Knowledge, Power and Dissent

Critical Perspectives on Higher Education and Research in Knowledge Society

Edited by Guy Neave
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Education on the Move

UNESCO Publishing
Foreword

UNESCO is pleased to publish Knowledge, Power and Dissent as part of the publications programme of the UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge and inspired by its 2004 Global Colloquium on the same theme.

This important book, edited by Professor Guy Neave, Director of Research at the International Association of Universities, IAU, assembles contributions from 17 distinguished international experts in Higher Education. The result is an incisive reflection of aspects of knowledge-generation and management that are shaping our present and future societies.

The UNESCO Forum, supported by the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), was launched to follow the critical issues addressed by the 1998 World Conference on Higher Education and the 1999 World Conference on Science. Both these major initiatives focused on the accelerating emergence of knowledge societies and the complex challenges posed for equitable social and human development.

As the 21st Century has unfolded, numerous interwoven facets of this new landscape have gained the attention of scholars in all domains and in all regions of the world. The UNESCO Forum provides the much-needed platform where researchers, policy-makers and civil-society experts can engage critically with research issues and findings. The ultimate aim is that both the global and local benefits of the Knowledge Society will be more equitably available to all nations and to their citizens.

UNESCO wishes to express its appreciation to Professor Neave as editor of this volume, to the distinguished authors for their thought-provoking chapters, and to the Swedish International Development Agency for its support of this major publication.

Georges Haddad
Director, Division of Higher Education
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INTRODUCTION
One of the little-appreciated, but nonetheless vital, functions that research into higher education performs from time to time is the historiographical counterpart of ‘backward mapping’, a concept developed more than 20 years ago by the Harvard policy analyst, Richard Elmore. Elmore’s concern lay primarily with the coordination of, and interaction between, policy procedures, and very especially with mapping the different stages of definition, operationalization, implementation and outcome of policy. Proceeding backwards, he began with the end impact sought and defined the preceding stages in light of what could reasonably be achieved in the stage that followed. Such an approach may also be extended by analogy to policy constructs. In this latter setting, ‘backward mapping’ consists in seeing how far theory and hypotheses built around a central concept – in this case the Knowledge Society – possess explanatory power and, more to the point, how the felicitous notion has emerged over time and what factors have contributed to its emergence. Within this latter and broader-ranging perspective, ‘backward mapping’ involves embedding a specific construct which itself has grown out of developments, some external, others internal, into a particular framework – in this case, the higher education systems of the world. An alternative perspective, which in effect amounts largely to the same thing, involves the transfer or extension of a given construct or concept, honed, operationalized and elaborated in one domain, to another. The ‘Knowledge Society’ is itself precisely such a construct.

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SUBTLETIES AND COMPLEXITIES OF THE TASK

Such ‘backward mapping’ of the Knowledge Society onto higher education is both subtle and complex. It is subtle because from one point of view it is a synthesis and summation of developments across multiple domains – some disciplinary in nature, others cross- and multi-disciplinary – which have served to give us intellectual purchase over the complexities of higher education. These domains, like Legion, are many. Already more than a decade ago, those contributing directly to the study of higher education were estimated at more than 20 (Becher, 1992). And to judge from the titles of new scholarly journals that have emerged in the meantime, this number is growing. ‘Quality studies’, ‘evaluation studies’ and ‘international cooperation’ are as good examples as ever of the intellectual creativity and liveliness that characterize the general, overall field of the study of higher education.

The process of ‘backward mapping’ is complex because the very use of this conceptual focus also serves to alter our understanding and perception of the functions, processes, purpose and, for that matter, place of higher education as it assimilates new functions and purposes within the Knowledge Society. Thus, the change in the mental boundaries brought about by the Knowledge Society, as an expression of synthesis, acts in turn to re-shape our perception – and very often, our vocabulary – of the basic functions the institution performs.

Nor does complexity cease there. For though the Knowledge Society may serve terminologically as a common point of exchange, dialogue and concentration shared across different discipline-related fields, each field tends naturally to interpret the central construct within its own conceptual frameworks, boundaries, paradigms, operational criteria and specific vocabularies. Thus what earlier appeared, and very often was represented by its earlier proponents, as a solid intellectual edifice begins to reveal – if it did not at first sight always admit – a variety, a diversity of approach and differences in fundamental interpretation that would honour the Tower of Babel. Yet dialogue and indeed scholarly exchange do not necessarily require a common vocabulary, though they may sometimes benefit from it. On the contrary, a strong case can very easily be sustained for not having a common, single over-riding perspective on the grounds that the most valuable aspects of exchange lie precisely in the variations in presentation, the lines of argument each pursued within their own setting and disciplinary frame. Indeed, without the heterodoxy that accompanies exchange
across different disciplines and intellectual paradigms, the creative spark kindled by comparing alternative and conflicting narratives risks all too often being quickly smothered under a convenient and tidy orthodoxy, as both Bhabha and Weiler remind us.

THE OCCASION

‘Research and Higher Education Policy – Knowledge, Access and Governance: Strategies for Change’ provided the focus of the second Colloquium of the UNESCO Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge. It was held on 1–3 December 2004, at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris. The Colloquium forms part of a multi-annual activity undertaken through the Forum on Higher Education, Research and Knowledge, supported by UNESCO in partnership with the Swedish International Development Agency; it marks a second stage in the ongoing discussion by scholars of higher education worldwide of the major issues currently shaping, and in the immediate future likely to shape, higher education and which, on that account, are considered central in defining a research agenda. The Colloquium was in effect a further step in exploring the dimensions and dynamic beneath the ‘knowledge nexus’; the first took place in December 2003, during the Global Research Seminar when attention focused on the Knowledge Economy and its implications for higher education.

The presentations in this volume fall into three parts. The first part is constructed around the Keynote Addresses, and includes certain shorter interventions that commented upon them. The second part consists of Chapters chosen from the three themes that provided the focus for discussion, namely Knowledge, Governance and Access, and very particularly those which both took up Keynote Address themes and featured broad geographical coverage in keeping with the Forum’s global nature. This second part of the book is built on grounded case studies which on the one hand provide more elaborate treatment, within specific cultural and political settings, of issues identified by lead speakers. On the other, they move in on the themes of Knowledge, Governance and Access and develop them both in greater detail and on a cross-national basis. The third part of the book contains the Closing Keynote by Steve Fuller, ‘Universities and the Future of Knowledge Governance from the Standpoint of Social Epistemology’.
AREAS OF DISCOMFORT

What stands out above all in the first and last parts of this dissection of the Knowledge Society – though it also permeates the grounded case studies – is surely the deep dissatisfaction at current attempts to represent the Knowledge Society in ideal, schematic if not outright ideological terms. Is ‘Globalization’ as its central construct in truth a ‘new start’? Is the seeming straightforward binary division of nations and cultures along the lines of ‘global’ versus ‘local’ plausible, or for that matter grounded in any reality? Does it in any manner advance our understanding of the nuances that political, cultural or social development force upon the arbitrary oversimplifying of economic schematics and models? Is our understanding of the changes in the human condition that globalization has brought about, and which in its social dimension are contained in the Knowledge Society, served – let alone advanced – by the rush to render human behaviour in the deceptively simple (and thus greatly appealing) drive towards quantifying the condition of humankind, peoples and nations? Even if such an economic doxology may provide solace to some, it is, as Bhabha gently points out, no great help to those who live in a world where the individual’s perceptions of that world are still overwhelmingly shaped by communities, identities and imaginations. However new and ordered and apparently simplified by the application of a ‘global overlay’, or by the centrality of knowledge in presenting the Global in terms of sweeping homogenization, society continues to be shaped by historical contingency.

DISTURBING PRECEDENTS

This theme is taken further by Houtondji and by Weiler. For Houtondji, what passes for today’s edition of the Knowledge Society builds upon a far earlier version of ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’: that of an Imperial heartland defining, framing and thus controlling what constituted ‘valued’ knowledge (held to be universal), and a colonial periphery, which furnished the ‘material’ but not the paradigmatic frame for organizing and classifying the knowledge thus built up into formal cognate fields. The ‘closeness of fit’ between the contemporary Knowledge Society and its industrial and colonial predecessor has an uncomfortable resonance, which may lead some to agree with the epigram of the mid-19th Century French journalist, Alphonse Kahr, that ‘plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose’.
The parallel between knowledge production in the industrial-colonial world of a recent yesteryear and its post-industrial successor reminds us that however appealing the potential of the Knowledge Society to act as a ‘level playing field’, the reality is very different. Houtondji reminds us that the self-same process by which knowledge held to be universal is forged, quite apart from the institutional and organizational settings in which that forging takes place, is also a process that, once account is taken of different levels of development, marginalizes – ostracizes even – other indigenous or alternative ‘knowledge traditions’. This is no small form of expropriation, and no little exclusion. Assimilating, ostracizing or forcing alternative traditions of local knowledge into ‘inner exile’ effectively evacuates meaning and value from the very social structures and communities that produce them. Expropriating ‘local knowledge’ in turn undermines that basic common enterprise – the creation of a particular knowledge tradition – that affords meaning and identity to particular societies and to non- or pre-industrial ones in particular.

There are, however, indications that despite assimilation into Western canons of knowledge, a revitalization of local identities through ‘literary re-appropriation’ is well under way. This theme is taken further by Ghemisola A. Adeoti, in his Chapter in Part Two on literary studies in Nigerian universities.

THE INHUMAN TIDINESS OF A BINARY WORLD

Creating the ‘periphery’ in the Knowledge Society is thus largely a self-fulfilling prophecy. If the Knowledge Society is to be a ‘level playing field’, which is a prophetic claim rather than an observed fact, this in no way alters the present topography. If there is somewhere a ‘level playing field’ in which each individual, community or nation may compete on equal terms with its neighbours – a decidedly Hobbesian notion – it is at present surrounded by high mountains and deep crevasses, both in its formal knowledge infrastructure and in terms of those having access to it; this is a point Karuna Chanana develops in connection with the participation and subject choice of women in India’s system of higher education; disparities such as these vary as much within nations as they do between them. Even if one does not contest the generous shape of things to come in the Knowledge Society of the future, the issue does not lie there: it lies very certainly in how to move from what is to what ought to be.
The Knowledge Society is very far from being utterly and wholly coterminous with the production, exchange and transformation of ideas, images and services of a saleable nature. Nevertheless this *reductio ad pecuniam* furnishes a powerful rhetoric behind the creation of ‘alternative providers’, which Carmen García Guadilla describes in detail in her Chapter on the Knowledge Society as it is emerging in Latin America. Agreed, knowledge permeates ideas, images and services; it shapes the way they are presented; it seeks to enforce their acceptability. But such a limited vision is precisely that. It is limited – a species of tunnel vision, a partial and very incomplete surrogate which affords overweening importance to those tradable aspects that may make the fortune of individuals, firms or even for a time whole peoples, trading in the image of their past excellence and present achievements. In the marketization of knowledge what tends to be forgotten is that knowledge is not confined to those dimensions which permit revenue-generation for establishments of higher education, any more than the species of knowledge and belief that brought the Vatican into being should be subject to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Services, on the grounds that Sacred Knowledge is not only a cultural good but also confers immeasurable spiritual well-being – and enduring value added – for its ‘end users’!

**ORTHODOXY CHALLENGED AND THE PROBLEMATIC REVEALED**

Weiler’s challenge to the orthodoxies of knowledge has little time – and rightly so – for the blinkers that more routine accounts have placed upon defining the Knowledge Society. The Knowledge Society is itself the outcome of profound changes in the nature of knowledge, and Weiler’s Chapter takes us to the heart of the matter by exploring three fundamental aspects he describes as ‘deficits’ in the current representation and depiction of the Knowledge Society. Certainly, the three deficits may be seen as the ‘takens for granted’ that lie behind certain contemporary analyses. They are, however, far more than that. Once one moves beyond the bounds of quantification and brings broader perspectives to bear on the evolving Knowledge Society, so the ‘takens for granted’ change in nature: they become fundamentally problematic. As such, they bid fair to make the appealing notion less coherent – and certainly less tidy – than many would wish. What is knowledge? What are the political consequences of its production and use? Who determines what knowledge is ‘valued’? Here we enter
into the politics of knowledge, and the interests that ease their agenda forward within them. Finally, having explored these dimensions of epistemic change, Weiler returns them to higher education by posing the question, ‘What are the structural changes that follow for higher education from recognizing both the political and epistemic shift in the contemporary culture of knowledge?’

By bringing back both politics and epistemology as basic points of departure in re-analyzing the implications of the Knowledge Society for higher education, a far broader series of questions becomes imperative. Whose interests are served by redefining ‘valued’ knowledge? How are such particular interests forwarded? What are the consequences of their execution? The Knowledge Society thus begins to yield up its status as an acquired construct or as a process whose inevitability is unchallenged. It becomes, on the contrary, an area of debate and uncertainty, the progress of which is perceived through a glass darkly as opposed to clearly through an economic model.

Samoff and Carrol move further down this very road in their examination of the role of The World Bank, as a prime architect of valuating certain types of knowledge and ensuring its institutional embedding through the funding the Bank provides (in this case, to higher education in Africa). Paradoxically, once an epistemological perspective is applied to World Bank policy the Bank itself can no longer remain in its official and pristine role as a funding agency. It assumes an additional dimension, which may be interpreted as an ‘agency for defining knowledge valued for its developmental potential’. The Bank’s role is itself designated as being – literally – a prime stakeholder, whose interests are met by assigning priority to particular forms of knowledge and to the policy instruments that sustain them. The impact such priorities have in Africa, and more indirectly in India, are followed up in the Chapters by Ishengoma and Tilak respectively.

THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY: DISCOURSE AND DISSECTION

There is, however, another constant theme that binds together many of the contributions to this book. It is the dissection of the discourse and policies which are vehiculated by that particular form of the Knowledge Society. Dissecting the policy, the institutions and the interests that seek to shelter beneath their imposed discourse stands therefore as another leitmotif in this series of essays. It is an important exercise, if only for the fact that the shaping of the Knowledge Society has sired its own vocabulary.
How discourse is shaped, and by which interests, is a theme pursued by different authors who tackle this central issue from widely different disciplinary perspectives. Houtondji dissects it through a historiography of the anthropology and ethnic studies created by Western scholars to describe the development of non-Western societies. Adeoti, by contrast, examines the role of discourse from within the world of Nigerian literature as it struggles to find an authentic voice for self-expression independently from the canon of English literature. A similar variation upon this theme is taken up by Samoff and Carrol, who chart the elaboration of the discourse that shapes the Knowledge Society within the framework of one institution – The World Bank – and its changes in priority as well as in terminology, which made for acceptability of the policies thus developed.

Different though these accounts are, nevertheless they provide clear examples of the way meaning may be reclaimed by, and re-set in, those societies on which externally conceived, disseminated and elaborated species of discourse have been imposed. The discourse, once universal, is re-defined from within. It is – to revert to Houtondji’s striking turn – re-appropriated. Through re-appropriation the values, social constructs and cultural variety that universal categories so subtly deny are revived to add further nuance to the once dominant terminology. The implications of this are clear for all to see: the process of modifying the universal discourse as it applies to literature and to anthropology may just as well be extended to the re-emergence of ‘universalism’ on the wings of the Knowledge Society.

Clearly, what bonds these scholars is not simply how discourse is shaped and formed – which, as both Weiler on the one hand and Samoff and Carrol on the other both point out, amounts to but another of the many faces of Power and Authority. Examining the hidden assumptions beneath a given discourse – and that which has coalesced around the Knowledge Society no less so – is an essential part of understanding the Knowledge Society beyond the terms it has of itself, and beyond the accounts which those who advance homogeneity and convergence would wish us to accept.

**SUSPENSION OF BELIEF AND THE DISCOURSE OF DISSENT**

In short, the other major theme that cuts across these essays is an attack on the narrative of orthodoxy and the orthodox narrative. To do so, of course, demands the suspension of belief in such a narrative. Such
a suspension of faith, the refusal to accept views that urge acceptance rather than debate – or for that matter the policies they seek to uphold – is an elemental and necessary act at the heart of scholarship. Examining how the orthodox narrative has developed, the circumstances that accompany its dissemination and the interests that lie behind it is also to challenge the largely un-admitted – and very probably, inadmissible – assumptions that underlie it. Thus, out of the discourse laid down by Power and Authority emerges its counterpoint, that of Dissent.

In this volume, the discourse of Dissent ends with what some may see as a tribute to the immortal memory of Ambrose Bierce, the early 20th Century American wit and author of the *Devil’s Dictionary*. Indeed, it is not greatly exaggerated to see Fuller’s essay as perhaps the first bold step towards the Knowledge Society’s very own ‘Devil’s Dictionary’. This he does by dint of an insightful and devastating anatomy of some of the more self-indulgent, and often opaque, jargon that accompanies the rise of the Knowledge Society as a social and economic construct.

The feline phrase has, of course, long been with us. And its modern-day technocratic counterpart – the contemporary edition of the feline phrase – like its predecessor has a very special and invidious strength. It has an outward and comforting blandness that camouflages a situation, a process or a condition which, when expressed nakedly and put back into the plain speaking that Everyman employs and understands, suddenly exposes a reality so unsavoury that even those of a minimal sensitivity to equity, decency and fairness are hard put not to recoil in astonishment and dismay. Thus, as Fuller himself points out, does social epistemology serve to give us greater and immediate purchase over a world the complexity of which we are told is graspable only with difficulty. We are also told that those who cannot grasp so puzzling a state of affairs should have confidence in those who can – usually the very same Master Word-Smiths of the ambiguous phrase. If the truth were out, social epistemology remains the trusty servant to an ancient and much-valued purpose: the ripping aside of double talk and exposing the richness of humbug that lies just beneath the surface of the careful craft of techno-speak. That social epistemology should have to come to our rescue at a time when Authority, for the past decade at least, has clamoured for higher education to fall in with accountability, transparency and responsiveness must surely be one of the more delicious ironies of the hour.
THE WORLD OUTSIDE

Whilst most of the contributions to this book turn around mapping the Knowledge Society back into higher education, there are some that move in a contrary direction. Anna María Cetto for instance pays close attention to the knowledge that lies outside the university. She calls for science within the groves of Academe to draw up a new social contract with society, and to explore new ways of recognizing and fulfilling the changing expectations society has of science and its applications. Saleem Badat also swims in counter-current; his concern is the appropriateness of academic knowledge to policy-making. Badat examines the different genres of research and writing undertaken by scholars in higher education, and more to the point how certain key issues in the national policy arena may pose difficulties when related to the autonomy of intellectual work.

Knowledge, Governance and Access have been constant preoccupations to the world of government, to the three Estates of higher education – the Academic, Administrative and Student Estates – and to society these three decades past. They figure amongst the pressing concerns of society, and thus amongst the abiding preoccupations of those who must recognize and meet society’s expectations of its universities. As enduring and essential strategic concerns, these three issues may indeed be aggregated and brought together within the all-embracing overview of the Knowledge Society. Indeed, the capacity of individual systems and institutions of higher education to make the transition depends on adaptation within these three spheres. Yet if there is one conclusion to emerge from these studies, it is that we are only starting to identify the operational issues for higher education that the Knowledge Society brings forward; these deserve to be pursued further on a cross-national, multi-level and multi-disciplinary basis.

Guy Neave
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PART ONE

GLOBAL VIEW, CRITICAL CHALLENGES
We are witnessing a globalization of the economy? For certain. A globalization of political calculations? Without doubt. But a universalization of political consciousness – certainly not.

Michel Foucault, *For an Ethic of Discomfort* (1979)

**INTRODUCTION**

In every decade there are events that transcend their times, and others that merely survive their histories. A defining image of the global world picture appeared on our television and computer screens on 11 September 2001, after which there seemed to be a kind of international consensus that the new millennium had come of age. ‘Coming of age’ is a curious term to describe adolescence and adulthood grappling uncomfortably on the threshold of history, both claiming access. But the door of history is neither open nor closed; the future lies on one side of the threshold, the past on the other. The present is a frame for the transition of times, the past-in-the-present, back to the future.

This author always believed that Terminus, the Roman deity of borders and frontiers who regulated the flows of arrivals and departures, the circulation of peoples and things, was the god of globalization. It was in that spirit that this author began this article, until he came upon

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a headline in the *International Herald Tribune* that read, 'U.S. Seeks God's-Eye View of Warfare'. A report on the Global Information Grid (GIG), essential for waging 'net-centric warfare', quoted U.S. Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld as saying that ‘... the GIG would not be a weapons system, but a set of interconnections' and networks and flows of information through which every member of the military ‘... would have a picture of the battle-space, a God's-eye view.' This would allow for a fast and ferocious engagement with a ‘faceless foe’ (Weiner, 2004). It is this image of a ‘global world picture’, seen from the perspective of a warlike God-in-the-military-machine confronting a faceless human being, frozen in time and fixed in place, which begs the question: What kind of a temporal event is globalization? What visions of time, history and community course through its complex capillaries of spatial diffusions and dispersals? What can the humanities contribute to the creation of global community and interdisciplinary knowledge? How do humanists engage in the process of inter-cultural and inter-textual translation?

**THE HUMANITIES AND THEIR EFFECTIVENESS**

An obvious difficulty lies in the fact that the humanities – the arts, literature, philosophy, history, languages, art history, the Classics – do not relate directly to something ‘real’ in the external world, such as the economy, class structure and voting patterns; nor do they establish methods and protocols that evolve towards some final result or conclusive truth, claims sometimes made for the sciences or social sciences. The humanities do not propose an instrumental or causal relation between the medium and the message, the object and its use, or technique and telos. For instance, literature is, in some profound sense, about the shape of language and words; but its ‘meaning’ lies in its meandering narratives that wander around and about the themes of character, action, social and political consciousness, unconscious fantasy. Art is about the formal and material constructions of light, colour, paint, stone, and figurative technique; but it casts its semiotic aura around and about the subjects of religious passion, aesthetic interest, the intimation of pain and the perception of beauty and virtue.

The humanities are effective in the education of the senses – and in the education of elites and masses – because they produce knowledge ‘at one remove’; they work within that realm of ‘representation’ where form turns into feeling, and an aesthetic and
ethical invocation of human experience creates a world of theoretical concepts and intellectual conjectures. It is in that remove that representation presents itself as metaphor (literature), image (art), abstract reasoning (philosophy), narrative and memory (history). What these disciplines have in common is a peculiar epistemological disjunction, or ‘doubleness’, that constructs their objects of knowledge. On the one hand, there is the production of academic, disciplinary knowledge that shapes the curriculum – literary history, art history, the history of philosophy – in a relatively longue durée, providing us with a critical vocabulary of appreciation and evaluation. On the other hand, there is the living ‘experience’ of the object ‘here and now’: the time-bound and genre-directed affective, sometimes intuitive, experience of grasping a poem, catching an image of the historic past as it suddenly emerges from a fact or a document, becoming deaf to the world as you listen to a sonata, a classical Indian raga or a rap artist from Trinidad. The ‘gap’ between the pedagogical and the performative, between disciplinary knowledge and the aesthetic or cultural experience (both important) creates an on-going, productive tension in the humanities between what counts as subjective and objective, what is fact and what is value.

It is because of such epistemological and pedagogical tensions that the humanities do not have a hard-wired principle or method, but share a common project or purpose; this is the act of interpretation that leads to the scholarly interlocution, intellectual dialogue and public debate for which the humanities are renowned. It is this ‘tension’ in the production of humanistic knowledge that establishes, in this author’s view, the single most foundational contribution of the humanities to social life: the humanities build communities rather than models. A humanistic tradition may well offer a line of reasoning, or represent the evolution of an argument (about truth, beauty or ethical value), or assist in the perfection of a technique. But these worthy professional perfections should not obscure the fact that the humanities make a unique contribution to establishing – through interpretation, instruction and interlocution – communities of interest and climates of opinion. Like the weather, humanistic knowledge can be changeable, turbulent and elusive. But does anybody seriously argue that we can do without air? We need the humanities, as we do the atmosphere, for they allow us to draw the breath of human culture and thus to aspire to our best selves.
THE CULTURE WARS

That is not to say that the humanities have not generated hot air. For over a decade, from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s, the humanities, in the Anglo-American academy, were caught in an unsettled exercise of self-definition – the Culture Wars – that led to divisions within departments and dissension amongst colleagues. The Culture Wars were disruptive because the assumptions and implications of important humanistic debates were confined to the politics of polarity. Disciplinary transformations (media and cinema studies, cultural studies, environmental humanities), emergent academic constituencies (gay and lesbian, feminist, Latino, African-American, Asian-American) and new hermeneutic or pedagogical practices (feminist criticism, new historicism, post-colonialism) – all these significant intellectual innovations and curricular changes were either pilloried by critics as being part of a politics of identity, or elevated by aficionados as inviolable icons of cultural authenticity and ethnic essentialism. In the fog of the Culture Wars, there were even those influential critics who suggested that Toni Morrison’s Nobel Prize was an ‘affirmative action’ award.

Over the last decade, humanists have emerged from this period of disorientation with a clearer and calmer conviction that the interdisciplinary nature of scholarship represents more than a willful demand by minority groups for curricular representation; it reflects a larger integration of the conditions of global knowledge-production. For example, recent changes in the global status of ‘literatures in English’ illustrate how the humanities have led the way in establishing common ground between diverse disciplines, and how these ‘interstitial’ scholarly interventions and intellectual initiatives have redefined disciplinary boundaries. Literature ‘in English’ is no longer seen as the cultural prerogative of the British nation; nor are English writings from Asia, Africa or Australia considered secondary or supplementary creations that dimly reflect a canonical body of ‘English Lit’ texts. New criteria of linguistic value and literary virtuosity inform aesthetic judgments when ‘writing in English’ is considered to be a global linguistic and cultural practice that links English writers and speakers across a trans-national axis of influence and innovation. These changes in critical criteria are accompanied by the need to understand the shaping forces – social, historical, cultural – that create regional ‘enclaves’ of English writing, and define the international or inter-regional networks through which
they interact with one another to form a global language and literature. This author fully accepts the problems created by the hegemony of the English language, whose imperial history has obscured or annihilated the authority of less extensive languages, and whose geographical sovereignty has now been re-deployed by the new languages of techno-scientific progress. His post-colonial plea is for the ‘trans-national’ literary use of English as a trans-cultural tongue, which has been happily transformed by the social and stylistic syntaxes of those who have ironically turned it into a ‘foreign’ language, a discourse of Diaspora.

GLOBAL INTERDISCIPLINARITY AND VALUES

Global interdisciplinarity, to coin a phrase, increases the integration of existing fields of study and, in many instances, produces a connected map of learning. However there is a widespread tendency to see the enlarged flow of communication as producing an increase in ‘information’ that provides us with ‘the big picture’. Yet facts do not speak for themselves; they are spoken ‘for’ by governmental or cultural institutions, academic elites, the media, interest groups, historical narratives and disciplinary discourses. Despite the great diversity amongst humanities disciplines, they are joined in their commitment to the spirit of informed and independent interpretation, for individuals and groups, as a crucial process in making judgments about the relationship between facts and values.

It is often asserted, wrongly, that the humanities today are caught in a mire of relativistic or pluralist thinking that denies the value of truth, and that they are therefore cynical and directionless in their approach to knowledge and historical reality. This author’s emphasis on humanistic interpretation as an on-going and evolving discussion of the inter-relation of fact and value, and the important decisions that arise from it, would refute such assertions. For instance, the wealth of knowledge we have of the Holocaust is much more than a gathering of information on an unprecedented scale. It involved researchers judging the ways in which purported historical or cultural facts – of ethnic personality or political economy – were manipulated and framed to instil values that led to the catastrophic moral collapse of a great nation, and in many ways the rest of the world. In trying to understand how such a frame of mind could have been created in modern times, the best scholars of the Holocaust have introduced a new definition of what
count as disciplinary or inter-disciplinary ‘facts’ by emphasizing the ‘value’ of oral testimony, memories, diaries, caricatures and photographs as accredited aspects of the academic archive. The humanist activity of interpretation carefully works through the genres and norms that define each of these frames of reference – emotional and rational, textual and contextual, spiritual and secular – in order to evaluate the significance of an event that threatened to destroy our faith in the very foundations of civil society in the Western World.

The Holocaust is a tragic illustration of the claim that scientific and technological advances are, in themselves, value-free; or that the God-like perspective of the U.S. GIG system would be the best way – because it is the most technically efficient way – to secure supremacy and security in the politics of international conflict. These instances raise the issue of the unbreakable, if unsettled, connection between the seductive power of new learning and the need to exercise intellectual responsibility and moral choice. The experience of the Holocaust has now become a model for interdisciplinary writings and course offerings (in philosophy, history, literature and international law) on the study of genocide and human rights on a comparative, global scale. It is invoked in the study of other peoples around the world – in Palestine, in sub-Saharan Africa, and amongst First Nations peoples, Aboriginals and Indian Dalits (or Untouchables) – who are either deprived of a national home and the rights and freedoms that go with full citizenship, or are oppressed in the name of their race, religion or culture. How do we develop our humanistic practices of interpretation to keep up with the changing world? How do we link scholarship with responsibility as we face the global picture?

NEW WAYS OF KNOWING

All advances in knowledge, if they are truly transformative, bring with them a shadow of uncertainty and incalculability. ‘New ways of knowing’, Hans Weiler has appositely pointed out, bring with them, ‘... a profound doubt about established conventions in the production of knowledge and an exhilarating sense of a new beginning’ (Weiler, n.d.). Exhilaration comes at the expense of epistemological doubt, because ‘new beginnings’ are not represented in transformed ‘objects’ of knowledge; they emerge as uncertain, provisional projections that are in the process of establishing the scale of a new paradigm or problématique. A projected scale seeks to establish the scope and
affectivity of new knowledge, its epistemological and phenomenological measures of living and thinking: What is globalization? How does it shape everyday experience? How does it differ from other worlds? Is globalization one or many? The search for a ‘scale’ must also be understood as a ‘weighing scale’, a measure of the values, judgments and claims that emerge through the descriptive, interpretational and institutional power of the ‘new beginning’: From what position do I relate to this knowledge? What difference does it make? Whose interests does it serve? New knowledges can only establish their epistemological authority and effectiveness by confronting the conceptual doubt and temporal contingency inherent in the problem of scale.

Traditional discourses of globalization, for instance, spatialize this problem of contingency by drawing the conceptual map of the global world in terms of the binary division of the global and the local, or its variants such as the ‘translocal’ or the ‘glocal’. This spatial division has usefully emphasized the vagaries of global development. Globalizers point to Silicon Valleys and outsourcing oases on a transnational scale, contrasting the successful ‘level playing fields’ of regional global development with the stagnant ‘backwaters’ of those who adhere to the nationalist remnants of the Westphalian system. Anti-globalizers affiliate with the ‘local’, in order to resist the hegemonic and homogenizing advance of multi-national capital and the global governance administered by The World Bank and the Washington Consensus. What the spatial perspective fails to adequately grasp is the profound transitionality and contingency of the global world, which is not adequately described in the distinction between the global and the local. Here we must heed Heidegger’s warning, issued in his essay The Age of the World Picture (1938), that the measure of the ‘world’ as a problem of perception, reception and representation cannot be grasped in the language of gigantisms nor of its opposite, the ‘increasingly small’. ‘We do not think at all if we believe we have explained this phenomenon of the gigantic with the catchword “Americanism”’ (Heidegger, 1977: 135). The measure of globality lies, then, in incalculability, that is ‘the invisible shadow that is cast around all things everywhere when man has been transformed into subjectum and the world into picture’ (Heidegger, 1977: 135).

The spatial perspective, constructed around polarities, cannot grasp the enormous significance of the temporal and historical contingencies – the incalculability – of the global condition. Political
‘distortions’, economic divisions and ethical dilemmas define our times because we live in an age of global transition (rather than transformation) in which the ‘extremes’ exist in a relation of antagonistic – and agonistic – proximity (and not polarity). The ‘secular’ liberalization of the markets has seen the rise of xenophobia and religious fundamentalisms; diasporic populations who live in the West, and participate in its modernizing public spheres and civil societies, are also among those who most fervently advocate traditionalism and orthodoxy; Western governments that become spokespersons of the democratic ideal the world over are themselves in thrall to the profound intolerance, and lack of transparency, of the Religious Right movements in their own countries.

**ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS?**

Economic ‘solutions’ to inequality and poverty, as practiced by the IMF and The World Bank for instance, have ‘… the feel of the colonial ruler’ (Stiglitz, 2002: 40). According to Joseph Stiglitz, onetime Senior Vice President and Chief Economist of The World Bank, ‘… they help to create a dual economy in which there are pockets of wealth … But a dual economy is not a developed economy’ (Stiglitz, 2002: 40). It is the reproduction of dual, unequal economies as orchestrated effects initiated by globalization that render poorer societies more vulnerable to the ‘culture of conditionality’ through which what is purportedly the granting of loans turns into the peremptory enforcement of policy. Economic domination secured through the ‘culture of conditionality’ sets the stage for global governance through unilateral ‘conditions’ that defeats any possibility of global consensus. These ‘dual economies’ claim to sustain diverse worlds of opportunity consisting of global villages, Silicon Valleys and outsourcing oases dotted across the North and the South. The landscape of opportunity and ‘choice’ has certainly widened in scope, but the colonial shadow falls across the successes of globalization. ‘Dual economies’ create divided worlds in which uneven and unequal conditions of development mask the ubiquitous, underlying factors of persistent poverty and malnutrition, caste and racial injustice, the hidden injuries of class, the exploitation of women’s labour, and the victimization of minorities and refugees. For instance ‘India shining’, the 2004 electioneering slogan of the ‘high tech’ Hindu nationalist BJP government, failed to mention the darker, daily reality of the 63 percent of rural households that do not have electricity, and
the 10 to 15 hours of blackouts and ‘brownouts’ on any given day that afflict those that do (Rajvanishi, n.d.).

The ‘contingent’ dialectic of global knowledge that this author has proposed reflects Stiglitz’s ‘dual’ structure. Contemporary globalization exists in a palimpsestical, side-by-side movement of inequities and disjunctions, rather than the binary or polarized dynamic that has been normalized through the variants of local and global. On the one hand, the material and ontological transformations of globalization are signified in the language of ‘enlargement’ or ‘magnification’ – interactions, interconnections and flows that transcend constituent States and societies. On the other, there is a movement towards ‘enmeshment’, blurring, space-time compression and ‘action at a distance’ (to use the key words most commonly associated with the ‘velocity’ of the global). When ‘enlargement’ and ‘magnification’ intersect and interact with ‘enmeshment’ and ‘compression’ in the global discourse, we do not get a totalized map of global knowledge or a unified global world picture. At this point of ‘intersection’, we feel ‘… an irresistible urge to search such a picture for a tiny spark of contingency, of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject (or the agent); to find the inconspicuous spot where … the future rests so eloquently that we may … rediscover it’ (Benjamin, 1979: 243).

This passage comes from Walter Benjamin’s meditation on the philosophical and temporal consequences of the photographic process of ‘enlargement’, and how it changes the world picture of modernity. What this author wants to develop, however, is an argument about the relation between the ‘time’ and the seared ‘subject’ (or ‘agent’) of the global experience. How should we who live with the asymmetries and disjunctions of the global world picture, who inhabit its here and now, relate to the historical contingencies that shape our identities, imaginations and communities?

STRUCTURES OF GLOBAL DISCOURSE

The above is perhaps too general a question, but this author has tasked himself with relating it to a range of genres, texts and historical moments. Critical emphasis is laid here on the narrative, temporal and cultural structures of global discourses, and we shall explore various visions of global community: Antonio Gramsci’s cultural front constructed in terms of what he calls the ‘philosophy of the part’; Adrienne Rich’s ‘unsatisfied’ ethical community; and Edward
Saïd’s contrapuntal humanist cosmopolitanism. The link between these visions, this author suggests, is their ability to constitute a transformative sense of global consciousness and social agency, built around the ‘spark of contingency’ that is a significant part of the ‘here and now’ of global thinking and living.

Such a moment, according to Antonio Gramsci, is a transitional, contingent process of historical incubation rather than the inauguration of an era. The historically ‘new’ is always a moment of incubation; ‘… what exists at any given time [in the name of the new] is a variable combination of old and new … a momentary equilibrium of cultural relations…’ (Gramsci, 2000: 353). As we inhabit ‘multiple non-coordinating jurisdictions’, both materially and metaphorically, how do we articulate individual agency or collective consciousness? It is with these questions in mind that we must turn to Gramsci’s scattered speculations on what it means to create a ‘cultural front’ engaged in ‘ethico-political’ projects. A ‘cultural front’ is not necessarily a political party; it is more a movement or alliance of groups whose struggles for fairness and justice emphasize the collaboration between aesthetics, ethics and activism. A ‘cultural front’ does not have a homogeneous and totalizing view of the world; it may be oriented or cathedected around one ‘point’ of political or psychic identification – between individual aspirations or group interests – that turns into a mutuality or solidarity that represents a ‘new tie’ in the uncertain circumstances of temporal incubation and historical transition. In her work on the institutional culture of global Human Rights activists, Kathryn Sikkink points to ‘principle issue networks’ that consist of various agents – individuals, NGOs, international organizations, State agencies. What brings people together in these networks is a ‘… focus on particular goals organized around a particular issue of principle, whether in support of human rights, against abortion, in opposition to environmental degradation …’ (Klug, 2000: 572). The point at which the ‘new tie’ is formed between and within groups must not be reduced to a model of common [or universal] subjectivity, for it is ‘… not a restoration of an original … identity or a neutralization of differences in the equality of rights, but is … the complementarity and reciprocity of singularities’ (Balibar, 1994: 56). The cultural front creates its solidarity and agency by identifying with the contingent movement of the here and now (a momentary equilibrium), a mode of linkage made possible by what Gramsci describes as ‘… the philosophy of the part [that]
always precedes the philosophy of the whole, not only as its theoretical anticipation but as a necessity of real life’ (Gramsci, 2000: 337).

Gramsci’s cultural front – a species of the subaltern – is, this author believes, a manifestation of the philosophy of the ‘part’ as a necessity of political and ethical life. The subaltern ‘strategy’ of counter-hegemonic power is replete with the nuance of the ‘partial’ and the ‘incipient’; indeed, its efficacy lies in knowing how to work with and through the moment of global transition and transformation, how to turn the processual, contingent conditions of historical ‘incubation’ into everyday forms of interrogation, intervention and imagination. The cultural front is ‘… deprived of historical [dominance] and initiative; it is often in a state of continuous but disorganic expansion’, without a necessary party affiliation; and crucially for the issue of de-nationalization its authority may not be able to go beyond what Gramsci calls ‘… a certain qualitative level which still remains below, beside, [at an oblique angle to] the level of the possession of the State’ (Gramsci, 2000: 357). Such a partial or ‘interstitial’ identification is empowered to confront the ideological sway and sovereignty of the State’s authority from the perspective of a progressive global cosmopolitan order, as represented in human rights law, or the International Criminal Courts. These partial spaces and interstitial strategies that exist in between national interests and cosmopolitan commitments are not ‘… political ideals of another age’, as David Held argues in Global Governance (Held, 2000: 170), but are ‘… embedded in rule systems and institutions … [that represent] forms of governance … diffused “below”, “above” and “alongside” the nation-state’ (Held, 2000: 450) – environmental regimes, arms control agreements, legal instruments of the European Union and so on.

Gramsci’s ‘philosophy of the part’ is informed by a global philology:

Historical grammar cannot but be ‘comparative’: an expression that, analyzed thoroughly, indicates the deep-seated awareness that the linguistic fact, like any other [singular or partial] historical fact, cannot have strictly defined national boundaries, but that history is always world history and that particular histories exist only within the frame of world history. (Gramsci, 2000: 353)

Becoming global is in some respects an aleatory claim rather than an achieved historical condition: it is a ‘domain of potential’
(Sen, 2000: 239), that attaches as much intrinsic importance to prior ethical entitlements as it does to actual legal or institutional rights. And it is for this reason that in addition to a global philology, the ‘philosophy of the part’ advances an ethical pedagogy:

One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern world, political parties have in the elaboration and the diffusion of the conceptions of the world, because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical laboratory. (Gramsci, 2000: 353)

EXTENDING THE MAP OF CULTURAL GLOBALIZATION

The map of cultural globalization, drawn in terms of geographical extensity, the intensity of flows and the velocity of ideas and images, will have to be extended when it reaches the landscape of historical memory in creating an internationalist narrative that takes brutality and alienation as the starting points for a new global future. For if, as suggested earlier, ethical and cultural globalization is at an ‘incubational’ turning point, a momentary equilibrium or combination of old and new, past and present, then we are committed to the temporality of revisionary repetition (or iteration) – the idea that we must always re-situate the past in revising the present and the future.

There are some lines in Adrienne Rich’s remarkably prescient book of poems, An Atlas of the Difficult World, that yield some part of the sovereignty of the self and of national self-interest in order to establish something like a global solidarity. It is not a sentimental surrender or a philanthropic gesture to the rights of the other; nor is it a ventriloquism of victims, although it could be read that way at first. The poet works through the process of partializing the poetic ‘person’, splitting its ‘first-person’ authority, sundering a foundationalist consciousness of ‘first world’ priority or positionality, in order to articulate a ‘family likeness’ that refuses facile forms of historical equivalence. The poetic meter, and moral measure, of the verse is maintained across a long history of ‘rights and wrongs’ through a momentary equilibrium of voice: ‘I am… I am… I am...’ This turns into an insistent and incessant repetition of ‘unsatisfaction’, in which the poem finds its ethical standing and historical understanding while struggling to achieve an appropriate global address:
Memory says: Want to do the right thing? Don’t count on me. I’m a canal in Europe where bodies are floating I’m a mass grave I’m the life that returns I’m a table set with room for the Stranger I’m a field with corners left for the landless I’m a man-child praising God he’s a man I’m a woman who sells for a boat ticket… I’m an immigrant tailor who says A coat is not a piece of cloth only … … I have dreamed of Zion I’ve dreamed of world revolution … I’m a corpse dredged from a canal in Berlin a river in Mississippi I’m a woman standing with other women dressed in black on the streets of Haifa, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem … I am a woman standing in line for gasmasks I stand on a road in Ramallah with naked face listening I am standing here in your poem unsatisfied (Rich, 1991: 44)

The insistent repetition of the subject-phrase, ‘I’m a … I’m a … I am’ [‘Don’t count on me’], as in some bleak counting-song of a monstrous child of our times, makes audible a conflict on the borders of memory, narrativity and agency. Historical memory, having born witness to the past – to history’s promises and betrayals – says ‘don’t count on me to do “the right thing.”’ And yet it is the unreliability of the narratives of history and memory that forces the poet to take a ‘stand’ as witness, in the performative, present tense: ‘I am, I am, I am’; a stark, simple repetition, like a nursery rhyme or a broken record. The long historical narratives of linear progress or cyclical evolutions are stopped short in this espousal of the ‘philosophy of the part’ that allows the poet to identify with various overlapping communities of fate – linkages through fragmentations. When historic memory fails public morality, is the compulsion to repeat, the beating pulse of death, the only answer? Each line contains its own encrypted narrative in which the instability and silence of memory acts out its struggle for recognition. Rosa Luxembourg may be the corpse dredged from the
Landwehr canal in Berlin; the civil rights movement of the American South is invoked in the Mississippi; the immigrant tailor’s plea, ‘A coat is not a piece of cloth only’, both recalls Marx’s use of the coat to expound his theory of value and commodifies him.

