread use of the product cost-effective Prices are high enough to incentivize suppliers to remain in the business	High, unaffordable prices or high price variance across geographies Cyclical swings in prices

Figure 5: Extract from *Healthy markets for global health: a market shaping primer* (2014) [87] p21

Of course profits are only realised when contracts are agreed and delivered, but at that point it is too late to address deeply embedded, systemic issues. There are important opportunities for pooling the expertise of experienced professionals to identify approaches to address market barriers to entry and barriers to switching, and to creating appropriate and aligned incentives [76]. Whilst such measures might be taken in consultation with regulators and competition authorities, they are not by definition regulator driven.

The (un)acceptability of some market practices

As we have seen with personal protective equipment, chips, vaccines and energy, governments step in in times of crisis, aiming to use their political influence and economies of scale to cope with chaotic markets. Excessive prices and the lack of security of supply motivate such reactive interventions.

Especially during COVID, corruption and incompetence on the buying side of healthcare procurement received a lot of attention in the press, as did some activities on the supplier side. Though the OECD, among others, has plenty of advice on recognising and addressing anti-competitive practices³⁰, they are not a widely discussed topic in professional and academic publications. To name just a few examples:

- these practices of getting buyers to sign non-disclosure agreements, which prevents price benchmarking and facilitates price gouging
- buying up and then closing down innovative market entrants [54]
- forcing customers to prematurely buy system upgrades, and expensive staff training
- shielding profit increases behind talk of inflation [88, 89]
- realising increased profit through unethical marketing practices [90] generating 'artificial' demand for healthcare
- bid rigging [91]
- prioritising wealth creation over health creation and care quality [92, 93]
- gaining price advantage by reducing costs through tax avoidance [94] facilitated by complex ownership arrangements [35, 36]
- management strategies and financial practices which jeopardise basic services such as social care [2, 56] and core government services [57, 95]

and the list goes on...

Collective action to identify, quantify and counter such harmful strategies is very much in scope for procurement experts. Not to replace regulation but to complement it and to foster genuine competition. There are experts out there ready to advise³¹, but of course that does not mean the necessary resources within buying functions are available...

Buyer-buyer Rivalry

Healthcare procurement during the pandemic provided plenty of evidence of rivalry and less-than-ethical behaviour between states and between care

providers [96, 97]. A popular conclusion is that we need to work harder on cooperating effectively. I argue that we also need a much greater understanding of rivalry between buyers when resources are very scarce or uncertain. In a crisis situation, it is a question of how (with support from stakeholders such as government) can buyers collectively reduce the tendency towards rivalry, and promote cooperation to make the most of scarce resources? And after the crisis, or if it is a long-term crisis, buyers who can hold their rivalry in check might also find common ground in pro-actively building supply market capacity. Such interventions would be about shaping the market to help develop a healthy market – two themes which I address next.

THE ROLE OF BUYERS IN MARKETS: FROM MARKET TAKERS, TO (FACTOR) MARKET SHAPERS AND MARKET CO-CREATORS

Market shaping is the “the agential efforts of firms, consumers, public actors, and various collectives to influence market formation and transformation” [98]. There is a growing body of research on market shaping, much of it in the context of innovation and marketing. In the health and public sectors, contrasting examples include market shaping for vaccine availability in low income countries [87, 99-101], Preston city council’s (UK) initiative to develop the local economy [102] and the UK’s central government’s market management advice which focuses on outsourced service suppliers [76]³². Each of these articulates a definition of healthy market, reflecting various economic, political and social goals. Some provide recommendations to buyers on influencing change in the market. Notably most are silent on the question of *fair* profit. Nevertheless, they provide interesting examples of how buyers can transition from being passive market takers to the market co-creators advocated by Mazzucato.

THEORISING MARKET SHAPING TOWARDS HEALTHY MARKETS: FACTOR MARKETS-AS-COMMONS AND MARKET STEWARDING BY BUYERS (AFTER ELINOR OSTROM)

In a recent wide ranging review, Nenonen and Storbacka [98] identified seven different theoretical perspectives in use. They conclude: “there is no general market-shaping theory – and we remain unsure whether aiming for one single theory covering this complex and multi-dimensional phenomenon would be possible or even desirable.” (p347) Given the huge range of literature they cover, I’m inclined to agree. There is however a theory which could be applied to a substantial subset of cases of market

shaping, namely those in which actors on the buying side shape supplier markets.