The provocation of the poetic impulse here is to ‘work’ the lapses of memory into a revision, a re-signification of the historical record as it emerges into the incubational laboratory of the global present. Rich struggles to find a way of establishing a narrative of human interest, in Hannah Arendt’s sense of the term, where to discover what lies in between these distinct, disjunctive moments of speech and action allows them to become affiliated with one another without being appropriated by an overarching, sublatory sense of the predictability of historical progress. The emphasis in the last line – ‘I am a woman standing/standing in your poem’ – should not be overlooked, for this is a peculiar kind of political stance, the ‘standing of citizenship’ as a measure of public ‘good’, as respect and recognition, upon which Judith Shklar founds her theory of American citizenship (Shklar, 1991). Citizenship as ‘standing’ arises from Shklar’s insistence that as active citizens we must vigilantly guard against the State’s strategies of exclusions and discriminations in the midst of promises of formal equality and procedural democracy. As a woman, whose effective elision from the polity becomes a ‘negative’ condition for the empowerment of the male citizen, Rich now stands with those who are in the minority on a global scale. Rich is performing a speech-act that addresses ‘intertemporal equity’ and ‘intertemporal rights’. The repeated phrase, ‘I am … a table … a field … a man-child … a woman … an immigrant’, does not seek to establish the sovereignty of a ‘representative’ world-subject. Nor can the unsatisfied ‘rhythm’ of repetition strive to ‘restore’ some pre-configured, normative sense of the good or the just or the free. In this poem the repetition of the simplest of all expressions of humanity, ‘I am’, becomes both a claim to human rights and an embodiment of the responsibilities and obligations of global citizenship.

This brings to mind a particularly moving and pertinent passage from Edward Said’s final work, *Humanism and Democratic Criticism*, which represents his contrapuntal ‘worldly’ concerns at their best. Like Rich, Said was a member of the community of the ethically and politically ‘unsatisfied’ whose mission it was to uncover the complacencies and collusion of historical memory. Like Gramsci, by whom he was deeply influenced, Said’s contrapuntal cultural critique
was committed to the above-mentioned global pedagogy and philology. The relevance of Sâid's sentiments to this author's argument will not be lost:

... always and constantly the undocumented turbulence of unsettled and unhoused exiles, immigrants, itinerant or captive populations for whom no document, no adequate expression yet exists to take account of what they go through ... Humanism, I strongly believe must excavate the silences, the world of memory, of itinerant barely surviving groups ... (Sâid, 2004: 81)

THE GLOBAL HUMANIST NARRATIVE

The global humanist narrative of revisionary repetition has a remarkable capacity for enduring and enunciating unsettled states of transition, moments when history seems to be in a hiatus, times at which the international humanist's faith falters or is lost. Rich and Gramsci both enlarge and transgress the civil society of the nation by confronting its self-regarding and self-enclosing sovereignty. Revisionary repetition is a deliberative measure of ethical and political reflection, which maintains tension rather than resolves it. It is a temporal register that regulates the narrative movement through which, in negotiating the unresolved tension between the aesthetic, ethical and trans-national, we make ‘... those connections that allow us to see part and whole, that is the main thing: What to connect with, how, and how not?’ (Sâid, 2004: 78)

It is from the turbulence of wars, occupations, segregations and evictions that these unsettled energies of place and displacement will settle into a design for living with shared borders and contrapuntal histories. And this returns to our beginning, to that doorway of history whose timbers shiver in the sharp winds of war, whose entryway is blocked by hate and fear. If oppression and destruction can tear down walls and destroy frontiers, then why can’t those gates remain open, those spaces de-territorialized, in times of peace? It is as if hostility brings us closer to our neighbours, in a deadly embrace, than hospitality ever can.

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GLOBAL KNOWLEDGE: IMBALANCES AND CURRENT TASKS

Paulin J. Hountondji *

SUPPRESSED ISSUES

Descriptions of ‘global knowledge’ usually emphasize such facts as the easy circulation of scientific knowledge from one country to another, or from one region to another. Among other novelties, attention is drawn to the extraordinary possibilities that information and communication technologies offer in the fields of scientific documentation, research and teaching: database consultation from a distance, virtual universities, forums for interactive discussions, and so on. Such internet-driven innovations enable one to overcome, or at least minimize, the inconvenience of distance.

However these facts only constitute progress toward the worldwide availability of scientific information, and not necessarily toward any real sharing of knowledge – though this worldwide availability is itself limited, as clearly shown by Pierre Péan in his Secret d’État (Péan, 1986). Indeed, usual descriptions of knowledge leave unaddressed the conditions under which that knowledge is produced, the conditions of its management and control, and its relationship with the culture or cultures specific to the places of its production. Such descriptions thus do not question the position of Southern countries in relation to existing information; nor do they raise the issue of the conditions under which those countries will cease being mere consumers of a knowledge

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produced elsewhere, and become resolute co-producers of that knowledge. Descriptions may insist on other aspects, for example the planetary extension of scientific paradigms and of their related practices, or the uniformity of methods and founding theories. But nobody appears to wonder where such paradigms come from, geographically or socially, nor to what extent researchers from the periphery (i.e. from the planet’s South) did indeed participate in their elaboration.

The increasing diversification of the international scientific community, particularly since the Second World War, has included an increasing number of researchers from the ‘Third World’. We note the theoretical effects of this broadening of the social base of science in general, and of social science in particular, and how it brought about a strong shake-up of themes and problems (Wallerstein, 1996); but there has been no questioning of the significance and limitations of this broadening. Has it truly transformed the scientific and technological relations of production world-wide? Have other regions of the globe become full partners in the production of knowledge? Are those regions full, joint managers of world scientific heritage, co-authors and co-makers of the decisions that concern them? Or are they still – today as yesterday – marginalized?

At a different level, we observe the sudden arrival of modern technology and its most sophisticated products into human communities hitherto known for their resistance to change. But little do we care about the deep-rooted processes and subterranean dynamics that lie beneath visible effects, the coexisting forms of old and new. Still less does we care about the way in which such imported knowledge, from time to time, fits in with local knowledge. Recent studies have shown for instance how peasant communities occasionally go about ‘dismembering’ technological goods, which they then reconstitute and adapt more freely to meet their needs – instead of merely yielding to invasion (Mongbo, 1995). Such studies have value and deserve to be more widely appreciated.

For some 30 years the sociology of science, before that no more than a study of relationships between science and society in industrialized countries, has shown increased concern for the development of science in the ‘Third World’ (Rossi, 1973: 7–14). Researchers have studied the formation of scientific communities in Latin America, where they see signs of an emerging ‘world science’ (Polanco et al., 1989), a phrase obviously derived from Wallerstein’s ‘European world economy’
(Wallerstein, 1989; 1980; 1974). Similarly, Jacques Gaillard and Roland Waast studied scientific communities in South East Asia and in India in particular (Gaillard and Waast, 1997). So far, however, few studies have addressed the sociology of science in sub-Saharan Africa; those which have deserve to be more widely known and discussed. More often than not, existing studies are on traditional knowledge1 (Alapini, 1950; Maupoil, 1961; Augé, 1975; Karp and Bird, 1980; Zaslavski, 1973; Kane, 1987; Tchitchi, 1997; Houndonougbo, 1997; and Gerdes, 2003 and 1994). As such they deal more with the anthropology of knowledge than with the sociology of science stricto sensu.

The sociology of science is very recent and still little known in sub-Saharan Africa. Recent work by Maxime Dahoun on the status of science and research in Benin (Dahoun, 1997) deserves mention here, as does research done in Dakar, Senegal during an epistemology seminar led by Souleymane Bachir Diagne which is yet to be published. A book edited by the Nigerian zoologist Frank Ukoli (Ukoli, 1995) also deserves wide publicity, as its title suggests: What Science? Problems of Teaching and Research in Nigerian Universities.

There is a pressing need to better understand the way research functions in Africa, and to catalogue all research works or as many works as possible of that kind.2 There is a need to build upon existing work on the sociology of modern scientific research, as well as on more classic studies in the anthropology of knowledge; we can benefit from the vast amount of information they contain, and the tentative analyses they offer, to rethink the outreach and limitations of scientific production in Africa, its true relationship with the process of research in the West, its mode of articulation with local industry, agriculture

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1 Some of these studies are remarkable. Many deal not only with knowledge stricto sensu, but with the cultures, world views, myths and ritual practices from which it is difficult to dissociate knowledge; for example, Alapini, 1950; Maupoil, 1961; Augé, 1975; and Karp and Bird, 1980. Other studies, and these are more numerous, focus more precisely on cultural practices dealing with the production of knowledge, and on oral corpuses and the texts which sometimes derive from them. For an example in the field of mathematics see Zaslavsky, 1973; also, the remarkable research by Paulus Gerdes from Mozambique on Bantu ethnomathematics (Gerdes, 2003; 1994).

2 One of the great problems of research in Africa, and probably in other peripheral or marginalized regions, concerns the (in)visibility of academic work which, carried out under the most miserable conditions, must experience some sort of miracle in order to reach the heights known as 'international readership'.
and economy activity, its degree of autonomy and its strengths and weaknesses. Based on the African experience, a number of problems could be raised: the problem of technological and scientific relations of production world-wide, the problem of planetary imbalances in the production and management of knowledge, the problem of the ways and means to correct such imbalances. A further ‘problem’ is to invent, in the field of knowledge together with all other fields, another form of globalization: a civilization of sharing and joint responsibility.

Let us recall here a few hypotheses, disseminated through this author’s past research. These hypotheses relate to the history, structure and functioning of colonial (and subsequently post-colonial) scientific research, the relationships between modern science and local knowledge, and North/South relationships in the fields of knowledge production and management. Some of these hypotheses have yet to be verified, and checked against empirical data as reflected in numerous available reports and studies. If this latter process is conclusive, some recommendations and simple suggestions can be formulated with regard to science policy. A summary of both the hypotheses and the suggestions follows.

**ORIGINAL SIN**

In the ‘Third World’, modern science is originally colonial or semi-colonial. Let us leave aside, for the moment, the huge problem of the relationship between exogenous science and so-called traditional knowledge; we shall recall first how it used to ‘work’ and how it was organized in its own way through the ‘colonial pact’.

Economically, colonies functioned as reservoirs of raw materials that fed factories in the metropolis. Similarly on the scientific level, colonies functioned as an immense reservoir of new facts; these were collected at their crude stage and conveyed to metropolitan laboratories and research centres which were entrusted with, and alone could undertake, the task of processing them, theoretically interpreting them, and integrating them into the overall system of facts known and recognized by ‘science’. Colonies lacked laboratories, just as they lacked factories. What was missing in both cases, what seldom took place in the colonies but always back in the metropolis, was transformation – the hard impact on raw material required to give value added. Colonies were thought to have no need of such facilities, driven by cerebral work, or of the sophisticated equipment required to transform crude facts
into proven knowledge. Metropolitan laboratories on the other hand had access in the colonies to an untapped source of new information and banks of data, leading on to new knowledge.

Globalization, much talked about today, dates back to that time at the very least – to be more accurate, before ‘formal’ colonization, to the time of brutal integration into a world capitalist market. In sub-Saharan Africa, the process began with the Slave Trade; elsewhere, other historic markers can be identified. In any event to have a clear sense of what lies hidden behind the current verbal deluge on globalization, we must go back to the history of that Trade. One of its lessons is that the world’s space is not a neutral ethereal atmosphere, homogenous, undifferentiated and all parts of which are on a level. On the contrary it is structured, oriented, polarized. It has uneven spaces, hills and rises harnessed by, and for the profit of, a particular sub-space which may be described as the ‘metropolis’. Samir Amin describes it as a ‘centre’ in opposition to ‘peripheries’. Globalization, in essence, is that process of peripherization.

LIMITED CHANGES

Things have surely changed for the better since the time of colonial settlements. In industry as in science, the ‘Third World’ is no longer a mere exporter of raw materials; it owns factories, laboratories, universities and research centres. This author must therefore nuance the description he gave 15 years ago, of the ‘scientific dependence in Africa today’ (Hountondji, 1990; 1988a; 1988b), as exceedingly pessimistic. The lack of industry for producing scientific applications was neither as complete, nor as serious as this author believed; to be sure, we in Africa still do not know how to make a microscope, but at least we have computer assembly lines here and there, and this is quite an achievement. On the other hand, this author had largely underestimated the importance of documentary holdings in local libraries and archives. A closer examination suggests that the trickiest problems derive not so much from poverty as from the poor use of available documents.

Today the ‘Third World’ features structures of scientific and intellectual production where extremely important work is done, the results of which sometimes have a resounding, world-wide impact. It is out of the question to downplay that production or ignore its value; the problem lies rather in knowing how it functions, by whom and in whose service it is exploited, and what position it holds in the world-wide
knowledge economy in general. In other words, are the above structures truly autonomous? Do they favour the collective uptake by societies in the South of the scientific knowledge available in the world? Or to the contrary are they, today as yesterday, still peripheral back-benchers in the service of knowledge accumulation at the ‘centre’?

EXTRAVERSION

Despite the important changes which have taken place since decolonization, post-colonial scientific research to this day has been tributary to, and structured like, colonial scientific research. In short post-colonial scientific research has been basically extraverted, i.e., turned outwards toward the outside world and organized to respond to a demand (theoretical, scientific, economic, etc.) that comes from the ‘centre’ of the world market. That turning outwards emerges in multiple ways. First, post-colonial countries are far from mastering the means of scientific production. Today as yesterday, such countries import their laboratory equipment from the North. Having failed to put in place an appropriate industry they also import spare parts, which may entail very long waiting periods and a considerable delay in implementing research plans (Gnininv, 1978). Post-colonial countries import books, journals and other principal forms of scientific documentation. Worse still, their own intellectual products are pushed out toward the North and destined primarily for external consumption. ‘Third World’ researchers, Africans in particular, publish preferably in Western journals and publishing houses. When the former do publish in local journals, it is in the knowledge that most of their reading public lies outside Africa and that those journals must conform to ‘international norms’ of scholarship (a concept which obviously also requires questioning). Consequently in their writing style, methodologies and intellectual procedures, in their ways of dealing with issues and in their very choice of issues, such researchers must primarily meet the expectations of potential readers at the ‘centre’ of the system.

All told, the international scientific community is largely concentrated in the North. No wonder then that even the journals and other scientific documentation published in the South have more readers in the North, since such publications, whatever their language of expression, must ensure minimum availability through brief summaries in European languages – namely English. In this respect Africa is probably the most backward continent: all research
works, on all subjects, are conducted in the languages of the former colonial masters and to the detriment of vernacular languages spoken and understood by the overwhelming majority of African populations. Willingly or not, researchers in the South, knowing their audience in advance, will naturally tend to choose research topics significant to readers in the North. The social extraversion of scientific discourse at the ‘periphery’ therefore has its intellectual equivalent as a corollary. For researchers in the South to dig deep into their original contexts, pinpoint the most relevant issues and carry them up to the required degree of abstraction and elaboration, they must address themselves to local readers as their priority reading public and to the local scientific community in its capacity as a privileged intermediary. To achieve that, African researchers must subvert prevailing trends.

**LEARNED INFORMANTS**

An unfortunate limitation in the practice of the social sciences or even some basic and natural sciences in the ‘Third World’ is their confinement within the particular. Local scientific discourse is interesting only if it accounts for local realities; for example, the African historian, sociologist, anthropologist, linguist and philosopher must thus expound African history, sociology, anthropology, linguistics and philosophy. Limited to their own horizon, ‘Third World’ researchers thus leave to others to theorize in their place, interpret the data they have gathered and integrate it into patently larger systems. Researchers in the South deny themselves access to the universal. Objectively, they operate as mere informants in the service of world science; learned informants, without a doubt, but informants all the same – people who neither design the questions nor determine the method, but are happy with answering questions put to them. Like model students, diligent and hard-working, researchers at the periphery comfort and carry over into the post-colonial era a division of intellectual labour put in place by colonization: the latter allocated to the ‘centre’ the monopoly of invention, and reduced the periphery to supplying the resources for that invention and to implementing the results as applicable.

**EXCLUSION**

Turning outwards – extraversion – as defined and described above, has a necessary corollary in a form of exclusion that all too often goes unnoticed. The study of non-Western societies and cultures has always
been undertaken without the participation of the peoples in question. Subjects of the learned discourse of ethnologists, historians or other specialists, these peoples were excluded from the discussions concerning them, debates on relevant methods, paradigms and hypotheses, and theoretical and practical matters arising. They were not even informed of them. They knew only that they were cause for curiosity, and very often thought this an honour; for who hates being the centre of others’ interest?

To carry out his or her enquiry, the foreign scientist was often in need of local informants. He or she also needed interpreters, to translate the information and to initiate him or her to the languages used. The exclusion of the populations could therefore not be total; on the contrary, it meant selecting a few helpers. Gradually these agents became true experts, used to the kind of questions asked by their learned employer and capable of anticipating them (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1996). Over time a class of ‘indigenous specialists’ emerged, some of whom had sufficient mastery of European languages to produce in them, on their own initiative, ethnographic, historical and other texts and documents comparable to those of their masters. Schooling did the rest. The number of ‘indigenous specialists’ increased, not only in ethnography but in all disciplines. Gradually, these individuals deliberately attended to those problems and methods in the human and social sciences that dealt with their own societies. To these fields they made more and more remarkable contributions (Hountondji, 1988b).

Yet clearly, the bulk of the population remains as excluded as before from the scientific debates of which it is the subject. The ‘indigenous specialist’ or scientist is simply co-opted by his or her Western peers, associated to discussions centred on the West and in which he or she cannot have an impact. He or she sees that in this context, others have invested him or her as a spokesperson for his or her society and culture, a spokesperson without a brief and thus without

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3 The intermediary is capable of guessing the responses expected by the inquisitor, and of giving them to him or her quite simply: after all, why not be nice to a visitor? This includes a few laughable episodes where the informant’s keenness on consistency turns his response into a first degree statement, quite the reverse of direct and spontaneous testimony as per the questioner’s wishes. In a recent article Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch tells how her informants, in a conversation with her, stopped to discuss what the right answer to her should be. They tried to agree on what their answer had been to Jan Vansina, the previous year! (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 1996)
the obligation to render accounts. All of his or her contributions are extraverted, directed toward a Western public or readership. He or she is only a new version of the ‘interpreter’ of colonial days, a learned informant helping to accumulate knowledge at the centre of the system.

GOING, GOING…

Massive dependence on the equipment, documentation and scientific paradigms produced at the centre leads the researcher in the ‘Third World’, and peculiarly in Africa, to going out of the Black continent. A journey toward Europe or America, South/North scientific tourism is part and parcel of the African researcher’s normal career. That journey has neither the same meaning, nor the same status, as the usual North/South journey necessary to the Western researcher as a ‘field trip’ and as part of a process of specialization (for instance in African or Oriental Studies). The journey to the South is useful only to certain categories of Northern researchers; for these it is a kind of detour to collect information and accumulate data, the theoretical processing of which will be done once they return. The researcher from the South does exactly the same thing, but goes to the North in a search not for empirical data but for paradigms, theoretical and methodological models, books, articles, laboratory equipment or research team-members. Precisely for that reason, the journey north is far from a detour, linked to his or her study area; it is an unavoidable imperative, whatever the area of study and research. The researcher from the South is an institutional nomad, who keeps coming and going. When he or she does not find institutional and financial support, he or she keeps searching for it all his or her life.

South/North scientific tourism should not either be equated to North/North scientific tourism. That more and more European researchers are taking flight to North America does not mean that in Europe there are no ‘research systems’ – that is to say, coherent and autonomous structures of scientific activity. We must look elsewhere for the reasons for that exodus.

The brain drain from the ‘Third World’, often denounced but never fought effectively, is only a side-effect of the general extraversion of intellectual, scientific and more generally economic activity in the South. It is the logical outcome of a system that is inseparable from globalization in its presently recognized form or forms.
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE

In all countries in the world modern science, namely organized, systematic and formal research activity, when it exists, is carried out jointly with knowledge described as traditional. However in the context of Africa arrangements for that coexistence have peculiarities that require close examination. Kwame Nkrumah warned against the risk of ‘schizophrenia’ that might emerge from bad management of the coexistence of cultures, or ‘philosophies’ as he preferred to call them (Nkrumah, 1964). Without going that far, we note that African pre-colonial corpuses of knowledge on plants, animals, health and disease, agricultural and handicraft techniques, rather than becoming more accurate and rigorous through contact with exogenous science, have tended to recoil upon themselves. In the best cases, they merely subsist beside new knowledge in a relationship of simple juxtaposition; some knowledge has reached the point of disappearing from collective memory4 (Adandé, 1997). The causes of such amnesia need analysis, the conditions of that historical regression need examining; remedies must be proposed.

ETHNO-SCIENCE

Very early, Westerners realized that in studying other cultures, it had to do not only with isolated practices or beliefs but also with belief systems, thought systems, knowledge systems. Interest in such knowledge systems thus gave birth to various branches of ‘ethno-science’. This author defines ethno-science as a study of corpuses of knowledge established in ‘oral civilizations’ (Houis, 1971). If the generic term appeared somewhat late, several specific terms designating sub-units of that discipline were coined earlier; moreover, these sub-disciplines themselves were practiced long before they were named5 (Murdock,

4 The Beninese archaeologist Alexis Adandé recalls with humour that on the occasion of the referendum organized by de Gaulle in 1958, opponents to independence willingly used a trump card argument: technological underdevelopment. ‘You can’t make a needle, and you clamour for independence!’ The results of the referendum show to what extent such arguments were effective. The bulk of electors hardly remembered the extraordinary development of an indigenous iron heavy metallurgy that flourished for millennia, or the blast-furnaces, some still active at the time, which operated far away from the limelight (Adandé, 1997).

5 The English word ‘ethnoscience’ appeared only in 1950, in the 3rd edition of the collective book published among others by Murdock, Outline of Cultural Materials
3rd edition, 1950; Hountondji, 2002). They form an important corpus of which Harold Conklin drew a check-list, updated until 1971, and which has been growing ever since (Conklin, 1972). New sub-disciplines keep appearing, hence today’s scientific embrace not only of ethnobotany, ethnozoology and ethnomedicine, but also ethnobiology, ethnopsychiatry, ethnolinguistics, ethnohistory, ethnomethodology, ethnosophiology, ethnosophiology, ethnosophiology, even ethnopharmacology and ethnocookery (Gerdes, 2003; 1994).

This author has pinpointed elsewhere (Hountondji, 1997b; 1987) the significant ambivalence in the very usage of these neologisms. In the primary meaning of the term, an ethno-discipline is the study of a knowledge corpus relating to a given field and conveyed through an oral tradition. Hence, ethnobotany is held to relate to the inventory of ‘traditional’ knowledge on plants; ethnozoology is the study of taxonomies and other ‘traditional’ knowledge on animals. Ethnoscience is then understood as the reconstruction of a pre-existing knowledge, something akin to ‘knowledge of knowledge’. This raises an inevitable question: in respect of that targeted knowledge, how original is the second-degree knowledge? What does the latter add to the former? Who brings what to whom, and how? That was what this author termed, if clumsily, the issue of the place of knowledge: where does knowledge, true knowledge, lie? Is it to be found in the target knowledge or in its erudite restitution by the anthropologist?

So ethnolinguistics, in its current sense, has never meant or does not truly mean the inventory of the linguistic knowledge of peoples called ‘primitive’, but rather the application of linguistics, a discipline on its own, to the examination of the language practices (1st edition, 1938; 2nd edition, 1945; 3rd revised edition, 1950). However, the word ‘ethnobotany’ dates back to 1895, when it was construed by an American agronomist, J.W. Harshberger. ‘Ethnozoology’ dates back to 1914 or thereabouts (see Revel, 1990). As for the ‘ethnosophiology’ which was the subject of lively polemics in Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, it has an American origin. The word was not construed as believed by both Marcien Towa and this author; in fact it could be seen in bold letters in the title of an unfinished thesis, written by Kwame Nkrumah between 1943 and 1945 at the University of Pennsylvania: ‘Mind and Thought in Primitive Society: A Study in Ethno-Philosophy with Special Reference to the Akan Peoples of the Gold Coast, West Africa’. Barring errors, no earlier usage of the word has been traced to this day. Nkrumah used the word with a naively positive meaning, without the critical and pejorative nuance it had in the 1970s (See Hountondji, 1997).
of those peoples. Nor is ethnodemography truly the inventory of the demographic knowledge of peoples who have oral cultures. Rather, it is first of all the application to those peoples of the knowledge and methods of demographic surveys considered ‘science’ in the West. Ethnopsychology is only another name for the ‘psychology of peoples’, in the sense of an objective, not subjective, psychology on and not by the peoples. Ethnohistory is handed out not as a mere restitution of tales of the ‘oral civilizations’ relating to their own past, but as a branch of history (a Western discipline among Western disciplines) simply characterized by the particular nature of its documentary sources (oral sources). In the above examples ethno-science is no longer presented as an inventory of pre-existing knowledge, but as an extension of Western disciplines to new fields, to regions in the world thus far unexplored. In that case, there is no wavering about the locus of knowledge; it is expected to lie within the mother discipline, whose overarching reach has simply been extended in width and breadth.

However, the issue is addressed only in appearance. The ethnohistorian knows perfectly well that the ethnic groups under his or her study did not wait for his or her visit to produce their stories on their own past, far less unanimous, infinitely more diverse and contradictory and infinitely more elaborate than was supposed. The ethnolinguist knows to what extent the ‘indigenous’ taxonomies, the autochthonous classifications of colours and tastes, plants, animals, and objects in general can be conscious and subtle, if not in all people then at least among the ‘intellectuals’ of the group under study, those often illiterate ‘masters of speech’ who supply his or her learned discourse with its essential materials. The ethnopsychologist is aware that the peoples on whose behaviours he or she holds forth do have a vision — or more accurately, visions — of the human being, of his or her essential motives and of the manner in which he or she ‘operates’, which in Europe is called a psychology. The question remains therefore what connection there is between the two levels of knowledge and the originality of the second with regard to the first.

Let us simply observe the following: throughout its history of more than 100 years, ethno-science has experienced remarkable progress by shifting from a purely aesthetic approach to a truly, openly ‘developmentalist’ one. Traditionally, the study of indigenous botanical or animal taxonomies was never aimed at determining which one, the botanist or zoologist from the West, or the Amerindian sage, was
right. That study sought only to foster understanding, from within, of the inner coherence of a given order starting from the language and discourse of the peoples under study. The classifications were taken only as language products among others, or art works among others. The approach was above all aesthetic, purely descriptive, aimed at reconstructing the inner logic of given systems of representation without the least concern for the objectivity of those representations.

However, for almost 25 years, indigenous knowledge systems have been increasingly studied not for their own sake but for their possible contribution to development. In the introduction to a book published in 1980, its authors emphasized the importance of that change in perspective in the face of a century-old tradition; their book, they insisted, marked a new step in the progress of the discipline (Brokensha, Warren and Werner, 1980). This new interest has not yet waned. The errors of ‘developers’ and other international experts who attempted to impose on peasant communities in the ‘Third World’ their agricultural techniques and other ‘technological packages’, carefully assembled in the West but ill-adapted to the target environment and often in complete ignorance of more efficient local techniques, have been denounced wholeheartedly.

However progress remains limited. One matter remains outstanding, today as yesterday: that of the truth or theoretical validity of indigenous knowledge systems. This issue remains blurred by an exclusive preoccupation with efficiency; there is also a blurring effect on the ways and means of a critical re-appropriation by the peoples themselves of that traditional heritage, and of its careful integration into the movement of active research. Indeed, that indigenous populations should finally take over these expert discussions, and reinforce their own capacity to choose for themselves and from experience, is axiomatic. For endogenous techniques and knowledge to be applied in a sustainable manner to development they should be re-appropriated in a judicious and critical way by the populations who produced them, or at the very least taken over by an intellectual elite, supported by and answerable to those populations. That step is necessary and unavoidable. No problem will be truly settled in the field of development without such critical appropriation by the societies themselves of the whole available technological and scientific heritage. This will require a special effort by the societies in question to enrich that heritage themselves, in a way that enables them to bring about the connection with ‘traditional’ knowledge and know-how.
This calls for a change in attitude, a new way of doing science. The researcher in the ‘Third World’, and particularly in Africa, can no longer be satisfied with being recognized and co-opted by the international scientific community. He or she must progressively put an end to extraversion, such as to enable his or her own society to judge his or her work freely and critically. He or she must favour the emergence of a local scientific community primarily concerned with the resolution of local problems; this local community does not exclude, but rather domesticates or tames, the universal (Hountondji, 2002).

ETHNO-PHILOSOPHY

The criticism of ethno-philosophy, which raised vivid controversy in Africa during the 1970s and later in African-American circles, can be understood fully only if re-situated in the above, larger framework (Hountondji, 1996). Ethno-philosophy is a brainchild of extraversion. That third-person philosophy seeks to account for collective thought-systems, but the author-classifier cannot for long hide his or her adhesion to the systems thus recreated; that discourse describes without proving, whilst attempting to prove by describing. It errs through amalgamation and categorization. The African philosopher encloses himself or herself in the particular because he or she thinks that nothing can be of interest to his potential readership so much as a description of his own culture. In so doing, he or she remains deaf to the demand for universality that is the foundation of all philosophy. He or she renounces all summative discourse and genuine theoretical ambition.

As the reader knows, such criticism of ethno-philosophy triggered a vigorous counter-criticism, in Africa and the African Diasporas of North America. European philosophy itself was a ‘Euro-philosophy’, it was claimed. A new call was made against cultural alienation and uprootedness, and for a greater linkage with one’s culture. The urgency of a connection between Westernized African intellectuals and the traditional intelligentsia was also stressed, as was the necessity for the former to take their cues from the latter. Very few onlookers realized that beyond such a connection, which remains indispensable, the strategic objective must be to maintain a critical and free relationship with local and exogenous cultures. Today it must also be to bring forward, in a responsible manner and in the new global context, those changes that have become inevitable. Without a collective redeployment of potentialities, such changes would probably
be carried out by external forces acting in a high-handed manner (Hountondji, 2002).

**LANGUAGE POLICIES**

The exclusive use of European languages for the purpose of scientific communication, to the detriment of even widely spoken sub-regional languages, is not conducive to the dissemination of knowledge or to the development of scientific creativity. While on this subject let us be extremely wary of the prejudices, so often conveyed by the research literature itself, that certain ‘primitive’ or ‘semi-primitive’ languages are not adequate to express rational thought⁶ (Levy-Bruhl, 1910). We need to look in another direction, and ask which technical work must be done. Which economic, social and administrative support measures are necessary for the success, under present conditions, of an alternative language policy to advance the dissemination of knowledge and its appropriation?

**CONCLUSION**

The ‘Third World’ is not only a victim; it is also largely responsible for its misfortunes. In this regard, it would be interesting to identify the internal factors of reproduction of dependence. In such activities as teaching and research, let us seek to identify the mechanisms, as obvious as they are resilient, that reproduce mediocrity.

What is required today to transform the intellectual relations of production world-wide is not just the co-option, however massive, of ‘Third World’ researchers into the international scientific community. Still less is it a re-statement of the issues and themes generated by such co-option (Wallerstein, 1996). What is required is a sundering of the ‘centre’ into several distinct and complementary poles, each negotiating with one another on an equal footing. The current ‘peripheries’ must initiate for their own benefit, in a coordinated and careful manner, an

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⁶ A good illustration of that prejudice is Lévy-Bruhl’s commentary on the Yoruba numbering system: indeed, in the Yoruba language, ‘sixteen’, ‘seventeen’, ‘eighteen’ and ‘nineteen’ are said as ‘twenty minus four’, ‘twenty minus three’, ‘twenty minus two’ and ‘twenty minus one’. The ethno-philosopher concluded that the Yoruba was incapable of detaching his or her thought from a heap of 20 cowries, and that he was unsuited for abstraction (Lévy-Bruhl, 1910). Lévy-Bruhl failed to remember that in Latin ‘eighteen’ and ‘nineteen’ are said exactly in the same manner (*duodeviginti*, *undeviginti*).
autonomous process of knowledge accumulation. They must appropriate the international heritage in the fields of science and technology, which they contributed to in their own way, while at the same time critically re-appropriating ‘traditional’ knowledge for themselves.

To take back ‘traditional knowledge’ in a responsible manner will mean that this knowledge ceases to develop in a closed circuit outside today’s intellectual canons, and that it starts being tested and validated anew and taken into account by disciplines recognized as scientific (Canguilhem, 1972). Substituting the dumb juxtaposition of ‘rationalities’ (Horton, 1967; Horton and Finnegan, 1973; Wiredu, 1976), an accelerated confrontation of intellectual procedures will enable an enlarged rationalism to be built up, and to be capable of integrating what is most solid both in the Euro-centric international scientific heritage and in local knowledges (Hountondji, 1997b). In practical terms, this means enhancing the application of endogenous knowledge (‘traditional’ handicraft, ‘traditional’ medicine, etc.) and improving it through imported knowledge if need be (de Souza, 1997; Farquhar, 1994). In a nutshell, it means bringing heritages together to make them complementary components of a single heritage, building coherence between intellectual practices and procedures within a live, open culture that is capable of providing an efficient response to present-day challenges.

In a sense, what is most needed today is not to globalize but rather to de-globalize knowledge. What is needed is to foster developments at the edges of the autonomous, intellectual activities that enable people to face their problems efficiently. What is needed is to develop the so-called ‘peripheries’ into regional and sub-regional poles of excellence, that they may negotiate and exchange on an equal footing with the so-called ‘centre’ of the world market at all levels including that of intellectual production. More than economy, it is perhaps through science that a beginning to the much-awaited revolution – the change of relations of production across the planet – will come about.

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CHALLENGING THE ORTHODOXIES OF KNOWLEDGE: EPISTEMOLOGICAL, STRUCTURAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR HIGHER EDUCATION *

Hans N. Weiler **

INTRODUCTION

The invocation of a ‘Knowledge Society’ has become ubiquitous. Among its many dangers is the illusion that we know what we are talking about with reference to ‘knowledge’. This article claims that when it comes to knowledge, we do not know what we are talking about. More specifically, this article argues that the contemporary discourse on knowledge, particularly in Europe and North America, suffers from three major deficits:

- It does not take a sufficiently critical view of what ‘knowledge’ means, and of the fundamental changes that the concept of knowledge has undergone in the course of the 20th Century.
- It fails to address the political conditions and consequences of the production and use of knowledge – in other words, it is oblivious to the politics of knowledge.

* The author has addressed this issue on several previous occasions, including at the Conference of the International Women’s University on ‘Rethinking the University’ in Berlin in May 2002, at the Heinrich Böll Foundation’s Congress in Berlin in May 2001, and at the New Europe College in Bucharest in June 2003. Each of these iterations, including this one, has grown several more ‘rings’ around the original ‘tree’.

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• It does not adequately address what kinds of structural changes in higher education would follow from recognizing both the epistemological and political transformation of our contemporary knowledge culture.

The purpose of this article is to address this threefold shortcoming and to help overcome it. This attempt begins by looking at the profound changes in our understanding of what ‘knowledge’ means and how it is produced (Part 1); it then presents the essential features of a ‘politics of knowledge’ and proceeds to illustrate these features with reference to discourses on the concept of development, the meaning of gender roles and the understanding of democracy (Part 2); it concludes by pointing out the structural implications that this kind of critical reflection on knowledge has for the future direction of higher education (Part 3).

As some of this author’s previous writing has addressed in considerable detail the epistemological transformations and (to a slightly lesser extent) political transformations in our knowledge culture (see Weiler, 2001), these two aspects will be summarily treated here; more emphasis will be laid on the structural implications of this transformation for higher education.

PART 1: THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF ‘KNOWLEDGE’

Especially in the second half of the 20th Century, the concept of ‘knowledge’ has undergone profound changes and has been at the centre of major controversies – so much so that Rajni Kothari felt obliged to speak of a ‘… deepening sense of crisis in the modern knowledge system’ (Kothari, 1987: 283). These changes have to do with the epistemological foundations of our understanding of knowledge, but also with the way in which we assess different processes and institutional forms of knowledge production. At issue here are thus both the criteria for judging the validity and adequacy of knowledge, and the structural arrangements under which knowledge is being produced. Altogether, this process presents itself to the observer – as this author once put it in an article published some 10 years ago – as ‘… a remarkable mixture of uncertainty and liberation, of a loss of dependable standards and an openness towards new ways of knowing, of a profound doubt about established conventions in the production of knowledge and the exhilarating sense of a new beginning’ (Weiler, 1993: 5).

In substantive terms, this process of transformation is similarly diverse; it involves, among other things, both the questioning of the epistemological tradition of a ‘unified science’ – the de-monopolization of a concept of knowledge that has its roots in the natural sciences – and the emergence of new ways of knowing.

**Challenging the Tradition of a ‘Unified Science’**

*The erosion of a homogeneous concept of knowledge.* Critiques of the tradition of ‘unified science’ take different forms, but what they have in common is that they question the notion of a homogeneous and uniform concept of knowledge, applied equally to every conceivable object. This notion originated in the epistemology of the classical natural sciences and its subsequent extension to the social and behavioural sciences, in line with Parsons’ classic statement in his discussion of Max Weber’s work: ‘There is not “natural” or “cultural” science; there is only science or non-science and all empirical knowledge is scientific in so far as it is valid’ (Parsons, 1977: 61).

*Sources of change.* Over the past decades the absolute validity of this notion has been called into question, not only through epistemological change within the natural sciences themselves but also in the realm of the social and behavioural sciences by a number of developments. These developments include:
• The long-term effects of the ‘positivism debate’ in German sociology (Adorno, 1976).
• The growing importance of phenomenological and hermeneutic forms of social inquiry (Gadamer, 1981; Habermas, 1968; Thompson, 1981).
• The growing influence of non-Western (Kothari, 1987; Nandy, 1981) and feminist epistemological thought (Belenky et al., 1986; Farganis, 1986, Harding, 1986).
• The commotions of post-structuralist and post-modernist debates (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987; Foucault, 1972; 1971; Lyotard, 1984).

**Differentiated and contingent knowledge.** Along these fault lines has emerged a conception of knowledge that is at once more differentiated (in the sense that it differs by the objects of knowledge and the circumstances of its generation) and more contingent (in the sense of statements that are valid only under certain conditions).

**Casualties of change.** As a result of these developments, some elements of classical theories of knowledge have suffered. These include, in particular:

• The concept of objectivity, *i.e.* the independence of the observed ‘subject’ from the observer.
• The idea of the certainty of statements across temporal and other circumstances.
• The possibility of prediction, *i.e.* the dependability of ‘if-then’ statements.
• The belief in the possibility of quantification, *i.e.* of representing reality exhaustively in numerical and quantitative terms.

**Nomothetic vs. ideographic knowledge.** In addition, there has been a shift of emphasis in the relative ‘worth’ of the general and the specific – in the jargon of theoreticians of knowledge, of nomothetic and idiographic knowledge. More concretely this argument is about what is more ‘important’ in generating knowledge about a given field of social activity: to produce generalized statements about patterns of behaviour, or to capture the full texture of a particular situation and decision.

One could and should, of course, emphasize the complementarity of the different bodies of knowledge that each of these options would
help create. However the shift in emphasis between these options is unmistakable, and accounts for a significant change in the pattern of research strategies. Thus in-depth case studies, historical analyses, ethnographic studies, biographical analyses, process, content and critical incident analyses, and interpretive studies of both literary and social evidence are increasingly competing with the time-honoured approach of hypothesis-testing on the basis of sampling strategies, which permits generalization to a theoretically defined universe with identifiable sampling errors.

Explanation and understanding. The situation is similar with respect to the tension between ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’, on which the work of Karl-Otto Apel (1984) has triggered intensive and momentous discussion. Paul Roth underlines how problematic a form of research that focuses on ‘… explanations of behaviour which allow predictions concerning future behaviour’ (Roth, 1987: 3; see also Dallmayr and McCarthy, 1977) has proved to be. Indeed, our most sophisticated predictive models for voting, consumption behaviour or warfare have provided little protection against surprises, serendipity, unexpected outcomes or even banality. Peter Winch gave us a similar warning some decades ago:

The central concepts which belong to our understanding of social life are incompatible with concepts central to the activity of scientific prediction. When we speak of the possibility of scientific prediction of social developments … we literally do not understand what we are saying. (Winch, 1958: 94)

Cognitive, normative and aesthetic knowledge. Finally, the critique of a tradition of scientific rationality geared to the natural sciences has led us to a situation in which knowledge is no longer seen exclusively in cognitive categories, but increasingly in normative and aesthetic categories as well. As a result both ethical justification and artistic expression are divested of their stigma of being unscientific, and are becoming legitimate elements in a new system of knowledge (Habermas, 1985: 134-137; Habermas, 1973; see also Putnam, 1987: 53-56; Lenk, 1986: 349-463; and Roth, 1987).

This development also takes account of the fact that the ‘cultural location’, and hence the normative disposition, of the observer is a constitutive element in the process of knowledge creation and has a decisive impact on its results – a conclusion that has found expression
in the term ‘culturality of knowledge’, with an increasingly rich yield in the literature (Böhme and Scherpe, 1996: 9; Vismann, 1996: 106; Greenblatt, 1994). In this respect also the influence of non-Western and feminist ideas should be acknowledged (Alatas, 1976; González Casanova, 1981; Harding, 1986).

New Ways of Knowing

*Epistemology and institutional structures.* The erosion of the canon and legitimacy of a ‘unified science’ has already been shown to have fundamentally opened up the process of knowledge production, giving forms of knowledge previously considered unscientific or extra-scientific a new and more legitimate role. An important observation here – to anticipate later remarks on the politics of knowledge – is that the hegemony of the tradition of a ‘unified science’ is not an epistemological issue existing in a vacuum, but has also produced a complex system of institutional mechanisms for setting relevant standards at universities, in scientific publications and in the funding of research. Thus one of the consequences of the erosion of the epistemological hegemony of ‘unified science’ is also a structural opening up of the system of knowledge production.

*The rehabilitation of ‘suppressed forms of knowledge’.* Michel Foucault uses a particularly appropriate term when he speaks of the rehabilitation of ‘… subjugated knowledges … a whole set of knowledges that once were disqualified as inadequate to their task’ and that have now acquired new validity as ‘… people’s knowledge’ (*le savoir des gens*) (Foucault, 1980: 82). In a remarkable article entitled ‘African Famine: Whose Knowledge Matters?’, Guy Gran makes a case for recognizing African farmers’ grass-roots knowledge of what does and does not work in African agricultural development as both more legitimate and more effective than the agrarian remedies imposed on the former by international agencies (Gran, 1986).

Following Habermas’ appeal to reconstruct a more holistic notion of knowledge that includes both the normative and aesthetic domains of knowing, the formerly rigid boundaries between scientific and non-scientific knowledge are increasingly questioned. We have thus learned to derive powerful insights into the nature of social reality from the literary testimony of writers such as Gabriel García Marquéz, Günter Grass, Chinua Achebe or Andrei Plesu (2003a; 2003b), from painters and sculptors such as Pablo Picasso, Diego Rivera, Anselm Kiefer or...
Joseph Beuys, or from film-makers like Rainer-Werner Fassbinder, Akira Kurosawa, Ousmane Sembène or Andrzej Wajda.

The ‘third culture’. Particularly fruitful in this connection is the rediscovery – for which we are principally indebted to Wolf Lepenies – of the relationship between the scientific and literary analysis of social reality, in which sociology has arrived at a new understanding of itself as a ‘third culture’ (Lepenies, 1985). Lepenies finds that, throughout its history, sociology ‘… has oscillated between a scientific orientation which has led it to ape the natural sciences and a hermeneutic attitude which has shifted the discipline towards the realm of literature’ (Lepenies, 1988: 1), producing ‘… sociology’s precarious situation as a kind of “third culture” between the natural sciences on the one hand and literature and the humanities on the other’ (ibid.: 7).

PART 2: THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE

The process of transformation summarized in Part 1 of this article has had a lasting influence on our understanding of knowledge. But it has also confirmed that the linkages between knowledge and power are both very intimate and very consequential, and that arriving at a better understanding of this linkage is crucial to any attempt at formulating a political theory of knowledge and its production.

Recognizing the fact that knowledge and power are closely and symbiotically related is nothing new, of course; it can be found in different guises in the works of Marx and Mannheim, as well as in those of Durkheim and Weber. But it was Foucault (1980) who took up this issue with an acumen that is without peer even in the above illustrious company – in his, as Edward Saïd puts it, ‘… highly wrought presentation of the order, stability, authority and regulatory power of knowledge’ (Saïd, 2000: 239; see also Escobar, 1984–1985; DuBois, 1991).

Of the many facets of this close relationship between knowledge and power, this author wishes to highlight four in particular:

• The paramount importance of hierarchies in the existing knowledge order.
• The relationship of reciprocal legitimation between knowledge and power.
• The trans-national division of labour in the contemporary knowledge order.
The political economy of the commercialization of knowledge.

Hierarchies are the quintessential manifestation of power. They signify higher and lower ranks in a given order, domination and subordination, greater and lesser value, prestige and influence. Wherever they occur they reflect structures of authority and power, and thus the essence of politics. In the world of knowledge, hierarchies are a pervasive structural characteristic that is manifested in different ways:

- Different forms and domains of knowledge are endowed with unequal status, the natural sciences traditionally – and, on a more subtle level, to date – occupying a leading position.
- In the realm of the institutional arrangements for the production of knowledge, there are again clear and more or less recognized hierarchies. Here the Max Planck Institutes, private American research universities, the *Grandes Ecoles* and exclusive ‘think tanks’, form the top of the hierarchical pyramid; this institutional hierarchy serves to organize the politics of knowledge, at least at the national level; it has, as we shall see, its international variant as well.
- Finally, the hierarchical principle also works within knowledge-related institutions – between professor and student, between institute directors and staff, between senior and junior academics and, if more subtly, between administrators and academics.

All of these hierarchical relationships are based on more or less explicit agreements regarding what constitutes an appropriate basis for status and authority in the world of knowledge.

Knowledge and power: A relationship of reciprocal legitimation. This author’s basic thesis here has two objectives. The first is to demonstrate that the concept of legitimation can be usefully applied to objects outside the sphere of State authority in the narrow sense – *i.e.* to the realm of knowledge and science as well. The second is to show that a problem central to the understanding of modern statehood, namely the relationship between knowledge and power, acquires particularly sharp focus when interpreted as a relationship of reciprocal legitimation.

On the first point, this author assumes that not only does power require legitimation (which we have known since Max Weber, if
not before), but that knowledge is in need of legitimation as well. Knowledge too must have a claim to credibility; knowledge too requires recognition, of which it must be ‘worthy’. None of these claims of legitimacy exclusively inhere in conceptions of knowledge itself; they derive their respective validity from social and cultural circumstances as well. The knowledge of Hildegard von Bingen was accorded, in the cultural circumstances of her lifetime, the same degree of legitimation as, in their respective lifetimes, that of Paracelsus and Einstein.

And this is where the second point comes in: that knowledge and power are connected by a relationship of reciprocal legitimation – *i.e.* knowledge legitimates power and, conversely, knowledge is legitimated by power. There is ample evidence for this symbiotic relationship. We need only consider the ever-increasing degree to which political decisions are justified by reference to a particular body of knowledge – from environmental policies to the location of new industries, from the redistribution of wealth to decisions on the investment of public funds. In our complex societies, knowledge and science have virtually become the currency of choice in legitimizing State power (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 102; see also Gouldner, 1970: 50; and Marcuse, 1964: 158–159). In his interpretation Ashis Nandy takes this line of reasoning a step further, in its implications for the role of the university:

> As more and more areas of life are ‘scientized’ and taken out of the reach of participatory politics to be handed over to experts, the universities as the final depository of expertise have become a major global political actor of our times. In addition to their other tasks, they legitimize the ‘expertization’ of public affairs and the reign of the professionals. (Nandy, 2000: 116)

But the relationship is far from being a one-way street. Just as knowledge legitimates power, it also derives a great deal of its own legitimacy from decisions of the State – decisions on, for example, what is to be learned and taught at schools, what sort of knowledge is required to qualify candidates for specific public offices and careers, what sort of research should enjoy public funding, etc.

*The trans-national knowledge system and the international division of labour.* The frame of reference for a political theory of knowledge, however, is by no means confined to the institutional and national level; it would not be complete unless the international dimension was
taken into account as well (see Drori et al., 2003). This international dimension is characterized not only by a worldwide information flow that is increasingly facilitated by technology, but also by its own kind of politics; for the apparent openness of the international knowledge system tends to obscure the fact that there are extreme global disparities in the distribution of both knowledge production and consumption. Indeed, one of the salient features of the international knowledge system is its peculiar division of labour, in which key intellectual tasks, such as setting theoretical agendas and methodological standards, are the prerogative of a relatively small number of societies and institutions that play a disproportionately important role in the system – societies and institutions which are, almost without exception, located in the economically privileged regions of the world.

This particular type of hierarchy in our contemporary international knowledge system reflects quite faithfully the international hierarchies of economic influence and political power with which the international knowledge system maintains a thoroughly symbiotic relationship. This is particularly evident in the case of institutions such as The World Bank, whose role in the international system is by no means confined to exercising influence on economic activity and policy. Less well-known, but extremely effective, is the influence The World Bank wields by imposing an orthodoxy of knowledge to which all countries and institutions that wish to enter into negotiations on financing and support must subscribe (Weiler, 1992b; 1991; 1988).

This paradigmatic hegemony of knowledge norms, which has its origins in Western societies and their scientific institutions, has not gone unchallenged. Indeed, the increasingly intense controversy over a new international system of knowledge is one of the most interesting and significant political phenomena of the last 25 years. Instrumental in this ‘… redrawing of the map of world culture’ (Böhme and Scherpe, 1996: 18–19) were many of the voices from the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Arab world that this author has already mentioned – Hountondji, Kothari, García Guadilla and many others, including very prominently Nandy and his call for a ‘… new, plural, political ecology of knowledge’ (Nandy, 1989: 267).

The political economy of commercialized knowledge. A final aspect of the contemporary political economy of knowledge production has to do with the growing commercialization of knowledge in the modern world. To be
sure, certain kinds of knowledge have always had their economic utility, but it is an important sign of our times that the creation of knowledge has come to be regarded and treated so pervasively in economic and commercial terms. This has something to do with the increasing cost of knowledge production, and hence the dependence of knowledge producers on external financial sponsorship. The very nature of modern economic activity has become so massively dependent on up-to-date knowledge of constantly increasing scope and complexity that the linkage between knowledge and both productivity and profitability has become virtually inescapable. This is true not only for the ‘hard’ sciences and their utility for industrial and other forms of engineering, but also for the knowledge of social and psychological processes and its significance for dealing with labour problems, enhancing productivity, and other forms of ‘social engineering’. It is this dependency that has become enshrined in the notion of the ‘Knowledge Society’ as an extraordinarily important paradigm of contemporary analysis (see, inter alia, Braunerhjelm, 2000).

As a result, a whole new set of power relationships has emerged around the world of knowledge. These relationships are dictated by both the interests and the resources of the commercial user of knowledge, and take a variety of forms; from outright research contracts between industry and universities to more subtle influences on research programs by philanthropic foundations, from industry-sponsored research institutions inside universities to the setting up of industry-owned research centres in more or less direct competition with other producers of knowledge in the academic realm. The story of Silicon Valley over the last 40 years offers a particularly instructive lesson on both the advantages and disadvantages of this new symbiotic relationship between knowledge and commerce in the context of high-tech development (Weiler, 2003).

Whatever the specific institutional arrangements, however, the overall growth in the commercialization of knowledge production has added a further layer of politically constituted interests to the contemporary system of knowledge production. The international dimension of this kind of dynamic in the politics of knowledge is the growing debate over the inclusion of higher education and research in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), designed to guarantee access to national markets by foreign suppliers of knowledge (Clift, 1999; Gewerkschaft Erziehung und Wissenschaft, 2002; World Trade Organization, 2001).
The Politics of Knowledge: Three Discourses

Among the many manifestations of change in the realm of knowledge, three discourses highlight particularly clearly the direction and extent of change as well as its political dimension: discourses on the notion of development, the role of gender and the meaning of democracy.

Development. It is surely no coincidence that the relationship between knowledge and development has been at the centre of the extraordinarily rich debate conducted over the past two decades on the concept and political significance of ‘development’. A new discourse on development looms large among the ‘counter-discourses’ that Escobar has identified in many ‘Third World’ countries (1984–1985), and that appear to be closely connected with a new discourse on global peace (Hettne, 1985; Blomstrom and Hettne, 1984; Bosse, 1978: 37). In his writings, Jinadu emphasizes the parallels between the prevailing incrementalist ideas of development and an instrumentalized role of the social sciences in Africa (Jinadu, 1985: 19; see also Bosse, 1978: 191, 198).

Ashis Nandy carries this debate farthest in his critique of a development policy he considers the modern world’s fondest – and cleverest – form of charity (Nandy, 1989: 269). He is even sceptical about the many alternative conceptions of development – sustainable development, eco-development, indigenous development – suspecting them of being ‘… products of the same worldview which has produced the mainstream concepts of science, liberation and development.’ For him the real challenge is to radically reject the unholy alliance between traditional science and traditional development, and construct a ‘… post-modern science’ and a ‘… post-development world’ (Nandy, 1989: 270).

This author’s old friend Majid Rahnema must take credit not only for constantly promoting and making valuable contributions to this critical discourse, but also for publishing his Post-Development Reader (1997), in which he has collected and made available to a wider public some of the most important texts on this subject including the writings of Arturo Escobar, Rajni Kothari, Ashis Nandy, D.L. Sheth and – an interesting European voice in this chorus – Vaclav Havel.

The common denominator in the work of all these authors, differing though they may in many respects, is the close connection they see between the discourse on development and the debate on the politics of knowledge (see for example Gran, 1986: 287).
Gender. As in the case of development, the critical discourse on gender is also much more than an exercise in redefining a concept. In terms of content, the discourse on gender itself is closely linked to both the political agenda of the feminist movement and its epistemological claims about ‘women’s ways of knowing’ (Belenky et al., 1986; Farganis, 1986; Harding, 1998; 1993; Figueroa and Harding, 2003). This convergence of political and epistemological agendas has yielded a wealth of contributions to our understanding of the role of gender in the construction of social reality, and of the many ways in which elements of patriarchy have pervaded our conception of performance, achievement, success, competition and, indeed, knowledge (Pateman, 1988). But beyond shedding light on how our conceptions have been shaped, there is an ongoing debate combining a fundamental rethinking of gender roles in knowledge production (as in the five ‘research programs’ described by Sandra Harding, 1986: 20–24) with the political struggle to involve women in, and bring their influence to bear on, the institutions of knowledge production (Conway et al., 1987).

Here, too, the international and intercultural dimension of the discussion has long since attained considerable importance, especially in the feminist debate of post-colonial discourses on knowledge and development (Charlton, 1984; Sangari and Vaid, 1989; Mohanty, 1984).

Democracy. It would take a more extended discussion than is possible here to review the multi-faceted changes in the way democracy is understood in different cultures and political circles. These range from a new theoretical interest in the conception of democracy (Pateman, 1970), to critical treatments of Western democracies’ lack of legitimation (Crozier et al. 1975; Habermas, 1973), to the discussion of transformation processes in Latin America, Africa and Eastern and Central Europe (O’Donnell et al., 1986). Of more direct relevance for our purposes, however, is the observation that this discourse, like that on development and gender, also has a dual dimension. On the one hand it addresses fundamental questions about the nature of democracy in modern societies, especially in terms of the relative importance of representative and participatory elements (Pateman, 1970; Barber, 1984). At the same time however, this discourse on democracy is also a discourse on the politics of knowledge and, more specifically, on the democratization of the processes of knowledge production and consumption.
A debate with far-reaching implications in this connection is that on the ‘governance of science’, which deals with the remarkable paradox that scholarship, while historically a significant contributor to the democratization of societies, has at the same time steadfastly refused to subject itself to democratic norms of procedure (Fuller, 2000: 135).

PART 3: THE POLITICS OF KNOWLEDGE AND THE STRUCTURES OF HIGHER EDUCATION

The transformation of the traditional system of knowledge traced thus far cannot but have major implications for the future orientation of higher education in terms of its organizational and institutional arrangements (Weiler, 1992a). This process will confront institutions of higher education with some major challenges, including the following:

- The need to acknowledge that the production and mediation of knowledge is a genuinely political process requiring systematic and critical inquiry, and in which both the culturality of knowledge and the role of knowledge in legitimizing political power play an important part.
- The critical examination of the role of traditional disciplines as the dominant matrix, for the organization of scholarly activity and for the structures of domination and subordination that are based on it.
- The critical review of criteria and methods for evaluating scholarship, taking into account the power structures inherent in these procedures.
- A frank reassessment of the role of institutions of higher education in the international politics of knowledge.

The Politics of Knowledge in Teaching and Research

Knowledge and the political conditions of both its production and consumption still remains – despite the many commendable efforts of individual scholars – at best a peripheral subject of serious and critical inquiry, generally relegated to disciplinary niches such as the sociology of knowledge, the history of science, etc. Attempts to transcend these niches – by the likes of Lepenies or Bhabha or Nowotny or Fuller – are, given the importance of this issue, a remarkably rare exception. Ashis Nandy has eloquently described the power of definition, of establishing categories and concepts, as the key to understanding the new relationship between knowledge and power:
The old, clichéd saying, ‘knowledge is power’, has acquired a new potency in recent years. For nearly a century it was fashionable to study how interests and material forces of history shaped knowledge. The world that has come into being in the aftermath of World War II seems to have reversed the relationship. It has forced us to recognize that dominance is now exercised less and less through familiar organized interests, such as class relations, colonialism, military-industrial complexes, multinational corporations and the nation-states. Dominance is now exercised mainly through categories, embedded in systems of knowledge. ... The war cry of our times is now: ‘define or be defined.’ ... Universities have come to share this new power, for they specialize in handling categories. (Nandy, 2000: 115-116)

The ideal location on the academic map to properly address the politics of knowledge would seem to be the field of cultural studies (Kulturwissenschaft), as postulated by Böhme and Scherpe (1996: 18-19; also Vismann, 1996: 106). This reappraisal of the need for a comprehensive understanding of knowledge and the cultural and political conditions of its production is one of the major challenges facing modern institutions of higher education in terms of critical self-reflection. Such a critical reflection must also take into account the fact that the sciences – and thus universities – are part of a powerful arrangement for purposes of reciprocal legitimation.

Academic Disciplines and Power Structures
There is something quite remarkable about the tenacity with which the traditional disciplines have retained their dominance of academic structures, despite the considerable evidence of their obsolescence or, at the very least, their limitations in adequately dealing with human and social reality. Boundaries between disciplines have become considerably blurred – between economics and political science, between sociology and psychology, and even between the social sciences and the humanities. Theoretical and methodological variation within disciplines is now often greater than between disciplines. Just as importantly, vast new domains of knowledge and systematic inquiry have emerged that transcend disciplinary boundaries and have become the source of important insights into such phenomena as biogenetics, symbolic systems, organizational behaviour and social engineering.
One of the reasons why, in spite of all this, the disciplines persist so tenaciously is of course the fact that the organization of science in terms of disciplines is not just a question of academic classification. It also is a question of discipline-based power structures, in which decisions are made on personnel matters, resources, buildings and equipment. Disciplines provide the rationale for professional associations and the organized representation of their interests; they form the framework in which decisions on the funding of research are made; and they secure the succession of academic dignitaries. But Wolf Lepenies is, of course, right in pointing out the profound limitations in discipline-based discourses: “The strict invocation of disciplinary identities may be useful in distributing scarce resources and cheering on old-fashioned academic cockfights ... but it is no longer suitable as a stimulus for intellectual ideas” (Lepenies, 1997: 93-94).

Higher Education and the Changing Role of the State

One of the key parameters for the politics of knowledge is the changing relationship between higher education and the State in many parts of the world. This is, once again, a multi-faceted phenomenon with a considerable degree of regional variation; it ranges from the stark consequences of fiscal crisis in many countries and a corresponding retraction of the State’s fiscal responsibilities for higher education, to ideologically-based transitions in higher education governance from State sponsorship to greater exposure to market dynamics (Weiler, 2000).

The net effect of these transitions, whatever their root causes, is an increase in the degree of the university’s self-determination or autonomy, at least from the State. This proves to be an ambivalent situation in at least two respects. On the one hand, especially where the university’s greater autonomy is a result of the State’s fiscal crisis, the university is likely to enter into sponsoring relationships (with tuition-paying students from certain segments of society, with business interests, with international agencies) likely to establish new and different kinds of dependency. Even where this is not the case, however, greater autonomy for the university tends to be resisted by staff members who have traditionally enjoyed a considerable degree of individual autonomy – even in situations where State control kept the university’s institutional autonomy rather strictly limited.

In this respect, among others, the modern university reveals one of its most intriguing traits: that of profound ambivalence about its own
identity and purposes. One can argue, as this author has done elsewhere (Weiler, 2005), that this ambivalence is both a defence mechanism against overly powerful accountability pressures (an institution that is ambivalent about its purposes cannot very well be held accountable for their achievement), and the result of profoundly ambivalent societal attitudes regarding the nature of the university (the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake vs. the satisfaction of societal and economic needs). The relationship between higher education and the State under these conditions of ambivalence will remain one of the key issues for both policy and research.

**The Politics of Knowledge and the Assessment of Academic Quality**

It is not surprising that the evaluation and assessment of scholarship is one of the most contested domains in the politics of knowledge. After all, it is the evaluation of scholars, students, research proposals, manuscripts and productivity that determines the principal rewards of academic life: peer recognition, institutional standing and influence, research grants and, most importantly, publication. This is where academic laurels are awarded and where scholarly effort is rewarded, and where power is exercised.

It is no accident that this assessment process tends to be fundamentally conservative, in the sense that it is guided by proven worth and duly sceptical about what has yet to be tried and tested. Disciplinary identities, methodological orthodoxies and the continuity of research traditions are tried and proven; interdisciplinary research and the addressing of new questions with new methods mean discontinuity, treading new ground and taking risks. However beyond being a reasonable safeguard for preserving valuable scientific legacies, this caution has increasingly become a determining feature of everyday academic life and of the reality of our academic institutions. It is here that the traditional hierarchies of knowledge manifest their power most clearly and effectively; it is here that the difference between powerful and powerless knowledge becomes tangible; and it is here that the tenuous place of democracy in our scientific culture becomes apparent.

Hierarchies become compatible with democracy and capable of innovation by being accountable. Hierarchies – and this is also true of hierarchies of knowledge – are not intrinsically incompatible with democracy and innovation; they become so by failing to comply with
the requirements of transparency and accountability. Creating this very transparency and accountability is a political challenge of the highest order. The current academic climate in many countries, notably in Europe, has in recent years fostered some astounding changes – changes in governance, in the status of professors, in programs of study, and in university financing. Creating transparency and accountability is an issue, however, on which there is still room for further progress.

Trans-National Knowledge and National Universities

It has always been difficult to reconcile the national origins and frames of reference of universities with the fundamental internationality and universality of scholarship. Given an international and trans-national knowledge system that is characterized by increasingly problematic conditions of domination and subordination, of inclusion and exclusion, of privileged and underprivileged knowledge, this issue is acquiring special urgency. It is confronting institutions of higher education – and not only them – with a momentous challenge (Inayatullah and Gidley, 2000; Weiler, 1995).

This has something to do with issues such as foreign-language study programs, internationally comparable degrees, the acceptance of credits obtained while studying abroad, etc. However given the real problems of an international system of knowledge, these issues are – important though they may be in specific cases – of a more superficial nature. Of course it is important that university graduates have the cognitive skills, the knowledge of foreign languages and cultures that enable them to function in globalized systems of action; but it is even more important to equip them with the skills they need to critically monitor the process of globalization and to assess its conditions and consequences. This, however, is only possible if the Western world’s largely mono-cultural institutions of higher education become, in scholarly and intellectual – and not only in extracurricular and folkloristic – terms, real centres of cultural encounter and multicultural discourse. In other words, if they become veritable cultural bridges in much the same sense in which Andrei Pleu speaks of the building of bridges between the different traditions of Europe – bridges that ‘... often symbolize mended rifts and provide the missing pieces to vital jigsaws’ and that provide ‘... proof that something seemingly impossible to cross can be crossed’ (Pleu, 2003a; see also 2003b).
At such centres, debates on the question of whose knowledge matters would be a normal and integral part of teaching and research, and what Rajni Kothari once called the trans-national knowledge system’s ‘... homogenizing monoculture of the mind’ (Kothari, 1987: 284) would be consciously subjected to critical and self-critical reflection. It would be the rule rather than the exception that someone like Homi Bhabha teaches in Chicago or Harvard or Berlin – or Bucharest.

This critical role of academic institutions with respect to the trans-national knowledge system has something subversive about it. Ashis Nandy sees some institutions of higher education in the so-called ‘Third World’ making courageous and imaginative efforts to ‘... begin to act as sources of scepticism toward the victorious systems of knowledge, and as the means of recovering and transmitting knowledge that has been cornered, marginalized or even defeated’ (Nandy, 2000: 118). For us Western and Northern scholars, it would be doubly inexcusable to ignore this process. For one, we owe it to our colleagues in the less privileged regions of the world to support as strongly as we possibly can their efforts at ‘re-appropriating’ (Hountondji, 2005) the kind of knowledge that the hegemons of the international knowledge system have marginalized. Even more importantly, however, we ourselves urgently need to participate in this process of rebellion because it helps us to question our ties to our own traditions of knowledge, and thus to constantly redefine ourselves as scholars. This author is sure that this is what Wolf Lepenies has in mind when he says: ‘It is high time that Western societies change from being cultures of lecturing to being cultures of learning’ (Lepenies, 1997: 40).

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INTRODUCTION
This Chapter explores a particular facet of knowledge production and dissemination with reference to the domain of higher education. Specifically, it analyses the different kinds of research and writing that are undertaken by critical researchers on higher education, and delineates the key issues and challenges that certain kinds related to national higher education policy-making pose for critical researchers. The article makes a distinction between analysis of policy and analysis for policy and highlights the implications of their differing purposes for knowledge production by critical researchers. It also identifies the political and social dilemmas that arise where there may be incongruence between the values and goals of critical researchers and those of particular policy-makers, and draws attention to the consequences, in some situations, of certain kinds of policy research for the autonomy of intellectual work. Finally, this article argues that despite its various purposes, basic scholarly research and writing on higher education can have as high a

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1 Many thanks to Dr. Mala Singh for her usual critical and incisive comments; to Prof. Johan Muller of the University of Cape Town for making the time for a stimulating conversation and the loan of some relevant literature, and to my colleague Ms. Chantal Dwyer for her assistance.
degree of policy relevance as applied policy research. To begin with, however, we must clarify the conceptual framework that is employed with regard to ‘critical researchers’, ‘research’, ‘writing’ and especially ‘policy-making’ and ‘policy’.

**TOWARDS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Critical historical sociology has a virtuous emphasis on theory and concepts, and especially conceptual clarity, as preconditions for rigorous analysis, understanding and informed social practice. A second strength is its core concern with the mutual interaction between historical social structure/conjuncture and human agency, and its emphasis on how structure and conjuncture condition human agency: they set limits and constraints on social action and outcomes, while also providing possibilities and opportunities for the same. ‘Social realities’ are thus the product of interplay between inherited economic, political and social conditions and human agency, conducted under specific relations of authority, power and access to resources. The two-sided interaction of human agency and social structure means that social relations, institutions and policies and practices are the medium as well as the outcome of individual and organizational actions and social struggles. The research and writing of critical researchers must therefore be understood in relation to social structure and conjuncture, social relations of authority and power and continuities and discontinuities in conditions – even if the research and writing may impact on and contribute to changing these aspects of social reality.

‘Critical researchers’ are actors who frame their knowledge production using critical theoretical discourses. These actors are principally located in higher education institutions, but also in scientific and research institutions, political organizations and government; they may also be found in social and popular movements and organizations or be self-employed (including the ‘independent consultant’). While politically diverse in terms of ideology and political affiliation, critical researchers are likely to embrace a common concern with or in opposition to a number of features of contemporary life.

The first of these is a world ‘… where disparities in wealth, resources and opportunities have grown, where human rights norms and values seem invariably to yield to the dictates of the rich and powerful; which expresses shock and outrage at arbitrary killing but at the same time is complicit in the killing of many more through hunger and disease.
– which could have been avoided’ (Kollapen, 2003: 26). Second is the reality that ‘… for millions of people the promise of human rights and the vision of a just and caring world remains an illusion. Intolerance, war and impunity; starvation and greed; power and powerlessness all combine in a conspiracy of the powerful against the weak that invariably deepens the fault lines (of ‘race’, class, gender, geography, etc.) that exist in the world and within nations’ (ibid.). Third, the pursuit by hegemonic conservative and neo-liberal governments and business corporations in the ‘developed’ countries of the old modernization project seeks to create a world in the image of advanced capitalism. Finally, critical researchers are also likely to express disquiet over and opposition to the dominant ideology of neo-liberalism, and the privatization, as well as growing marketization, commodification and commercialization, of expanding arenas of social life.

Concomitantly, although they may have differing political goals that could range from a substantive social democracy to socialism, critical researchers are to be expected to have political commitments in common. Prunty suggests that the values and social commitments of critical researchers ‘… would be anchored in the vision of a moral order in which justice, equality and individual freedom are uncompromised by the avarice of the few’ (Prunty, 1985: 136). They would ‘… endorse political, social and economic arrangements where persons are never treated as means to an end, but as ends in their own right’ (ibid.).

With respect to knowledge, critical researchers will identify with Held’s argument that

> The purpose of theory is … to analyze and expose the hiatus between the actual and the possible, between the existing order of contradictions and the potential future state. Theory must be oriented, in short, to the development of consciousness and the promotion of active political involvement. (As cited in Motala, 2003: 1)

They would embrace the view of knowledge as an intervention into the social world. They may, however, have different views of the nature of this intervention – a ‘weak interventionism’ associated with scholarly critique, or ‘strong interventionism’ characterized by some kinds of policy research (see Mouton and Muller, 1995: 164-165). Mouton and Muller note that ‘… the distinction between weak and strong interventionism coincides, to a large extent, with Zygmunt Bauman’s
distinction between intellectuals as interpreters and intellectuals as legislators' (ibid: 166)

By ‘research’ is meant here the endeavour to produce knowledge (facts, explanation and understanding of social structures, conjunctures and historical and contemporary processes) which could serve different purposes, through creative, systematic and disciplined investigation and the use of generally agreed scientific conventions. This production of knowledge is ideally characterized by explicit and clear definition of purposes, of research context and aims, of the objects and conceptual framework of research, of the analytical and empirical research questions, and by the specification of methodology, research methods and techniques. The production of knowledge could be the outcome of basic research, whose purpose is principally the advancement of knowledge, of strategic research, or of applied research and/or experimental development.

‘Writing’ as understood here is the product of research undertaken by critical researchers with the necessary disciplinary, field and research expertise. This is important to clarify, since critical researchers who do not possess the requisite disciplinary, field and research expertise can and do shape higher education policy-making through activities including service as ‘public intellectuals’, advice to policy-makers and speech-writing for policy-makers. This raises various issues that are beyond our scope.

Turning to the concept of ‘policy-making’, it is necessary to first clarify the term ‘policy’². In brief, this author proposes:

- That ‘policy’ has a wide variety of meanings – authoritative allocation of values, framework, discourse, text, strategies, practice, etc. – that are embedded in differing problematics (Ball, 1994; 1990; Dale and Ozga, 1991; Ham and Hill, 1984; Henry, 1993; Kogan, 1985; Ozga, 1990; Prunty, 1985; 1984; Taylor et al., 1997).
- That policy is closely linked to social goals and objectives.

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² Cerych has noted that ‘… many languages have no distinct term for “politics” and “policy”’ (1984: 234). In French, for example, the word politique means both, as does the German politik or politika in most Slavic languages. Consequently the way in which Burawoy has defined ‘politics’ – as ‘… struggles within a specific arena aimed at specific sets of relations … struggles that take as their objective the quantitative or qualitative change of those relations’ (Burawoy, 1985: 253-254) – could usefully be a definition of ‘policy’.
• That far from being neutral, policy embodies values and principles (Prunty, 1985; 1984).
• That policy is the product of multiple determinations (or is ‘over-determined’) – goals and values, but also economic and social policies, social conditions and available personnel and financial resources (Lankshear, 1987).
• That there are different kinds of policies – substantive, symbolic, material, procedural, distributive, redistributive, etc. (de Clerq, 1997).
• That there are different types of policies in terms of scope, complexity, range of choices, arena of decision-making and criteria involved in decision-making – strategic, multi-program, program, issue-specific, etc. (Haddad, 1995)
• That policy has a wide variety of objects – social equity, institutional provision, governance, financing, research, curriculum, etc.
• That policies focus on many different levels, singly or concomitantly (international, national, regional, provincial, local, institutional, etc.).
• That policy is pertinent to diverse institutional and organizational settings.3

This author defines policy-making as an ensemble of inter-related activities in time and space through which social actors engage in the making of policy choices and decisions. The different moments include but are not limited to agenda setting, policy formulation, policy adoption, policy implementation, monitoring and evaluation and further agenda setting. They entail structural and procedural arrangements that may be relatively public or hidden, transparent or opaque, open or closed. Policy choices and decisions involve ‘trade-offs’, and social actors make such trade-offs with either no or full consciousness that they are doing so and of the implications. As will be noted, the social actors can include a wide array of agents – governments, political parties, social movements, organizations and individuals. Social actors engage in

3 The analysis that is undertaken, the critical issues that are raised and the article’s concluding propositions could apply equally to other arenas of social life and social policy such as schooling, health and social welfare. Indeed, some issues are approached here in fairly general terms rather than from a perspective that may be specific to higher education. Whether the analysis engages adequately with what could be distinct about higher education is open to question.
policy-making in co-operation and/or conflict, with varying degrees of consensus on values, principles, social goals, social problems and social reality. Finally, social actors participate in policy-making with differential access to knowledge, information and resources.

Focused on the formal moments of policy-making, the observer may get the (highly misleading) impression of policy as a smooth, sequential and linear process. In reality, all policy-making, including in higher education, is a complex, multi-layered, iterative and convoluted activity with often multiple policy initiatives underway simultaneously. Of different kinds and types, the latter may be undertaken at different levels and be at different moments in the policy cycle, and yet could still be connected to greater or lesser extent.

Policy-making and its constituent moments are not neutral, purely technical exercises but are laden with values and related to social goals and concerns. With respect to the process of policy-making, Weiler has made the important point that ‘… given the nature of policy choices and the question of their legitimacy, the process by which they are arrived at may be as important as, if not more important than, the directional criteria which define (and delimit) the options to be taken’ (Weiler, 1978: 190). In a similar vein if more generally, Wright Mills has written that ‘… the problem of freedom is the problem of how decisions about the future of human affairs are to be made and who is to make them. Organizationally, it is the problem of a just machinery of decision. Morally, it is the problem of political responsibility. Intellectually, it is the problem of what are now the possible futures of human affairs’ (Wright Mills, 1959: 174).

On the substance of policy-making and policies, Lankshear has rightly noted that these are concerned fundamentally with the ‘… politics of daily life – with issues of power, control, legitimacy, privilege, equity, justice and the dimensions of values generally’ (Lankshear, 1987: 231-232). Policy-making is therefore necessarily characterized by social conflict and struggles, and over-determined by politics. As Scoufe has observed,

... the assumption that education policy could be the result of simply identifying and choosing the alternative that is ‘best’, that is relevant, or not wasteful, ignores the obvious political fact that the ‘best’ has to be determined in the political crucible of competing interests. (Scoufe, 1985: 116)
It should be noted that social conflict might not be confined to the moments of policy formulation, adoption and implementation. They could be present at the very outset of policy-making, in contestation of policy ‘problems’ and ‘issues’ and even the characterization of contemporary social structure and conditions. All of these raise two issues for critical researchers involved in higher education policy-making. One is the extent to which there is congruence between the goals, values and principles of the critical researcher and those of the policy-makers. The other is that the reality of social conflict in policy-making is such that the work of critical researchers on higher education policy-making can also lead to conflict.

Assuming that higher education policy-making is a relatively open, accessible and public process, critical researchers who seek to participate through their research and writing are confronted with two key questions: To which activity or activities do they seek to contribute? And, can they actually contribute? The answers depend, of course, on the institutional location of the particular researcher, his or her field of expertise, research interests, and personal and/or political preferences.

It must also be recognized that policy-making occurs in many different sites and spaces. Too frequently critical researchers confine themselves by seeking to influence governments (in their various forms), political parties and statutory policy advisory bodies. No or little thought is given to the policy thinking and making of other important social actors such as associations of higher education institutions, labour unions, organizations of academics and other professionals, student organizations, business interest groups, etc. or to that of the critical researchers’ own institutions. This tendency implicitly assumes that government actors are the only, or key, policy-makers. However this is far from given, and not self-evident. Such an assumption rests on an unfortunately restrictive definition of policy-makers and is informed by an extremely limited conception of ‘policy-making’.

Who ‘policy-makers’ are will depend on how we conceptualize ‘policy’ and ‘policy-making’. It is vital to distinguish between policy formulation and adoption, as two specific moments of policy-making, and policy-making in its entirety. The making of policy and policy outcomes are not reducible to policy formulation and adoption, for two very important reasons. First, the policies that are implemented
or exist in practice are often different from those which exist in text. Second, legally authorized policy formulators and adopters may well be the key social actors in so far as decision-making is concerned. However to regard them as the sole actors in policy-making, under all circumstances, grossly overstates their importance. How key and influential they are in the making of policy and its outcomes depends on structural and conjectural conditions, and is a matter for empirical analysis. In practice a wide range of social actors – higher education institutions, representative bodies, student organizations and movements, academics, business and political organizations etc. – are involved in the shaping of policy and its outcomes. On occasion these social actors, individually or in coalitions, may become powerful social forces and key policy-making actors in the place of legally authorized decision-makers.

This is a crucial point, which has implications for the orientation and nature of critical research on higher education policy. In essence, critical researchers have to think more carefully about the targets of their research and writing; there is not always a single or most important audience. Instead there is a multiplicity and diversity of audiences, from the well-defined individual to the 'general public'. Moreover, the policy-maker may not be an individual but rather a collective, and this necessarily has implications for writing and dissemination. Multiple and diverse audiences require different media and dissemination strategies; they may also require different genres of writing. Most critical researchers tend to be proficient in scholarly writing only, with limited ability to write in other genres.

Finally, popular struggles can shape policy-making and policy outcomes, and can also undermine and modify policy as contained in official texts. Crucial to the analysis of the policy outcomes is to ask under what conditions do these struggles occur; what are the conditions which structure them and affect their outcome. Of particular importance in this regard is the question of the form or structure of the political terrain in addition to the question of the form of the State … (Wolpe, 1988: 23)

In a democracy the different moments of policy-making may be relatively public, open and accessible to citizens and the law and political conditions may facilitate social participation in policy-making. Such participation may take various forms, including formal and
informal requests by key policy actors for advice, provision of advice by legislatively empowered bodies, formal and informal consultation initiated by authorized policy actors, public hearings, lobbying, petitions, demonstrations and dissemination of public information (National Education Policy Investigation, 1993). Even in generally authoritarian and repressive contexts, the State and its apparatus and institutions are seldom omnipotent, monolithic and impermeable to contestation.

By the same token, it is important not to overstate the access and possibilities for participation in policy-making available to various social actors – especially socially disadvantaged and marginalized groups. In both democratic and authoritarian contexts, social actors possess very different and often highly unequal resources (specialist expertise, financial resources, strength of membership and organization, access to key actors) which inevitably condition their degree of participation in shaping policy-making and its outcomes.\textsuperscript{4} At any rate policy-making and its constituent moments are distributed over a range of institutional locations, and are subject to shaping by a wide array of social actors and influences.

THE PLACE OF RESEARCH AND WRITING

Research and writing can enter into policy-making in numerous ways, and can shape the policy thinking of social actors at various points. The former can vary considerably in nature, from theoretical and conceptual work to concrete empirical analysis, and from description and analysis of policy to that for policy. Research and writing for policy can in turn encompass only the contextual conditions under which policy-making must take place and be implemented, or they can extend to include the construction of policy options and actual policies. In addition research and writing can draw on a range of methodologies, methods

\textsuperscript{4} The Italian theorist of democracy Bobbio contends that ‘… nowadays, if an indicator of democratic progress is needed it cannot be provided by the number of people who have the right to vote, but the number of contexts outside politics where the right to vote is exercised; that is to say, ‘… the criterion for judging the state of democratization achieved in a given country should no longer be to establish “who” votes, but “where” they can vote … how many more spaces there are where citizens can exercise the right to vote’. Bobbio uses ‘vote’ here to refer to ‘… the most typical and common way of participating’ and certainly does not ‘… limit participation to casting a vote.’ (Bobbio, 1987: 56)
(quantitative, qualitative) and techniques (documentary research, interviews, surveys, collection and processing of statistical data).\(^5\)

As has been alluded to above, the research and writing of critical researchers can have as their subject any of the moments discussed, and can engage with the concerns of all, various or specific social actors.

**THE NATURE OF RESEARCH AND WRITING**

There are two issues related to the nature of research and writing that this author wishes to explore. The first is policy relatedness and relevance; the second is the distinction between analysis of policy and analysis for policy and its implications. Related concerns include the issue of the policy-making activities to which the critical researcher can contribute, and the matter of the congruence between the goals, values and principles of critical researchers and policy-makers.

**Relation and Relevance**

The nature and content of the research and writing of critical researchers will be shaped by a number of factors such as their theoretical perspectives, interests and inclinations; the analytical and empirical questions that concern them and that they wish to pursue; and the context of knowledge production, including whether the research and writing are self-initiated or commissioned, the institutional location of production, and the time-frame of production. Some critical researchers, especially those located in higher education institutions, may deliberately confine themselves to ‘basic’ scholarly research. They may hold the view that the knowledge production of scholars should be confined to ‘basic’ research, or they may have no affinity for strategic or applied knowledge production and therefore avoid association with

\(^5\) This is not to overstate the role and importance of research and writing in policy-making. The reasons why the research and writing were undertaken, the purposes the researchers are pursuing, and the accessibility of their work will affect the extent to which the research and writing are policy-related and relevant. The nature of the social actors and the degree to which they are intellectually and politically receptive to the work of critical researchers will obviously condition policy relevance. Further, the research and writing of critical researchers that is of low or poor quality and should thus have minimal policy relevance sometimes enjoys prestige among certain social actors. Ultimately, the relatedness and relevance of research and writing are not determined solely by critical researchers themselves but also by the take-up of their work on higher education, its impact and uses, and its effects on the higher education policy-making terrain.
policy-oriented work. They could have policy and policy-making as the subjects of their research and writing; however their purpose in this is the disinterested pursuit of knowledge, rather than a contribution to the development of more effective policy-making. This is an entirely legitimate standpoint that must be respected, and research of this kind must be supported and funded. It is vital that the value of knowledge production and research not be judged solely in instrumental and utilitarian terms, and that basic scholarly research not be sacrificed at the altar of ‘relevance’, defined in the most parochial manner and reduced ultimately to market or economic relevance. Other critical researchers may, on the other hand, purposefully pursue policy-oriented research and writing for various reasons: preference for strategic, applied or developmental research; as a corollary to their institutional location; or as a basis for economic livelihood.

On the basis of the meanings of policy and policy-making offered here, how critical researchers conceive of their knowledge production, the purposes that they define, the nature and accessibility of their work, and their inclinations and motivations are all immaterial in so far as the potential relation and relevance of their work on higher education is concerned. All research and writing on higher education undertaken by critical researchers is potentially policy-related and relevant, on the only condition that it be rigorous and of high quality. This argument can be illustrated with reference to a South African text, Race, Class and Apartheid State, penned by the late Harold Wolpe and published in 1988 by UNESCO. In this text Wolpe’s intellectual adventure centred on investigating the mutual interpenetration of past and present, events and processes, actions and agents, and social structure and conjuncture.

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6 On the theme of critical researchers writing for policy actors and makers, a number of additional points can be made. First, the form of writing will necessarily be shaped by the concerns; these may be with substantive policies, or symbolic, material, procedural or (re)distributive policies. Or they could be with policy change, or with mobilizing particular goals, conditions and resources. Second, the form of writing will also be related to extent of compunction about the matter at hand: an exuberant, confident style vs. a more circumspect, cautious style etc. Third, the status of the policy text will be another determinant of form. Policy discussion documents tend to be more ‘readerly’ texts, while final documents tend to be more ‘writerly’ texts. Finally, writing alone may have limited efficacy in influencing policy-making. Verbal communication, with its synchronicity, has numerous advantages including the opportunity to adapt according to milieu and mood, and to clarify the inevitable different readings of texts of a ‘writerly’ nature.

7 On the need, value and critical roles of public policy dialogue see Hoppers, 1997.
His concern were the hidden structures and conditions which both frustrate human aspirations and enable social contestation and struggle, democracy and justice; in other words, a search for the mechanisms of social reproduction and transformation. Wolpe was not immediately concerned with policy issues. Nonetheless his rigorous, high-quality description and analysis of social structure and conjuncture was highly policy-related and relevant for actors engaged in contemporary policy-making. To take another example, a rigorous, high-quality historical sociology or political economy of South African higher education prior to 1990, undertaken as a disinterested, scholarly pursuit of knowledge, could help to answer a number of contentious historical questions. Such a text remains to be written, but could deeply influence policy thinking and therefore have a high degree of relevance.

If all high-quality research and writing on higher education by critical researchers is potentially policy-related and relevant, it can also have little or no policy relevance for any number of reasons. These could range from poor quality to a change in the policy agenda, to an unreceptive political environment, to ineffective dissemination, to inopportune release of the research, etc. In summary the relevance and value of research and writing on higher education are not guaranteed by their explicit policy purposes and orientation. The research and writing on higher education that is unconcerned with policy-making can have as great an impact, if not greater impact, than that which deliberately sets out to inform and influence policy-making.

Analysis of Policy and Analysis for Policy

There is, of course, a considerable difference between research and writing on higher education that is concerned with analysis of policy, and that concerned with analysis for policy. The former is confined to the description and analysis of existing or emerging policies, and past or current policy-making. It may be undertaken as scholarly ‘basic’ research, disinterested in applied policy-oriented investigation; or it may be conducted as part of a deliberate pursuit of applied policy-oriented research and writing. The latter, analysis for policy, covers a spectrum from weak to strong involvement.

The weak version of analysis for policy entails the description and analysis of the structure and conjuncture within which policies must be made and implemented. Such research and writing could be undertaken by critical researchers who do scholarly basic research but are not averse
to commissioned and consultancy work, as well as by those who restrict their policy-oriented research and writing to only analysis of policy. The strong version of analysis for policy involves the development of policy options, and the analysis of their implications for particular values and criteria; the strongest version entails the design and motivation of specific policies in relation to conditions, values and criteria.

Incorporating the earlier discussion of scholarly basic research, there is in practice a continuum of research and writing from scholarly basic research on one end, which is unconcerned with policy and policy-making, to analysis for policy on the other that includes the design of policies and policy-making instruments and processes. In between the two poles lie scholarly basic research on the subject of policy and policy making; analysis of policy; and certain kinds of analysis for policy. It should also be clear that there is a blurring between various types of research and writing, even if the same is not true of their respective purposes. Since they are the products of biography and history, the concerns of critical researchers are not static: they may (and do) oscillate between different kinds of research and writing. In the process they take on changing identities and must confront various social and political dilemmas.