This is a theory of collective action developed in the field of commons scholarship led by Nobel Prize winner Elinor Ostrom³³ [103]. At the time she began her research, popular theories of collective action held that rational actors sharing a set of resources, known as a commons, would act only in their own short term interest, leading to resource degradation and a ‘tragedy of the commons’ [104, 105]. This ‘tragedy’ could only be avoided by government intervention or privatisation. However she saw that this theory did not always fit actual and historical practice.

She noted many examples of successful management of commons which was self-organized by the beneficiaries. Based on her investigations of an exceptional set of cases (both in terms of their scale and number), she derived 8 design principles by which common-pool resources can be governed by local actors collectively. In her earlier research, she looked at natural common pool resources, for example fisheries, forests and river basins. By the end of her career, she was working on global commons and the role of polycentric governance in addressing climate change [106].

I argue that factor markets – that is the pool of suppliers – can be regarded as a form of commons. As buyers contract with the suppliers, they are drawing out resources from the common pool. If all the buyers were to act in their own short-term economic interest, they would most likely – sooner or later – to degrade the resource pool. If however they draw out those resources using methods and taking volumes that are sustainable, and they jointly look after the resource pool to keep the market healthy, all benefit. Over the long term, the supplier market is healthy and buyers’ needs are met. I call this process ‘market stewarding’.

To be clear, this notion of market stewarding does not presume suppliers are passive actors in the system. It does however assume that buyers are far from passive market-takers. It does not assume that buyers will coordinate their resource extraction (as in joint contracting). It does assume that there will be some form of coordination for looking after the long term health of the market.

REFRAMING

Many of the comments I have made so far might be taken as being anti business. I don't think they are! On the contrary, they are very much pro-business and about progressive ways of doing business. They are about constructively and frankly criticising current problems and understanding their origins, and providing positive suggestions for systemic change. They propose that procurement experts working across public organizations can do more for the sustainability transition if they more fully and explicitly take up a market level view of their role, and act collectively as market stewards. Note, this is in addition to the significant progress that is being made on green and social procurement.

Taking inspiration from Ostrom and her colleagues, in market stewarding by buyers, we have an umbrella concept for initiatives which neither rely on government regulation or centralising purchasing power, nor defer to powerful market incumbents or naively hope that healthy markets will emerge in settings which are 'far-from-free' markets. It offers a way of reframing how we think about market forces and power, and proposes how distributed buyers might self-organise to collectively co-create markets. It aligns with Mazzucato's call for a positive framing of government's roles in innovation and value co-creation with the business sector.

PUBLIC SECTOR AND HEALTHCARE PROCUREMENT CHAIR: ACTIVITIES AND PLANS

Moving from these ideas about how procurement could develop to my plans for the future, there are some general implications for procurement research and education that I would like to highlight.

IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION AND RESEARCH

Research Challenges

As a management researcher, getting access to a decent number of companies is tough enough, doing robust research looking at long term change across ecosystems presents additional challenges. We will need to adopt some new approaches.

Future focused research methods: working very closely with experts and collaborators with a vision for change. I'm pleased to say that is a growing strength in the team here at UT, where we have used scenario

planning, World Cafés, design science methods and online Delphi studies [18, 107-109].

Non-traditional data: The data transparency and open data movement affects us in both procurement practice and research. New data sources from EU public tendering portals [110] in combination with new research techniques offer exciting opportunities. I am part of a team that submitted an application for European funding for network building to bring together policy makers and researchers to use open data for developing evidence-based procurement practice.

Collaboration for data pooling: This is somewhat more speculative and draws inspiration from the scope and scale of Ostrom's empirical work and the programme she led. Case studies have to capture longitudinal data from multiple stakeholders. They are highly resource intensive. Perhaps there is scope for collaborative data collection and pooling.

The academic practice of (not) speaking out

As my colleague Esther Turnhout, UT Professor of Science, Technology and Society, put it so bluntly and so eloquently, referring to sustainability scientists: "As a result of a misguided idea of neutrality and a fear of being seen as political, they continue to produce knowledge that lacks actionability, reproduces the status quo, and ignores power... The blindness created by the false ideal of neutrality allows science to continue to reinforce dominant values, interests, and knowledge systems, because questioning them is seen as political, while not questioning them is seen as neutral... science has become an obstacle for transformation... We need to recognize that transformation cannot happen by only elevating nice things"[111]. We need to learn to be more forthright.