An ability to produce high-quality research and writing that is unconcerned with policy issues, or is related only to the analysis of policy, does not imply an automatic capability on the part of critical researchers to generate high-quality analysis for policy and/or to construct policy options or design policies. Similarly, the ability of critical researchers to produce high-quality research and writing related to analysis for policy is not a guarantee of ability to undertake other aspects of analysis for policy, such as the production of imaginative policy options or the elaboration of innovative policy-making instruments, mechanisms and procedures. Appel (1993) advanced much the same argument, during a period when South African critical researchers began to undertake education policy research and reconstruction work linked to the national liberation movement: those critical researchers with a tradition of producing critical theory and scholarly critique should not assume an ability to undertake analysis for policy that involved designing policies. As Muller has observed, ‘… Appel’s point is that mastery in the discourse of critique does not necessarily transfer to mastery in the discourse of reconstruction. Appel is … valuably reminding us that each discourse has its own grammar, its own language game’ (Muller, 2002: 265).
The education and training of most critical researchers, in the scholarly tradition, render them most comfortable with analysis of policy and only certain kinds of analysis for policy. Analysis for generating policy options could require critical researchers to embrace specific value frameworks and social goals that may be at odds with their own; it could also require critical researchers to adopt as a given particular policies and conditions that rightly should be problematized and which, in other contexts of knowledge production, they would themselves problematize. Finally, analysis for policy may also require critical researchers to possess insights of a political and strategic nature, and to sometimes become involved in institutional and organizational design issues and politico-strategic calculations for which they may be poorly equipped. Of course capabilities are not innate or immutable, and can be learnt and developed over time.

Particular challenges may exist for critical researchers. There are the grave dangers that social actors could seek to reduce them to policy appendages who research and write principally to justify and confirm particular organizational policies, or that critical researchers could unwittingly turn themselves into policy propagandists. However, policy analysis undertaken for social actors does not inevitably reduce critical researchers to policy appendages and propagandists; it depends on the terms of engagement, and it is vital that critical researchers ensure that the terms do not compromise their intellectual autonomy. The necessary conditions are that critical researchers be guaranteed, through constitutional and other mechanisms, academic freedom and intellectual autonomy and that they vigorously protect such freedom and autonomy. The defence of these values may need to be directed not only at States, political parties and social movements. Given the way in which the market and corporations have begun to intrude into higher education with a concomitant commodification, commercialization and marketization of knowledge, the defence of academic freedom may have to be focused on higher education institutions, especially those that have embraced questionable forms of entrepreneurialism and management (‘managerialism’).

A further necessary condition is that critical scholarship and research be able to interrogate the policies and priorities of governments, political parties and other social actors. There are two reasons for this. First, policies and priorities are the products of theory and analysis, and ‘… neither the theory nor the analysis … can ever
be regarded as settled but are continuously open to theoretical and empirical testing’ (Wolpe, 1985: 75). This means that critical research and writing have the tasks of investigating both the theoretical foundations and the empirical analyses that ground the formulation of policies and the definition of priorities. Such investigations could expose those policies that rest on shaky foundations, with profound consequences and implications for policy implementation. Second, the ‘fundamental point which cannot be overemphasized’ is that the policies and priorities of key social actors must necessarily be treated by critical researchers ‘… not as conclusions but as starting points for investigation’ (Wolpe, 1985: 75). That is to say, the perspectives of governments, political parties, or other social actors cannot place any limits on the research and writing of critical researchers. For ‘… if the role of research and writing is to be restricted entirely to providing the materials for and confirmation of already defined policies, then this is to reduce research to a purely ideological function and to deny any autonomy or value to intellectual work and hence to the critical yet essential function of such work’ (Wolpe, 1985: 74). If critical researchers are not to become the ideological and political functionaries of key social actors, the space for critical intellectual work must exist and be defended. This work could well challenge cherished notions and positions of key social actors. However, the value of autonomous intellectual work is precisely the ability to produce critiques that inform debates on the trajectory of society.

The consequence of research and writing not being approached in this way is that critical researchers become trapped in a situation in which, as with Stalinism, research ‘… becomes a mere political instrument, never producing any knowledge … since it is already a political ideology’ (Buci-Glucksmann, 1980: 15). However as Gramsci insisted, research ‘… must produce knowledge for politics, without cutting itself off from the objective and scientific investigation of the world’ (*ibid.*). In principle and under appropriate conditions, critical researchers who confine themselves to basic scholarly research or analysis of policy concerned with higher education can approach research and writing without any compromise of either their values or intellectual autonomy. Where there is congruence between critical researchers and social or policy actors with respect to values, goals and general strategies in higher education, and also commitments to wider priorities, then little or no surrender of intellectual autonomy may be required.
However, critical researchers who undertake analysis for higher education policy that includes the design of policies and policy-making instruments could experience particular dilemmas. Often the rhythms, horizons and time frames of actors who formulate or seek to impact on policy and those of critical researchers are at odds. This confronts critical researchers with predicaments related to the integrity and rigour of research and writing and to the prospects of shaping policy-making.

Yet far more difficult political and social dilemmas arise as a result of difference on subjects related to values, purposes, goals and general strategies for higher education, and to political priorities, macro-economic and social policy and so forth. One example is the identification of problems and issues warranting analysis and intervention, and the terms in which the latter are formulated. This is not a neutral, technical activity but is significantly shaped by values, goals and readings of social structure and conjuncture. What are defined as higher education policy issues and problems may only incidentally have to do with higher education, and could considerably have to do with problems that are rooted in other arenas of education or related to economic and social policy issues. Sometimes higher education ‘problems’ and the mobilization of public consensus are less about the search for social interventions than that for mechanisms to restructure and implement specific policies. A second example is the expectation placed on higher education institutions to pursue the public good, to extend their range of roles and functions, to enhance their social responsiveness, and to achieve these without any significant increase in public and other revenues (or with declining public subsidies). The core purposes of higher education must intersect with economic and social challenges, however it is unreasonable to allocate responsibilities to higher education institutions that are principally those of others. Once again, unless critical researchers engage with the purposes and goals that are defined for higher education and with the issues and problems that they can be legitimately expected to address, the autonomy of intellectual work may suffer. Third, in practice some important social and policy actors may be inattentive to critical research and writing. With respect to South Africa in the late 1990s, Motala suggests that…
immediacy and pragmatism. It signalled, at least for the time being, the end of frank and open ideological contestation and the beginning of steady subsumption of the ends of politics to the means of administration. (Motala, 2003: 3-4)

He goes on to argue that the ‘… separation of politics and administration explains the rise of consultancy and the weakness of consultancy research and report-writing’ and that ‘… consultancy report-writing is of necessity the pre-eminent form and inevitable consequence of the separation of politics and administration’ (Motala, 2003: 6). Critical researchers face the twin challenges of asserting the value of critical research and writing and contesting the rise of ‘… tourists of reconstruction’ (Muller, 2002: 273) and their frequently dubious prescriptions and ‘solutions’. Fourth and again in the case of South Africa, higher education transformation confronts major paradoxes and intractable tensions – between access and enrolment growth and quality, between social equity and quality, between social equity and institutional equity, between the pursuit of public good and the need for new sources of non-public funding that could undermine the public good. Morrow has pointed out that when confronted with an intractable tension between dearly held goals and values, various ‘simplifying manoeuvres’ are possible. One simplifying manoeuvre is to refuse to accept the existence of a dilemma – a kind of moral blindness. A second simplifying manoeuvre is to elevate one value or goal above all others, making this the value according to which all choices and policies are made. A third simplifying manoeuvre is to rank values in advance so that if there is a conflict between them, one will take precedence. In the latter two cases, the effect is to privilege one value/goal above another (Morrow, 1997). A fourth route, however, is to acknowledge that these simplifying manoeuvres are not easily open to critical researchers and actors who pursue a progressive or radical social agenda. The alternate path is to then accept that for good political and social reasons, values, goals and strategies that may be in tension have to be pursued simultaneously. Paradoxes must be creatively addressed and policies and strategies devised that can satisfy multiple imperatives, balance competing goals and enable the pursuit of equally desirable goals. This means confronting difficult social dilemmas and choices, and making unenviable decisions. Trade-offs become inevitable, and there must be transparency regarding their making and implications.
This opens up a public space for intellectual and policy debate and contestation between social actors, including critical researchers. The importance of this, to paraphrase Melucci, is the possibility of a ‘... new political space ... beyond the traditional distinction between State and “civil society”: an intermediate public space, whose function is not to institutionalize the movements (or critical researchers) nor to transform them into parties (or ideological functionaries), but to make society hear their messages and translate these messages into political decision-making, while the movements (and critical researchers) maintain their autonomy’ (Melucci, 1985: 815). Motala adds the vital argument that ostensibly consensual and unifying radical visionary education policy statements that promise social equity and redress social injustice often obfuscate ... the reality of power and historically entrenched privilege. In reality, many of the articles relating to equity are not achievable without purposeful [even aggressive] and directed strategies, which set out deliberately to dismantle the core of historical privilege, disparities in wealth, incomes and capital stock, critical to unlock the possibilities for social justice and fairness.8 (Motala, 2003: 7)

This brings to the fore the dilemmas that may arise with the recognition of this ‘reality of power and historically entrenched privilege’, and with the requirement to advance policy proposals that could leave the structural bases of such power and privilege largely untouched.

There are no simple or easy formulas for addressing and resolving these political and social dilemmas. They involve choices, decisions and trade-offs related to matters of principle, values, social commitments, complex strategic and tactical considerations and livelihood. Of course, how critical researchers experience the dilemmas and how they mediate the configuration of constraints and opportunities will be conditioned in part by their institutional location or occupation. However it does not mean that critical researchers automatically become policy appendages of powerful social actors, or that they necessarily compromise their commitments to social equity, justice or freedom. Abrams has made

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8 He goes on to posit that in the South African case, ‘... these imply a directive, coordinating and interventionist role for the State - requiring positive discriminatory measures in favour of the poor, expecting political courage in the face of administrative challenges and the will to defy public discontent from highly articulate and organized interests’ (Motala, 2003: 7).
the important point that ‘… what we choose to do and what we have
to do are shaped by the historically given possibilities among which
we find ourselves’ (Abrams, 1982: 3). Between higher education and
social reproduction, and higher education and social transformation,
lie scope and opportunities for improvement and reform that under
some conditions can and do advance social equity, justice and human
freedom. Especially under authoritarian and hostile political conditions
it would be childish not to struggle for improvements and reforms.9

Critical researchers must recognize that the adoption of a particular
point of departure and framework, where alternate frameworks and
departure points are possible, dilutes the autonomy of intellectual work.
It is also important that critical researchers not make a virtue of the
necessities that may confront them; instead and in such cases, it is
necessary to also explore and pursue, within the bounds of possibility,
these alternative frames and their implications for higher education
policy-making and policy. What this analysis makes clear is that there
are situations in which it is not possible to undertake certain kinds of
policy research and writing for a given social and policy actor and to
function simultaneously as a critical researcher. It is of course quite
possible for a critical researcher to concomitantly undertake research
and writing projects that posit different policy conclusions, and to
conduct, using different frames, policy research for other social and
policy actors that point to different policies. However, the argument
holds: in certain situations, perhaps in the majority of situations, it is
not possible concurrently; only consecutively.

The distinction between critical scholarship that is not focused
on policy applications and writing geared to policy proposals and
design parallels that between ‘weak interventionism’ and ‘strong
interventionism’ respectively. It also coincides with Bauman’s
distinction between intellectuals as ‘interpreters’ and intellectuals as
‘legislators’, the Habermasian categories of ‘cognitive interests’ and

9 Already a century ago, the question was posed: ‘Can the social democracy be
against reforms? Can we counter-pose the social revolution, the transformation of the
existing order, our final goal, to social reform?’ (Luxemburg, 1970: 8) The answer was
an unambiguous ‘Certainly not’. ‘The daily struggle for reforms, for the amelioration
of the conditions of workers within the framework of the existing social order’, is a
means of working towards the ‘final goal’. ‘Between social reforms and revolution
there exists for the social democracy an indissoluble tie. The struggle for reforms is
the means; the social revolution, its aim’ (ibid.).
‘strategic interests’, and, in the South African case, the reference to ‘critics’ and ‘reconstructors’ (Muller, 2002; Mouton and Muller, 1995: 164-165). It will be tempting for some critical researchers to ‘… claim that, in their persons, they have resolved the tension between critique and reconstruction, and that they are now critical reconstructors’ (Muller, 2002: 278). However, the argument of this paper is in general agreement with Muller’s contention that it is not that these individuals are not doing both critique and reconstruction work, but that in their critiques and their reconstruction work respectively, the tension between the two modes is not held in dynamic balance, except perhaps where policy work is of a very general nature, or in exceptional cases. The more the policy work drives towards planning and implementation, the less can it entertain doubts about its constitutive grounds. Or, in Weberian terms, ends have to be accepted for means to be technically elaborated (Weber, 1949). And yet, just as planning must be practical and strategic, so critique is only coherent when it undertakes a systematic interrogation of those constitutive grounds. The argument is not about conceptual incompatibility so much as it is about the social conditions that enable or constrain specific forms of intellectual work. (Muller, 2002: 278)

He concludes that ‘… critics and reconstructors can only … comport themselves in separate and separated fields of endeavour’ (Muller, 2002: 279).

CONCLUSION

To conclude, the analysis of the preceding pages can be distilled into seven core propositions. Research and writing on higher education by critical researchers can be placed on a continuum that ranges from scholarly basic research on one end, unconcerned with policy and policy-making; to scholarly research which has policy and policy-making as its subject (but not its purpose); to analysis of policy; to analysis for policy that is confined to advancing policy options and their implications; and to, at the other end of the continuum, analysis for policy that includes the design of policies and policy-making instruments and processes. More extensive and varied conceptions of policy and policy-making open up avenues for more fertile, complex and nuanced thinking about critical research and writing and its connection to higher education. They also allow us to characterize all rigorous, high-quality critical scholarship
and research and writing on higher education as policy-relevant and policy-related. This is in contrast to limiting ‘policy research and writing’ to only that which is consciously and deliberately policy-oriented. Thus research and writing undertaken with no thought of shaping policy-making becomes potentially as policy-relevant and policy-related as applied and strategic policy-oriented research. Indeed, critical research and writing on higher education that is not concerned with policy may be as valuable, if not more valuable, than that which is.

With respect to research and writing in the field of higher education, critical researchers can

- Confine themselves to research and writing unconcerned with policy (even if their subject or object may be higher education policy and policy-making).
- Restrict themselves to analysis of policy if they are inclined to undertake policy research.
- Confine themselves to only some kinds of analysis for policy.
- Undertake the full spectrum of research and writing related to analysis for policy.
- Undertake research and writing that is unconcerned with policy, analysis of policy and only some kinds of analysis for policy.
- Undertake all kinds of research and writing.

It is, of course, possible to move between the different types of research and writing and even to master them. However it is crucial that critical researchers fully comprehend the implications of each for their values and for the autonomy of intellectual work, and make explicit and conscious choices regarding the purposes of their research and writing. Critical researchers who seek to be involved in all kinds of analysis for policy must be fully conscious of the challenges, difficulties and pitfalls. It is important not to make a virtue of the necessities that commissioned research or institutional location and roles may entail with regard to policy research undertaken for government, political parties and other social and policy actors.

Is it possible for critical researchers to undertake analysis for policy that includes advancing policy proposals on higher education and simultaneously function, in the same space and time, as critical researchers? The above analysis suggests that critical researchers can, albeit under the following conditions:
- Where the policy proposals are unsolicited, and advanced with no special concern over whether they are taken up by a social actor.
- Where the policy proposals are commissioned without any conditions (that is, pre-requisite inalienable principles, values, goals, criteria, existing approaches and strategies) and the critical researcher is indifferent as to whether the proposals advanced are taken up by the commissioning actor.
- Where there is a very high degree of congruence between the values, goals and approaches of the actor to whom proposals are being addressed, and those of the critical researcher.

The above analysis also suggests that there are conditions where critical researchers cannot produce policy proposals on higher education and also function as critical researchers. These conditions include:

- Where the policy research is commissioned with specified criteria (the principles, values, goals, criteria, existing approaches and strategies) that the proposals must satisfy, and there is dissonance between these criteria and those of the critical researcher; in other words, where certain conditions are pre-set. This is an example of what Wolpe cautions against – the treatment of the priorities and policies of governments, political parties and other social actors as ‘conclusions’ rather than as ‘… starting points for investigation’ (Wolpe, 1985: 75).
- Where critical researchers undertake policy research specifically to confirm the views of social actors on the efficacy (or lack of efficacy) of certain policy proposals or modes of policy-making. This would be ‘research and writing … restricted entirely to providing the materials for and confirmation of already defined policies, [which] is to reduce research to a purely ideological function and to deny any autonomy or value to intellectual work and hence to the critical yet essential function of such work’ (Wolpe, 1985: 74).
- It is possible for a critical researcher to concomitantly undertake different kinds of research and writing on higher education that result in different policy conclusions, and to also conduct policy research for other actors that points to different policies. Nonetheless, in some situations it is not possible to concurrently be
a critical researcher and undertake certain kinds of policy research and writing. It is only possible in relation to other social and policy actors and other kinds of research and writing (i.e. consecutively). Muller has concluded that ‘… critics and reconstructors can only … comport themselves in separate and separated fields of endeavour’ (Muller, 2002: 279). Certainly, there are different kinds of research and writing on higher education, featuring differing conditions of production (and reproduction), purposes, approaches, and social functions; these must be acknowledged and appreciated. In an age of extreme utilitarianism and reduction of higher education and scholarship to ‘… liberal practicality’¹⁰ (Wright Mills, 1959: 88), it is especially vital that basic critical scholarship is valued, promoted and defended.

Muller would recognize that critical researchers can and do oscillate between critical scholarship that is unconcerned with policy and analysis for policy, and between social functions as critics and ‘reconstructors’. Beyond personal choice, there may be certain conditions in which critical researchers are impelled to undertake research and writing of a kind for which they are unprepared or that they would normally avoid. Such conditions may include transitions from colonialism to national independence or from authoritarian rule to political liberalization and democracy, such as have occurred in South Africa, Chile and Eastern Europe. These conditions may also include situations where the transition may be fairly rapid, and characterised by the existence of relatively small ‘communities’ of critical intellectuals and researchers; they could also include situations where there are social pressures to demonstrate allegiance to the ascendant new political forces, or where there has been a history of collaboration between critical intellectuals and researchers and the new hegemonic political forces. When O’Donnel and Schmitter (1986) write of transitions in terms of ‘… numerous surprises and difficult dilemmas’, of ‘… elements of accident and unpredictability, of crucial decisions taken in a hurry’, of actors facing unsolvable ethical dilemmas and ideological confusions, of dramatic

¹⁰ That is, an ‘a-political … kind of democratic opportunism’ in which the ‘political’ is ‘… identified with the proper functioning of the political status quo’, and the ‘… political order itself is seldom examined; it is merely assumed as a quite fixed and distant framework’ (Wright Mills, 1959: 88).
turning points reached and passed without an understanding of their future significance, they could well be describing the circumstances of critical researchers in some situations.

If ‘… freedom is, first of all, the chance to formulate the available choices, to argue over them – and then, the opportunity to choose … [and] freedom cannot exist without an enlarged role of human reason in human affairs’ (Wright Mills, 1959: 174), then in conditions of such flux it has to be acknowledged that critical researchers sometimes operate with a relative lack of freedom. Aside from the particular conditions that may push or pull critical researchers into oscillating between critical scholarship unconcerned with policy and analysis for policy, there may also be some value in this. Critical scholarship on higher education that is unconcerned with policy can benefit in terms of greater access to information, insights and rigour through the experience of analysis of and for policy. Without doubt, analysis of policy and especially analysis for policy can, in turn, benefit greatly from rigorous, critical scholarship on higher education. If it is the affinity of the critical researcher, and occurs with full knowledge of the dilemmas and implications, this oscillation should not require legitimating claims (‘critical reconstructor’ or ‘reconstructive critic’). However even if critical researchers opt to ‘… comport themselves in separate fields of endeavour’, there are good grounds for pursuing continuous, vigorous engagement and dialogue between critical researchers whatever the purposes of their research and writing or institutional locations (see Watson, 2002: 7-8).

Through high-quality research and writing, and within the bounds of possibility, critical researchers can help improve, reform and transform higher education and society more generally. However they would benefit from greater modesty and intellectual scepticism regarding the efficacy of their (radical) policy proposals, and whether they do indeed provide frameworks and strategies that resolve or dissolve the intractable tensions riveting both higher education and contemporary society. It is necessary, to borrow a phrase from Weiler (1978), that critical researchers move from ‘innocence’ to ‘greater critical reflexivity’11 with respect to their roles, functions and contribution to higher education policy-making and change.

11 Although the analysis and concluding propositions are suggestive, this author is not able to do justice here to their implications for a critical praxis. This is of course an important issue.
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The topic is central and in discussing ‘strategies for change’, it is obvious that the role of higher education researchers and experts must come into focus. Many of us belong to this group, and we meet to discuss change; change will not come about if policy is not involved. And most of us do believe that our work, our labour in our universities and institutes or in our agencies and government offices, is somehow brought to bear on policy. In that respect, Badat’s is a highly important paper on a highly important, even central topic – a topic that goes to the heart of the entire Global Forum process. The topic is important also because it touches upon one of the central features of the role of the intellectual in society. Of course the 20th Century discourse on the ‘intellectual’, in whom this author includes the researcher, has been marked by Max Weber’s two papers, *Wissenschaft als Beruf* and *Politik als Beruf*. And we know that Weber, although seriously struggling with the dilemma and working on both, still advocated a sharp line of distinction between the two. Weber is not quoted by Badat. Maybe he thought it is not necessary to lecture an erudite and experienced readership with such elementary sociology. But then, on the other hand, he does make a point of bringing a canonical piece of Marx into the picture, so he is not entirely uninterested in the Great Tradition. At any rate his is a lengthy paper, carefully looking at a fairly limited number of ideas that are approached from many angles and in sharp detail.

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ANALYSIS AND DICHOTOMIES
There are some dichotomies involved. The first is between analysis of policy and for policy. If you work on policy you try to understand it. If you work for policy you will still have to try and understand it; but you will also care, somehow, how your work is going to be used, or whether it could be used, in policy. On the surface this just looks like the old distinction between basic and applied research, concepts that appear in Badat's text. But even more, it is a matter of the fundamental distinction: Do you want to make politics, or just stick to academic norms and ideals? That is a Weberian rather than a Mertonian, or even Marxist, problématique we are dealing with here, and it is further reinforced by Badat's discussion of the 'critical researcher'. It is not entirely evident, even from his substantial deliberations, precisely what a 'critical researcher' is – although most of us understand it almost intuitively: a 'critical researcher' is the one who tries to unite the true and the good and who believes that truth helps to achieve good.

DEFINITIONS, QUALITIES AND PROPERTIES
Professor Badat does not leave much to intuition; he wants definitions. He assures us, somewhat circularly, that critical researchers are those who use critical theoretical discourses. Sociologically speaking, he claims, they could be found anywhere, except perhaps in firms (although they could be self-employed). They could be politically diverse, but nonetheless they seem to stand for 'substantive social democracy' and should embrace a 'non-capitalist future'. This being said, they are '… expected to have political commitments in common.' They would also oppose neo-liberalism, privatization, marketization, commodification, and commercialization. And they do not believe that history has come to an end.

Not that several of these characteristics of the critical researcher would be far fetched in many of us, in particular the disbelief of Francis Fukuyama's infamous claim some 15 years ago (if we still bother to recall this remarkable neo-conservative, triumphalist outcry). But what sort of taxonomical agenda has Professor Badat invented to come up with precisely this sociological creature? Why did he not concentrate on ethnicity? Race? Class? Gender? Or the human rather than the narrowly ideological? Apparently there is a mission here, and Professor Badat seems to know who has been chosen to pursue it.
CRITICAL INNOCENTS
Having created first a generously welcoming collective of ‘critical researchers’, Professor Badat proceeds to let only some of us in. Maybe it is this part of the research community, one may think, who represents the ‘innocence’ in his title – a word that otherwise is left a little bit up in the air and only taken down in the very last paragraph with reference to Hans Weiler. And then we learn that innocence was largely ignorance – ignorance of the harsh realities of policy-making, one can presume. On the other hand, one might hold that innocence is a respected, even cherished, quality. Maybe innocence was something that the research community possessed in some ideal past, a stage now left behind in the era of the Knowledge Economy and academic competition? Or, maybe, innocence is really a disease that many scholars have not yet discovered they are suffering from, and thus need to be rescued from, perhaps by rushing over to the camp of ‘critical researchers’ who are, presumably, no longer innocent.

Again, on innocence, Professor Badat does not say very much, which is to this author’s regret. Let us remember that innocence is an ambiguous concept. One side of it faces the ignorant, if not the fool. But the other side faces the angel. And with that we are back to the very virtue of his article, which is that it encourages us to ask ourselves once again: What are we here for?

THE ISSUE LINGERS ON
It seems as if, at the end of the day, Professor Badat – after his initial crusade – must lower his lance and say: the point is not if you work on or for policy. The point is how you do it. The Weberian issue lingers on and is, ultimately, a moral one, namely to try: ‘The honest ones try to skirt the siren call of those in power.’ Professor Badat picks up on the experiences of the globalizing 20th Century, of which Weber did not live to see very much. We can engage with Power – and sometimes you have to. But then let us do it with honesty – and for human dignity.
INTRODUCTION

The modern university is a cradle of knowledge – new, high-value and specialized. Though particularly true of the so-called research university, when such a distinction is made it also applies to the public university at large wherever a research component, normally linked to graduate curricula, is present. In the developing world this aspect of universities and higher education is essential, as universities concentrate most of a country’s scientific and technological research: outside these institutions, to find research activities of significance in most of the natural or exact sciences is difficult indeed. It is more difficult still to find technological research, except of course in more industrially developed countries. At the same time and with its democratizing function developed during the 20th Century, the public university serves as a catalyst to individual and social development. Its students have an opportunity to improve their quality of life; it advances society in all aspects, both spiritual and material; and it is an ideal haven for critical and independent thought.

Yet while the public university is challenged to meet this dual responsibility, it is increasingly under stress and risks losing ground. Private universities – even commercial firms sometimes not even connected to universities – with well-defined, market-oriented agendas
are substituting themselves for the public higher education system. It is therefore essential for the public university to reaffirm its place in modern society by becoming more socially valuable and relevant.

**CLOSING KNOWLEDGE GAPS**

Today, the spread of information and knowledge through technology is held to be one of the major factors of change in education. However the diffusion of knowledge will remain uneven so long as the number of internet users in higher income countries is 11 times that in developing countries, and 160 times that in the least developed countries (UNDP, 2004). The capacity to generate new scientific knowledge remains concentrated in a few industrialized countries, with 10 times more researchers *per capita* than developing countries and featuring over 90 percent of the world’s expenditure on research and development. High-income countries invest six times more in education than the developing world, although the latter’s total student population is three times greater (Hopenhayn, 2002). Recent trends, both political and economic, suggest these figures will not change significantly in the near future.

Inequity is thus a major challenge for the ‘globalized world’, and for the education systems of the ‘Third World’. In Latin America alone, three quarters of the population aged between 18 and 25 years have no access to higher education of any kind. In some countries of the region, that statistic reaches 90 percent (Ocampo, 2002). Young people in rural areas, many of whom have moved to the cities, are amongst those worst affected by the paucity of educational opportunities – this in addition to poor health and nutrition, and lacking cultural, social integration and employment opportunities.

In 2003 at the follow-up meeting to the World Conference on Higher Education (UNESCO, 1998–2003), UNESCO’s partners raised the issues of ‘borderless higher education’ and of the ‘... vital role of higher education in bridging the knowledge gap’ between developed and developing countries. Rather than turning attention to just this knowledge gap, let us recognize that many such gaps exist. Such a situation begs the question whether any educational policy at all can in fact bridge these gaps. Policies may open up higher education further, and advance the university’s commitment to democratization; however they cannot narrow knowledge divides when the latter are structurally part and parcel of a broader system, itself beset with gaps and inequalities.
OTHER KNOWLEDGE SOURCES
Although the university brings together the rare combination of responsibilities cited above, it is not alone in this – particularly with regard to its role as a source and transmitter of knowledge. Other important creators and owners of knowledge include such diverse entities as traditional societies, indigenous communities, professional associations, specialized NGOs and other practitioner groupings; the knowledge these possess is neither simple nor trivial. In some cases in fact, it is the outcome of a secular process of collective experience over several centuries. That this knowledge is neither rigorously tested in the conventional scientific sense, nor comprehensively and systematically catalogued, often makes it difficult to assess and draw on. Save in some specific areas of the natural sciences and anthropology, university research has very little to do with this kind of knowledge, considered unreliable or irrelevant – as irrelevant as academic science itself is often held to be beyond the university boundary.

Most people today have a respectable knowledge porte-manteau – highly diverse in its origin and content, context-dependent, rapidly evolving and difficult to define. And much of this knowledge has only a tenuous link to that knowledge created in universities as a result of science and scholarship. Each new generation today is distinct not only in its knowledge base, but also in its approach to knowledge and information and their use. Everyone admits that modern communications have vastly increased the sources and diffusion of information and knowledge; that they rapidly change people’s approach to learning. But information is spread so chaotically and unevenly that it becomes a challenge for an educational system to respond to the huge variation in environments, skills and needs in society-at-large.

CROSS-FERTILIZATION
Any policy to make the university more socially valuable and relevant should take account of the wide and diverse knowledge framework in the population the university intends to serve; that is to say, in its student body and wider community. How to interact with this knowledge framework? Despite the high importance society assigns to knowledge, the creation of knowledge and its translation into practice are still little understood (Wenger, 1998). Traditional approaches to knowledge management captured existing knowledge within formal
systems – databases, curricula, textbooks, published papers. Modern communication technologies have not substantially changed these approaches; rather than providing for a different education to address the needs of the 21st Century, they underpin a '20th Century education' through high-tech tools (Scardamalia, 2004).

Yet current theories on learning are starting to place high importance on context, and on social interaction among those that constitute a learning community. Amongst the salient features of the knowledge processes identified are direct engagement with problems; working with emergent rather than fixed goals; self-organization around promising new directions rather than around mandated work; self-monitoring and self-correction; productive use of diversity of ideas; and responsibility for high-level socio-cognitive activities, such as setting and refining goals, providing resources and identifying different perspectives (Scardamilia, 2004). Such goals and activities are highly relevant to a revision of educational approaches within the traditional university. They become particularly relevant when other stakeholders are included.

Strategies to make the university interact closely with a broader knowledge base should take these features into account; they should be people-oriented and participatory, involving students, teachers and other knowledge communities. In the field of social projects this implies the establishment of horizontal relations, to readjust goals and the ways of achieving them and to reassess the various interests of stakeholders – the latter constantly evolving with a changing environment (Cohen, 2002). Also, the participation of communities from outside the university requires management capacity at local level. These communities are not simple recipients; rather their potential should be used as a resource and as a vehicle for change. Facilities for interaction with stakeholders, for putting theoretical solutions into practice, and for feedback to the academic environment are also needed.

A NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT FOR SCIENCE

Customarily, science has not interacted systematically with other systems of knowledge. Notable and recent exceptions within the traditional system of research and higher education are ecology and natural resource management; in these areas scientific research of academic origin has had useful dealings with community-based knowledge systems, predominantly in rural environments. By
working with communities to diffuse knowledge more broadly and
benefit more people, science has been made more valuable. Nurtured
along with community knowledge and driven by real and concrete
problems, science itself is transformed: it becomes more socially (and
environmentally) valuable.

Indeed a stronger social commitment from academic science
does not affect higher education policies alone; it changes policies
and practices in science as well. This was the main message of the
World Conference on Science, organized in 1999 by UNESCO and
the International Council for Science (ICSU) (UNESCO, 2000). As
Lubchenco pointed out on the eve of the Conference, public support
for science traditionally has been predicated on the expectation that
scientific research contributes to the achievement of goals society has
deemed important. This has not changed over the years. But the needs of
society have changed and to meet them, science must provide new kinds
of knowledge and new means of applying it. Science must forge a ‘new
contract’ with society (Lubchenco, 1998: 491–497). The Conference
called upon the scientific community, as an expression of its new social
commitment, to lower the barriers between social and natural sciences,
to adopt ‘inter-disciplinarity’ as a common principle and to facilitate
the participation of the disadvantaged. Scientists should consider the
value of other systems of knowledge; this was also recognized, and
subsequently confirmed in a report published by ICSU. The report
set out the positive influence of traditional and local knowledge on
science; it pressed for due acknowledgment of this influence by the
scientific community; and it stressed the need for careful distinction
between this knowledge and ‘pseudo-science’ (ICSU, 2002). Some
activities are indeed undertaken in recognition and support of this
knowledge (UNESCO, 2002) or in conjunction with it; however, they
rarely become integrated with mainstream science.

In developing countries, the potential benefits of closer interaction
between science and local systems of knowledge are great: science
becomes more locally and socially relevant and other knowledge systems
are strengthened and enriched by science. The scientific outcomes of this
interaction would increase the contributions of developing countries to
the international scientific enterprise; they would help to redefine the
current paradigm of ‘good science’, away from that which is defined,
approved and predominantly carried out by scientists in Europe and
North America.
THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF THE UNIVERSITY

Universities should recognize their social commitments and obligations, and explore new ways of meeting them. Where the public university becomes more socially relevant and valuable, where it achieves tangible benefits for its extended community and for society in general, these may serve its sustainability. In the rapidly growing cityscape that surrounds many universities in the developing world, important and pressing problems need to be addressed with creativity and with the engagement of the scientific community. Such problems include new diseases, resource depletion, migration, social marginalization, lacking public transport and environmental degradation.

In developing countries these problems acquire a particularly urgent character in large urban settings, and where a high percentage of young people are excluded from higher education. Opening the system to those who need it – rather than to those with the means for it – would present an important benefit to society in general.

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COMMENT: IS DEMOCRACY A DAUGHTER OF KNOWLEDGE?

Nico Stehr*

A CAUTIONARY TALE

Dr. Cetto stresses that the modern university provides its students and society with the kind of thinking, as she puts it, that ‘… is needed by every individual and every society’ in order to find its own way to develop and move forward in an increasingly knowledge-driven world. On the other hand, she points out that a movement toward market-driven higher education fails to fulfil this function. In commenting, this author would like to refer to another contradiction, namely between the dependence of modern societies on knowledge, the growing specialization in knowledge production and the gap between expertise – that is, powerful agencies that harbour expert knowledge – and the knowledge of laypersons in modern societies. This latter gap has dramatically and irreversibly widened; it exists not only among societies as Dr. Cetto has emphasized, but also within societies, independent of their state of development. This author’s contribution is a cautionary tale, not quite as upbeat as that of Dr. Cetto. In a recent review in the New York Review of Books (November 18, 2004: 38), the molecular biologist Richard Lewontin maintained that ‘… the knowledge required for political rationality, once available to the

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masses, is now in the possession of a specially educated elite, a situation that creates a series of tensions and contradictions in the operation of representative democracy.’

**CONTRADICTIONS**

Is there then a fundamental contradiction not only between justice and freedom, that do not reinforce each other, but also between democracy and knowledge? Or is knowledge a ‘democratizer’? Is the progress of knowledge, especially its rapid advances, a burden on democracy, civil society and the capacity of individuals to assert their will? And if there is a contradiction between knowledge and democratic processes, is this a new development? Or does the advance of liberal democracy jointly achieved by knowledge and democratic political conduct enable us to claim that civil society, if not democracy itself, is the daughter of knowledge? Knowledge may be defined here as a capacity for action. The possession of knowledge enhances agency. At the heart of civil society is agency.

**RIVAL HYPOTHESES**

A large number of rival hypotheses explain the emergence and persistence of democratic regimes, and the strength of their civil societies. Francis Fukuyama, for example, explicates his thesis about the end of competing ideologies in the last century by stressing that ‘... here are fundamental economic and political imperatives pushing history in one direction, towards greater democracy’. As the war in Iraq has shown, democracy is also expected to follow from the barrel of a gun. In contrast to the latter claim, John Stuart Mill, in *The Spirit of the Age* (1831), stressed that social progress is linked rather to a general diffusion of knowledge. This in turn strongly resonates with the notion of present-day society – the social structure that emerges as industrial society passes on – as a ‘Knowledge Society’.

**EXPERT KNOWLEDGE, DemOCRACY AND THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY**

Many observers are concerned by the serious consequences of an asymmetry between expert knowledge and the public, particularly for the nature of civil society. It is widely assumed that scientific illiteracy decreases the public’s democratic capacities. Large swathes of the public have become disenfranchised, and barred from effective involvement
in democratic processes that increasingly require a certain level of scientific literacy. This loss of contact is not only the result of a growing cognitive distance between science and everyday knowledge; it is also affected by ever-increasing speed in the expansion of knowledge, based on a growing division of labour in science and by the deployment of knowledge in a productive capacity. Decreasing cognitive proximity increases the political distance from science: it restricts public reflection on both anticipated and unanticipated transformations of social and cultural realities that result from the application of new knowledge.

On political and moral grounds many groups, constituencies and institutions must be consulted before decisions are made about issues affecting the regulation of knowledge and, indirectly, the development of science and technology. Yet it would be misleading to think that the distance from, and the loss of contact with, science – or the considerable scientific illiteracy evident in modern societies – is somehow a ‘… potentially fatal flaw in the self-conception of the people today’ (Holton, 1992: 105), and/or that it signals the possibility of a dramatic collapse in public support for science.

A PRECARIOUS BALANCE

It is more accurate to speak of a state of precarious balance, which affects the autonomy and dependence of science vis-à-vis modern society. A loss of close intellectual contact between science and the public is perfectly compatible with a diffuse support for science in modern society, and with an assent to legal and political efforts to control the impact of science and technology. In another sense, however, the loss of cognitive contact is almost irrelevant and highly controversial; for example when ‘contact’ refers to close cognitive proximity as a pre-requisite of public participation in decisions affecting scientific and technological knowledge. Such a claim is practically meaningless because it virtually requires public engagement in science-in-progress.

CONCLUSION

This author has concentrated on questions concerned with how to gain knowledge in modern society, and less on what to do with it. The basic claim for the moment, however, is that democratization in modern societies as ‘knowledge societies’ increasingly extends to a democratization and negotiation of knowledge claims. Scientific knowledge is much more malleable and accessible than is suggested
in the classical perspective of the relations between science and society. The boundaries between expertise and everyday knowledge are less fixed and less robust than is often surmised, especially in any distance between expert knowledge and that of the public. This produces particular challenges, for example in terms of access to knowledge, but also in the form of new modes of participation. And here universities, civil society and trans-national organizations will indeed be challenged.
INFLUENCE – DIRECT, INDIRECT AND NEGOTIATED: THE WORLD BANK AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA
Joel Samoff and Bidemi Carrol *

CHANGING AGENDA, POWERFUL CONSEQUENCES
In the early 1960s the agenda seemed clear. For World Bank policy-makers and many others, the primary task of higher education in Africa was to develop the specific skills that African countries needed. Human resource development – the contemporary terminology was ‘manpower planning’ – was higher education’s principal mission, and that high-priority objective required significant public resources.

However within a decade that independence-era perspective of The World Bank began to change: since graduates could expect substantial individual personal benefits, public expenditures on higher education, particularly student accommodation, meals, transport and stipends, should be understood not as a contribution to development but as a misdirection of resources. Rate of return analysis, which had become the assessment tool of choice, showed that society would benefit more from allocations to basic education. Universities and other higher education institutions were to reduce per-student costs, substantially increase student fees, and privatize. That orientation fit well with global commitments to Education for All, which emphasized basic (in practice, primary) education.

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By the 1990s severe deterioration of higher education institutions, African insistence on a holistic perspective to the development of the education sector and fascination with the 'Knowledge Era' combined to support another policy reversal. Student fees and privatization must continue, the new view argued, but where knowledge has become the most important factor of production higher education has a special role and once again warrants significant public support and funding. African universities scrambled to fit the new frame and secure the resources associated with it, and at the same time sought to preserve some autonomy of action in the face of strong national and international constraints. For many, dependence has become an institutionalized fact of life.

What explains World Bank policy in the above domain, both its transitions and continuities? How does that policy influence the course of events in Africa?

WORLD BANK POLICY AND HIGHER EDUCATION DECAY

As a condition for qualifying for World Bank assistance in the education sector, African countries were to divert resources from higher education and channel them instead towards primary and basic education. African governments protested that in the matter of providing education to their citizens, it was not a question of either primary or secondary, or indeed higher education. Needless to say and given the tremendous pressures that come with World Bank and IMF conditionality, they lost the battle and higher education in Africa virtually went under. To this day, many countries have not been able to recover from that onslaught on African higher education. Some of Africa's finest institutions have thus almost been destroyed, thanks to the imposition of bad policies from partners who, in the first place, came out professing to help. 'What we received from them was the kiss of death!'1 One of the casualties of structural adjustment in Africa was higher education, said to be an expensive luxury.2 These are stinging indictments, and such widely articulated views hold The World Bank at least partly

accountable for the deterioration of Africa’s universities and the decline of higher education in Africa more generally. The argument is straightforward: as The World Bank assigned high priority to spending on basic education, it told everyone – from its own operations staff to other funding agencies, to African governments, to non-governmental organizations – that higher education was too costly, too inequitable, and marginal to national development goals. Accordingly, resources were to be redirected from higher education to basic education. Decay was the result.

The past two decades have indeed been difficult for Africa’s universities. Deteriorating economic conditions, pressure from external funders and internal constituencies to reduce costs and redirect resources to basic education and leaders’ perceptions that university communities were more a political threat than a development engine combined to undermine higher education. In many countries staff salaries stagnated or declined, requiring second jobs and increasing the attraction of overseas opportunities. Book purchases, journal subscriptions, laboratory equipment, facilities maintenance, and research support also suffered. By the 1990s, the consensus was that the deterioration of higher education in Africa had become a crisis. By 1990, Makerere University for example exhibited in extreme form the resource constraints facing universities throughout Africa. No new

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3 The term, ‘Africa’s universities’, poses semantic as well as analytical challenges. The authors use here Africa’s self-definition, that is, membership in the Organization of African Unity (succeeded by the African Union). That orientation is at odds with the categorization used by The World Bank, the U.S. Department of State and others who cleave Africa at the Sahara and join North Africa with the Middle East, and who all too often use ‘Africa’ to mean ‘sub-Saharan Africa’. Consequently, the authors must at times draw on commentaries and data that refer to sub-Saharan Africa. Analytically, the challenge is that of generalization; since there are always exceptions, all generalizations are inherently risky. The authors discuss here, for example, a crisis in higher education in Africa, which for most higher education institutions is a reasonable characterization. But some institutions have been rather less affected than others. In situations of intense conflict – in recent years, Angola, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia – there have been too few functional higher education institutions to warrant even the term ‘crisis’. Higher education in South Africa has experienced a different sort of crisis in Apartheid and its consequences, which took different forms for White and Black institutions. Like other commentators, the authors characterize the final decades of the 20th Century as a period of severe stress and distress for higher education in Africa.
physical structures had been built, and no maintenance carried out in 20 years. Journal subscriptions had declined to zero, as had chemicals purchases for science laboratories. Supplies of electricity and water were spasmodic, cooking and sewage facilities were stretched to their limit. Academic staff members received the equivalent of US$30 per month, and were forced by this so-called ‘leaving’ wage to depart the country or seek other paid employment for most of their day. Student numbers remained low, the government subsidy small, and research output minimal. A ‘pillage’ or ‘survival’ culture prevailed, putting at risk any saleable and removable item, from computers and telephones to electric wires and door fixtures – and sometimes the doors themselves. In a situation of limited transport, few if any working telephones and the absence of needed equipment and stationery, it is remarkable that the university managed to remain open at all throughout this period.4

African universities struggled to cope, some very imaginatively. Still, many commentators saw no end in sight to the decay and disarray, and the most recent economic prospects are not reassuring. Even with the most optimistic view about education’s role in development, higher education is likely to continue suffering severe resource constraints. The distress of Africa’s universities has multiple causes, but prominent among them in the view of many observers has been the pressure of World Bank policies. Over more than two decades those policies have characterized higher education in Africa as inefficient and expensive, and have called for redirecting resources to other education sub-sectors, increasing student fees and privatization.