Orienting Education to the Future

We need to recognise that the economic style of reasoning predominates, and its reach and implications are not well understood and addressed. We will not succeed in tackling unsustainability if we just try to add environmentally and socially desirable goals to our existing approaches, and only focus on incumbent firms in today's markets. I aim to contribute to developing our education to meet the challenges I have outlined. This will involve 'nice things' [112] – like Ostrom's theory of collective action and Mazzucato's co-creation of public value – and paying attention to the

negatives, as Susan Strange did [1].

RESEARCH

From a research perspective we will pursue 3 interconnected themes.

MARKETS-AS-COMMONS AND MARKET STEWARDING

With Steven Borobia, Fons Wijnhoven and others, we are working on the first of what we hope will be many contributions on bringing commons scholarship to procurement and markets. While working on the concept from a theoretical and modelling perspective, we have also identified two possible markets to investigate as case studies. By the time Steven completes his PhD, we should have a strong foundation in place. We have MSc students doing their theses in related areas, for example on contracting patterns in the Dutch youth care services (Willemien Hoogenraad) and on procurement managers' experiences of anti-competitive practices by healthcare suppliers (Pim Hovestad).

RIVALRY, RESILIENCE AND RELIABILITY

Through three connected projects, included one funded by ZonMw³⁴ and the long running IRSPP³⁵ initiative, and working with another PhD candidate, Esmee Peters, we have researched successes and failures in healthcare procurement during Covid-19 [96, 113]. There is much to learn from the crisis, and not just in terms of managing in times of crisis, but also in surfacing and addressing endemic problems. Like many other researchers, we are working with the notion of resilience but also rivalry between buyers, and organising for reliability within the buyer network [97]. From a market perspective, we need to understand how to maintain constructive, effective cooperation in the face of ever greater pressures to compete for scarce resources.

INNOVATIVE & RESPONSIBLE PROCUREMENT

The EL-IPS public sector and healthcare procurement team has several projects under way with municipalities and in health with the hospital and social care sectors, and we are busy preparing proposals for further funding.

Innovative and responsible procurement in the context of cities

Cities are at the forefront of addressing the climate emergency, and many other challenges besides. Thanks to our colleagues at Gemeente Haarlem,

we connected with the European Commission supported Urban Agenda Partnership for Innovative and Responsible Public Procurement. We are actively involved in delivery of its second action plan, in part through the work of the Horizon Europe funded PROCEDIN project³⁶ which I coordinate. PROCEDIN is all about capacity building³⁷. It involves several of us from UT, including Frederik Vos, Klaas Stek, Esmee Peters and PhD candidate Shantal Kartoidjojo.

Innovative and responsible procurement in the context of healthcare

Historically, in healthcare procurement, the innovation agenda has had more attention than green procurement. Even when the evidence is strong that novel products will yield better care outcomes and significant cost savings, the barriers to market entry are often too high for successful adoption. My colleague assistant professor Carolina Belotti Pedroso researches innovation and value based purchasing in hospital procurement teams. Taking a market perspective, there are connections here between new technology adoption and market stewarding.

On the environmental front, next month we will submit a major grant application that I am leading, responding to a Horizon Europe call for reducing carbon emissions and pollution in the healthcare system. Our angle is how stakeholders on the buy-side – procurement professionals, clinicians, managers and policymakers – can together better mobilise and cooperate with suppliers to improve environmental performance.

BUSINESS-NOT-AS-USUAL (BNAU): RESEARCH, PROMOTING PROCUREMENT, NETWORK AND CAPACITY BUILDING

Alongside these three core areas of research, there are a number of smaller initiatives and studies I lead or participate in, and other academic roles. All, in one way or another, connect to my interest in what I call ‘business-not-as-usual’. These include:

- Exploring various concepts of degrowth and their implications for procurement with Desirée Knoppen and Johannes Heller
- Advocating for non-positivist case study research in procurement and supply chain management with Thomas Johnsen and Johannes Heller
- Serving as a Senior Associate Editor at Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management, and guest editing a long term special issue/initiative focusing on BNAU oriented research, with Jo Meehan

- Coordinating IPSERA's (International Purchasing and Supply Education and Research Association) special interest group on public procurement
- Co-directing EL-IPS (UT's European Lab for Innovative Purchasing and Supply) with Holger Schiele and Leentje Volker

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Before I close, I want to thank family, friends and colleagues without whose support I would not be here today, and those without whose shared passion for the topic of procurement and commitment to making a difference I would not be looking ahead with such enthusiasm. Time is short, the list is long and the fear of missing someone out is considerable!

My research journey started when my boss at London Underground, Christopher Bouverie-Brine, suggested I join the part-time MPhil programme at the University of Bath led by Richard Lamming who was setting a research centre called CRiSPS. There, I had the best of supervisors! Annie Pye guided me through the MPhil and my subsequent part-time PhD studies, expanding my horizons well beyond procurement and constantly, gently challenging my linear views of management. That linear thinking is long gone, but I still benefit from Annie's caring forthrightness and generosity – thank-you, Annie!

The research bug bit hard and two years after starting the MPhil I joined CRiSPS full-time. The team I worked with there is now scattered across Europe (and yes that does still include the UK!), but the collaborations and friendships endure. In particular, I would like to thank Christine Harland for her leadership. What we learnt together is foundational to much of the agenda I set out today. Christine, you and I have been talking about markets for a long time, and I hope we will enjoy many more conversations, both professional and social.

While at Aston University, the research projects undertaken with Desirée Knoppen, Jo Meehan and the CIPS were both inspiring and convivial. I am grateful to them and my Aston colleagues, especially Ed Sweeney and Aris Matopoulos.

In early 2020, I joined the University of Twente. Building new networks is challenging at the best of times; it's very hard during a pandemic. Despite

this, progress is good and I particularly acknowledge Valentina Schippers and Sanne van Kamp, both at Gemeente Haarlem, and Danny Havenith, President of EHPPA, the European Health Public Procurement Alliance, and other EHPPA colleagues.

Acknowledgements to colleagues in the Dutch academic purchasing community are based on relationships which long pre-date my arrival in the Netherlands. This is a large, still growing and very vibrant community, centred on the WION association. In particular, my thanks to Jan Telgen whose quiet and consistent support has been invaluable since we worked together in 2003. Finn Wynstra and Erik van Raaij also deserve a special mention for JPSM related collaboration.

Closer to home, I want to say to my purchasing colleagues at UT just how much I appreciate being a part of this exceptional team.

The fact that I am here and that EL-IPS is under way has a great deal to do with our previous Dean, Theo Toonen – thank-you, Theo.

I want to mention Holger Schiele, my HBE and ETM colleagues, the leadership team here at UT, especially Tanya Bondarouk, the editorial team at the Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management now led by Carmela Di Mauro and Steven Carnovale, the IPSERA community and colleagues in the PROCEDIN and S4CARE consortia. I am very fortunate to work with you – thank-you!

And so to family and friends. On the one hand academic life provides much more flexibility than many professions. On the other, it can be family unfriendly. I am so very grateful to my parents, Janet and Bill Knight, my partner Steve Wragg and our son Miles. To them and dear friends, in particular Annette, Bethina and Ole, what more is there to say than a huge and heartfelt thank-you for all your love, support and patience.

New action is driven by new understanding, which depends on surfacing and addressing long held assumptions. As Tanya Bondarouk, our Dean, mentioned at the Faculty's new year meeting, we need to make the unspoken spoken. My mission to get us talking more about unsustainability and markets is motivated by two questions 'what could or should 'business-not-as-usual' look like?' and 'how can procurement play its part in the necessary transition?'

If any of you have read Lionel Shriver's work, the title of my inaugural lecture may have rung a bell. For the protagonist in "*We need to talk about Kevin*", it was too late to talk, let alone act. Hopefully, we are not too late.

Ik heb gezegd.

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
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ENDNOTES

- ¹ former dean of the School of Forestry & Environmental Studies at Yale University (US)
- ² Lamb et al (2020) represent their typology of climate delay [4] in this figure.



Source: Lamb, W.F., Mattioli, G., Levi, S., Roberts, J.T., Capstick, S., Creutzig, F., Minx, J.C., Müller-Hansen, F., Culhane, T., Steinberger, J.K., 2020. Discourses of climate delay. *Global Sustainability* 3, e17.

³ I first encountered the term unsustainability in a short video talk by Karl Henrik Robert making the business case for firms to become sustainable. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZzEhMDCw-OQ>

⁴ At best, now, we are slowing down the rate of digging a little. But, we are nowhere near stopping, let alone starting to infill. And to the techno-

optimists [5]: no – I don't think it's a good idea to keep digging in the hope of coming out safely at the other end!