EXPLORING POLICY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
To address the above critique and to consider more broadly the significance for Africa of The World Bank’s notions of appropriate roles for higher education, the authors explore here World Bank policies on higher education for Africa and their consequences.5 At

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5 The specification of what is higher (or tertiary) education has varied across time and countries, and occasionally within countries. For the purposes of this discussion, the authors adopt a local perspective and defer to each country’s own definition of what it considers to be higher education. At the same time and despite the periodic proliferation of post-secondary award-granting programs, the core higher education
Let us begin with attention to context, to the multiple meanings and forms of policy and the politically negotiated ambiguities that enshroud what is or is not World Bank policy. The authors will review briefly the evolution of World Bank policy on higher education in Africa, noting important continuities. The unevenness of the empirical literature, however, provides greater clarity for some settings than for others, and that unevenness is necessarily reflected in this discussion. Also, World Bank policies are more visible and perhaps more influential in countries that seek and receive World Bank loans. Countries that have not sought World Bank loans can, presumably, more readily reject World Bank advice and deflect World Bank pressure. To some extent, they do. However The World Bank’s indirect influence, for example, on how the roles of higher education are defined and how education spending patterns are (and should be) assessed, is much broader and may constrain national policies and programs even where there are no loans.

On The World Bank and its influence, anecdotal commentaries abound. Assessments, more or less well supported, span the entire range. The World Bank is the ‘Death Star’ of Capitalism, imposing its control, supporting its friends and destroying its enemies; The World Bank is the Pilot Boat for the Global Future, leading countries and peoples across uncharted and turbulent waters. Aware of those characterizations of The World Bank and its influence, and of the tendency to make sweeping claims with little evidence, the authors have sought to draw on systematic, empirically grounded research in institutions and the focus of most higher education development efforts are universities. Accordingly the focus here is largely on universities, and the terms ‘university’ and ‘higher education’ are used interchangeably. Included or not within universities, teacher, technical, professional, and vocational education all warrant systematic and critical attention; but that differentiation is beyond the scope of this article.

both the published and unpublished literature. Sources are identified in notes and the list of references.7

CONTEXT
The broadest context for World Bank higher education policy is the institution’s role in the global system of the late 20th Century. From its initial charge to promote reconstruction in post-war Europe, The World Bank has assumed some of the roles of the former colonial powers and many of the responsibilities of specialized United Nations organizations as it seeks to manage the integration of poor countries into the world economic system. Earlier, education had little place in that complex process, but as education was seen as essential to economic growth The World Bank’s attention to education increased. In the Knowledge Era – a preferred characterization of the present – education, and especially higher education, are even more important. Although The World Bank is generally very attentive to the priorities and preferences of its largest shareholder, the United States, the U.S. has generally not been a trend-setter on education and development, thus providing The World Bank a good deal of autonomy in this arena. As we focus on education however, and on The World Bank and its education policies and lending, we must understand those activities and all their complexities in the context of The World Bank’s role of managing the global economy. Let us begin this discussion, however, in Africa.

Foreign aid to education in Africa is a small beast with a loud roar. For nearly all African countries the major source of funds for education is the national treasury and with a few exceptions, foreign funding is a very small portion of total spending on education. Its attraction is that it is not, or may not be, allocated to education’s recurrent costs and is therefore available for discretionary allocations. Government education spending pays teachers’ salaries. To a lesser extent, it builds and maintains buildings, purchases textbooks, and where residential education is important, supports students’ accommodation and board. A very little of it buys chalk or wall maps or copy machines or other supplies and equipment. Hardly any of it is available for innovation,

7 The authors’ full report, From Manpower Planning to the Knowledge Era, includes a more extensive survey of sources, as well as details on patterns of World Bank education lending and observations on higher education lending in several countries.
experimentation and reform. There lies foreign aid’s powerful roar: its leverage is not its total volume, but rather that educators with exhausted budgets can use it to expand, to alter priorities, to modify practices, and more generally to respond to their own and others’ sense of what needs to be done.

Pulled by popular demand and pushed by the need for highly educated and skilled personnel, education can quickly become an insatiable demand for resources. As economic crises succeeded earlier developmental optimism, and structural adjustment replaced rapid development as the realistic short-term objective in Africa, there was strong pressure to assign the highest priority for available funds to directly productive activities which often did not include education. Thus throughout Africa foreign aid has become the centre of gravity for education and development initiatives. Over time it has come to seem not only obvious but unexceptional that new initiatives and reform programs require external support, and therefore responsiveness to the agenda and preferences of the funding agencies: essentially, aid dependence. To reiterate, aid dependence is not about education systems whose principal funding comes from abroad. Rather, aid dependence is the internalization within those education systems of the notion that improvement and change require external support, advice and often personnel. That internalization makes the policies and preferences of the foreign funders far more consequential than could be explained by the volume of their assistance.

**CHANGING WORLD BANK PRIORITIES FOR HIGHER EDUCATION IN AFRICA**

Let us turn now to World Bank policy on higher education in Africa. But what exactly is it? For some observers the issue is straightforward: World Bank policy is an official statement by the Board of Governors that is labelled as such. Yet other observers insist that policy is what guides action, which may or may not be incorporated in a formal statement signed by officials. The tension between these perspectives is central to this discussion. Let us suppose that an institution expresses formally that its priority is to support school construction, and that careful scrutiny of its allocations found that over two decades in fact nearly all funds went to student bursaries. What, then, was its ‘policy’? Those who insist that the policy is the formal statement regard the allocations to bursaries as a deviation. Those who insist that policy is
what guides practice will point out that institutions make statements and publish documents for many reasons, and that the only sensible notion of policy is to look to practice, in this example the priority to bursaries. In this view policy statements can serve many purposes, from information to affirmation, to confirmation, to deception. Sometimes policy statements reflect the temporary dominance of a particular line of thought, and thus a particular set of advocates, within an institution. As their influence and authority wane or as their leadership is eclipsed, their carefully articulated policy may be ignored almost as quickly as it is published. Even when policy statements are intended primarily as a signal and are not expected to be fully implemented, practice, and especially allocations, can send a very strong signal.

For The World Bank, this issue emerges clearly in the comparison of policy statements and annual allocations: the two seem to be related, but not always and not very tightly. The authors shall consider both of those threads here. Also, important debates about policy directions within The World Bank are resolved by incorporating policy orientations in major documents that are not formally issued as policy statements. When asked what the policy is and in justifying proposed projects, World Bank staff members refer to those documents. When pressed, they respond that 'no, it is not an official policy statement, but it is our policy reference'. Hence, the authors are particularly concerned here with the policies that are embedded in analyses, commentaries and operational decisions on the provision of resources.

The challenge, therefore, is to be broad-minded and inclusive about the policy process. The authors are thus more concerned with key ideas and their uses and influence than whether or not those ideas have been officially designated as policy. That orientation reflects both a multi-modal notion of the policy process, and a multi-nodal understanding of The World Bank as an institution with both official policies and numerous diverse, at times discordant and inconsistent, policy-like pronouncements. For outsiders 'official', 'quasi-official', 'official-but-subordinate' and 'unofficial' are often difficult to distinguish. In specific circumstances all can be presented with the weight and authority of The World Bank and thereby shape outcomes in recipient countries.

It is also important to note that internally, The World Bank is characterized by both functional specialization and functional overlap. The contemporary World Bank may usefully be understood as a bank, a development agency and a development research institute.
simultaneously. From another perspective and organizationally, part of The World Bank is concerned with policy, part is concerned with research and the most powerful part is concerned with lending. In practice those distinctions are semi-rigid, in that while they appear as distinct in the organization chart (with periodic changes) for specific tasks the boundaries are breached. Within the institution all three vie for influence, with the sorts of alliances, coalitions and conflicts common in large organizations. That helps us understand why several sorts of policy emerge from The World Bank and why policies may be inconsistent at all but the most general level.

Although there is wide agreement on the importance of World Bank policies, empirical studies of World Bank policy-making remain very few. Seemingly ubiquitous in Africa, the Bank also remains relatively invisible. And while formally an international organization with transparent rules and a commitment to expanded access to its documents, The World Bank has been very self-protective about its deliberations, priorities and decisions. Like their counterparts elsewhere, policy-makers within The World Bank periodically seek to disguise their intentions, obscure their motives and re-write history. Accordingly, in the authors’ efforts to explore the education policy process in The World Bank they have drawn on several sorts of sources. The understandings and explanations developed here, therefore, necessarily rest on direct sources of several sorts; indirect indicators established on a solid footing; and reasonable inferences from the available evidence. Like policy-making itself, explaining policy-making requires a mix of science, craft and art. Formal policy statements are one source for World Bank policy on higher education in Africa; World Bank analytical reviews are another; so too are loan conditions; and allocations are a fourth. Recalling the confrontation of perspectives noted earlier, of policies as formal statements vs. policies defined by recurring behaviour, the authors draw here on both orientations. To focus entirely on formal statements is to ignore that politics often revolves around symbols and around both decisions and non-decisions,

9 See Heyneman, 2003. Unfortunately, there are few accounts like this on the process of developing World Bank education policy and policy papers.
10 The World Bank and its staff are prolific publishers, both directly and indirectly, at many levels and in many forms. Even casual reading will uncover periodic divergences and disagreements, and occasionally very sharp critiques.
i.e. the exclusion of particular courses of action from consideration. What, then, do we learn about World Bank policy on higher education in Africa from World Bank lending to education in Africa?

Since its first education sector policy paper in 1971, the World Bank has periodically produced similar documents that describe current and future directions in education lending and policy. The 1971 paper called for greater emphasis on vocational and technical education and non-formal education; that continued to be World Bank policy until the mid-1980s, when a World Bank study on Colombia and Tanzania argued that vocationalized secondary schools did not yield sufficient benefit to warrant their much higher costs. Yet with one brief exception in the mid-1980s, lending for general education at the secondary level has been consistently higher than lending for vocational education. Neither the policy push for vocationalization nor the subsequent rejection of vocationalization is clearly discernible in the lending pattern for Africa, though there may have been significant changes for particular countries. Within higher education, World Bank lending to vocational education was higher than lending for universities until the mid-1980s when their share increased.

Since the 1971 paper, The World Bank has stressed primary education, especially for the poorest countries. Correspondingly, the share of lending to primary education in Africa has been increasing since the 1970s. However despite the apparently declining priority assigned to higher education in World Bank documents, the share of World Bank lending to higher education increased in the 1970s, stayed relatively constant through the 1980s, and then decreased in the 1990s. Consistent with the increased attention to basic education (for The World Bank, ‘primary’ education) manifested in the 1990 Jomtien conference, primary education’s share of World Bank lending increased significantly in the early 1990s. Yet notwithstanding pressure to reallocate resources from higher to primary education, it seems clear that it is lending to secondary education that has declined most over those years, though its support may now be once again increasing. Thus it seems reasonable to conclude that even after adjusting for time lags, there is at most a loose coupling between World Bank policy statements on higher education in Africa and its lending patterns. Whatever the external consequences of those policies, they seem to leave a good deal of manoeuvring room for World Bank operations staff.
The authors’ review of policy as pronouncement (including both formal policy statements and other documents) and policy as conditions (with specific attention to explicit conditions attached to recent higher education loans) shows clearly the evolution of World Bank higher education policy. As it moved beyond its initial focus on Europe, The World Bank addressed higher education in Africa largely as the setting for developing the high-level skills needed to replace departing Europeans and to staff the institutions of developing country societies. Human resource development (‘manpower planning’) was both the order of the day and the appropriate measure of the effectiveness of Africa’s post-secondary education. By the 1970s The World Bank had redefined its development role to assign high priority to alleviating, reducing and eliminating poverty. In the case of education that was accompanied by an emphasis on basic education, which crystallised in the 1990 and 2000 international conferences and agreements on Education for All; the corollary of the commitment to Education for All seemed to be a smaller role for higher education. Pressure to reallocate resources from higher to basic education – in policy statements, in reports and other documents and in loan conditionalities – was often accompanied by harsh criticism of existing African higher education institutions as costly, unproductive and irrelevant. Throughout this sharp critique, however, individuals and groups within The World Bank continued to assert the importance of higher education and of maintaining or increasing its funding.

By the late 1990s African resistance to the above pressure, the obvious deterioration of higher education institutions, an affirmation of a holistic view of education systems and The World Bank’s growing focus on what it termed the ‘Knowledge Era’ (and thus ‘knowledge generators’) combined in renewed attention to higher education and at least partial restoration of its status. That review supports a central thread of the authors’ analysis: however imperious and omnipotent its appearance, and however rigid and inescapable its loan conditions, The World Bank’s policy and practice are always negotiated – within The World Bank, between The World Bank and other funding agencies and between The World Bank and recipient countries. While that negotiation is inherently unequal, and while The World Bank’s leverage far exceeds that of its loan recipients, still The World Bank must have the participation and cooperation of ‘Third World’ governments to
pursue its agenda. Securing that participation and cooperation provides both funds and manoeuvring room for those governments.

CONVERGENCE AND INFLUENCE, BUT NOT LINEARITY

Nearly everyone agrees that the World Bank has been influential in higher education policy and practice in Africa. Yet that influence seems ever-elusive, always more discussed than documented. How do we make sense of an influence that seems obvious across a continent but is difficult to discern in specific cases? A complex picture emerges from this study. Despite the many claims of World Bank influence on higher education in Africa, it is difficult to demonstrate that a particular outcome is a direct consequence of a World Bank policy or loan. Even where lending is conditional on policy reforms, outcomes vary. In higher education projects in Kenya and Ghana, for example, the loan conditionalities were similar yet the outcomes decidedly were not. In Kenya key policy reforms, including the introduction of university fees, were implemented, whereas in Ghana they were not. In both cases students violently resisted these policies and universities were disrupted by numerous closures. But unlike their Kenyan counterparts, students in public universities in Ghana were not required to pay tuition fees. The Ghanaian experience suggests that assertive African governments may have more manoeuvring room than they realize. Despite not having implemented key conditions, Ghana nonetheless received additional support.

While it may be tempting to see loan conditionalities as proof of The World Bank’s direct influence in higher education policy, the ownership of the education reform agenda is more complex. Clearly, there are African officials who favour privatization policies such as those espoused by The World Bank. One strategy for limiting public debate and implementing measures that face strong local opposition is for national leaders to acquiesce, perhaps ostensibly reluctantly, in their specification as loan conditions. In this way conditionality can disguise ownership of the reform agenda, since if reforms are unpopular governments can blame The World Bank. If popular, governments can take the credit.

11 Many authors characterize conditionalities in this way: reforms that national leaders regard as necessary but which are politically difficult to support directly, and can be blamed on The World Bank or another funding agency. Among others, see ‘Overview’ in Devarajan, Dollar and Holmgren, 2001.
It is important here to consider briefly other explanations for some of the outcomes, particularly privatization policies, which have been attributed to World Bank intervention. Many of these reforms appear to follow a worldwide trend of introducing market-oriented reforms in higher education.\textsuperscript{12} Privatization is the order of the day even in countries like England and Australia, which do not borrow from The World Bank for education but have also experienced reduced public funding of higher education. Some researchers argue that nation-states show a high degree of convergence in educational ideology and structure as they adopt the ideas, institutional forms and organizational structure of an international system in order to gain legitimacy, and in some cases, resources.\textsuperscript{13} International organizations such as The World Bank play a role in disseminating these ideas around the world through international conferences, technical assistance, provision of resources and academic exchanges. From this perspective, the privatization response may well have more to do with the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas worldwide and a more subtle diffusion of ideas than with World Bank direct intervention.

Yet others have suggested that privatization is less about ideology and more about the necessity for institutions to respond to adverse financial conditions.\textsuperscript{14} One way in which institutions respond to drastically reduced public funding is to resist the change by raising revenues from other sources.\textsuperscript{15} Whether an institution follows this policy or simply cuts back on its activities depends on the duration and severity of the crisis, the degree of flexibility available and other such factors. From this perspective, attempts to privatize in universities in Africa should be understood as institutional responses to a long and severe period of under-funding.

Thus The World Bank does have an influence on higher education in Africa. This influence is quite strong, though not always direct and not always related to the volume of lending available. Technical assistance, providing financial resources and loan conditions are only some of its forms. The domestic situation, both economic and political (including student protests and the fragility of the State), also determines the

\textsuperscript{12} See Johnstone, Arora and Experton, 1998.

\textsuperscript{13} See for example McNeely and Cha, 1994; Ramirez and Boli, 1987.

\textsuperscript{14} See Johnstone, Arora and Experton, 1998.

\textsuperscript{15} See Brinkman, 1990.
extent to which The World Bank can influence the direction of higher education in Africa.

**CONTINUITIES IN CHANGING PRIORITIES**

Through the transitions in its priorities, there have been important continuities in World Bank policy and recommendations for higher education in Africa, especially since the 1970s.

First, The World Bank entered education support as a bank, and remains a bank; that has several immediate consequences. Support to education activities must be justified in ways not required by other funding agencies, including numerous, often complex studies. Even as there is discussion of cancelling previous debt, The World Bank's lending process requires reasonable assurance of repayment; that in turn requires not only a link between the activities supported by the loan and economic growth, but also broad attention to the national economy, its apparent health and its short- and longer term prospects. Development advice is thus not an additional service provided by The World Bank or a side benefit of working with The World Bank, but rather an integral part of the lending process. For The World Bank as creditor, that advice is critical to justifying the loan. For the debtor, that advice is part of the non-financial cost of the loan, just as a bank might require automobile insurance and driver training as part of a car loan.

Second, a standard set of recommendations has endured over time, changing objectives, revising understandings of the role of education and specific local situations. That set has consistently included increased student fees, privatization, reduced public support for ancillary activities (for example, housing) and a generally diminished government role. Prominent as well have been calls for limits on repetition, more relevant curricula (usually understood to mean more science and less humanities) and greater sensitivity to labour market expectations and changes.

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16 Moura Castro points out that from its inception The World Bank has been a governments' bank, or rather '… a credit cooperative of countries.’ That is, it is structured to enable its less affluent members to borrow at about the same rates as its more prosperous members, who effectively dominate its policies and personnel. It is the reputation and creditworthiness of its affluent members that permit The World Bank to borrow at the lowest global rates; that capital can then be lent to the poorer members, who face severe sanctions if they fail to repay (de Moura Castro, 2002).
Third, theory and method often have a life of their own. Human capital theory and rate of return analysis provided the rationale for The World Bank to lend to education. With that theory and method education became not just a service activity, but a productive sector. Even as that occurred, both the theory and especially the method and findings were challenged within as well as outside The World Bank. Still, the method prevailed, and it was used to justify some initiatives and block others. In practice it has often carried more leverage than broad goals and objectives, than requests and proposals from a particular country, or than action plans emanating from The World Bank itself. Once the method was accepted, it limited the manoeuvring room of even its proponents.

Fourth, learning remains a lower priority, both as an objective and as an outcome measure. Logically, learning should be the ultimate focus and determinant of education support programs. In practice however, learning is often at best dimly perceived in World Bank projects. In part this reflects the dominance of economists and finance experts, who commonly find learning a frustratingly elusive concept. Thus three metaphors predominate in World Bank writing about education: investment (for which the tools of investment banking are appropriate), production (with efficiency as the principal focus) and delivery systems (with attention to the nature and characteristics of service provision). All three relegate learning to a subordinate, dependent role or ignore it entirely. In part, this orientation reflects the difficulties in quantifying learning. In part, learning’s lower priority is a manifestation of the tension between a bank’s preference for precision and certainty and the fact that learning is locally contingent and continually renegotiated; from this perspective learning is the ultimate floating currency, whose convertible value cannot be reliably predicted for any place at any moment. And in part, learning’s status in The World Bank is a function of its centre of gravity. Foreign aid relies on a diagnostic metaphor: the aid provider is the expert medical practitioner, who examines the ‘ill patient’ (the country seeking assistance), reviews the symptoms, diagnoses the malady, prescribes the remedy, and then monitors the course of treatment. As the ‘doctor’, the funding agency is detached from the development terrain within the country; aid is what the provider does to and for the recipient. But learning is what the learner does. It cannot be transferred, or provided, or delivered. To pursue the image, where learning is the active process, the doctor does not heal patients but rather supports the patients’ own immune and
curative systems. For that to occur the ‘doctor’/aid provider cannot rely entirely on its own understanding or fixed rules, but must instead be exquisitely sensitive to the patients’ needs, assessments, capacities and commitments. Notwithstanding occasional rhetoric about listening better and listening more, The World Bank has consistently seen itself as the pacesetter, not the follower.

Recent World Bank statements seem to indicate an increasing concern with education quality. In part that is a response to the objective situation of many (perhaps most) schools in Africa, where too many students, too few materials and under-prepared teachers combine to limit learning. In part, that is a defensive look forward: when ‘universal primary education’ (UPE) has been widely achieved and poverty persists, the claimed cause will have to shift from lack of schooling to low-quality schooling. The challenges here are indeed dramatic, as education experts everywhere argue about how to improve learning, consensus is occasional and ephemeral and it certainly cannot provide unequivocal guidance for a bank’s loan program. But the larger problem here is conceptual; The World Bank prefers a ‘black box’ model, with attention to inputs and outputs and relative inattention to the process that links them. That inattention to the learning process becomes in itself an obstacle to improving quality. Seeking broadly applicable patterns, commonly termed ‘best practices’, is a further obstacle since to be effective education must be continually modified to suit unique and local circumstances. In sum and more frequent references to quality notwithstanding, the learning process remains a lower priority concern for The World Bank.

Fifth, growth and equality are understood as objectives in tension. A recurring theme of many World Bank analyses and recommendations is that countries must choose between growth and equality; each is seen as an obstacle to the other. Periodically influential are the theoretical arguments that economic growth requires inequality (the core argument has to do with individual incentives to invest and re-invest), and that the pursuit of equality is the privilege of prosperity.17 Since the tension

17 It is important to note that many World Bank documents equate equality, which has to do with sameness or non-differentiation, with equity, which has to do with fairness or justice. That is problematic, since achieving one may at least temporarily undermine the other. Egalitarian rules may be a fundamental characteristic of an equitable society, but achieving that equity may require shorter- or longer-term differential treatment. Affirmative action is one example.
between growth and equality is assumed to be fundamental, the counter argument – that both inequality and injustice hinder growth and that therefore growth and equality should be understood as complementary, not in tension – receives little empirical or policy attention.

Sixth, the market is assumed to be the most efficient and fairest allocator of values. In its many forms, the privatization campaign has been a core component of World Bank policy from its creation; for education, its prominence has increased. For higher education, the focus has been on fees and institutions: more of the responsibility for paying for education should be transferred from the public treasury to students and their families. Within higher education there should be at least a partial market for services and support, with clear rewards for those units that generate higher revenue. More broadly, private providers of higher education are to be encouraged and perhaps supported, directly or indirectly, with public resources. Those higher education institutions that fare poorly in a market environment should be closed, or incorporated into other institutions. Less noticed but equally dramatic has been the transition from nearly entirely public to substantially private supply of education materials. Vendors of the new technology, both hardware and software, are private and often foreign.

The reasons for privatization are varied but linked, and relate to both macro-economic and micro-economic concerns. They include:

- The rise of neo-liberalism globally, which calls for a reduction in the size and activities of the State on grounds of equity and efficiency.
- Fiscal constraints of governments due to economic and political crisis.
- Loss of faith in universities as institutions in service of the public good.

Note that ‘cost-recovery’ obscures the extent to which the poor in Africa already pay most of the cost of higher education. In more affluent countries, the public treasury depends heavily on individual and corporate income taxes. For most African countries, the principal sources of national income are not income taxes but levies on major exports, commonly subtracted from the fees paid to producers. Hence it is the coffee, tea and cocoa farmers (or the copper and gold miners) whose labour pays for higher education. To suggest that their children receive free education is to mystify the national economy and to confuse the producers about their own role, and therefore about what it is reasonable to expect from society.
Increasing importance of the Education for All agenda, which favours spending on basic education over higher education, and thus requires private resources if higher education is to expand.

Increased emphasis on the private benefits of higher education, which leads to a push for higher individual payments on equity grounds. And,

A proliferation of studies showing higher private and social rates of returns to primary education, which were then used to argue for reallocation of funds from higher to primary education on grounds of both equity and efficiency.

Seventh, the public sphere and State role in higher education require redefinition. Consistent with the market notion, education and education services should be understood as commodities, with market-set value and prices, as contrasted with public goods whose value and share of resources are set through a publicly accessible process of policy setting and implementation. The government must limit its role to ‘market enabler’ and ‘monitor of market imperfections’, for example with regard to incomplete information or restrictions on the flow of capital. While the government should not be an advocate for class or other interests, or a principal decision-maker for the common good, it can reasonably seek to provide a safety net for the most disadvantaged.

PATHWAYS OF INFLUENCE
Let us return to The World Bank’s influence and how it works. Notwithstanding the important transitions in The World Bank’s orientation toward education, there have been significant continuities in its education policy including increased student fees, privatization, reduced public support for non-academic activities and a generally diminished government role. How has the Bank sought to make that agenda the agenda for the development of education in Africa?

In the 1960s The World Bank insisted on the importance of post-primary education. Many African countries, including Tanzania, relied on that advice in developing their education plans. In that case, The

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19 The World Bank’s current documents explicitly characterize higher education as a global public good that governments should support. Recent contributions to the debate about the public role in higher education in Africa include Mkandawire, 1997; Jonathan, 2001; and Singh, 2001.
World Bank’s influence was quite direct. Years later The World Bank changed its mind and methodology, and assigned highest priority to basic education.²⁰ So too did many countries in Africa, indeed around the world. Causality? In part, surely. But not everywhere, and often not direct; Tanzania provides a useful example. It was Julius Nyerere and TANU, not The World Bank, who rejected the ‘manpower planning’ orthodoxy in favour of basic education. In that setting and in others influenced by Nyerere’s notion of education for self-reliance, The World Bank followed, not led. Only occasionally is a simple linear causality between World Bank pronouncement and African practice tenable. More common is what has been termed a ‘funnel of causation’, in which major and minor influences that tend in the same direction become mutually reinforcing and ultimately lead to a common outcome. That funnel helps to focus attention beyond the fact and extent of influence, to its process.

As we have seen and on closer examination, World Bank policies emerge from a tangled mix of ideas, experiences, research, powerful individuals and shifting alliances. Similarly and up close, World Bank education lending and conditionality are buffeted and shaped by political currents inside and outside the institution. Every project, every loan, every interaction is a local tale with infinite details, all seemingly significant. Yet there are broad patterns, and they do matter. It is for that reason that the authors have adopted the funnel metaphor. At the wide end of the funnel are the debates, discussions, coalitions and power brokers: educators, politicians, evaluators, researchers, specialists of all sorts, community organizations, students, parents and others may all be active. As the funnel narrows, the specific setting shapes the interactions. In different settings arguments and negotiations about, say, the priority assigned to teacher education or the role of decentralized management, may take different forms and reach different conclusions. Outcomes are, in that sense, conjuncture. But they occur within the confines of the funnel itself, which represents the values, assumptions, and understandings of The World Bank’s global role and the world’s political economy. Diverging currents, churning confrontations and

²⁰ Note that there is strong evidence of renewed interest in secondary education. That reflects both a more holistic approach to the education sector, and more focused attention on the increased demand for secondary education that is one of the consequences of increased primary enrolment.
Local particularities manifest a striking commonality. What flows through the narrow end of the funnel is surprisingly homogeneous.

How do external and internal pressures intersect? Patterns of influence have been varied and have evolved with changing global and local circumstances. Outsiders, from The World Bank to former colonial powers and other governments, to philanthropic foundations, have long had a strong sense of how education in Africa should function. With a similarly strong sense of how instruction and research should be organized in African universities, they have regularly sought to shape departments, faculties, and institutes according to their vision. Simultaneously there have been local visions and initiatives. The two spheres overlap. Educated and socialized overseas, African decision-makers, educators and academic staff brought home not only new skills and understandings but also strong views on the appropriate mission (intellectual and developmental), domain (academic and political) and methodology (instruction and research) for higher education in Africa. With a few exceptions, both local circumstances and external funding agencies have been inhospitable to the most radical higher education voices.

Foreign aid in general and institutional cooperation in particular has tended to reinforce particular perspectives and orientations and thereby strengthen their advocates and disparage and devalue others. The authors are not suggesting that all external influence is problematic, or that external ideas and preferences are invariably implemented faithfully and uncritically. African universities have innovated and insisted on their own direction, and overseas institutions acknowledge learning from Africa. It does seem clear that from their creation modern higher education institutions in Africa have been strongly influenced, both directly and indirectly, by intellectual and political currents from abroad, and that their organization and orientation reflect the internalization and local articulation of particular ideas about what should be their mission and focus. It also seems clear that there is little evidence of Mazrui’s notion of ‘counter-penetration’ – powerful African influences in the overseas institutions that educate and employ Africans, or in the funding agencies for which they consult.21

Bearing in mind that outcomes reflect the interaction of foreign pressures and local circumstances, let us explore briefly the prominent pathways of influence.

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21 See Mazrui, 1975.
DIRECT ADVICE AND CONDITIONS

World Bank influence can be explicit and direct, both in advice and recommendations and embedded in the conditions required for the provision of funds. While The World Bank has always provided advice with its funding, in recent years it has insisted ever more forcefully that its development expertise is even more important than its loans. In large and small ways, The World Bank instructs loan recipients on what they should and should not do, when and how. Those instructions may come from The World Bank’s President or other senior officials, from mid-level managers or from young staff who have barely completed their own education. The resources associated with those instructions make them loud and forceful, however they are articulated. The fact that The World Bank increasingly acts as the lead funding agency, or on behalf of other funding agencies, makes its messages even more compelling. That The World Bank is a primary designer of aid forms and modalities also enables it to set the rules that govern the aid process more generally. In this way even as it insists that it is not imposing its will, The World Bank seeks to achieve its objectives by specifying those rules in ways that require certain behaviours and preclude others.

The World Bank also exercises influence through its extensive reports and publications. Loans are enmeshed in a web of reports, from early studies to pre-appraisals, to sector analyses, to public expenditure reviews, to implementation and management reports, to narrower and broader evaluations and more. Embedded in nearly all of those reports (there are occasional exceptions) is The World Bank agenda of the moment. While their specific purposes and foci vary, those reports specify what is to be done, what has been done and what is yet to be done. African countries and education ministries put their loan eligibility at risk when they ignore or reject the findings and recommendations of those reports.

Historically, the authors of many of those reports have been non-Africans deemed to have relevant expertise. Increasingly and in part in response to persistent critiques on this score, the World Bank has involved African researchers and evaluators in its analytical efforts. Recognizing this transition helps us to understand that the nationality of the report author is far less consequential than the origins of the approaches and methodologies employed. African economists of education who employ rate of return analysis uncritically reach the
same conclusions and make the same recommendations as their non-African counterparts. Rate of return analysis, however, was developed in particular settings outside of Africa and may or may not yield the same insights in African settings. More importantly, rate of return analysis may be an inappropriate tool for assessing the relative value of alternative decisions about priorities and the use of resources in education. In this example The World Bank’s influence is incorporated in analytic tools, and does not depend on the nationality of those who use the tools. Indeed, the tool and the consequences of its use gain credibility and legitimacy when they are cloaked in African cloth.

Beyond its loan-related reports and associated studies, The World Bank’s massive publications program directly enhances its influence. The World Bank’s annual *World Development Report* has become a standard reference for nearly everyone, including many of those who decry the assumptions, values and orientation written into it. World Bank studies, analyses, reviews and policy guides address all major development domains. They too are widely regarded as reliable points of reference, even though it is often difficult to cross-check their findings. Generally readable and well presented, World Bank major publications frequently do not cite their sources or rely nearly entirely on research undertaken or commissioned by The World Bank itself. Colourful boxed inserts provide vignettes and examples that should be treated as illustrative, but that are commonly regarded as demonstrative or confirming. Far too often what emerge are assertions presented as facts, which are accepted as such largely because The World Bank says they are.

Also, The World Bank exercises direct influence through its certifying role. How are aid providers to determine whether or not a country is making progress along an agreed trajectory, or implementing the activities for which it has received foreign support, or fulfilling its commitments to modify spending patterns, decentralize authority or democratize political competition? Often, other funding agencies tie their own support to the satisfaction of expectations and conditions set by The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Consequently where The World Bank or IMF has not certified that actions are appropriate or that progress is adequate, all aid stops. Even countries that prefer to seek assistance from other sources – for example Tanzania in the late 1970s and early 1980s – find all funds blocked until they have satisfied World Bank and IMF terms.
Conditionality, too, must be understood as a mode of direct influence. In their initial form conditionalities had to do with increasing the likelihood of loan repayment, which in turn required increasing the likelihood of success in the activities financed by the loan. More recently, conditionalities have become a major component of policy-based lending. If the goal is to encourage particular behaviours, then attaching conditions to loans is a major way to achieve that. As noted earlier, structural and sectoral adjustment loans carry explicit requirements, both at the macroeconomic level and within the education sector. The World Bank and other funding agencies stoutly defend the conditions they impose, not only in terms of the requisites of development but also to achieve desired social goals. The authors see here a manifestation of the expanding role of The World Bank. Initially, imposed conditions were intended to assure loan repayment and defended in those terms. Over time, providing development advice became both a purpose and a rationale for direct influence.

Girls’ education is a clear example. For many years girls’ education was a barely visible or a low-priority objective in African education strategies and plans. By the 1990s no policy paper, proposal or project could ignore it. The World Bank and others simply insisted. Even more, they presented themselves as more active and more effective defenders of the disadvantaged than Africa’s governments and organizations. ‘How do you get girls educated in the Sahel, except through conditionality?’ The World Bank’s Vice President for Africa asked.22

Note here both the delicate dance The World Bank must perform as it sets loan conditions and enters tacit negotiations about them with recipient governments. Formally, The World Bank must lend to and negotiate with governments. At the same time, The World Bank believes that it knows better than those governments what their countries need, and that it is more effective than those governments in advancing the interests of the poor, women, ethnic minorities and other disadvantaged groups. From that perspective it is reasonable for The World Bank to impose conditions with which governments must comply. Yet those very governments must agree to the conditions. Hence the fan dances with obscuring veils and feathers: even as it insists they change their behaviour, The World Bank insists that its conditions reflect African governments’ preferences and decisions.

Sometimes, though probably less often than The World Bank claims, the governments themselves find the conditions reasonable but unpalatable to strong local political interests. From that perspective too it is reasonable for The World Bank to impose conditions, since it is helping the government to do what must be done but for which the latter cannot appear to be taking the initiative. The government can blame The World Bank for unpopular action and claim credit for beneficial results.

Yet although powerful and influential, The World Bank is not omnipotent. African governments do ignore or reject World Bank instructions, at the risk of reduced funding not only from The World Bank but from other agencies as well. As in the discussion of higher education conditions in Kenya and Ghana, African governments can create manoeuvring room and decide not to implement World Bank instructions without necessarily becoming ineligible for future funding. To understand World Bank influence, one must explore how it is mediated and negotiated.

**INDIRECT CONDITIONS**

While they may be intrusive and onerous, direct conditions are visible. Where funding is conditional on, say, the commitment of a specified percentage of education spending to basic education, or on the privatization of textbook production and distribution, all involved can see and address whatever is expected; the conditions may be regarded as unpleasant and unreasonable, but they are apparent and can be confronted directly. Far less visible, and therefore often more insidious and powerful, are indirect conditions that may be imposed and monitored in several ways. Among them are the conditions embedded in the administration and management of the aid relationship.

The expanded terrain of the analysis and planning required to support a funding request provides a clear example. For many years The World Bank has required what it terms ‘education sector work’ as part of the preparation for a project proposal or loan application. The concept is straightforward. To assess the proposal for a specific activity, whether physical facilities or the learning process, as the lender The World Bank wants to be sure that what is proposed has a reasonable prospect of achieving its objectives and thus contributing to the income-generation necessary to repay the loan. Education sector
studies, historically undertaken by expatriate-led teams with brief, intense field work, addressed those and related issues, intended both to provide the foundation for the loan proposal and to strengthen its preparation.  

As critics pointed to the external orientation of those studies, to their reliance on expatriate researchers and to their distance from national education planning and management, The World Bank increasingly employed African researchers and presented results in government-led forums. At the same time, however, a different set of pressures both entrenched the external orientation of education sector studies and made them more onerous for African governments. First, The World Bank and other funding agencies began to shift their focus away from discrete projects and toward sector-wide support; that necessarily broadened the scope and often intrusiveness of their preparatory studies. Second, The World Bank's overarching attention to poverty leads it to insist that education be understood as part of a broader anti-poverty strategy. The required studies and other preparatory documents must therefore address not only the education sector but the entire national development strategy. Ironically, the criticism that the education sector work required by The World Bank was not well-integrated into national education planning and management has fostered the expectation that in order to receive funding, the countries must themselves produce studies and plans in a form and manner acceptable to The World Bank. Currently, the most visible and imposing of those documents are the Comprehensive Development Framework and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). PRSPs have been adopted by The World Bank and the IMF and following their lead, by other funding and technical assistance agencies, as the major framework for development cooperation. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers will be broadly endorsed by the

23 For a critical review of education sector studies in Africa in the early 1990s, see Samoff and Assié-Lumumba, 1996; and Samoff, 1999b.

24 The literature on this claimed transition is expanding rapidly. For a start, see Buchert, 2002; Samoff, 2004; and their references. The transition may be less dramatic and less thorough than is often claimed. A recently completed study confirms both increased sector-wide support and the persistence and utility of the project orientation: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2003).
Bank and Fund’s Boards as the basis of concessional assistance from the two institutions.25

The World Bank has enormous influence over the shape and pace of countries’ policies and reforms in its own right, but also through its production of the economic analysis on which other creditors and donors rely to make decisions.26 If the PRS process were a government-led process, why would the Bank and Fund send numerous missions to the country to develop the PRS? Why would the Bank develop a 1,000-page ‘sourcebook’ to tell developing country groups how to create a PRS?27 Effectively, the approach and major tenets of structural and sectoral adjustment – a broad development agenda commonly characterized as neo-liberal and as the ‘Washington Consensus’ – have now had their lives extended in the form of PRSP development and approval: PRSPs provide a rationale for broadened external intervention. Poverty reduction is a widely shared goal, and the process of developing a national poverty reduction strategy can permit greater transparency and wider participation in debating national policies. In practice, however, that process can also broaden, extend and legitimize external influence and can deflect and defuse the critiques of community groups even as it positions them as co-sponsors of its outcomes. Many more people can board the ‘aid train’. They can speak forcefully and loudly about where it should go. They may even sit in the driver’s seat. They may determine its speed and fuel economy. The national government and community organizations are ‘responsible’ for what happens. But they are proceeding along tracks whose directions and technical specifications have been set elsewhere.

26 See Wilks and Lefrançois, 2002: 11. Though the country discussed is Indonesia, the comment is equally relevant for Africa, where few countries have Indonesia’s size or presence in the global economy.
Ostensibly the products of national deliberations and analysis, the CDF, PRSP, and related documents are heavily shaped by the explicit and implicit expectations of the external agencies and by the national interpretations of those expectations. That extends not only to the content of the planning and analytical documents but also, and more importantly, to their assumptions, constructs and tools. For example, to accept uncritically that rate of return analysis is the preferred tool for setting education priorities, or that student attrition should be addressed in terms of the efficiency of schooling, or that attention to the gendered character of power and authority in society is inappropriate in an education planning document is to exclude from discussion without debate vital issues of education policy. A political perspective that is embedded in the selection of analytic tools and the organization of research and planning documents thereby becomes a condition of receiving funding. Internalized, institutionalized and often not fully recognized, that condition is all the more powerful for its near invisibility. PRSPs from wildly divergent countries reveal great universality in vocabulary, process, form, content and even prescription. With some exceptions, PRSPs provide a good deal of evidence of the macro still driving the national, the global driving the local, the rational driving the practical, the technical driving the political and economic.\(^\text{28}\)

The point here is not that it is undesirable to base decisions on extensive data collection and careful analysis; of course not. Well-grounded decisions are certainly to be preferred. Rather, what is important here is that the extent, form and frequency of required education sector work overwhelm African capacities and come to rely on external staff, and that when they are embedded in education sector work, assumptions, preferences and conditions are both difficult to discern and sharply constraining.

**INFLUENCE ON OTHER FUNDING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGENCIES**

A third pathway of World Bank influence is through other funding and technical assistance agencies. The international and national

providers of financial and technical support are numerous and diverse. Each defines its own role and agenda; each is responsible to its own governing body or national government; none can keep up with The World Bank. That was not always the case. Earlier, The World Bank credited UNESCO for the recognition of the importance of basic education; now, The World Bank has explicitly and implicitly assumed some of the roles of UNESCO and other agencies. Across Africa The World Bank’s professional capacity exceeds that of most other agencies, though the situation varies from country to country. Even though it may not be the largest aid provider in a particular country, The World Bank’s macroeconomic leverage is unparalleled: it sets the pace and largely controls the form of education sector work. Not infrequently, it oversees the provision and use of other agencies’ funds. Its energetic development of CDF, PRSP and related holistic strategies effectively make The World Bank the primary point of reference for how to organize and manage development assistance.

Recent years have seen increased efforts to coordinate foreign aid. In many African countries a committee or working group of funding and technical assistance agencies meets periodically to share information, address divergent expectations and practices and speak with a single voice to the national government. Commonly, The World Bank’s own voice carries great weight in those settings and its message shapes or becomes the common message. That is especially true of higher education since most other agencies, in part following the World Bank’s lead, have shifted their attention to basic education.

Periodically The World Bank has created new organizations to strengthen this pathway of influence. A clear example is the Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA), originally named Donors to African Education (DAE). Initiated and centred at The World Bank, which provided its rationale, organizational priorities and structure, and secretariat, DAE brought together funding and technical assistance agencies involved in education in Africa. Increasing its influence and effectiveness and assuring its legitimacy required the involvement of Africa’s education ministers; that has taken a momentum of its own. Over time, the organization has strengthened ministers’ roles and African participation in working group activities, relocated its secretariat to the UNESCO International
ADEA is also a useful example for understanding the complexities of influence. While its origins are clear, currently ADEA is not solely or perhaps even primarily a vehicle for promoting World Bank ideas. Its working groups maintain a good deal of autonomy, often reflecting the interests and expectations of their own lead agencies and other participants and periodically spawning or supporting still other organizations with their own agendas (for example, the Forum for African Women Educationalists). Its biennial meetings permit active, sometimes acerbic, exchange between agencies and governments in a relatively informal setting. African education ministers use ADEA to forge their own common messages and deliver them to funding and technical assistance agencies; at the same time having moved beyond its origins and acquired greater legitimacy, ADEA remains an important vehicle for transmitting and reinforcing ideas and practices with roots in Washington.

ADEA may also have played an unintended role within The World Bank. Precisely at the moment when its basic education message was most forceful, The World Bank assumed formal leadership of ADEA’s (then DAE’s) Working Group on Higher Education (WGHE), funded by the Ford Foundation. In practice, that increased the visibility of higher education in Africa inside The World Bank. As the WGHE focused heavily on commissioning research and publications on higher education in Africa (more than 25 to date), it spoke a language well understood and difficult to ignore within The World Bank. Here, too, there is no linear causality; but it seems reasonable to infer that the WGHE, the child of a World Bank effort to influence others, has contributed to the continuity of attention and lending to African higher education in a context of unsupportive institutional policy and in the face of strong objections.