⁵ See for example https://single-market-economy.ec.europa.eu/single-market/public-procurement_en

⁶ Joanne Meehan is Professor of Responsible Procurement and Director of the Centre for Sustainable Business at the University of Liverpool

⁷ A second source of inspiration has been the study Desirée Knoppen (EADA Business School, Spain) and I undertook on what we called born sustainable firms – that is enterprises founded with the specific goal of delivering social and/or environmental benefits. Our starting point was the argument that it's easy to say a firm must abandon the blind pursuit of profit at any cost, and become purpose driven, but how does that play out in practice? How do new firms – which are free of legacy constraints and are strongly committed to social and/or environmental goals – manage tensions between their sustainability goals and economic viability and profits, and actually develop their businesses? [19]

⁸ See https://www.oecd.org/naec/resources/Briefing-Note_New-Approaches-to-Economic-Challenges.pdf

⁹ Interestingly, nearly 20 years ago, Sumantra Ghoshal set out a similar argument. He describes the hegemonic 'ideology-based gloomy vision' set out by proponents such as Milton Friedman [26] is based on two assumptions, first of "homogeneous human behavior based on self-interest". And, second, "the liberal conceives of men as imperfect beings . . . and regards the problem of social organization to be as much a negative problem of preventing bad people from doing harm as of enabling good people to do good. . ." (p. 12). He explains its hold over business and management education and research, and makes various recommendations, with a plea for pluralism. Crucially, he pointed out that theories in social sciences tend to be self-fulfilling: "A theory that draws prescriptions on corporate governance on the assumption that managers cannot be trusted can make managers less trustworthy (Osterloh & Frey, 2003). Whether right or wrong to begin with, the theory can become right as managers—who are both its subjects and the consumers—adapt their behaviors to conform with the doctrine." This makes a positive approach to management scholarship, akin to positive psychology, especially appealing and important.

¹⁰ InfluenceMap's research has shown that, in the last five years, the proportion of major European companies whose climate policy engagement is either supportive or increasingly supportive of the goals of

the Paris agreement has doubled to 52% (see <https://europe.influencemap.org/report/Does-Corporate-Europe-Support-Climate-Policy#6>). However the positions of their industry associations has only moved from 14% to 25% (see <https://europe.influencemap.org/report/Does-Corporate-Europe-Support-Climate-Policy#8>). Corporate influence has resulted in reduced policy ambitions (see <https://europe.influencemap.org/report/Does-Corporate-Europe-Support-Climate-Policy#15>) [29, 30]

¹¹ “as judged by the ClimateAction100+ investor initiative and InfluenceMap’s A List of climate policy engagement” (<https://europe.influencemap.org/report/Does-Corporate-Europe-Support-Climate-Policy#4>)

¹² See also the company to industry association mapping at <https://europe.influencemap.org/Industry-Associations>

¹³ Most economists were completely taken by surprise by the 2008 financial crash. Famously, Queen Elizabeth II when visiting the London School of Economics asked why? In this article [31] and related blog Nat Dyer explains that Susan Strange did foresee the crash, and outlines her substantial but largely unrecognized contributions.

¹⁴ Here I follow Steven Lukes’ three dimensional view of power [40]

¹⁵ Notwithstanding the perceived lack of agency we noted in the CIPS study [17]

¹⁶ These are ADM, Bunge, Cargill, and Louis Dreyfus. See <https://www.wur.nl/en/research-results/research-institutes/economic-research/show-wecr/international-wheat-trade-in-times-of-war-seven-questions-and-answers.htm>

¹⁷ Market concentration is most acute in the US [44]. See the summary by Wu (exhibit 4) based on data from the Open Markets Institute. According to Philippon, European markets are less concentrated and do not suffer from the competition problems seen in the US. However, evidence from more recent research, some of which uses better, novel data sets, shows that, in Europe too, market concentration is high across many markets [47], and rising most steeply in EU wide and worldwide services markets [47] [see also 48].

¹⁸ See for example the work of Lina Khan [52, 60-63], now Chair of the US Federal Trade Commission, Barry Lynn [64], Director of the Open Markets Institute (<https://www.openmarketsinstitute.org>), Rana Foroohar [42] of the Financial Times and CNN, and Michelle Meagher [55]