NEW PARTICIPANTS IN THE EDUCATION POLICY PROCESS

Aid dependence has fostered another pathway of influence: Africa has seen a wide range of strategies for generating, debating, and adopting national education goals and programs. In many settings presidential
initiatives, national commissions, *États-Généraux*, stakeholder forums and other approaches have fostered vigorous debate about directions, priorities and practices. Education policy is perhaps always a morass of conflicting interests and alternative orientations. Yet the process matters. Who has participated? Which ideas have been considered, and which discarded without examination? Whose interests are reflected? Aid dependence has brought two new participants to the African education policy table.

External agencies and The World Bank in particular have become direct participants in national policy-making. Although it is careful to defer formally to the national government, in practice The World Bank regularly makes clear what it regards as good and bad education policy, and that the adoption of what it regards as poor policies will limit the availability of funds. It is of course not unreasonable for The World Bank to make decisions about what it will or will not support and to communicate its preferences to African governments. What has changed, however, is that aid dependence has effectively made The World Bank an insider in those discussions. In part, that participation in policy debates is formal and direct. In part, The World Bank sows the seeds through its contacts with and support for key individuals, or by funding the preparation of policy briefs. As those seeds germinate, they bloom in national colours.

Like most external support, World Bank loans are to governments, not directly to education institutions or the education sector. As such they are commonly administered by the finance ministry, which thereby also secures a seat at the policy table. Along this pathway, The World Bank’s messages are presented in education policy debates by the national finance ministry. Thus, as reliance on foreign funds increases, so does the influence of both the finance ministry and external agencies. Representing the government in negotiations with those agencies, the finance ministry tends to become much more directly involved in policy and programmatic details across all government departments. That increased role may suit the external agencies well. Concerned as they are with reducing government spending, those agencies are likely to see the finance ministry as their ally in contrast with ministries of, say, health or education, whose general mandate requires them to be more concerned with spending than with saving. The alliance between external agency and finance (and perhaps planning) ministry may be structured as a powerful lever for influencing national policy.
As this occurs, the concerns, orientations and priorities of the funding agencies are internalized in the policy process, both in the analyses and diagnoses and in the recommendations that shape the policy itself. As the distinction between insider and outsider blurs, the homogenization of perspective and the adoption of ‘universal verities’, ostensibly with sound research support, proceed apace.

The World Bank distinctly prefers a rational-technical orientation to policy-making, with unambiguous policy directions, systematic planning and orderly implementation, all supported by applied research. Education itself, however, is more process than product. A rational-technical orientation to education policy disdains the interactive and participatory policy-making that is necessarily clumsier, muddier and slower. As they work in an aid-dependent setting, often without being fully aware of the transition, African educators and decision-makers discard education as a vehicle for national liberation, for reducing inequality and for constructing a new society – in favour of education as upgraded facilities, more textbooks, better-trained teachers and improved test scores.

**SPECIFICATION OF CONSTRUCTS AND ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS**

External support to higher education in Africa is increasingly associated with research in several important ways, and the ironies are painful. Even as African universities are less able to support sustained research programs, research on education has become one of the major forms of influence on education in Africa:31 The World Bank and other funding and technical assistance agencies have become research entrepreneurs. As noted earlier, education sector work – studies required as part of the project approval process and more recently for broader, sectoral support – continues to be an important though less visible component of the aid relationship. Formally intended to inform and guide, education sector studies in practice often serve to justify and legitimize. Ostensibly technical and functional, they carry values, assumptions, analytical frameworks and constructs, and are thus another pathway of influence. The specific examples are too numerous to be detailed here. Important issues of education policy, like the circumstances in which repetition is educationally desirable, are treated as matters

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31 The authors draw here on Samoff, 2003; 1999a; 1999b.
of efficiency. The egalitarian objectives of residential education are obscured by narrow notions of cost and benefit. The terminology can be particularly obfuscating, as increased fees become ‘cost recovery’.

It is important to recall here that The World Bank is an extensive, seemingly indefatigable publisher. Its documents are of all sorts, from small reports on individual projects to major studies of sectors and countries, to analyses of aid and its consequences, to periodic reports on the state of the world. Formerly, many of The World Bank’s documents remained confidential, available only to its staff and a small circle of others. More recently, more of its publications are broadly circulated, many now instantly accessible on its massive website. Effectively, The World Bank has become a global point of reference for the major issues in which it is involved. Even resource-starved African university libraries and bare-shelved bookshops may have an ample supply of World Bank publications. Like many dimensions of The World Bank, this role has a dual edge: on the one hand, it is desirable that World Bank analyses, policies and recommendations be widely available. It is especially helpful to be able to trace thinking from initial drafts and preliminary papers to final documents. On the other hand, the very profusion of documents and their authoritative character makes The World Bank the centre and focus of discussion and often the term-setter, manager and arbiter of the discussion itself. The World Bank is not, however, a neutral discussion organizer, but rather an institution with a strong agenda. Notwithstanding the plethora of publications, those mixed roles do not assure transparency or accountability, or even equitable access to a debate in which the issues are fully aired and critics have effective air time.

The near invisibility of this path of influence renders it particularly powerful. The World Bank controls a desired good that is highly sought by African educators. To release funds, it commissions research. While African researchers are increasingly involved in those studies, the research bears the strong imprint of those who have commissioned it. Their assumptions, understandings and expectations are embedded in the framing questions and the detailed terms of reference. This combination of funding and research constitutes a financial-intellectual complex that is difficult to challenge or deflect.32 The World Bank, and to a lesser extent other funding agencies, need no longer announce

imperiously what is to be done. Rather, they attach their funding to strategies and programs based on those research findings they regard as relevant and solid. Notwithstanding the efforts of some researchers to adopt a critical posture, the commissioned research presents a strikingly coherent and self-reinforcing picture. What might be controversial becomes unexceptional as it is incorporated into frameworks and ostensibly technical questions, with no explicit or direct link to the source of the constructs or their ideological content: some questions simply never get asked. External support guides education policy in part by shaping the research that is policy’s justification.

CROSS-NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT ASSESSMENTS

Yet another pathway might be termed ‘influence by examination’. Coincident with funding agencies’ increasing attention to ‘quality’ and ‘outcomes’ has been an expansion in efforts to compare learning achievement across national borders. The common strategy relies on standardized tests, more or less modified to suit local conditions, to assess competence in specific subjects among generally comparable groups of students in different countries. Results often catch public attention, appearing as newspaper headlines that proclaim the improvement or decline of education in a particular country. Assessments of this sort may provide useful information on education approaches and strategies and their implementation in diverse settings; the challenges, however, are enormous. There are major differences in understandings of what education is to accomplish, and how to measure that. The tests used necessarily embed some of those understandings and discard others. Critics charge that international comparative analysis is generally insensitive to the importance of local variations and their consequences, both in explaining test results and in comparing outcomes. For those who understand effective learning as interactive and therefore necessarily local, the problems of cross-national testing are structural and can never be satisfactorily resolved.

Like tests everywhere, cross-national assessments incorporate curricular understandings and can shape teachers’ behaviour. Commonly, and especially when they regard themselves as under-prepared, teachers teach to the test. Indeed, some reformers use modifying national examinations to change education practice. In this role cross-national assessments become another pathway for external influence, including that of The World Bank. Although there are some African initiatives
on this subject, the principal impetus and locus of control are external to Africa. With greater or lesser African participation, and always proclaiming the universality of their approach, outsiders specify what are reasonable learning objectives for Africa, how to measure them, how to interpret the measures and what to do when the scores are low.

**INFLUENCE BY INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE**

By the 1970s The World Bank had already begun to argue the importance of basic education in Africa. The challenge for The World Bank’s education advocates was to show that education is a productive sector – and thus an appropriate focus of lending – and not simply a service. After all, The World Bank had earlier argued that education was a luxury to be enjoyed only after expanded production generated the revenue to fund it. The theoretical lever was human capital theory. Spending on education could be understood as an investment in future productive capacity, like investment in new technology and equipment. But the education sector is broad, with many claimants for resources. Rate of return analysis, it was argued, showed clearly that investments in basic education yielded better societal results.

The World Bank has championed both the method and the message for over two decades. The late 1980s saw the effort to make that message a global campaign, leading to the 1990 Education for All conference, followed by a 1995 mid-term conference in Jordan, and the follow-up 2000 World Education Forum in Senegal. With major international support (The World Bank was one of four sponsoring organizations), a substantial commitment from the national funding agencies and some engagement by education NGOs, the 1990 Conference and follow-up activities became another important pathway of influence. Ultimately and notwithstanding what its leaders or educators might say privately, no country wanted to be the lone naysayer arguing for an alternative perspective or different priorities. If the major players were putting their money on basic education, those seeking funds clearly had to do likewise. Not only the broad

33 See Naudet, 1999.

34 It is important to note that criticisms of this use of rate of return analysis were made inside as well as outside The World Bank. For the use of rate of return analysis to reach the opposite conclusion – in Kenya, secondary, not primary, education has the higher rate of return – see Knight and Sabot, 1990. For a more general critique, see Bennell, 1996.
basic education message, but also interpretations and implementation, were communicated and given official sanction through the conference process. Education for All was to focus on expanding access, primarily to formal schools. Though mentioned, pre-school and adult education were clearly lower priorities. So too were equity and quality issues, though girls’ education achieved some prominence.

Critics quickly raised these and other concerns, with an even louder voice in the 2000 conference. The evidence suggests, however, that the original framework has proved quite durable, even though the funding agencies have apparently not provided the resources needed to achieve agreed goals. The implementation strategies associated with these international conferences further entrenched particular understandings and approaches. For the 2000 conference, countries were required to report on their progress toward EFA goals using an outline that specified the topics to be addressed and data to be included. Following that conference an even more elaborate monitoring process also specified the constructs and categories that were to be used to report on and talk about EFA.

International conferences have many purposes, some accomplished more readily than others. These conferences take many forms, some more accessible to community and non-official participants than others; they may or may not have influence beyond their participants, or even beyond the few days that they meet. But conferences do provide opportunities for debate and disagreement and for challenging those who organize them; sometimes conferences take on a life and momentum of their own. What is important for this discussion is to recognize the extent to which The World Bank has used the international education conferences for developing and communicating a particular message about basic education and for pressing national governments and organizations of all sorts to modify their behaviour in accord with that message. Equally important is to recognize the ways in which the major message, along with its values and assumptions, are all embedded in the procedures of the conferences and their follow-up.

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36 See the World Education Forum website, http://www2.unesco.org/wef/. For the detailed guidelines on the preparation of national EFA country plans of action, see www.unesco.org/education/efa/country_info/country_guidelines.shtml. For the EFA observatory, which is to develop standardized indicators, see www.unesco.org/education/efa/monitoring/efa_observatory.shtml.
Once again, the ostensibly technical is in practice strongly ideological and fiercely political.

At a smaller scale the same pattern is discernible in seminars, colloquia and task forces. The deep agenda may be more about how to approach issues than about the issues themselves or their consequences; participants return home with a thesaurus and a toolkit. The former influences how they understand their own education sector, for example student attrition becomes ‘dropout’, which in turn becomes ‘wastage’, obscuring the many social, economic, educational and other pressures that push students out of school in favour of a notion of individual failure to continue. The ‘toolkit’ includes a spanner for tightening some connections and loosening others, but generally not a wire cutter or acetylene torch for severing links entirely. Study tours can play a similar role. The World Bank identifies settings where its recommendations have been effectively implemented, and then brings others to see. World Bank staff members are quick to note that study tours of that sort are far more influential than even the most carefully documented study, cogently presented analysis, or coherent policy recommendations.

RECRUITMENT OF AFRICAN PROFESSIONALS

In this review of pathways of influence, the authors have been especially concerned with what is not obvious, particularly routes and vehicles that are less visible and the ways in which values and ideas are institutionalized and internalized. Another such pathway of influence is through the recruitment of African professionals.

For its work in and on Africa, The World Bank has relied heavily on non-Africans, including professional staff and longer and shorter-term consultants. At the same time, its multinational personnel have increasingly included Africans in senior positions. Especially as it has expanded its poverty focus and its work on education and as it has been challenged to be less Washington-centred, The World Bank has assiduously sought to hire Africans and other ‘Third World’ professionals at various levels. In itself, that is not problematic. Indeed, many see that as a positive development, with benefits for the individuals employed and the countries where they work both during and after their World Bank employment, and with at least some prospect that they will have some influence inside the institution. There are individual stories that support all of those expectations. Still, the authors would be remiss not to note another dimension of this process.
The World Bank is a particularly powerful socializing institution that is generally more resilient, more persistent and more penetrating than its individual employees. Irrespective of their politics, African professionals recruited to work at The World Bank, whether as interns or temporary or permanent employees, often carry with them to Africa particular assumptions, frameworks and expectations that are (more or less consciously) influenced by World Bank policy and that in turn influence behaviour in Africa. The authors refer not to these professionals’ motives or intentions or ethics, but rather to analytical orientations – core ideas not only about what makes a good education system but even more important, how to study and assess an education system – that inform their observations, findings and recommendations. First-person accounts of World Bank employment are replete with references to how things must be stated or presented to secure approval from managers and eventually the Board of Governors.

Ultimately, The World Bank remains a bank, managed largely by people with expertise and experience in economics and finance. Access to funding requires requests and rationales to be formulated according to these standards, which effectively structure the education and development discourse. Humanist notions of the intrinsic value of education and educators’ support for child-centred learning are simply never as persuasive as detailed cost-benefit and rate of return analyses in securing authorization for an education sector loan. To reiterate, the authors are concerned here not with the intentions or goodwill or morality of World Bank staff, but rather with the direct but often much more subtle ways in which the institution shapes their ideas and their approaches. That also occurs through advanced education programs, in which young scholars adopt ideas, perspectives, frameworks and research methods that then shape what they do when they return home; for some this includes, eventually, national education policy and practice. Once again, the pathways of influence are indirect, difficult to discern, and in this case, particularly delicate to challenge.

Recruiting African professionals also brings legitimacy to The World Bank’s agenda, even when their work is formulaic, unimaginative and insubstantial. One example will suffice. In 1990 The World Bank published a series of discussion papers that sought to provide a comparative overview of education reform efforts in eastern and southern Africa. Eight case studies (Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Swaziland,
Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe) were complemented by a brief general overview by the series editor and a literature review.\textsuperscript{37} Individually, notwithstanding the experience and competence of their authors, the eight case studies say little that is new, oversimplify complex issues of policy and practice, confuse policy pronouncements with actual behaviour, employ constructs and categories uncritically and do not substantiate their findings. The process of embedding influence in approach is particularly clear in these papers. All manifest the assertion of the positivist faith: studies not principally concerned with testing hypotheses, indeed all other approaches to knowledge and understanding, are fundamentally flawed. The conjunction of funding and research becomes the vehicle for imposing orthodoxy.

Thus one approach to knowledge is characterized as social science itself. Detached from its context and shorn of its ideology, the scientific method is transformed into an atheoretical straight-jacket. Positivist proselytizing parades as injunctions for good research, and only ‘good research’ should guide the allocation of funds and the specification of activities to be supported. For whom was the above series produced? Informed readers surely found the case studies superficial; readers with little background on African education found the jargon frustrating and confusing; policy-makers were not likely to find these papers much more useful. Other sources provided clearer, concise summaries and more substantial analyses. Nearly all of the authors had published more insightful, better-supported and documented and more rigorous and stimulating analyses elsewhere. Yet reading these papers does prove instructive; they reflect The World Bank’s willingness to accept insubstantial work from competent ‘Third World’ scholars, and its effort to institutionalize a particular set of understandings and constructs in research on education. While those constructs do not significantly enrich these papers, it is their uncritical acceptance that is striking. Within the accepted terminology are embedded particular conceptualizations, conceptions, orientations, prejudices and policy preferences. That discourse that structuring terminology treats as part of the environment – what is ‘given’ and therefore does not require explicit justification and is not subjected to critical attention – contains important issues that ought to be the focus of policy discussion. Also, that terminology obscures important issues and thereby far too frequently misdirects the

\textsuperscript{37} The series editor’s overview was by George Psacharopoulos (1990).
search for understanding. The quasi-official status of these constructs, in a setting where the same agency oversees both funding and research, effectively diverts attention from and often precludes consideration of alternatives that warrant serious exploration, systematic elaboration and critical evaluation.

The series of publications highlights two consequences of this pathway of influence. First, the use of the constructs, frameworks and terminology was clearly deemed more important than the substantive content of the studies. Second, the fact that African scholars were the messengers rendered more legitimate both the message and its originating institution.

CONTINUITIES OF DEPENDENCE

Let us summarize. The authors set out to explore the consequences for Africa of World Bank higher education policies, and have charted the evolution of World Bank policy, both formally stated and less formally presented. At each stage, they found a discernible corresponding change in Africa. The Bank’s focus on manpower planning was associated in Africa with emphasis on human resource development as the university’s mission and with a narrowly defined notion of relevance. The World Bank’s emphasis on basic education was apparently associated in Africa with the reallocation of resources and sharp constraints on the higher education budget. The World Bank’s reiterated recommendations for privatization have been associated in Africa with student fees, rapid expansion of private institutions, and in a few places, fundamental institutional transformations. Structural adjustment reinforced all three of those. Continuous World Bank challenges may have been associated with re-thinking, perhaps re-defining the notion of the ‘public’ role of education and higher education. The World Bank’s more recent focus on the ‘Knowledge Era’ has been associated in Africa with computerization, expanded attention to science and technology, and in a few settings, an increased role in curriculum and pedagogy for information technology.38

38 Though not primarily a higher education issue, with World Bank support vocational and vocationalized education were at one time development priorities in Africa, declining in status and allocations after they were discredited and rejected by The World Bank in the mid-1980s. Only now are they beginning to recover from that downgrading.
Thus, the authors find strong World Bank influence. At the same time, all of those changes had clear local roots or responded to significant local interests. Manpower planning made great sense to new leaderships in de-colonized Africa; Nyerere led, not followed, The World Bank on shifting the focus to basic education, though not because of rate of return analysis; narrow notions of relevance are attractive to governments inclined to see intellectuals as threats, to blame the threats on poets and philosophers (rather than mathematicians and chemists) and to attribute unemployment to what schools and universities are or are not doing; privatization is an attractive solution to governments that face increasing demand with stretched or declining resources; increased information technology use seems not only modern, but also a lower-cost way of meeting particular needs, especially if financed externally. Rarely are observed outcomes the direct result of The World Bank's imposition of unambiguous requirements on unwilling African countries.

Within the World Bank, policy directions are debated and challenged. While sometimes a strong leader or manager can prevail, more often decisions rest on alliances and coalitions that may themselves be fragile and fluid. While experience and evidence matter – no policy can prevail without a strong claim of research support – only in special cases are they definitive. Experience and evidence are always interpreted, organized, presented and mediated, and thus are part of alliance construction rather than outside it. That The World Bank's organizational imperative is to lend money assigns great authority to those who manage loans; periodically they reject, ignore, or redefine explicit policy statements. At other times they seek to exercise control over institutional policy-making in order to reduce the gap between formal policy statements and lending practice.

In this regard, let us consider the evolution of World Bank higher education policy through the lens of alliances and coalitions. In the 1960s World Bank orthodoxy regarded education (and social services in general) as non-productive and therefore a limited focus for government spending and an inappropriate focus for World Bank lending. Justifying the change with human capital ideology, The World Bank subsequently decided that education made a direct contribution to production and therefore was a legitimate focus for lending. During the structural adjustment era, The World Bank was criticized for insisting on reductions in spending on social services and direct fees for
social services. That reflected primarily a neo-liberal understanding of development (the ‘Washington Consensus’), namely that it be achieved through trade liberalization, privatization and economic deregulation. Let us recall here that the countries that were the focus of structural adjustment were deemed too poor to meet their current obligations, too poor to invest in new and expanded production and too poorly informed and managed to know how to change things.

At the same time, in part because of the critics and in part because of internal voices who insisted that maintaining social services was essential for expanding production, The World Bank established a Social Dimensions of Adjustment program intended to protect basic social services from the harshest consequences of structural adjustment. Hence structural adjustment intensified the tension between understanding education as a service whose costs can be met only after production and productivity have increased, and the alternative notion that education contributes to production. By the late 1990s, the Wolfensohn-era emphasis on poverty tilted the balance toward the view that education and other social services contribute to production and therefore that spending on education is necessary for economic growth. Consequently, the new vehicle for organizing and managing aid – poverty reduction strategies and poverty reduction strategy papers – required significant attention to education and provided an opening for education groups to advocate education support.

Ironically, a new challenge to support for education and other social services emerges from among World Bank critics, who effectively join with the earlier World Bank dominant view in arguing that since ending poverty requires expanded production and productivity, these must have the highest priority.39 ‘That this view is articulated forcefully

39 In the words of one group of critics, ‘The [Poverty Reduction] Strategy privileges allocations to social sector spending (primary health and education) at the expense of the longer-term structural issues like factor productivity, employment, the viability of small-holder agricultural and agro-industrial linkages. The Government’s responsibility for promoting economic transformation is largely restricted to budgetary instruments for the management of aid-sponsored public expenditure … while improving the access of all citizens to adequate education and health facilities is a medium-term goal of the highest priority, in the absence of substantial actions to improve factor productivity and create jobs social sector spending alone cannot safeguard against the negative economic and political consequences of a growing debt burden.’ (Gould, Ojanen and McGee, 2003: 7-8)
by World Bank critics highlights the importance of similar arguments within The World Bank, whose policies reflect divergent perspectives and shifting alliances, shift between stronger and weaker support for education, especially higher education, and periodically are not entirely consistent with the World Bank’s own lending. Much as its policies are politically mediated within The World Bank itself, its instructions and conditions are politically mediated in the interactions between lender and borrower. World Bank staff members are highly motivated to lend; unsuccessful projects are often preferable to no projects at all. Consequently and notwithstanding their faith in their own vision and strategies for achieving them, World Bank staff must modify expectations and conditions to make them acceptable to the prospective borrowers. Here, too, we find shifting alliances and fragile coalitions. Ultimately, even where higher education activities in Africa are heavily dependent on World Bank lending, the content and trajectory of those activities reflect both external pressures and national politics.

From a different perspective, the authors have found direct influence and much more often, complex interactions with multiple pathways for indirect influence. They also found striking convergences on perspective and preferred action, reflecting at least in part the internalization of assumptions and understandings that are themselves a major mode of influence. They also found strong local rationales for limiting African universities’ autonomy and activities and narrowing their mission. In practice, those are often mutually reinforcing currents. To explore the nature of this convergence, its specific mechanisms and practices, and the relative balance between external, internal and internalized factors we need much more detailed study at the local level, which for the most part has not yet been done.

The modern history of African universities began with dependence, formally institutionalized in the links between European universities and subordinate institutions in Africa. External support has been significant throughout their history, combining the rhetoric of development, closing the gap, protecting national initiatives, capacity-building and empowerment with the practice of continued dependence. That dependence seemed to lessen in the energy and excitement of the immediate post-colonial era, as dynamic debates within higher education were increasingly Africa-oriented and Africa-focused and decreasingly driven by the disciplines and discourses of overseas counterparts. Though they were listening to and watching the
flow of events overseas, African academics were less often following and accommodating. Just as economic and financial crisis threatened national development plans and constrained national courses of action, so too it reinforced external orientation within higher education. As structural adjustment became the order of the day, universities too found that access to (rapidly declining) funds was dependent on reorganizing in accord with externally set priorities and agendas.

Co-existing with and periodically undermining intellectual independence, intellectual dependence is maintained in several ways. At the broadest level, the global system of academic recognition – especially publication, invitations to professional seminars and conferences, and research grants – is controlled outside Africa. At a very deep level, external influences on the intellectual structure and priorities of African universities continue to be profound and often unrecognized: What constitutes high-quality social science research? What is the appropriate balance between curative and preventive medical education? What is the recognized corpus for comparative literature or music or poetry? To what extent should legal education focus on cooperatives or conflict resolution, or the social consequences of constitutions and laws?

In immediate and practical terms, external influences are once again directly visible in the increasing use of curricula developed and packaged overseas, for which the most recent but not sole examples are web-based units and modules. World Bank policy and practice play an important role in maintaining that external orientation. For Africa, The World Bank has become one of the major managers of the world system, including the integration of African countries into an economic order largely defined and governed outside the continent.

Like World Bank influence, history is not linear. Currently The World Bank and the IMF are both very powerful and much challenged. The Bretton Woods institutions pronounce on what is to be done and seek to enforce their pronouncements with their enormous economic leverage; as they pronounce, however, they are confronted. Protesters appear at their major meetings, apparently in increasingly large numbers; critiques and alternative analyses are forceful, strident and sometimes persuasive; several World Bank and IMF monitoring organizations have emerged. Just as the internet provides a vehicle for The World Bank to spread its message, it also enables the critics
to share information and communicate across national boundaries.\footnote{There is here, it would seem, potentially a powerful test of The World Bank’s (and others’) claims about the ‘Knowledge Era’. The World Bank is willing to commit major resources (its own and those secured from others) to develop its Internet presence, not only a Development Gateway with grand aspirations but many, more modest web pages that help to make The World Bank a first point of reference for people who seek information about education, health, agriculture, dams and more. With far less funding, a great deal of volunteered labour and dispersed focal points, a critical network also has an accessible Internet presence. Is the electronic era transformative? Can the poor substitute ‘bits for bucks’, at least in the effort to influence development thinking? Can the vitality of mass energy make lack of central coordination and direction an asset, and effectively challenge the vitality and authority of one of the contemporary world’s most powerful global institutions?} International conferences are challenged by inclusive parallel meetings and counter-summits.

These confrontations provide an exciting opportunity for higher education in Africa: to participate, perhaps even lead, the conceptualization of alternate futures and the analyses of how to get there. Seizing that opportunity will require imagination, insight, commitment to cooperation and a willingness to assume the risks required for innovation and critique. It will also require a political system for support and protection. To the extent that the opportunity is missed, we find a curious dance of the mutually dependent: The World Bank and African leaders each need the other to pursue their agenda. Where money, rather than mobilization, is the preferred currency, The World Bank retains the upper hand.

For more than two decades The World Bank advocated reduced allocations to higher education and thereby contributed to its dramatic decline. The World Bank’s advocacy has apparently shifted, and now asserts an essential developmental role for Africa’s universities; additional funding may be available for this revitalization. With those funds, however, come both direct conditions and indirect influences on the evolution of higher education and on African society more broadly. Ironically, Africa’s universities energetically seek those funds and thus become responsible for the internalization of their accompanying values, assumptions and precepts, entrenching their own and national dependence. Foreign aid in that form can be enabling, but not liberating.
REFERENCES


ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION: BETWEEN GLOBAL MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION

Carmen García Guadilla *

ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

The second half of the 20th Century is considered the most spectacular era of higher education expansion, particularly in the most developed countries. From 1960 to 1995 the number of graduates world-wide grew more than six times, from 13 million to 82 million (UNESCO, 1998). In the 1960s, expanding access to higher education held great relevance to the policy debate because of its social and political implications; in all regions of the world, enrolment rates spiralled upwards. Europe's 2.2 percent enrolment rate in the 1960s rose to almost 40 percent by the mid-1990s. The United States and Canada, from an enrolment rate of 7.2 percent, reached upwards of 80 percent in the same period. Similarly, in less advanced countries enrolment rates grew from 1.3 to around 7.8 percent, although a tremendous gap is still to be found between more and less developed countries. In Latin America, the corresponding levels grew from 1.6 percent in the 1960s to 18 percent in the 1990s (García Guadilla, 2000).

In some regions, private higher education played an important role in this trend. The proportion of private enrolments internationally is set out below in Table 1.

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Table 1. Scope of the private sector, worldwide

| Countries with large private sector enrolments (more than 50 percent of enrolments) | Japan; Philippines; South Korea; Bangladesh. In Latin America: Colombia; Brazil; Chile; Dominican Republic; El Salvador. |
| Countries with mid-sized private sector enrolments (25-50 percent of enrolments) | United States; Canada; Australia; New Zealand; India; some English-speaking African countries. In Latin America: Paraguay; Peru; Nicaragua; Venezuela; Guatemala; Mexico. |
| Countries with small private sector enrolments (less than 25 percent) | Most of Western Europe. In Latin America: Costa Rica; Ecuador; Argentina; Honduras. |
| Countries with incipient or non-existent private sectors (under 10 percent of enrolments) | China and almost all Eastern European countries. In Latin America: Bolivia; Panama; Uruguay; Cuba. |

Sources: Salmi and Alcalá, 1998; García Guadilla, 2002.

In his classic study on higher education access, Martin Trow (1974) aligned growth in enrolment rates with three different stages of development, which he identified as models of access:

- Elite access, where less than 15 percent of the age group is enrolled in a country’s higher education system.
- Mass access, where enrolment ranges from 15 to 35 percent.
- Universal access, where enrolment levels exceed 35 percent.

Today and on the basis of these criteria, developed countries have reached the ‘universal’ stage. However, given that the Knowledge Society places high value on education, the figure of 35 percent as the threshold for universal access would seem to fall short; many developed countries have doubled this percentage in the past few decades. Also, the concept of ‘access to higher education’ itself is being replaced by
that of ‘access to knowledge’ and, in the case of less developed countries, ‘access to significant social knowledge’ – ‘relevant’ knowledge. Against a background of globalization and knowledge management, of new mobility in both product and process, demand exists in all countries for yet higher levels of education. Broadening access to knowledge is a necessity for all countries, especially those with weak enrolment rates in higher education.

The Knowledge Society presents two dynamics: it demands higher levels of education, and it seems to endorse the possibility of their attainment through Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). Both dynamics are transforming access to information per se and thus also access to higher education. ICT are used to meet the new demand for access, both from traditional providers – established institutions are experimenting with various forms of distance education, generally in combination with teaching that requires physical presence – and from new providers who, though using mixed modes of delivery, operate much of their services through distance education. Among these new providers, three types can be identified.

- Corporate universities: as the name suggests, these belong to important industrial or commercial conglomerates that must continuously update the skills of their personnel.1 Some estimate that by the end of the present decade corporate universities will outnumber traditional universities, on the grounds that while the ‘corporate’ sector is growing, the ‘traditional’ is contracting.2 However, the learning modes of corporate universities draw heavily on distance teaching.

- The enterprise or ‘for profit’ model: as compared to private ‘traditional’ institutions, these establishments have little problem in admitting that they are driven more by profit than prestige. The power of ‘for profit’ models is to be found in their managers and users: in that

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1 Information taken from reports issued in 1999 states that corporate universities have grown from 400 in 1980 to 1,000 in 1999. This latter figure has doubled in the last 5 years.

2 High-profile corporate universities include corporations and brands such as Motorola, Toyota, General Electric, General Motors, Shell, Coca-Cola, Marlboro, McDonalds’ and American Express. These organizations expand their adult education provision by replacing capacity-building and training programs that were previously department-based. Apart from providing their employees with practical and management skills they also develop new norms, which supporters see as a bid to increase organizational competitiveness.
the application of knowledge is more important than its production. Phoenix University (based in Arizona, USA) is a clear example of this type of establishment.

- Virtual universities: in 2001, some 1,180 institutions were identified as offering courses and post-secondary programs via the Internet. In less than two decades, it has been suggested, the number of students learning via virtual education will exceed that learning through ‘traditional’ teaching that relies on physical presence (Rodríguez, 2003).

New providers and suppliers are evident in all regions of the world. In less developed countries in particular, new providers are emerging in various forms: foreign conglomerates who take over private national institutions; virtual universities; campuses, outposts and offices of foreign institutions; and local franchises of foreign institutions. Joint, linked programs between foreign institutions and their local counterparts have also proliferated, with mixed modalities in the type of providers and the relationship between public and private institutions.

NEW PROVIDERS AND SUPPLIERS FOR LATIN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION

New providers and suppliers are appearing in Latin America, in some cases working in a virtual mode as well as through branch campuses and franchises. A large number of link agreement programs are also represented in Table 2.3

Table 2 suggests an important number of foreign providers, operating through different modalities and with different forms of provision, which did not exist even a few years ago. Thus Europe has a higher number of establishments operating in the distance education mode,4 whereas with the United States institutions the system of branch campuses and franchising predominates. In the area of linkages and partnerships, both Europe and the United States stand at much the same level. As for the Agreements/partnership mode it is present in all countries, and especially in Latin America.

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3 The information provided in country reports (consulted in the preparation of Table 2) contains considerable discrepancies, and not all information relates to all headings. The data presented here should be suggestive of tendencies only, subject to revision.

4 This is not the case as far as enrolments are concerned.
Table 2. Foreign higher education institutions in Latin America, by region of origin and modus operandi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EUROPE</th>
<th>LAT. AM.</th>
<th>OTHERS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distance Education</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branch/ Franchising</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative Programs</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agreements</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>816</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Countries covered: Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela. In Central America: Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama)

Sources: Personal research, based upon country reports by Marquis, 2002; Peña Davidson et al., 2004; Zarur Miranda, 2002; González, 2004; Didou, 2002; Bravo Villa, 2004; Quintana, 2004; Llaque Ramos, 2004; Camarena, 2004; Brezzo, 2003; Jaramillo and De Lisio, 2004; and Estrada and Luna, 2004.

Foreign Distance Education Institutions

In the case of distance-teaching institutions and according to Table 2 above, Europe has a 53 percent market share, followed by the United States with 27 percent and Latin America with 19 percent. If we focus on the European presence, Spain is by far the largest; of the 54 European institutions reported in Latin America most are Spanish, except for the Open University (UK). The Spanish institutions include the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED), Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Universidad de Salamanca and Universidad Virtual de Barcelona. From the United States, universities represented include Phoenix University, Pacific Western, New York University, Harvard, Athabasca, Bircham, Atlantic International and Oracle University. Some have representative offices in host countries.

Phoenix University, a member of the Apollo Group (one of the major higher education investors worldwide along with the

5 Cuba and Brazil are not included. In the case of Cuba, there was no report. As for Brazil, though studied, the results were very uneven; this made it difficult to include them with the rest.

6 Considering that the student follows his/her learning process by enrolling personally, and in general through the Internet, it is difficult to identify the activities carried out by distance education institutions across countries.
Sylvan Group), offers information via the Internet and, according to Rodriguez (2004), recently initiated a series of projects to link up with countries like Brazil in conjunction with the Pitágoras Group. Together they are exploring options in Chile and Mexico. In Mexico, offices have already been opened in order to finalise the purchase of the Universidad Tecnológica de México. The latter is the third largest private establishment in the country, with some 35,000 students; the second largest, the Universidad del Valle de México, was acquired by the Sylvan Group. Latin American distance education institutions do not appear to have explored the region seriously, with the possible exception of the Instituto Tecnológico de Monterrey (private) which has developed a virtual campus network encompassing Bogotá, Guayaquil, Medellín, Panama, Lima and Quito, as well as ‘physical’ centres in Peru, Colombia, Chile, Honduras and Venezuela, and outside Latin America in Barcelona, Spain (Didou, 2002).

In Latin America distance education is in most cases provided by existing higher education institutions, and important developments are taking place. For instance, the Universidad de Quilmes (UVQ) in Argentina is a public university that receives technical support from the Universidad Oberta de Catalunya (UOC) in Spain. Since 1999 the latter has been developing a pioneer experiment in university education, based on the virtual mode, where the students follow their entire university programme through a virtual campus. Brazil is another instance, and features a virtual consortium of 69 public-sector universities to include postgraduate levels, extensions and continuing education.

**Branch Campuses, Franchises and Twinned Programs**

The most frequent arrangements in this category are branches of foreign institutions, and the United States has a dominant presence. Among the institutions present are Endicott College, Sylvan Learning Systems Inc., Nova Southeaster University, Columbus University, Florida State, Westbridge, Westhill, Pacific Wester and Jones University. Following the franchise pattern, Pacific Wester, with its campus in Honolulu, Hawaii, has offices in the Instituto Mexicano de Educación a Distancia (IMED) and others in Argentina. The programs available in Mexico...
address adult education and bachelor’s (licenciaturas), masters and doctoral degrees.

The North American company Sylvan Learning Systems Inc., one of the major investors in education worldwide, has penetrated the Latin American market and bought out (wholly or in part) such establishments as Universidad de las Américas in Chile and Ecuador8 (González, 2004), Universidad del Valle de México, Universidad Andrés Bello in Chile, the Foreign Language and Professional Studies Academy (Chile) and Universidad Iberoamericana in Costa Rica and Panama (Rodríguez, 2004). Total enrolments at all Sylvan institutions in Latin America are more than 80,000 students9 (Rodríguez, 2004: 33).

In some countries, foreign academic institutions maintain offices to promote their activities and sustain their agreements. In Chile, for instance, one could mention the University of California, Harvard, University of Heidelberg, the University of Michigan, Stanford, the State University of New York, Tufts and the University of Wisconsin. Chile does not allow foreign universities to open campuses, hence the former are constituted as legal entities under international ownership. Among these is the SEK University, an organization founded in Spain and which provides a range of courses from primary through tertiary levels. SEK University also has outreach activities in Guatemala, Panama, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, and ‘physical’ universities in Ecuador, Chile and Spain (González, 2004).

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8 In the year 2000 Sylvan bought 60 percent of Campus Mater S.A., a Chilean group who were the original proprietors and founders of the University of the Americas. The academic side of the university remained in Chilean hands, and no changes in personnel were made. The University has around 17,500 students. In 2003 Sylvan extended its base in Chile by associating itself with the Universidad Nacional Andrés Bello, a private autonomous establishment, and ‘acquired’ some 14,000 additional students for about US$ 62 million (González, 2004).

9 As a business group, the Sylvan consortium is basically profit-making; any other purpose (or activity) is subject to the same objective. Recently, Sylvan posted a sustained, gross sales growth of between 10 and 25 percent. In the medium term up to 2010, Sylvan plans further acquisitions, a total enrolment of 200,000 students and an average income in the region of US$ 1 billion per year; this would place the consortium as the largest trans-national provider of higher education in the world (Rodríguez, 2004b: 33).
Alliances, Partners and Linked Programs

In this category while some providers may be new, others are established mainstream providers experimenting with new delivery systems. The highest proportion of alliances is Spanish and also North American. Amongst the major Spanish universities for instance are Universidad de Salamanca, Universidad Politécnica de Valencia, Universidad de Barcelona, Universidad de Sevilla, Universidad Complutense de Madrid and Instituto Empresa. Among the North American institutions are Columbia University, University of Florida, Nova Southeaster, UC Berkeley, Pittsburgh University etc. In all cases there is a wide geographic spread, which suggests that the institutions do not necessarily overlap. In Latin America, Cuban institutions also maintain a significant presence in the region; these include the Instituto Superior Politécnico José Antonio Echeverría and the Centro Nacional de Perfeccionamiento.

In Chile the most outstanding institutions are Universidad de Chile, Universidad de las Américas and Universidad Técnica Federico Sta. María, among others. Institutions with a regional commitment are also to be found in Latin America, such as Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, FLACSO, CLACSO, INCAE and Escuela Agrícola Panameicana, Asociación Universitaria Iberoamericana de Postgrado and Universidad Latinoamericana del Caribe. Many of these institutions are overhauling their communications and cooperation strategies dealing with the countries that are part of their outreach.

The development of linkages or alliances takes different forms. In most cases no new providers are involved, but new forms of provision are derived by existing players. For instance, in Mexico the author notes comparatively more link programs between public institutions; in Argentina, linkages are more often created between private institutions. Both countries also feature links between public and private sector establishments (García Guadilla, Didou and Marquis, 2002).

Inter-institutional agreements continue to be the most frequent form of international cooperation. This procedure represents the

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10 Latin American Faculty of Social Sciences.
11 Latin American Council of Social Sciences.
12 INCAE was founded in 1964 by the governments of the Central American nations under the supervision of Harvard Business School. It is a private, non-profit, multinational higher education institution devoted to teaching and research in the fields of business and economics. It trains and teaches, from an international perspective, individuals being groomed for top management positions in Latin America.
traditional pattern for academic internationalization, and remains the most common practice in Latin America in academic matters. This holds true regarding countries in the same region, and those outside of it such as Spain and the United States.

**New Providers’ Fees**

Little public information or research on new providers’ fees exists, however it is possible to point out some basic patterns. In four cases from Bolivia, enrolment costs were under US$ 1,000; in four others, they ranged from US$ 1,000 to 3,000; seven others charged between US$ 5,000 and 10,000; and one, over US$ 10,000. Nonetheless most of the institutions (20) charged between US$ 3,000 and 5,000. Such costs appear to be lower than those of the most important private universities: the tuition fees for a Master’s degree in the Universidad Católica Bolivariana, for instance, amount to US$ 9,000, well beyond those of the Fundación Iberoamericana (US$ 5,000); the latter is lower still if a scholarship is made available, in which case the cost drops to US$ 1,400 (Peña Davidson *et al.*, 2004: 48).

Further information on fees and costs is as follows. Atlantic International University: between US$ 4,200 and 5,200, depending on the type of degree; UNED (Spain): the cost for the diplomatic corps lies only between US$ 50 and 154; INTEC, Monterrey: between US$ 930 and 2,070, also depending on the type of degree; Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile: US$ 25,000 for a Master’s degree, including books, airfares, lodging and weekly out-of-pocket expenses; for the Grupo Santillana (Spain), enrolment fees are from US$ 3,500 to 6,500 for a Master’s degree; Columbus University charges between US$ 1,512 and 2,616, depending on the degree; University of Texas A&M: US$ 5,775 for Masters’ degrees (Estrada and Luna, 2004).

Much publicity material is published in Colombia on foreign distance learning programs. In 2003, 121 programs were on offer: 74 from the United States, 24 from Spain, and the rest from the United Kingdom, New Zealand, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, Argentina, Ireland, Australia and Panama. There are, furthermore, other institutions whose campus sites and country of origin are not yet identified. Among those who reported their fees were Madison University, between US$ 1,975 and 2,775 depending on the degree; Tecnológico de Monterrey: between US$ 943 and 3,100, depending on the type of degree; Phoenix University: US$ 440 per credit-hour to US$ 620 per credit-hour, also varying by degree (Zarur Miranda, 2004).
REGULATION, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND ACCREDITATION

For less developed countries, one of the main problems is vulnerability vis-à-vis ‘degree mills’ or institutions that grant diplomas with little indication as to their quality. Most Latin American countries developed national systems of evaluation and/or accreditation during the 1990s. Rarely however did they include mechanisms of regulation for foreign providers, and when they did the law has not always been applied. Argentina passed a resolution in 1998 regulating the provision of distance education; yet if a foreign university is not physically present in the country, and the service is conveyed purely over the Internet, the regulation does not apply (Marquis, 2002). Thus Argentine law can neither regulate, nor lay down conditions to ascertain, such an institution’s performance.

Brazil introduced a Resolution in 1997 stipulating that diplomas and postgraduate degrees obtained from courses delivered in Brazil by foreign institutions (through partial presence or at a distance) shall be neither validated nor recognized by any form or association of Brazilian institutions without proper authorization from the appropriate Public Authority. Yet the American World University did not consider the Resolution applicable to it on the grounds that it had no campus in Brazil but rather in the States of Iowa and Hawaii, USA. Its students, the University argued, were considered matriculates from AWU in the USA, and thus AWU was not obliged to comply with Brazilian legislation (Marquis, 2002).