¹⁹ See for example <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en>

²⁰ At a recent conference, the ‘deep pockets’ of large companies was repeatedly mentioned as a key barrier to addressing monopoly’s threat to

democracy and security. Tommaso Valetti, Professor of Economics at Imperial College (UK), spoke about the anti-trust establishment: how it is made up a tight knit network of consultants and lawyers, and that they are the ones interacting with judges at conferences and the like - a practice which, in how it plays out in the US, Valetti described as "borderline corrupt". Whilst advocating that anti-monopoly regulations are properly enforced, speakers believe authorities' efforts on anti-trust cases have got bogged down by too many discrete and very slow moving cases. Dealing with issues on a case-by-case basis draws attention and energy away from the structural change that is needed. (Conference hosted by Open Markets Institute, the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO), Lobby Control, the Balanced Economy Project. For recording of conference talks see here)

²¹ A case that is robustly, but not convincingly countered, by Wennberg, Sandström and their colleagues [70] (2022)

²² As opposed to traditional views which held that government should intervene only to ensure a 'level playing field' on which suppliers could then compete

²³ As articulated by the Business Roundtable in August 2019 "though it remains to be seen if they really mean it" [55]. A recent analysis suggests there are some positive developments [30]

²⁴ New Public Management (NPM) policies implemented through the 1980s and 1990s sought to apply value maximising strategies from the private sector to make public services more efficient and accountable [72]. This notion of bringing 'market discipline' to the public sector was later tempered by introducing a focus on 'public value' framed in terms of outcomes like equity and accountability, and concerned with democratic influence and public deliberation [72]. This offered a more pro-social perspective, but nonetheless a conception of public management built on the economic style of reasoning [25].

²⁵ "Public value should be understood as a way of measuring progress towards the achievement of broad and widely accepted societal goals (for example, a rapid but orderly transition to a net zero carbon economy). Such goals can only be achieved through collaboration between both private and public sectors, which together, via the process of innovation, co-create and co-shape markets" [20]

²⁶ The Sustainable Markets Initiative: "Vision - A sustainable future for Nature, People, and Planet. Mission - To build a coordinated global effort to enable the private sector to accelerate the transition to a sustainable future.

Action - The former Prince of Wales is gathering a global 'coalition of the willing' who share the vision around the need to accelerate global progress towards a sustainable future." "Under the mandate of the Terra Carta (a charter for change), the Sustainable Markets Initiative will encourage three major market transformations: 1) A dramatic shift in corporate strategies and operations 2) A reformed global financial system 3) An enabling environment that attracts investment and incentivises action" See <https://www.sustainable-markets.org/>

²⁷ "Growth is an inherently collective process: value is co-created between producers and consumers, workers and managers, inventors and administrators, regulators, and investors – not just heroic entrepreneurs, venture capitalists and corporate leaders – through the organisational and institutional configurations which enable all to work together." [71] See also [21, 78, 79]

²⁸ The political agency of such firms and their leadership could be deployed to yield benefits far beyond the boundaries of their own organisations. To quote Michelle Meagher: "Climate change, geopolitical instability, resource security, migration - these problems are not going away. If we do not involve business in fixing them, and treat it as the enemy, to be suppressed and sidelined, then we give business a free pass: we absolve it of its moral and economic responsibility to remedy the damage that it, in part, caused. But we also pass up the opportunity to access the vast resources at its disposal - not only cash and investments but also the millions of talented and resourceful people currently employed by private enterprises." [55]

²⁹ "We have failed to connect two separate policy conversations: about corporate power and monopoly, on the one hand, and corporate responsibility and stakeholder capitalism, on the other" [55]

³⁰ See for example: <https://www.oecd.org/competition/roundtables.htm>

³¹ See for example Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and Mind the Gap

³² "Market health is about both the buyer side and the supplier side of a market. In simple terms, markets are healthy when buyers are clear about their requirements, and can select and switch to best value for money suppliers, and when there is an adequate number of suppliers that are actively competing to offer what buyers want. When these conditions are present, suppliers must make attractive bids in order to win contracts, and those that win contracts must work hard to deliver value for money, or risk buyers taking their business elsewhere." [76]

³³ See Erik Nordman's brief overview of Ostrom's legacy here

³⁴ ZonMw is the Dutch national agency for health research and healthcare innovation. All three reports of the ZonMw funded research MASCC project are available here

³⁵ See here for further information on the International Research Study on Public Procurement

³⁶ Grant Agreement: 101070830. Funding Scheme: Coordination and Support Action (CSA). Theme: HORIZON-EIE-2021-CONNECT-01. Start Date of Project: 01 October 2022. Duration: 24 months

³⁷ One of the goals of PROCEDIN which is particularly close to my heart is growing connections between the network of highly innovative and committed purchasing professionals working in cities across Europe, and my European colleagues in academia who teach purchasing and supply chain management.