As above, Brazil is one of the Latin America countries adopting a reasonably rigorous attitude to preserving the quality of its postgraduate courses. The Ministry of Education, via its Internet page, provides undergraduates with information about recognized institutions while CAPES\(^1\) does the same for its own postgraduate courses. Despite these efforts the Brazilian Ministry of Education estimates that some 4,000 students are currently enrolled in non-authorized courses. Furthermore in April 2001, the National Council for Education and the Chamber of Higher Education demanded that postgraduate courses provided on Brazilian soil by foreign institutions, whether directly or by agreement with national institutions, should cease admitting new students.\(^1\)

\(^1\) CAPES is the Agency in charge of coordinating post-graduate studies in Brazil.
\(^2\) Among them were one Cuban Institution, 10 Spanish, two French and two Portuguese. This measure only applied to irregular courses offered by foreign
addition, Brazil held in abeyance those agreements granting new scholarships to certain foreign institutions (Marquis, 2002). If effective in the short run, such responses are a very limited solution especially when dealing with procedures transcending national frontiers. It is in this regard that the provisions of international regulatory frameworks play a fundamental role in trans-national education, given the vulnerability of poorer countries to abuse by fraudulent institutions. Investigation by the United States General Accounting Office in 2002 suggested there were some 200 institutions in North America alone which fell into this latter category\(^\text{15}\) (General Accounting Office, 2002).

**ON MARKET TENDENCIES**

In parallel to the weight placed by new providers on marketizing forces, traditional market dynamics exist in the peripheral countries. The ‘consumption abroad’ tendency is one of these, and through it institutions in developed countries have reaped large economic benefits. The world market in higher education represents more than 3 percent of all commercial services! For several countries, educational services are among the five most important activities in the export sector (OECD, 2002). The United States, for one, benefits most; in 2000, incoming foreign students generated an income of US$ 10.29 billion, a sum greater than that assigned to the whole of public sector higher education throughout Latin America. According to the OECD (2002), the market for higher education in its Member States is worth some US$ 30 billion per year.

Over the past few decades less developed countries have played a consumer role in the world market, and this with a great deal of asymmetry. Indeed, none of the Latin American countries figure today among the 23 that attract large numbers of foreign students; foremost on this list are the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Australia.\(^\text{16}\) Those showing major growth in their specific

\(^{15}\) See the United States General Accounting Office 2002 letter on ‘Purchase of Degrees from Diploma Mills’.

\(^{16}\) In order of importance, the countries that today attract the greatest number of foreign students are: the USA, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, Japan, Belgium, Canada, Spain, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Turkey, The Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Hungary, Ireland, New Zealand, Poland, Finland, the Czech Republic, and South Korea.
internationalization policies include Australia, the UK and New Zealand (OECD-CERI, 2002). Independently of such internationalization, and through different modes and arrangements, negotiations are also under way within the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The WTO is the only international body to deal world-wide with rules regulating international trade,\(^{17}\) and the GATS favours the development of a world higher education market.

Since 1994 and in parallel to the GATS framework, Latin American States have been negotiating the Acuerdo de Libre Comercio de las Américas [Americas Free Trade Agreement] (ALCA).\(^{18}\) The agreements contained in the ALCA are related to GATS, inasmuch as negotiation over ALCA follow procedures agreed upon in GATS. The forms of higher education trade, following the approach in GATS or ALCA and qualified in the agreement as ’types of services’ include cross-border supply, consumption abroad, commercial presence and presence of natural persons. By 2002 32 countries had subscribed to the higher education dimension of GATS, including the majority of OECD members (25 countries out of 30) of which 12 from the European Union. In Latin America only Mexico and Panama have declared their intentions. Each country can determine the terms of access for foreign providers to its marketplace, and Mexico has opted for the ’commercial presence’ with foreign investments limited to

\(^{17}\) The GATS envisages 12 services, of which education is one. It establishes a series of commitments that apply to all members: \textit{A) Unconditional obligations:} the status of “Most Favoured country” (MFC) implies equal treatment of all partners. \textit{B) Conditional obligations:} the purpose is to protect national objectives. They apply only to those commitments that each country set out in its charter, which means that the degree and scope of the obligation is determined by each country. \textit{C) Market Access (MA):} each country determines the limitations of access to its market corresponding to each sector committed. \textit{D) National Treatment (NT)} implies similar treatment for all suppliers, national or foreign.

\(^{18}\) Rodríguez (2004) argues that as both agreements are under negotiation, it is probable that influences from one may affect the other. Thus negotiations in the context of the WTO would create frame conditions that shape the definitions deriving from the ALCA, and the former operates as a mechanism in support the different positions reached at the world level. Whatever the agreement reached, it would certainly be introduced as a section into the ALCA; and whatever is agreed upon in the area of services at a hemispheric level will complement and underpin the focus and substantive content of the GATS.
49 percent of the applying firm’s registered capital, and subject to authorization from the Ministry of Education.

Should these mercantile tendencies prevail, on an implacable market agenda the status of less developed countries could be one of great uncertainty. All trade agreements treat different countries as equals and disregard the vulnerability of many; it is not difficult to imagine that, for most less-developed countries, the disadvantages would greatly outweigh the advantages.

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONALIZATION

That the university has always been international is a widely-held belief which is not entirely accurate. When the Western university was founded in the Middle Ages, the movement of students and professors between institutions revolved around different geographical sites. They were not separated by national frontiers, for in those days the nation-state did not exist. The movements of students and teachers was ‘inter-territorial’, not ‘inter-national’ (Scott, 1998; Neave, 2001; Knight and de Wit, 1995). Universities of that time, such as Bologna, Paris, Oxford and Salamanca, were considered as a single body belonging to the same community and linked by the same religion (Christianity). Academic programs and examination systems followed the same broad model, with no major problems for the recognition of studies; this allowed wandering scholars to go from one university to another, at will and in keeping with their needs.

With the creation of the modern State in the years leading up to the 20th Century inter-territorial linkages shrank, particularly as new universities already had the task of dealing with ‘national’ issues. Furthermore, international ‘traffic’ during those times largely involved the export of European university models to the rest of the world. The first half of the 20th Century saw an increase in the mobility of scholars, particularly from Europe to the United States and in the aftermath of two World Wars. Only in the second half of that century was internationalization revived within the framework of Development, with cross-border movements of students from less developed countries towards the more developed ones – a movement from South to North. The last decade of the 20th Century featured a drive towards integration, within regions
and across sub-regions\textsuperscript{19} in addition to agreements reached between institutions. Paralleling this trend, the globalization of knowledge (Knight, 2003) emerged with fracas\textsuperscript{20} with it came a trend towards internationalization which underscored the financial or revenue-generating aspect of such dynamics. Over the past few years, the growing impact of globalization has taken greater relevance as an offshoot of internationalization: the latter plays a key role, as well as being the main vehicle through which academic institutions can come to grips with the impact of globalization (Scott, 1995; de Wit, 1998).\textsuperscript{21} Thus internationalization has moved from the periphery to the centre of attention in institutions of higher learning, but as it gains in importance it moves closer to becoming an enterprise, interwoven with market processes (Knight, 2004). To oppose these ‘monetary’ tendencies in internationalization, it is important to give weight to those options that advance cooperation, both regional and international.

**REGIONAL COOPERATION**

Some countries are organizing themselves in order to face up to ‘monetary’ internationalization, primarily through regionalization. Such an approach is seen by certain scholars as a ‘co-sharing’ of globalization, in that regionalization amounts to the trans-nationalization at the sub-global level of social arrangements and within adjacent areas (Beerkens, 2004). Central in this debate is the need to ensure that regional integration rests on the basis of multiple links and relationships that reflect national interest: in other words in which higher education sectors and institutions, although operating under national oversight,

\textsuperscript{19} In Latin America: MERCOSUR, TLCAN, UNAMAZ and CSUCA, among others. In the area of academic cooperation programs between Europe and Latin America, the ALFA and COLUMBUS programs come to mind.

\textsuperscript{20} Globalization is understood here in terms of flows in technology, knowledge, people, values and ideas that circulate across frontiers and affect each country differently in keeping with its history, traditions, cultures and priorities (Knight, 2003).

\textsuperscript{21} Several authors (De Wit, 1995; Scott, 1998) argue that though clear similarities exist between globalization and internationalization, they are in reality two different concepts. Internationalization depends on the existing nation-state and therefore tends to reproduce the hierarchy and hegemony within countries. Globalization is not attached to the past; it is a force that could be considered subversive, and may therefore raise new issues and agendas once one considers that different options are present within market scenarios.
may acquire further levels of autonomy and independence. In this connection and in Europe, two simultaneous processes are taking place: on one hand the globalization of knowledge, including the signing of the GATS by 12 members of the European Union; on the other, regional cooperation as expressed in the Lisbon Convention and the Bologna Declaration, and designed to create a European Higher Education Area by the year 2010\(^2\) (Beerkens, 2004: 37).

Regionalization could constitute a strategy by conferring extra weight on those initiatives that favour the development of links, alliances and agreements – and thus reinforce internationalization through cooperation. Regional integration may also be a way to gain power and influence within the academic dimension of globalization; in Latin America the Association of Universities of the Montevideo Group (Asociación de Universidades del Grupo Montevideo or AUGM) brings together Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and Chile and this sub-regional alignment studies shared problems in priority areas of social development, health, environment and cultural development. Finally, regional integration may also give agreements greater visibility across different regions. One thinks here of the European Higher Education Area – Latin America, and such initiatives as the European Union’s Programme of High-Level Scholarships for Latin America (ALFA).\(^2\)

**CONCLUSION: COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONALIZATION**

How to harness the positive side to the globalization of knowledge without undermining acceptable forms of competition? Internationalization by cooperation may prevail over internationalization by money-making, but it requires emphasis to be laid on sustainable and harmonious development so that ‘… the regulations are not subdued to the marketplace, but to society.’ If the strong drive towards the market, with its highly competitive character, is to be mastered, international cooperation, interactive globalization by mutual exchange and mutual

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2. The wide and dense network of linkages that emerged through cooperation and exchange has provided European universities with the need for coordination and communication and for external positioning. (Beerkens, 2004: 37)

advantage, with regulations focusing on educational agreements, will be required (Hayward, 2001). This scenario will also require closer accord between the public and private sectors. Many of the views and perceptions that once held sway no longer govern. Rigid dichotomies are rarely conducive to an understanding of the complex, unprecedented situation we face. To rise above dichotomies such as 'public-private', 'trans-national vs. national' etc. calls for new analytical concepts. This author has pointed out that linkages between national and foreign institutions are sometimes mixed, if not of a hybrid nature. Agreements can be cooperative or competition-oriented, regardless of whether the providing institution is private or public, national or trans-national.

Higher Education should continue to be a public good, dedicated to achieving a development that is sustainable and equitable, both between countries and within them. This is the scenario that is desirable for both developed and developing countries. For developing countries, their academic institutions would share in the globalization of knowledge, absorbing knowledge but also producing knowledge relevant to their societies. For the developed world it would also be a best-case scenario, on the basis that if cultures exclude, they lose; if include, they win. International systems of accreditation should align themselves with the criteria of cooperation, taking account of different countries' cultures and traditions (UNESCO, 2001).

At the international level, developing an agenda for globalization – intelligible, inclusive and with the goal of global democracy – is necessary. The value of higher education as a global public good should dwarf the current drive to marketize, not the other way around. Expeditiousness is needed, if only to avoid the imposition by default of undesirable options.

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24 'Those countries that are not able to achieve models that would guarantee quality of their higher educational system are destined to remain in the periphery, that is, outside the new global economic tendency.' (Hayward, 2001)

25 The need for trans-national agencies that can undertake quality assurance with a global scope has been identified by UNESCO in expert meetings such as the September 2001 seminar, 'The Impact of Globalization on Quality Assurance, Accreditation and the Recognition of Qualifications in Higher Education'.
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COMMENT: THE SONG, NOT THE SINGER

Guy Neave *

PREAMBLE

In any post-presentational comment, there are basically two ways of doing things. First, to comment on the particular interpretations contained therein. Or, to comment in what may be seen as a historiographical mode, namely to dwell less on what is said than on the light cast upon the field of study itself. In short one has the choice to pay attention – in this case, homage – to the Singer, or to take a wider view and attend to the Song, that is, to the state of the art. In this case the latter is the field of Access itself. How do perceptions and scholarship more generally mould, shape and hopefully advance our knowledge in this particular sub-domain of the study of higher education?

There are three constant dimensions in Access studies:

- The institutional perspective: What type of establishment provides higher education?
- The participatory perspective: Who is going, or not going, to higher education? And finally,
- The epistemological perspective: What is being learned and taught? What content and knowledge are purveyed?

A rarer sub-category of access is of course the access of different types of knowledge to formal institutions of higher learning.

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Dr. García Guadilla hones in on the first, that is, the institutional perspective. Her paper is essentially taken up with what, in the inimitable jargon of Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Schools, would be termed ‘Provision’: What is provided and on offer in terms of institutional variety and modes of delivery? The paper focuses on the expanding range and variety of institutions ‘coming onto the market’, and hers is effectively an account of the evolution of very particular structures in higher education, their spatial outreach, their location and the ties between their seating in one region and their operating location (very often) in another. This is a very special view, and one that is acknowledged in the title. We are treated to that sub-field within access, which deals with the burgeoning aspects of globalization and the rise of a global market for higher education services. Globalization or its more respectable twin, internationalization, stand at this moment at the centre of the hopes of some and the disquiet of many.

**IDEOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION**

One of the more pronounced features of globalization is its indissoluble ties with what is known here in France as ‘ultra-liberalism’ – essentially the unfettered right of those individuals who can afford it to buy and sell whatever they may, and to consume to their heart’s content or their pocket’s depth. If students – ever more diverse as the years pass – are lumped together as ‘consumers’, it is not surprising that the main interest of those able to consume is what is available for consumption. And, more to the point, how much they are going to have to pay for their appetites. Thus when studies focus on the spread of those vehicular forms and establishments of higher education, whether symbolic or real expressions of globalization, it is not surprising that the consumerist perspective takes the upper hand: What is newly available, and on what terms? Thus attention dwells on ‘new providers’, ‘alternative forms’ that are emerging on the higher education landscape.

**THREE DIMENSIONS IN ‘RE-CONTEXTUALIZATION’**

What causes their emergence and the underlying forces behind them, involves a quite massive exercise in ‘re-contextualization’ – to use a hideous neologism much cherished by certain schools of sociology. Re-contextualization brings a number of interesting features with it. Some of them are not greatly novel, either. Since the days of Pierre Abélard, ‘… pour qui fut châtré et puis moine Pierre Abélard à
Saint-Denys …’ as the medieval French wastrel François Villon reminds us, higher education has long been prey to the fashions of this world. *Amor scientiae* as against *amor pecuniae*, higher education as learning and the means of collective improvement versus higher education as training and source of profit for some is a very old theme. It is almost as ancient as the ‘international dimension’ itself.

There are other elements in the unwitting, and in some cases not so unwitting, process of re-contextualization. Technological determinism is one. In formulaic terms, internationalization can be boiled down to the proposition, ‘higher education equals learning plus information and communications technology’. This is not greatly different from another slogan that hailed from an earlier era, ‘communism equals the Soviets plus electricity’, which was Lenin’s way of harnessing historical inevitability to the service of what was then a new order in the making.

Another element in re-contextualization is more subtle. It involves concentrating attention wholly and exclusively on the progress achieved by new forms – whether entrepreneurial, lucrative, virtual, distance or franchise. The claim to progress, demand and success is of course not greatly difficult to make when such examples start from scratch. And it is a simple thing indeed to enhance the notion of inevitability by comparing time to growth rates – whether institutional forms, numbers enrolling (this is a rarer dimension) or the rising potential for money to be made, as against the situation in Year Zero. The statistics are always satisfyingly spectacular. And when projected forward in straight-line extrapolations over the next 10 to 20 years, they yield prospects of a speculative order that defy the imagination. But that does not mean that what is projected will come to pass, though it does allow hope to base itself on an apparently objective calculus. What we may learn from the recent history and experience of the enduring and unfashionable sector of higher education over the past 40 years or so is that extrapolations are fine for political mobilization, for the generation of instant enthusiasm and unseemly hype. What eventual reality they correspond to, however, is almost always coincidental.

**SELF-REFERRING STATEMENTS AND STRANGE OMISSIONS**

The other feature which the study of Access in the international higher education market brings with it is no less methodologically puzzling. That is its self-referring nature. What is not referred to, nor for that matter examined as a contrastive parallel, is what is happening on
the same criteria in main-line provision. This is a grave oversight from a methodological standpoint, and also leads to an impression that can only be qualified as disproportionate. And this is allied, so I believe, to the need to prove success or to strengthen the impression that established structures are either inadequate or not up to the task – on the basis that if they were, there would be no need for alternative forms. Absence of contrasting proportion is allied to another insidious and implicit assumption – insidious because implicit – that because the organizational forms and their technology are new, what they are doing and how they do it is exclusive to the virtual, the digital and the self-styled entrepreneurial.

THE ‘LEARNING UNIVERSITY’ IN A DIFFERENT LIGHT

This is not wholly true. Old, mainstream universities learn, and if the experiments of the ‘alternative providers’ have lasting benefit and impact, which has yet to be definitely proven, there is nothing on earth to prevent the old and established from overhauling themselves. Then, of course, the vexatious question rears its ugly head: Which of the providers, ancient or modern, does a better job? In this so far we remain very much in the dark. It is time we knew.

Dr. García Guadilla has given us a species of map, rather a medieval map, one without the vital relief or precise dimensionality of performance and quality which nowadays determine the fate of universities old and new. Strangely, there seems to be reluctance amongst the ‘new providers’ to submit themselves to the rigours of the national authorities in whose back yards they ply their trade. But in drawing this map for us Dr. García Guadilla has performed a useful first service. She has showed us what we need to do to make this map a true instrument for navigating the often tortuous channels between global market and international and regional cooperation. For this we owe her our gratitude.
PART TWO

FROM THE GROUND UP
LITERARY STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY NIGERIAN UNIVERSITIES: THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION

Gbemisola Aderemi Adeoti *

INTRODUCTION

By ‘literary studies’ is meant the discipline that deals with the literature, oral, written and performative, of different peoples and cultures across the world. As a branch of knowledge, literature is inherently bound with the history and culture of the people for whom it is primarily designed; it articulates the ideas, habits, traditions, hopes and aspirations of individuals and a people; it is used to persuade and mobilize a people toward a particular course of action. One of the aims of literature is, as Ogunba reminds us, ‘… to probe the fundamentals of our nature to the furthest reaches of our being and also to make available to the ordinary man, in a mode he understands, the great truths of our situation’ (Ogunba, 1979: 1). There is something inherently universal in literature which constitutes the raw material of literary studies. Consequently, we must approach literary studies from its cultural specificity to its trans-national, cross-cultural and even interdisciplinary dimension; hence the attention given to national and global dimensions of contemporary literary studies. Of primary interest in this article are the literary products of various cultures, made available in the English language and considered of import to the curriculum of Nigeria’s tertiary institutions.

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LITERARY STUDIES: A BEGINNING

In contemporary Nigeria the study of literature has experienced tremendous growth since 1948, when the first university was established at Ibadan as a college of the University of London. This growth is within the context of a university admission policy, adopted by the Federal Government of Nigeria since the 1980s, which privileges science and technology against the humanities at a ratio of 60:40. Here is a ‘minoritized’ discipline that maintains an appreciable development, largely in response to vital socio-cultural and historical stimuli. With the exception of specialized universities of technology and agriculture, 33 out of Nigeria’s current 49 universities offer courses that lead to the award of a Bachelor’s degree in literary studies; this represents about 67 percent. Of this number, about 23 are already awarding postgraduate degrees in the field.

At the inception of the University of Ibadan, literature was a vital component of scholarship in English and Classical Studies. The course also featured among foundational disciplines at the regional Universities of Ife, Nsukka and Zaria. Along with the Federal university based in Lagos, these universities were established shortly after Nigeria attained independence from British colonial rule in 1960 with a view to expanding access to higher education. The country was faced with the challenge of producing required manpower to fill the vacuum of expatriate staff that had left the country after independence. Even in the consideration of the founders of other, subsequent universities in the 1970s through 1990s, literature still found a place; this notwithstanding the gradual shift of emphasis from the humanistic disciplines to science and technology-oriented pursuits.

When it started, ‘literary arts’ were part of the colonial educational structure which had as its basic end the incorporation of Africans into the orbit of Western Civilization. Wole Ogundele succinctly captures the situation: ‘In the European colonization of Africa, commerce, Christianity and civilization were a three-legged relay in which Christianity was always either first or second baton (after commerce). Both combined to produce colonialism and the sum total of all three was the imposition of Western civilization on Africa’ (Ogundele, 1997: 67). In terms of content and focus, the curriculum was largely made up of European texts and authors. Admittedly, at the inception of tertiary education in Nigeria in the late 1940s authors of African origin had written few texts. But neither literature written in the indigenous...
African languages, nor traditional artistic practices, were considered significant enough to merit attention in a scholarly investigation of literary experience, presumed (when convenient) to be universal. Thus until the post-colonial agitation for artistic and cultural decolonization impacted on academia, African literature was like an inconceivable possibility, or at best a shocking novelty. It is not surprising then that the curriculum of literary studies in Nigeria, as in many parts of colonized Africa, was fashioned in the image of metropolitan derivation. Primary texts and authors studied, as well as the theoretical approaches adopted in textual interrogations, were largely Euro-American. Where the Continent featured as subject, its otherness is underscored; for example, Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness*, Shakespeare's *Othello* and *Tempest*, Sir H. Rider Haggard's *King Solomon's Mine*, etc. No indigenous poet had presumably emerged to match Thomas Wyatt, William Shakespeare, John Milton, Alexander Pope, William Blake or T.S. Eliot, among others.

The indigenous imagination was thought incapable of the epic compositions and rhetorical grandeur exhibited in *Beowulf* by the Anglo-Saxons, or of stories of arresting suspense and didacticism as exemplified in Chaucer's *Canterbury Tales*. In terms of drama, African ritual performances and festivals (the seedbeds of African drama) earned no place in the curriculum fashioned in the main and *ab initio* from the metropolitan centre. Thus, the historical trajectory of literary studies in Nigerian universities shows that it was part of what Mudimbe calls the ‘... all-embracing marginalization of Africa’, in a colonizing structure which rests on the triad of ‘... domination of physical space, reformation of native minds, and the integration of local economic histories into the Western perspective’ (Mudimbe, 1988: 2).

**CALLS FOR THE DE-WESTERNIZATION OF AFRICAN LITERATURE**

Nonetheless, the increasing call for a de-Westernization of African literature expressed at writers’ and literary scholars’ forums from Kampala to Dakar earned a measure of attention. Considered worthy of theoretical and critical exploration, African literature was no longer an ‘exotica’ for the exclusive delight of wondering anthropologists and ethnologists. The 1960s saw a gradual legitimation of African oral literature as a worthy subject of literary inquiry, and thus traditional rituals, festivals and indigenous poetic chants became subjects for
doctoral dissertations in existing universities. Of course, gathering data from fieldwork presented its own daunting problems: the researcher had to rely on tape recording and transcription, which could not adequately re-present the context of performance. Besides, the performance sites were usually in rural areas, lacking electricity, good transportation, accommodation and other basic amenities.

Apart from the significant interest shown in indigenous artistic traditions, by independence the nation had produced writers whose mastery of poetic, theatrical and narrative skills were acclaimed beyond Nigerian shores. They included Gabriel Okara (‘The Fishermen’s Invocation’, The Voice); Chinua Achebe (Things Fall Apart, Arrow of God, No Longer at Ease and A Man of the People); Wole Soyinka (A Dance of the Forests, The Strong Breed, The Lion and The Jewel, Kongi’s Harvest and The Road); and J.P. Clark (Ozidi, Song of A Goat, The Raft). Their works fused elements of the indigenous and Western literary traditions, and alongside palpable foreign influences are rituals, myths, legends, proverbs, sagas, ballads and other local artistic resources. These authors were also gradually finding a place in the curriculum, along with works from the European great traditions. The same development was witnessed in other parts of Africa, judging from the writings of James Ngugi (Kenya), Ayi Kwei Armah (Ghana), Sembène Ousmane (Senegal), Mongo Beti (Cameroon), Ezekiel Mphalele (South Africa) and so on.

Literary activities at the Department of English and the School of Drama [of the University of Ibadan] in the 1960s were such that they nurtured those who would later dominate the literary arts, both in academia and outside it, as teachers/scholars, critics and creative writers. One can cite in this regard John Munonye, Ken Saro Wiwa, Dapo Adelugba, Oyin Ogunba, Dan Izevbaye, Abiola Irele etc.

THE 1970s AND AFTER

There were tremendous developments in the sphere of literary studies in Nigeria after its Civil War of 1967 to 1970. Socio-political events in the country impacted on academia, and this was reflected in the tenor of its knowledge production. Literature, it can be argued, responds more readily to social stimuli; for instance the end of the war coincided with the oil boom, which spelled increasing prosperity for most middle class Nigerians. Apart from the existing four universities, more were established in Benin, Ilorin, Jos, Calabar, Port Harcourt, Sokoto and Kano. Later, in the 1980s, State governments established universities
to take care of their increasing need for tertiary education. This brought with it an enlargement of opportunities for literary studies, as many of the newer universities also provided courses leading to the award of a degree in the study of literature.

During that period, more writers emerged to join the earlier generation of writers: Niyi Osundare, Femi Ososinan, Kole Omotoso, Festus Iyayi, Ben Okri, Tess Onwueme etc., most of them scholars of literature based in universities. Also relevant to developments in the discipline is the role of multi-national publishing houses such as Oxford University Press, Heinemann, Evans and Macmillan, who discovered and made available those writers who were to enlarge the canonical possibilities of literary scholarship. By the 1970s new indigenous publishing houses sprang up alongside the multi-national ones, all of them hunting for new talents and manuscripts in order to stay in business. Among the former were Fourth Dimension, New Horn, Delta and Malthouse, to mention only a few.

EXPERIENCE IN THEORY AND CRITICISM

The realm of literary theory and criticism also exemplifies the epistemological dependence of African scholarship on Europe and America. The model critiques and theoretical approaches adopted in the scholarly discourse of literature were not necessarily products of any perceivable filiations with the indigenous creative cultural milieu. As a result of the multi-sidedness of the literary experience, there has generally been a consistent contestation of interpretive codes among various schools of literary theory, and the critical evaluation of African literature in academia likewise experienced this divergence of analytical methods. Critics had to contend with the epistemic binaries of oral/written, engaged/disengaged art, political/apolitical thought, universal/particularistic perspectives, significant/immanent notions of aesthetics and textual/extra-textual interpretation. On the basis of available evidence, three issues have engaged the attention of literature experts.

First is the proliferation of literary theories and critical approaches. Abiola Irele, in his essay, ‘Literary Criticism in the Nigerian Context’ has observed with palpable disquiet what he calls the ‘… profusion of theories, methods and approaches’:

Literary criticism has been moved beyond, in something of a forced march, into such diverse territories as psychoanalysis, Russian formalism, phenomenology,
structuralism and semiotics, and more recently, ‘deconstruction’. There is now such a proliferation of theories and of schools that the discipline can no longer be said to have a fixed centre of canons and procedures. (Irele, 1988: 94)

To this list one may add Marxism, feminism (in all its polemical mutations, whether radical, liberal or African), post-modernism and post-colonialism. Jeyifo’s remark in ‘Literary Theory and Theories of Decolonization’ is equally relevant in this regard:

Thus, properly speaking, in engaging literary theory, one should talk of theories and reinforce this pluralized enunciation with the image of a carnivalesque parade: Classical and Post-Marxist Marxisms; Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic schools; old and new historicisms; speech act, reader-response and semiotic textual theories; deconstruction and postmodernisms; French and Anglo-American, Western and non-Western feminisms etc., etc. (Jeyifo, 1993: 14)

The diversity of theories and theorists is not objectionable in itself. In fact, the natural dynamism of aesthetic experiences on the one hand, and the multi-sidedness of human nature on the other support such diversity. What some critics have often decried, however, is the domination of the art of theorizing by Euro-American sensibilities. For instance, Femi Osofisan in ‘Theatre and the Rites of Post-Negritude Remembering’ expresses disapproval of the West-centric conception of post-coloniality and post-modernity by certain critics. He argues that the conception informs a misreading of African texts, African writers and their missions. According to Osofisan, ‘… the postcolonial debate itself is inspired from the West with its firm control and manipulation of the technology of communication. Hence Africa, the postcolonial country itself, is marginal to the postcolonial debate.’ (Osofisan, 1999: 1)

THE PLACE OF AFRICAN WRITING IN THE DISCOURSE OF THEORIES

Arising out of this is the second burning issue in literary scholarship, namely the place of African writing in the discourse of theories: African literature has a marginal presence in the metropolitan pool of theories. Scholars who hold this view query the totalizing and universalizing tendencies of Western critical theorists and the consequent exclusion of the historical and cultural realities of Africa, especially when such
exclusion privileges the West – the putative epicentre of literary scholarship. As a remedy, such scholars favour the formulation of an African poetics or similar framework of analysis which, though not exclusively African, is sufficiently independent of Western formulations. That concern for example is expressed in the work of Chinweizu, Jemie and Madubuike (1980) among others.

The third issue in contention in literary discourse is the predilection of certain theories to stress the autonomy of literary creation, in a bid to emphasize the ‘literariness’ of literature. That implies an intense concentration on formal compositional patterns, structuring principles, diction and other signifying elements that are intrinsic to the text. It also implies the undermining of social, historical, cultural and other elements that lie beyond the text, even when that text is evidently shaped and conditioned by them. As Terry Eagleton remarks in *The Function of Criticism*, such critical approaches centre on a ‘… disengagement from any particular worldly engagement’ while denying the affinity of text with social landscape (Eagleton, 1984: 69). Russian formalism, the structuralism of Levi-Strauss and Saussaure, post-structuralism and semiotics, among other attempts to push the methods of literary criticism close to those of science, illustrate this tendency.

The exclusion of extra-textual materials from the scope of criticism was strongly affirmed in the late 1970s and culminated in the ‘deconstructionism’ of Derrida and Foucault. No doubt, it also contributed to the gleeful celebration of the ‘death of the author’ by the French philosopher and theorist Roland Barthes. The rallying point of all these was the canonization of textuality: the *modus operandi* of literary theory became to disregard what is considered social and historical context. Perhaps, the concept of *écriture*, especially its signification of writing as a self-referential and autonomous entity, provides the basis for the conclusion of Derrida about the ‘disappearance of the author’. The author’s activities in the production of text and meaning are undermined in the course of the critic’s intense concentration on the internal architectonics of the work, that is, on ‘signs’ and ‘difference’. The focus of critical evaluation in deconstruction therefore shifts from the author and sociological details, to the text itself in its purely isolated and personalized form. Reading is to free the text from the notion of ‘a centre or origin of recoverable meaning’ and the role of the critic in this context is to show how text resists interpretation.
THE VALUING OF THEORY AND DENIAL OF ENGAGEMENT

One crucial question inspired by the above exposition is this: What is the value of a literary theory that shuts out realities of daily life, politics, social productions and economic relations from its focus of attention? The answer is not difficult: a theoretical investigation of African literature that undermines or denies its socio-cultural and political engagement is flawed. The production and consumption processes of literature in Africa, whether pre-colonial or post-colonial, are inextricably linked with socio-historical and cultural conditions. Indeed, the social context that African writers explore in their works reflects a striking similarity with situations in ancient and contemporary Africa. In light of this, criticism needs to secure a balance between art and life, between literature and politics and between form and content; it must recognize the artwork as a significant record of social experience and as a careful structuring of creative elements.

The issue of critical standards for the evaluation of African literature, especially that written in foreign languages – English, French and Portuguese – is somewhat problematic. Should African literature be judged by the criteria produced in Western literary scholarship, or by a set of indigenous codes with due regard for the oral tradition and socio-historical particularities of Africa? The scholarly debate sparked between proponents of the former (universalists) and the latter (nationalists) in various attempts to address the question is much alive in the academy. The same goes for the autonomy of the text as championed by structuralists, deconstructionists and semioticians. Edgar Wright rightly sets the scene as follows: 'The first [question] is whether any general critical theory, e.g. a mythopoetic or Freudian approach, can work when applied to a culture that is totally distinct in its origins from the one that supplied the source material for the theory' (Wright, 1973: 8).

The ‘nationalist’ argument, laden with much suspicion of the hegemonic discourse of the West, is reinforced by the politics and aesthetics of Negritude. Though Negritude is never a prominent ideological choice among the Anglophone African countries, its celebration of Africa and its cultural values (among other tendencies) are shared by the Anglophone cultural elite from whom writers, critics and intellectuals are drawn. In summary, experience in theory and criticism in literary studies also reveals a contention of national consciousness and trans-national imperative. It is from the complimentary interactions
of these interests that literary studies would benefit most, hence the need to navigate the contours of the local and the global in search of a new direction.

**NEGOITIATING NATIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION**

As outlined earlier and from the beginning, literary studies in Nigeria is characterized by a tension between the national consciousness of educated Nigerians and the recognition of its operations within a trans-national context. The discipline still has the responsibility of contributing to the international pool of knowledge production, in order to be meaningful and relevant in an increasingly globalizing world order. Today the call for the ‘decolonization’ of literary studies has not been totally muffled, decades after independence. A direction that pays due attention to traditional literary practices, as well as written literature expressed in indigenous languages, continues to be advocated. Literature no doubt should contribute to the uplifting of a people, apart from ensuring the transmission of their cultural heritage. The crucial point is how to mediate the conflict between the decolonizing imperative of nationalism and the need for incorporation into a larger discursive space, as implied in globalization. There is also the unfinished quest for a theoretical/evaluative framework that is mindful of African cultural sensibilities. Quite as real now as it was in the 1960s is the yearning for an indigenous, integrated, creative praxis of consumption and criticism.

As expected, the tidal wave of globalization in the emerging new world order presents its own challenges. Globalization subsists on a blurring of differences and a collapse of traditional borders (geocultural as well as disciplinary). This in turn implies the promotion of multiculturalism and de-autochthonization, and literary studies, like any other discipline in contemporary Nigerian universities, is inescapably confronted with this reality. Hence just as it responds to the call for a nationally-conscious and inward-looking literary orientation, it should not close its doors against trans-cultural elements. Apart from opening up the global space for the free interaction of economic and socio-political forces, globalization also discourages cultural purity and nationalistic insistence and seeks to change the nature of knowledge production. There is of course a wide gap between this ideal and the current reality of inequality, a subject raised elsewhere (Adeoti, 2004).

Literary scholarship in Nigerian universities will be better off if given adequate access to those modern advancements of science
and technology which propel globalization. Such access will boost the production, consumption and scholarly investigation of written literature. The study of indigenous oral literature, which at the moment still ekes out a marginal existence in the curriculum of literary studies in universities, will also be enhanced. As an aside, the curriculum for a four-year Bachelor of Arts degree in Literature in English in most Nigerian universities was designed to fulfil what the Nigerian Universities Commission (NUC) calls the ‘minimum standard’, set in the early 1990s. It emphasizes the study of English literature from the Anglo–Saxon period to the twilight of the 20th Century, supplemented by courses on the written works of Caribbean, African, American and Commonwealth literature. Indigenous oral literature constitutes an insignificant part of the syllabus, and at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile Ife, a student may have an acquaintance with it in the second year and fourth year. This is similar to the University of Ibadan, where the subject is studied only in the last two years of enrolment.

What this calls for is a re-orientation of the curricula of literary studies. There is a need for flexibility and receptivity that would allow for adequate exploration of indigenous literary culture alongside the occidental and oriental geo-literary space, of the oral and performative alongside the written. The discipline should also accommodate the burgeoning popular culture of home videos, popular music, cartoons and others. In this regard opportunities offered by the Internet, global systems of mobile communication, satellite television, electronic libraries and audio-visual instruction, among others, need to be explored. At present, the discipline has not taken full advantage of the above resources, and this is where the socio-economic situation prevailing in Nigeria, as in many nations of the so-called ‘Third World’, is relevant. A technologically assisted literary arts education is invaluable; but in the face of an inadequate and constantly interrupted power supply, of what use are the Internet, digital satellite television and assorted audio-visual players in knowledge dissemination? Besides, with the dwindling State funding of education and contracting government spending on public institutions (in the name of structural adjustment), Nigerian universities have been facing a crisis of existence since the early 1980s. Various palliatives and manoeuvres have not yielded much result.

Nigerian universities would be better off, and the study of literature would be enriched, with the technological dividends of globalization as above; however this would require increased funding of education by
governmental and non-governmental organizations. The universities should also be allowed to operate in a democratic and truly autonomous atmosphere. When this happens, the study of literature will have gained in its ‘decolonizing’ quest. It will also have been positioned to respond more appropriately to the challenges of globalization.

REFERENCES
MANAGING CONTRADICTORY FUNCTIONS: THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES IN SOCIETIES UNDERGOING RADICAL SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION

John Brennan* and Rajani Naidoo**

INTRODUCTION
This Chapter presents an analysis of how universities located in national contexts undergoing radical political, social and economic change contribute and respond to such change. It draws on the findings of a major comparative research project (see Brennan, King and Lebeau, 2004; http://www.open.ac.uk/cheri/Trhome.htm), and argues that the interaction of global and local forces exerts powerful and contradictory forces on higher education. In post-apartheid South Africa and post-communist central and Eastern Europe, attempts to resolve these conflicts have drawn, at least in part, on linked processes of differentiation and diversity within national higher education systems. Some of the social, political, educational and economic implications of such strategies are discussed.

UNIVERSITIES IN THE GLOBAL ORDER
To understand the roles played by universities in the process of transformation, it is useful to begin by classifying some of their major

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functions. Castells has suggested four major functions as generally applicable to most societies (Castells, 2001). First, universities play a major role as ideological apparatuses by exerting ideological and cultural influence on society, through the socialization of students and the development of a relatively autonomous space to enable critique and reflection. Second, universities act as a mechanism of selection, socialization of elites and social mobility. Third, universities generate knowledge, and fourth, they are responsible for the formation of human capital and a skilled labour force. However commentators (Naidoo, 2003) have noted that in the contemporary social context, some of the cultural, political and social functions of higher education have been eclipsed by the developments associated with globalization and the knowledge economy. The State’s ability to compete successfully in the global marketplace is seen to rely on the production of higher value-added products and services, which are in turn dependent on knowledge, especially scientific and technological knowledge, and on continuous innovation. Intellectual capital has thus been portrayed in government policy as one of the most important determinants of economic success and as a crucial resource in the scramble for global profits (Brown et al., 2001). In this context, higher education has been positioned as a major and indispensable contributor to the transition to a high-skills economy and one of the main institutional sites for the production, dissemination and transfer of knowledge, innovation and technology.

REMARKABLE INVERSIONS

Less than a generation ago, higher education was discussed as a luxury that developing countries could ill afford (Sall, Lebeau and Kasimir, 2003). In a remarkable inversion of global policy, influential international agencies such as The World Bank are now advancing the argument that the development of robust higher education systems is an essential pre-requisite for developing countries to enter the knowledge economy (World Bank, 2002). A major force underlying reform in the present period is therefore pressure on governments to harness public universities in a relatively unmediated manner to economic productivity, and to reposition higher education as a commodity. Furthermore, international literature on the restructuring of higher education reveals that there is a global trend away from the forms of funding and regulation that were based on the ‘social compact’ that
evolved between higher education, the State and society over the last century (Slaughter and Leslie, 1997). The belief that universities require a relative independence from political and corporate influence to function optimally, which was in turn linked to the need for guaranteed State funding and professional autonomy, has been eroded. These developments, together with more general retractions in public policy away from frameworks based on Keynesian Welfare State settlements, have resulted in the implementation of new funding and regulatory frameworks which revolve around neo-liberal market mechanisms and new, managerialist principles.

Such frameworks are based on the assumption that the contemporary higher education system has become too large and complex for the State to sustain its position as sole regulator and funder; that market competition within and between universities will create more efficient and effective institutions; and that management principles derived from the private sector which monitor, measure, compare and judge professional activities will enhance higher education functioning. There has therefore been a world-wide decline in State funding for research and teaching, and a tightening of external control over core aspects of academic life through quasi-government quality assurance bodies. In addition, market mechanisms have been deployed to exert pressure on universities to comply with changing external demands. At the same time, universities are subject to pressures from the national, regional and local contexts in which they are embedded, as well as internal pressures from the epistemic communities which form the community of higher education. The combination of a range of local and universal pressures pulls universities in different directions and generates contradictions in their roles.

UNIVERSITIES IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMING SOCIETIES

The tensions outlined above are likely to be exacerbated in university systems in societal contexts undergoing radical transformation. Social transformation implies some fundamental changes in society’s core institutions, the polity and the economy, with major implications for relationships between social groups or classes and for the means of the creation and distribution of wealth, power and status. Within these broad features of social transformation, one may discern dramatic moments of transformation in particular societies or regions.
It is possible to see two distinct phases in transformation: first, the period of ‘removing the old’, of regime overthrow and the events leading up to it. This phase can be divided between the crisis events immediately prior to regime change and a generally much longer period of disillusion, critique and probably repression by the agents of the old order. The second involves ‘building the new’, the period of reconstruction, of institution-building, of forming new social relationships at home and new alliances abroad, of (attempted) economic regeneration and redistribution. The second period is of uncertain length because the initial dramatic changes of transformation will gradually merge into more evolutionary processes. While this Chapter focuses on ‘building the new’, the authors believe that it is impossible to understand the role of universities in this period without understanding their role in the previous, ‘removing the old’ period.

The collapse of communism in the late 1980s in central and Eastern Europe, and the demise of the apartheid regime in South Africa a few years later, stand as key moments of transformation. The ending of the apartheid regime in the early 1990s resulted in a consequent restructuring of the higher education system – previously organized on racial lines. Transformation in South Africa has been largely about democracy and equity, but within a context of capitalism and development. In particular, it has been about building the institutions of civil society.

South Africa’s higher education institutions reflect both colonial and apartheid pasts that provided very different levels of funding and support. To a varying degree, they are all engaged in becoming ‘normal universities’ although the recent legacy of ideological struggle remains important. While the agenda of economic modernization has been important, it is however not the only imperative of modernization as Singh (2001) reminds us: ‘Transformation has been used as much to denote the repositioning of higher education to serve more efficiently as the “handmaiden” of the economy as to signify the drive to align higher education with the democracy and social justice agenda of a new polity as in South Africa’ (Singh, 2001: 7). Yet South Africa is the only case in this project where current higher education policy formation and implementation can really be said to have been ‘… framed by the overall social goal of transcending the contemporary social structure and institutionalizing a new social order’ (Badat, 2001).
The authors draw on Bulgaria, Estonia and Russia to capture the important ‘transformation’ related to the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe. Geographically on Europe’s edge, Bulgarian society and culture has incorporated many different traditions and one of the aims has been to re-enter international life. Transformation, therefore, has been about independence, internationalism and capitalism but from a unique national vantage point. Bulgaria has a well-developed higher education system based on the Soviet model; however it is undergoing a process of westernization, with large state universities joined by an increasing number of newer, smaller private universities. Although of vastly different size and complexity, Estonia and Russia share recent histories as part of the Soviet Union; unlike Bulgaria, both had been part of the Soviet State rather than of its extended empire. But like Bulgaria, transformation was largely about democracy and capitalism although perhaps with a greater emphasis on national identity. If higher education in Russia has been largely about social modernization, it has also been about growing inequality. The role of higher education in Estonia has been partly a project of building national identity, and partly the socialization of its national elite.

THE TRANSFORMATIVE POTENTIAL OF UNIVERSITIES

Universities have frequently been regarded as key institutions in processes of social change and development. The most explicit role they have been allocated is the production of highly-skilled labour and research output to meet perceived economic needs. During periods of more radical change, universities have sometimes played an important role in helping to build new institutions of civil society, in encouraging and facilitating new cultural values and in training and socializing members of new social elites. The transformation functions in which universities may be involved may be analyzed along many dimensions. These could include and be classified as transformations of the economy (the formation of human capital), the polity (the creation and sustenance of State and civil institutions or the selection and socialization of political and social elites), the social structure (the basis of social stratification, the extent and mechanisms of mobility for different groups) and the culture (the production and dissemination of ideas, exerting influence upon and providing critique of the above).

There are of course likely to be tensions in the transformative roles of universities. The case of South Africa reveals a tension between a social
and democratic ideology that was important during the anti-apartheid struggle and a more market-driven competitive ideology that may be dominant today (Subotzky, 1999). Similar tensions exist elsewhere, and should serve as a reminder that universities contain many contradictions even at a single point in time. Some aspects of the university may become briefly dominant when external circumstances allow, reverting to invisibility once more when external circumstances change.

RESOLVING APPARENT CONTRADICTIONS

One way of resolving these apparent contradictions is to acknowledge that universities play multiple roles, which both resist and draw on global and national forces and which are simultaneously reproductive and transformative. Within individual institutions, even within individual academic departments, the roles played may be multiple and contradictory. At system levels, differentiation has become a key characteristic: non-university sectors, distance universities and private universities exist alongside traditional State universities in many countries, each type playing distinctive roles. Martin Trow’s well-known distinction between elite and mass higher education (Trow, 1974) saw these states as largely sequential. But Trow also saw the possibility of them running in parallel – elite and mass higher education existing side by side in the same society. This – and broader questions of system differentiation – become crucial factors to consider in attempting to understand the role and responses of higher education systems. The next two sections focus on dimensions of transformation: the transformation of the political, and the transformation of the social.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE POLITICAL

The notion of ‘protected space’ refers partly to campus-based political activism, and has been employed in different contexts. Academics and students may have been able often to preserve these spaces legally, even under authoritarian regimes, and have sometimes used them to develop an alternative political project. In these countries academics often occupied the forefront of opposition movements because while unionism and political parties were usually banned or controlled, academic freedom could not be challenged without closing the universities. But universities were also seen in some cases as ‘protected space’ in the sense of islands, isolated from their own country for political reasons but connected to the rest of the world through cooperation programs and research networks.
The authors’ case studies provide relatively little evidence of how a political transformation role is in reality being achieved by universities. And what evidence exists is double-edged. While higher education is usually said to equip individuals with more liberal and tolerant views, universities that are highly embedded in political spheres, for example in communist Bulgaria and Russia, have often been at the forefront of the ideological legitimation of totalitarian regimes – perhaps unintentionally sowing the seeds for new ‘dramatic moments’ of transformation. Where their role was seen by the State as incompatible with their institutional status, universities were often closed down or even demolished (as in the case of Chechen State University in 1996).

There is a strong current of thought to the effect that universities are partly about ‘reproducing the old’ rather than ‘removing it’, and thus preventing change. Universities in Central and Eastern Europe were particularly open to this charge, but reproductive elements can probably be seen everywhere. In the USSR and its satellites, for example, academics proved to be (actively or passively) more supportive of the regime and were more regularly used by the regime as advisors and mediators. Universities were infiltrated by the State security apparatus, and therefore less suspected of harbouring opposition leaders. It is also the case that some of the aspects of the political role referred to above, for example providing research and personnel for governing and administrative elites, have been provided for whatever regime was in power. Thus, in South Africa, universities both sustained the apartheid regime and contributed to its overthrow. Universities in central and Eastern Europe were assigned an important and prestigious role in communist societies, but dissidence was also nurtured in some parts of the university system. The political influence of universities in these countries today appears to be more marginal, even if politically influential individuals may have close ties with universities.

In addition, the political role of the university might be more important after the people, networks and ideas formed in its ‘protected space’ spread into the wider society and provide the human resources to fill new political leadership roles in society and its institutions. As part of the second phase of transformation, ‘building the new’, the authors note in South Africa and elsewhere the role universities have played in undertaking policy research for new regimes: providing personnel for the governing and administrative apparatus, and consultancy services to both government and enterprises. Perhaps especially in Africa, the authors
found university personnel active in the work of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs – see Chapter by Badat in this volume).

Cultures: National and International
The political transformation and nation-building role of universities may sit uneasily alongside the larger, internationalizing role generally ascribed to them: pressures for demonstrating universalism and the conception of knowledge as international in its essence may be in conflict with pressures for knowledge that may be relevant and immediately useful to the national context. In addition, the concern to preserve or ‘create’ a national culture may tend to exclude regional and international collaboration and groupings. To some extent, these national and international conflicts in roles may be managed by the differentiation of institutional function, in other words such functions may be performed by different institutions.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SOCIAL
One way of determining the role of a higher education system in social transformation is to assess the extent of educational opportunities for previously disadvantaged groups; this is clearly an important question. But it is a question hampered by lack of reliable data, as there appear to be only vague notions of how the social composition of the student body has changed in recent years. For example although enrolments in Bulgarian higher education doubled after the end of the communist regime, we do not know very much about the social consequences. Even less is known about how student enrolments classified according to social group are distributed among the increasingly diversified institutional contexts.

DIFFERENTIATION
In general, the pressure for higher education to provide more opportunities for access to previously disadvantaged groups has been accompanied by a differentiation of higher education institutions and programs. The notion of differentiation is used to distinguish institutional and program types – for example public and private institutions, academic and vocational programs and sectors, institutional status and regional differences. The authors might also note in this respect that differentiation also includes the growing internationalization of higher education, as members of elites arrange for their offspring to
Institutional diversification emerges in the case studies hand in hand with the notion of diversity, which refers to the characteristics of the student populations and social groups served by different forms of higher education. The strategy of differentiation and diversification has enabled higher education in the context of transforming societies to perform contradictory social functions, namely to maintain the status and position of social elites while providing some opportunities for social mobility.

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

As far as Eastern and Central Europe is concerned, it appears that societies are moving from a system of ‘forced equality’ to one of new and substantial inequalities. The movement has been accompanied by a ‘disbelief in meritocracy’, and a cynical view of society as a place where the ‘corrupt win’. While ex-communist countries have diversified their higher education landscapes and in some cases implemented widening participation and access initiatives for ethnic minorities, their student populations cannot be said to have dramatically changed in composition over the past decade. The case of Bulgaria seems to summarize the overall trends quite well. Totomanova (2003) has written that the rise in tertiary enrolment can be explained by an increased demand for higher education in a setting of high youth unemployment, and the desire of young people to postpone their entry to the labour market and/or increase their chances of finding a good job. On the supply side new private universities were created, and State universities were allowed to admit students on a paying basis in addition to their traditional intake of students. However Totomanova did not associate this rise to a real revolution in the social distribution of students by field of studies, and indicated that:

[Before 1989] the stage was set for a two-tier system in which the elite would attend special language schools and go on to elite Bulgarian or Eastern European universities, while the rest would attend general secondary or vocational schools to become the skilled workers of the society. This separation still exists in post-communist Bulgaria, although the higher education system has opened up to many more of the ‘working class’ students than in the previous era. (Totomanova, 2003: 3)
In addition, there does not appear to be much debate about extending access to minority groups, or indeed about their rights. Russian-speaking minorities in some of the Baltic States may in effect be declining at the same time as enrolments in higher education have expanded. In the case of Russia the rise in enrolments primarily benefited middle-class children, although Fedotova suggested that in such a highly polarized society, ‘... social prestige is linked primarily with financial capabilities’. Higher education, she believes, plays a relatively limited role as a passport to the middle class because, in public opinion, the values attached to higher education and those of business and power tend to be opposed (Fedotova, 2004: 19).

SOUTH AFRICA

The South African case both reflects and constitutes a notable exception to the above trends; Reddy noted that differentiation was already a striking feature of higher education during the apartheid regime:

Instead of denying university education to blacks by relying on the admissions policies of established white universities, the Apartheid state embarked on a determined policy to create universities for the variously state-defined ethnically classified black groups. ... These institutions were expected to legitimate, reproduce and constitute, especially among the elites, identities and social relations of race and ethnicity. (Reddy, 2004: 12)

A major challenge for today’s South Africa is to redress such inequities, while also ensuring effectiveness and efficiency for the new higher education system. South Africa has thus set out the role of universities as ‘... framed by the overall social goal of transcending the contemporary social structure and institutionalizing a new social order’ (Badat, 2001). In this context there has been a policy of institutional mergers (see Cooper and Subotzky, 2001), which are expected to go some way in redressing institutional and social inequalities. In the case of South Africa, there has been an unparalleled shift in race and gender patterns of participation in higher education:

The breakdown of university students by race shows that the number of African students rose dramatically after 1984, both relatively and in absolute numbers, from around 40,000 in 1984 to 90,000 in 1988 and to 182,000 in 1998, although between 1996 and 1998 they dropped by nearly 20,000.
This contrasts with white student figures, which fell significantly over the 1988-1998 decade from 156,000 to 126,000, reversing the ratio of African to White university students from 21:66 in 1984 to 52:36 by 1998. (Cooper and Subotzky, 2001: 26)

However a fine-grained, disaggregated analysis of enrolment patterns shows continuing inequalities (Cooper and Subotzky, 2001). With State support to universities’ welfare functions declining and tuition fees on the rise, the poorest students remain primarily in remote, historically black universities and in private higher education. As Reddy observed:

The State’s funding proposals and student aid scheme will in time assist these students, but in sociological terms, as a class, access to universities and movement into the middle classes will remain remote. The students from poor and working class backgrounds in the 1990s did enter universities in significant numbers. However, soon the historically black universities complained that they had to increase fees and monitor fee payment more systematically than previously because they did not receive any additional funding from the State. (Reddy, 2004: 56)

The regional dimension is one important aspect of the generally neglected treatment of the social role of the university. In Africa and Latin America particularly, the authors find examples of the university being ‘taken’ to poor and disadvantaged regions and districts as part of an explicit attempt to address issues of social equity. Community partnership programs in several South African universities, oriented towards community development, primary health care and service learning should also be mentioned here as viable alternatives to the trend towards the ‘entrepreneurial university’ model (Subotzky, 1999).

**CONCLUSION**

Considerable claims are being made for higher education as a motor for social, economic and political change in various parts of the world. The authors’ conclusion is that local conditions and history impose powerful constraints on universities’ capacities to both change themselves and contribute to the delivery of change more widely.

Universities appear to play multiple and contradictory roles. Sometimes roles are distinguished by institutional differences – whether
sectoral, regional or private/public. But multiple roles can also be found within individual institutions and departments. The capacity for institutions to change their roles thus seems to be rather limited, at least in the short term. And change, when it comes, seems more likely to be generated by external forces than from within the institution. Change in the long term may come largely from the arrival in positions of influence of a new generation of academics, socialized into new conceptions of the nature of the university and its social role.

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION

In traditional societies, the value of higher education is recognized perhaps more than in their modern counterparts. Though the former made no attempt to identify and quantify the benefits of education, they rarely questioned the value of education. Education and knowledge were viewed as great riches in themselves, besides being a way to increase wealth. Even the existence of externalities was acknowledged in traditional societies and this in times ancient and modern. Accordingly they invested in education voluntarily, gladly, and often without expecting any direct economic return. Even in modern societies until the 1970s, it has been so. The benefits of education were held to be vast and widespread. In the long run, government investments in education could be recovered by society through increased productivity of the labour force and through consequent higher tax receipts for government. Hence specific measures directly to recover investments in education from students or from non-governmental sources were not felt necessary. As Mishan (1969) observed, ‘… [higher] education is an investment and will pay for itself; and will increase the earnings of the beneficiary students and the government will recover its costs through consequent higher tax receipts.’

* National Institute of Educational Planning and Administration, New Delhi, India.
The immediate post-War years in Europe, and the post-independence period in developing countries, were dominated by a Welfare State philosophy together with a philosophy of social democratic consensus. That government could do almost everything for everybody was a strongly shared belief. The organizational power of the State, following John Maynard Keynes, was recognized in planning, provision, financing and the extension of traditional functions. Education was one important sector where this was widely applied; indeed the importance of public education was highlighted in classical political economy. As Vaizey (1962: 23) observed, ‘… there is a long and honourable tradition from Adam Smith to Alfred Marshall which assigns to publicly supported education a major role not only in promoting social peace and harmony, and self-improvement, but in the process of wealth-creation itself.’

The 1970s heralded a continuing financial crisis in education, characterized by high rates of inflation, shrinking public budgets for education along with rising student numbers, falling per student expenditure and grossly inadequate investment in the quality of education. Severe distortions were observed in inter-sectoral and intra-sectoral allocation of resources, together with widening inter-country and intra-country inequalities in education expenditure. By the early 1980s, strategies of neo-liberal economic reform were unveiled in several developing countries in the form of stabilization and adjustment policies, associated with the International Monetary Fund and The World Bank.

The economic policies of the Bretton Woods institutions are rightly felt by many to be synonymous with privatization, and privatization has become the most significant item in the agenda of The World Bank (Richardson and Haralz, 1995). The eclipse of Keynesianism in the mid-1970s opened the way for the entry of market principles. Until the end of the 1970s or early 1980s, the concept of a free market then current in economics was probably consistent with government dealing with ‘market failure’ and therefore constituted the basis of welfare economics; the 1980s and 1990s reversed the swing of the pendulum. Social democratic values and welfare state dimensions were ousted by the philosophy of the free market, which stressed individual economic values and gains. Individual freedom and choice are preferred to social (or public) choice. In its extreme form of free market philosophy (à la Hayek, 1944), ‘social good’ or ‘social
welfare’ have no meaning. Society – or value to society – becomes coterminous with, and inseparable from, individual gain. Public good and social justice are seen as neither possible nor necessarily desirable. Many countries, particularly developing countries, are moving from a development paradigm predominantly based on Keynesian economics to a ‘neo-liberal’ one. Markets, more clearly the private sector, now hold the centre-stage.

This philosophy permeated the education sector – particularly the higher education sector, and argued that government should be confined broadly to drawing up a coherent policy framework (e.g. World Bank, 1994). The insinuation of market philosophy into education has come as a culture shock not only to people in developing countries, but also to several in Europe, including the United Kingdom (Bottery, 1992: 83). Privatization in higher education is pursued as a means of improving efficiency and as an important measure to ease the financial crisis.

TRADITIONAL PERCEPTIONS AND VALUES IN HIGHER EDUCATION

Traditionally, higher education creates and diffuses knowledge, and many societies assigned high value to that knowledge for its own sake. Knowledge itself was considered as wealth. Secondly, higher education acted as an instrument of personal development, expanding individual intellectual horizons, interests and potential, empowering individuals and raising their quality of life. Thirdly, higher education served as an instrument for social integration, socializing individuals into the values of society – social, ethical, cultural and political; conversely societies become more virtuous, civilized, polite and urbane as more people are educated to a higher level (as argued by sociologists such as Durkheim). Lastly, human capital theorists placed emphasis on education’s role in transforming human beings into human capital, into instruments of production and economic growth and thus forwarding the economic well-being of peoples and societies (see for instance Theodore Schultz and Gary Becker). Many institutions of higher education in the contemporary period aimed to serve all these functions, and thus it has long been held that higher education institutions have social functions. Yet they discharge important social, cultural and economic roles too. They provide a public service and thus differ from commercial and business organizations. They produce human capital, and even specialized human capital. Their output is
not necessarily tangible. But above all, it was held they were not ‘for-profit’ institutions.

With the unveiling of economic reform policies, the role of higher education is being reinterpreted and redefined; market-promoting policies everywhere pose serious challenges to higher education, as new values, policies and practices replace traditional and well-established values, concepts and approaches. Social democratic visions are being replaced by market-driven policies. ‘Marketization’ has become the buzzword; the role of the government is being ‘reinvented’. Higher education’s traditional functions of production and dissemination of knowledge are under attack, and public subsidy of higher education is increasingly criticized. Equity in higher education is no longer valued. Modern economic policies, or rather the market reforms that aim at making higher education institutions responsive to market forces, do not distinguish between education and any commercial product.

Against such a backdrop, this Chapter presents an analytical account of some of the prominent trends emerging in higher education. It describes how higher education moves from State to market, and the costs involved therein (see also Tilak, 2004).

**STATE VERSUS MARKET IN HIGHER EDUCATION**

Education is provided publicly in every nation, and the dominant place of State subsidies is an outstanding feature in most. This very particular condition is shared only by a very limited range of goods and services — national defence, internal security, courts and police. Even where education is not publicly provided, it is heavily subsidized by the State in almost all countries of the world — in developing countries as in the developed. Why has education been given such treatment? There is a powerful and persuasive economic logic for this and a social, political and historical rationale as well.

**The Role of the State in Higher Education: The Case for Education as a ‘Public Good’**. Several arguments in the literature justify the role of the State in higher education: education is a public good, and higher education is at the very least a quasi-public good producing a wide variety and huge magnitude of externalities. Consumers of education confer external benefits on those not acquiring education. The social benefits of having a large number of highly educated people go beyond increases in GNP; they cannot be reduced to individual self-interest.
By taxing those receiving such benefits and subsidizing educational provision, the welfare of both groups, and thereby society as a whole, can be improved. Amongst the externalities are improvements in health, reduction in population growth, in poverty, improvement in income distribution, reduction in crime, rapid adoption of new technologies, strengthening of democracy, strengthening of civil liberties, etc. To this, one may add ‘dynamic’ externalities (Schultz, 1988; Romer, 1990; 1986; and Lucas, 1988) and ‘technological’ externalities (Behrman, 1990), necessary for technical progress, for economic growth and to halt diminishing marginal returns. Such positive externalities justify the State’s crucial role in education (Nerlove, 1972). The ‘externalities’ – ‘uncompensated’ benefits – derived from education are legion. Further, when viewed in terms of democracy, reduction of crime, economic growth, redistribution of resources etc., which are also public goods, clearly education helps in their advancement.

_Education as a ‘Merit Good’_. A very similar aspect is that of education as a ‘merit good’ (Musgrave, 1959), whose consumption needs to be promoted; people may be ignorant of the benefits of education. They may not appreciate its value, or may be unable to foresee the implications of their decision to invest or not to invest in education, or indeed may be unwilling to invest at all. Still, governments are expected to be better informed than individuals or families. They should be better able to look into the future and accordingly take judicious decisions on educational investment. The important point is that the individual recipient himself/herself benefits far more than he/she is aware of. The effect of education on wages may be known, but the likely impact on productivity in general, on family health and nutrition, and on decision-making for oneself or for one’s family members about education and employment, are less likely to be grasped, foreseen or understood. Thus to argue that individuals can be represented as economic agents who unfailingly make rational choices, who are infinitely percipient about how to realize their ambitions, who are able to anticipate all the consequences of their acts, who can hit upon the best strategy to serve their chosen ends – to say the least, all this is implausible. Consumer ignorance is a typical instance that necessitates public subsidization.

_Equity_. Thirdly, the State’s provision of higher education is justified on the grounds of underwriting equality of opportunity. Ensuring
equality of opportunity in education to all irrespective of social, racial, cultural and economic background is considered an important function of the modern State. It ‘… is necessary to provide free education at all levels and also to subsidize students’ living expenses in post-secondary schooling so as to guarantee “equality of educational opportunity”’ (Blaug and Woodhall, 1979: 352). Education is an effective instrument of equity. In the absence of State subsidies, only those able to pay would enrol. The concern for equality of opportunity has led to a universal agreement that governments should subsidize education.

**Imperfections.** Fourth, many accept another argument in support of State funding of higher education: the presence of imperfections in capital markets. As Arrow (1993) observed, imperfections in capital markets and asymmetric information are also possible justifications for public subsidy of higher education. In several developing countries, markets are ‘incomplete’; credible markets do not exist (see for instance Joseph Stiglitz). Education credit markets are also incomplete (Kodde and Ritzen, 1985). Imperfect capital markets inhibit students from borrowing against the uncertain future returns of higher education, and people may prefer not to borrow to invest in education as the gestation period is often very long. They may not be ready to risk investing in an education whose benefits are not certain. Risk associated with human capital investments may be difficult to spread, and could be very high to society. For the individual the risks of not completing, or the possibility of higher education’s market value falling, are high indeed. Furthermore and understandably, lenders would be reluctant to accept risk backed only by the uncertain future incomes of reluctant debtors (Arrow, 1993); hence the need for State subsidies.

**Economies of Scale.** Fifth, education is a sector, subject to economies of scale or increasing returns to scale. Average costs of providing education decline as enrolments increase. If a production process is characterized by decreasing average cost condition, it may be more efficient for government to operate that process. Higher levels of education can be particularly prone to this phenomenon. University systems, scientific equipment, libraries, etc. cannot be used on a small scale. Hence it may be more efficient for government to provide them (Colclough, 1996). Government monopoly over education, including higher education, appears desirable as against allowing many producers into the field.
The Role of the State: The Case against

Of late, several questions have been raised about the rationale of State subsidies in general, about the subsidy of education in particular, and more particularly higher education. The arguments against public subsidy of education are essentially of three kinds: efficiency, equity and pragmatic considerations.

Efficiency. First, much opposition to public subsidization, especially of higher education, sprang from estimates of rates of return to education. Social rates of return are found to be consistently lower than private rates of return to education. For this reason, it was recommended that public subsidies could be reduced, and individuals be asked to pay for their education (Psacharopoulos, 1994; World Bank, 1994).

Equity. Secondly, public subsidy of education has perverse effects on distribution. Subsidizing higher education, it was argued, was regressive and would increase income inequalities by transferring resources from the poor to the rich as education (particularly, but not exclusively, higher education) subsidies go more to the rich than to the poor (Psacharopoulos, 1977; Jimenez, 1987; World Bank, 2000: 80). A reduction in education subsidies in general is in order so that education subsidies can be directed to the poor only (World Bank, 1994).

Pragmatic considerations. Thirdly, governments in developing countries increasingly face a crisis in resources. Economic reforms adopted in many developing countries, including policies of stabilization and structural adjustment, demand across-the-board cuts in public expenditure. Education appears to be one sector where State withdrawal is relatively easy.

There are also other arguments. Public subsidy is not needed to promote either equity or democracy (Tooley, 2000); through heavy State subsidy, education institutions become vulnerable to government control; giving subsidies (in the form of grants to institutions) is inefficient, since it provides no incentives to allocate resources efficiently; subsidies to higher education may not be desirable when basic needs such as primary education and health care are funded inadequately, in other words when public resources are misallocated, etc. Reduction in the role of the State and in State subsidies would not adversely affect the growth of higher education. Cost-recovery measures can be adopted.
Since higher education very especially may not be price elastic, the belief is that cost-recovery measures would not lead to any significant fall in enrolments. On the other hand, cost-recovery measures would improve access, lead to improving quality in education by reducing the baby-sitting role of education and make students more diligent. Finally, given the high private rates of return, people will be willing to pay.

**An Assessment of the Arguments**

The debate between the two sides, State *versus* market, also known as liberalism *versus* neo-liberalism, is intensifying. To what extent are the arguments and counter-arguments valid? First, all arguments against the role of the State cannot necessarily be considered as favouring markets in higher education. Second, some arguments against the role of the State assume the level of efficiency of the State sector as a given; there is no scope for improvement. This is not true. While one may marshal enough evidence to argue either way, some aspects stand out very clearly in favour of a dominant role of the State in higher education, and these are rarely questioned. There are very few (except for neo-liberals) who do not recognize the externalities of education: West (1965), for whom the externalities are ‘completely unimportant’; and Schultz (1972), who opines that many benefits go only to the student; Newman (1985: 24) reckons that a large proportion of the benefits of higher education go to a relatively small group of students.

Even opponents of public subsidy to higher education recognize that it produces a huge magnitude of externalities. Friedman for instance (1962: 86) implicitly agreed that given the externalities associated with education, it should be publicly financed. Though all the social benefits cannot be identified and measured accurately, still a consensus holds that they are substantial. Other aspects – widely shared – are: its nature as a public good (and in higher education, a quasi-public good), as a merit good and as a social investment in education, its market imperfections and its economies of scale. Many arguments made against public subsidy do not command unqualified support – either from theory or from empirical evidence. As Vaizey (1962: 34) concluded, ‘… publicly financed education is a legitimate end of public activity, even to extreme exponents of “classical” economic doctrine.’

*Weighing the case against.* Recently, the case against public subsidies in education rests on the premise that governments in developing
countries do not have adequate resources at their disposal and that scope for restructuring public budgets (and thereby increasing substantially subsidies to education) is rather limited. *Per se*, this is not an argument against public subsidy or in favour of markets. Except for quoting figures relating to budget deficits or external indebtedness, plus the corresponding debt service charges born by developing countries, this premise has rarely been examined critically. Arguments are made for restructuring public budgets by withdrawing resources from unproductive sectors and reallocating them to education (e.g. UNDP, 1992; 1991). Some research also shows that education expenditures are affected by military expenditures, suggesting a clear trade-off between public expenditures on defence and education. Patterns of public expenditure in developing countries also show that the governments are not so much starved of resources, but rather lack priorities and political will especially in sectors like education.

That higher education subsidies are regressive is a general argument. It is also stated that subsidies to higher education accrue to the better-off in society, those to primary education to the masses. It is claimed that public subsidy of education produces perverse effects on distribution (Psacharopoulos, 1977), a finding subsequently disproved by Ram (1982). In a cross-country analysis, Ram concluded that ‘…there is little evidence in favour of the postulate of a significant dis-equalizing effect of public subsidy to higher education. If there is such an effect at all, it appears to be stronger in the DCs than in the LDCs’ (Ram, 1982: 45-46). Trostel (1996) further showed that public subsidy of education would even correct distortions in taxation. Hence, subsidizing education is efficient. After a careful review of several studies, and after standardizing their results, Leslie and Brinkman (1988: 118) found ‘…that higher education in most cases does contribute to progressivity and moreover that when the analytical methods employed are most advanced, progressivity is found without exception.’ Also widely held is the view that any withdrawal of public subsidies would certainly make the system worse, and more regressive. Markets are cumulatively and inherently un-egalitarian in the distribution of resources in society. As Johnson (1984) demonstrated, taxing the poor to finance higher education, even that of the rich, may be justified because of the externalities associated with higher education (of the rich), which can be relatively rich in a permanent income sense. The poor (or
less able) also realize a portion of the gains from the rich (or more able) receiving higher education.

*Are Subsidies regressive?* State subsidies need not necessarily be regressive *per se*. Much depends upon the nature, type and kind of subsidies. For instance, if subsidies expected to be universally available are targeted, or vice versa, they may produce adverse effects. The type of subsidies, e.g. grants to institutions *versus* grants to students, may also count in this context. The solution to regressive effects of subsidies lies in progressive taxation rather than in eliminating or reducing subsidies.

The use of estimated rates of return to education to back arguments against public subsidies has also been found to be improper. First, high levels of private rates of return may not sustain themselves for long, as some countries have experienced; this reduces students’ willingness to pay. Secondly, private rates of return will decline as public subsidies are drastically reduced or eliminated, making investment in education unattractive from an individual point of view. Thirdly and more importantly, it is commonly accepted that social rates of return to education are not true social returns. Except for tax benefits, no other social benefits are considered in estimating social rates of return to education. Hence rates of return cannot be used to argue against public subsidies (see Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2000: 39), nor on behalf of any sound public policy in education (Majumdar, 1983). Properly estimated, social returns could be much higher than earlier estimates and even higher than private rates of return (see McMahon, 1999; Weale, 1993; 1992).

A few also think that education may not qualify as a public good, since the criteria of ‘non-exclusion’ and the ‘free-rider’ do not apply. One’s admission to a school may mean denial to someone else, as the number of places in schools may be restricted (see Eicher and Chevaillier, 1993: 478). It is important to check the applicability of the criteria of non-exclusion and free-riders not to the consumption of the service (admission in school), but to the receipt of the benefits. After all, people who have not gone to school cannot be excluded from the benefits of having an educated population in the neighbourhood. Lastly, many who argue for increased cost recovery in higher education do not oppose public subsidies *per se*. However, since there is limited scope for increased public spending, it is argued that additional resources can be mobilized through a variety of measures. Also, public subsidies *can*
increase efficiency (e.g. Arrow 1993); the real issue is for the State to raise resources through tax and non-tax revenues.

As Blaug (1983: 126) argues, market failures, consumer ignorance, technical economies of scale, externalities in production and consumption, public good and inherent imperfections in capital and insurance markets all inhibit the attainment of Pareto optimality in education investments. In the case of higher education Blaug agreed that amongst these factors, externalities and imperfections in capital and insurance markets were relevant; hence the sense in government subsidy. Governments subsidize education, not for efficiency alone but also for reasons of equity and for other social and political objectives. Eicher and Chevaillier (1993: 480) argue that even if theoretical justification was weak, ‘… it would probably be a mistake to curtail sharply public subsidies to education’. In short, there is not much disagreement over the rationale behind the role of the State and State funding of higher education. As Vaizey (1962: 36) remarked, ‘… the opposition to a publicly financed system is a political opposition to paying taxes rather than an attitude ineluctably derived from the mainstream of economic reasoning.’

CURRENT TRENDS TOWARDS THE MARKETIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION

Despite abundant knowledge of the importance of the State’s role, higher education systems are changing; policies of economic reform, introduced in almost all developing countries during the last quarter century, required a drastic cut in public expenditures across the board, including higher education, and the promotion of markets in higher education. Such policies set the tone for drastic reform in higher education, and on the whole, the latter suffered severely. In many developing countries, public expenditure on higher education declined – both as a relative priority (proportion of GNP or of total government expenditure) and/or in absolute terms in real prices (and sometimes even in nominal prices), in total as well as per student. Cuts were also made in several countries specifically in public expenditure on quality- and equity-related inputs (e.g. research and scholarships). Recovering costs from students (through high- and even full-cost-equivalent fees) has been an important strategy adopted in most countries, along with raising resources from other non-governmental sources including industry through closer links.
Along with these and the growing public apathy over higher education, one can note a strong emergence of forces in favour of private higher education. The lack of resources is one oft-cited reason for the growth of private higher education; but an equally important reason is the change in attitudes towards higher education and private higher education, and towards ‘for-profit’ private institutions of higher education in particular. The public and ‘merit good’ nature of higher education is being increasingly discounted. Private higher education is projected as an efficient system, which can improve access and quality as well as equity!

Higher education institutions are encouraged implicitly to adopt market-relevant policies; or more explicitly, governments design policies to ease rapid privatization. Such policies include withdrawing government grants and incentives to better mobilize funding from non-governmental sources (fees and others included); the introduction of ‘marketable’ courses to be ‘sold’ to students in place of long courses of study; and appointing industrialists as heads and/or chairpersons of governing bodies in higher education institutions. Management, including cost-recovery and profit/surplus generation, are the traits sought in such appointees. The march towards marketization operates through a variety of measures, including financial privatization in public universities; transfer of ownership of public institutions; establishment of private institutions – private institutions with government support, self-financing private institutions and profit-making private institutions, all focusing on short-term market considerations and immediate market relevance. The burgeoning private institutions are increasingly institutions without government recognition; universities mutate into ‘entrepreneurial universities’. Autonomy from government has become a buzzword. As Johnstone (1999) suggested, progress towards ‘high privateness’ in higher education (shown in Table 1) is very rapid.

The Varying Degrees of Privatization
Varying degrees of privatization are emerging in higher education (Tilak, 1991). First, an ‘extreme’ version of privatization involves the total privatization of higher education, with colleges and universities managed and funded by the private sector with little government intervention. Second is a ‘strong’ degree of privatization that entails full recovery of the costs of public higher education from users – students, their employers or both. Third is a moderate form of privatization,
implying public provision of higher education but with a reasonable level of financial participation from non-governmental sources. Last is what may be termed ‘pseudo-privatization’ – higher education institutions are privately managed, but government-assisted. Originally created by private bodies, they receive nearly the whole of their expenditure from governments. In many developing countries all forms of privatization appear to take place rapidly, without any coherent perspective and plan, thus creating different kinds of problems.

In many developing countries in transition, the emerging trends and changing public policies in higher education can be summarized in tabular form. These trends are indicative rather than exhaustive,

Table 1. Trends towards private higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>High Public (Traditional)</th>
<th>Mission avowedly both public and private</th>
<th>Mainly to respond to students’ private interests</th>
<th>Mission serves private interests of students, clients and owners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mission/Purpose</td>
<td>Serves a clear public mission as determined by the State/faculty</td>
<td>Public corporation or constitutional entity</td>
<td>Private non-profit; clear public accountability</td>
<td>Private for profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ownership</td>
<td>Publicly owned</td>
<td>Publicly owned</td>
<td>Private corporation or constitutional entity</td>
<td>Private for profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sources of Revenue</td>
<td>Public/taxpayers</td>
<td>Mainly public, but some tuition or cost-sharing</td>
<td>Mainly private, but some public assistance (to needy students)</td>
<td>All private, mainly tuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control by Government</td>
<td>High State control</td>
<td>Some control by the State</td>
<td>High degree of autonomy; State control limited to overseeing</td>
<td>Almost no control by the State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norms of Management</td>
<td>Academic norms, shared governance, anti-authoritarianism</td>
<td>Academic norms, but acceptance of need for effective management</td>
<td>Limited adherence to academic norms, high management control</td>
<td>Operated like a business, norms from business management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Johnstone, 1999.
and the two broad categories include changes already in place in some countries, slowly taking place in others, and in yet other cases taking place very fast. However neither of the two systems or approaches is final in any sense. In short, the emerging higher education system can be represented as the transformation of academic institutions into ‘entrepreneurial universities’ and ‘commercial institutions’, whose single most important objective seems to be the mobilization of more and more resources (Raines and Leathers, 2003).

Table 2. Emerging trends in policy, planning and financing higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conventional System</th>
<th>Emerging System</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare approach</td>
<td>Market approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public higher education</td>
<td>Mixed and private higher education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public financing</td>
<td>Private financing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: State-financed institutions</td>
<td>Private: self-financing institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: government-recognized institutions</td>
<td>Private institutions requiring no government recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: degree-awarding institutions</td>
<td>Private: non-degree (diploma/certificate) awarding institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private: philanthropy and educational considerations</td>
<td>Private: commercial motives, profit motives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No fees</td>
<td>Introduction of fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low levels of fees</td>
<td>High levels of fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No student loans</td>
<td>Introduction of student loan programs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercially ineffective loan programs - no security, High default rates, but based on criteria of educational qualifications and economic need</td>
<td>Effective/commercially viable loan programs: security/mortgage. Expected high recovery rates based more on commercial considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholarly/academic disciplines of study</td>
<td>Self-financing/commercially viable/ profitable disciplines of study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emphasis on formal/full-time education</td>
<td>Open/distance/part-time education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection criteria for heads of institutions: academic background</td>
<td>Selection criteria for heads of institutions: expertise in financial/ money management and in resource-generation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Portrait of Private Higher Education

The emerging private – moderately or highly private or predominantly private – systems of higher education pose serious problems in terms of access, quality and equity. Earlier reviews (see Tilak, 1991) have exploded several myths of the superiority of private higher education. For example, the claim to higher quality of private compared to public higher education is exaggerated. Graduates from private universities do not necessarily receive higher rewards in the labour market, lower unemployment rates, better-paid jobs and consequently higher earnings. Rather, the external efficiency of private higher education is no higher than that of public higher education. Nor do private institutions necessarily provide governments with any sizeable relief from financial burdens. The private sector does not respond correctly to the economic needs of the individual and society; if it does so at all, it responds to short-term needs of the market. Very rarely do private firms have genuine philanthropic motives in opening private universities, and in general such institutions tend to become profit-making establishments; they create inequalities in education and in society, and are not necessarily apolitical.

Developing countries require a rapid growth in higher education of good quality for their very survival in the highly competitive, globalized world. Some (Tilak, 2003) argue that a threshold level of gross enrolment ratio in higher education is about 20 percent. Only those countries with such a ratio could become economically advanced, and vice versa. Furthermore, only those societies that have developed their public systems of higher education can progress economically. Those countries that have expanded their higher education systems by relying on the private sector, or on what can be called ‘predominantly private’ higher education systems, cannot progress much. Most of the countries in South America have reached a gross enrolment ratio in higher education of 20 percent and above, yet they remain developing countries (see García Guadilla’s Chapter in this volume). The problem is essentially that the interests of market forces (private universities) and those of State universities are different, as Table 3 shows. The former may even conflict with national interests.

The conflicting interests of State and markets in education are so serious that any attempt to forge a partnership between the two may be counter-productive. Some economists advocate a middle path – State-market or public-private partnerships in higher education.
This, described as ‘welfare pluralism’ (Mishra, 1996), represents a middle ground, a centrist position balancing between the public and the private, the State and non-State sectors. It rests on the following premises: ‘(a) that the limitations and limits of State-owned welfare – fiscal and administrative – are clearly recognized; (b) that the State cannot and should not be the monopoly or near-monopoly provider of social welfare; (c) that non-State providers can and should play a bigger part in the supply, and especially the delivery, of services; and (d) that the migration from a State-centred welfare towards “welfare pluralism” could result in greater inequality in the distribution of social benefits, but that this is unavoidable’ (Mishra, 1996: 229-230). But such a middle path is not really a middle path, as the power of market forces is tremendous and once unleashed the latter are not easily regulated. In effect, the middle path eventually converges with the total market system, reminiscent of the old story of the Camel’s nose under the Arab’s tent flap!

**SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS**

In almost all countries of the world, education is a State function. Higher education, including higher technical and professional education, is heavily subsidized by the State both in economies where development policies tilt explicitly in favour of welfare and equity, and also in developed, market economies. Traditionally the role of the State has been justified by the recognition that education produces externalities, as a public good (a quasi-public good in the case of higher education),

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Table 3. Conflicting interests of the State and markets in higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>State</th>
<th>Market</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Motivation</strong></td>
<td>Service</td>
<td>Profit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main Concern</strong></td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Area of Interest</strong></td>
<td>Generic</td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration of Interest</strong></td>
<td>Long-term</td>
<td>Short-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Team Effort</strong></td>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>Always</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research</strong></td>
<td>Publish/public good</td>
<td>Strict confidential/private good</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Time Schedule</strong></td>
<td>Flexible</td>
<td>Rigid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nature of Universities</strong></td>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>Uniformity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: the author.
as a merit good, as a social investment for human development and as a major instrument of equity, besides being a measure of quality of life in itself. Markets cannot ensure an optimum supply of education. Left to individuals or market mechanisms, social investment would be below optimum or socially desirable levels. Even when markets work well and students enjoy a service of quality, private institutions may yet fail to serve the public interest (Task Force on Higher Education and Society, 2002: 28). In the wake of current market reforms, questions are being raised about the role of the State and about the rationale for public subsidies. It is also being argued that to reduce, if not totally eliminate, public subsidies in higher education is both desirable and feasible.

In this Chapter the author has presented a succinct review of some of the arguments in favour of the State. He has restated how important it is for the State to continue to play a critical role in higher education. Any significant reduction in the role of the State in higher education is neither feasible, nor desirable even if feasible.

To conclude, given the critical role the State has played in higher education in developing countries, and still plays in advanced countries, today higher education is elitist no more. It has ‘democratized’ somewhat, with a large proportion of less well-off socio-economic groups participating. In countries like India, higher education has supported self-reliance in the manpower needs of the economy (see Chapter by Badat in this volume). Secondly, higher education is rightly and increasingly viewed as an effective instrument (if not the only instrument) of socio-economic mobility for the more fragile groups in society. Thirdly, it is also widely recognized that higher education is an important factor of economic growth and that education makes the basic difference between developed and developing countries. All this, viewed in the broad context of relatively low standards of living for ordinary people and imperfect and incomplete markets, makes it imperative that the State play a dominant role in the provision of higher education, and that it yields no place to market mechanisms.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

The past 20 years have seen much upheaval, but also a consolidation of major trends including globalization and the universalization of information and communication technologies (ICT). Following a long period of growth known as ‘the glorious 30 years’ (1945-1975), governments experienced a growing fiscal crisis and accordingly started reforming their institutions and procedures of public spending. The impact this had on higher education systems posed a fundamental challenge to the Humboldtian ideal of the university: firstly, it was expensive; secondly and in the opinion of government leaders in most countries, it was too remote from society’s needs.

Similarly questions were asked about research, particularly basic research, and its funding. Research requires an ever-increasing volume of financial resources to keep up with the pace at which equipment becomes obsolete and unsophisticated. Until the 1980s, science evolved in accordance with the ‘rules’ laid out by an American, Vannevar Bush. In the report Science: The Endless Frontier (1945), Bush argued that from excellent research would arise innovations and economic growth. Under the terms of this ‘social contract’, government financed scientific research in the expectation that its findings would have positive effects.

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on the economy and society, without further assessment of research projects. The past decade, however, has seen major change in the relationship between science and society.

The new ‘social contract’, which is still being written, emphasizes the mission of research, its strategic orientation and new forms of university governance. This construct reduces researchers’ degree of freedom, inasmuch as financial backers seek either to determine the topics of research or to receive guarantees that research will be successful. It is now almost an axiom that priority in allocating public funds goes to applied research projects with highly specified objectives and with the prospect of rapid transfer to the productive sector.

UNCOMFORTABLE QUESTIONS

University research today presents certain marked trends: sophistication (with expensive equipment and rapid obsolescence), interdisciplinarity, competitive funding, new competitors, accountability, evaluation and tension between teaching and researching. The theme to emerge from this environment relates to the growing impact of commercialization and contractual research on institutional autonomy. Research in the Humboldtian university was curiosity-driven; the new environment extols industry-driven research. Yet two dangers are present at institutional level: to have research driven by fashion, and an advancement of knowledge that is less than dynamic. A balanced research portfolio would be a good means of avoiding ‘modish’ research, ensuring sustainability and protecting the long-term advancement of knowledge. At the institutional level, much depends on freedom of choice and on the degree of autonomy achieved. If institutional strategies are to be put in place, some questions need to be answered:

- What is better, adequate public funding or more diversified funding? Do these options have the same impact on autonomy?
- When survival is the main goal, can an institution be autonomous?

This essay discusses them in the light of the Brazilian experience.
THE BRAZILIAN CONTEXT
In a country such as Brazil, in the throes of an everlasting and major fiscal crisis and striving to raise its systemic competitiveness, to a certain degree research funding policy radicalizes the trend towards controlling and choosing projects solely from the standpoint of industrial policy. In Brazil the public sector is responsible for practically all research and development activities, and the universities are the main actors responsible for the production of knowledge in the public sector. In times past, the government funded the researcher and his/her partners (non-profit or for-profit organizations) directly, with no second thought as to the consequences such activities had upon university institutions. Over the years, this approach to financing gave rise to a culture of individualism: decisions were mostly taken by the research group and in many cases by the researcher alone.

The National Fund for the Development of Science and Technology (FNDCT) provides the main source of funding for university research at the federal level. Funds from the federated States are managed by research support foundations, present in almost all Brazilian States. Foundations manage funds that are collected by a proportional levy on State revenues (usually 1 or 1.5 percent) according to their constitutions (currently only São Paulo respects this constitutional rule). These State funds were never wholly adequate in the resources they distributed, and they have tended to become more sporadic.

NEW RESEARCH FUNDING MODELS
From 1999 onwards the federal government decided that it would increase research funding to tackle the problem of continuity, and at the same time announced its pursuit of a clearer policy towards technological development. A number of sectoral funds were established with substantial resources, independent of the Treasury. The sectoral funds stand as an interesting alternative to shrinking public funding and to consequent constraints on the freedom to research. The purpose of these funds is to bring technological solutions to industry while helping to reduce shortcomings in production. They are primarily industry-driven and contractual. This new model of research funding in Brazil poses new challenges to public universities, and especially to the federal universities. Increases in funding underlined the very evident need to change the decision-making process within institutions, with the idea of improving the balance and relationship between investment
(whose current pace sharply contrasts with earlier sluggishness), staff and maintenance (the upkeep of new buildings and equipment).

This Chapter discusses the challenges and the dangers the nation faces, and poses the question whether the right answer is to focus solely on that research which seeks to resolve bottlenecks in industrial production.

PUBLIC FUNDING OF RESEARCH IN BRAZIL

Efforts by Brazilian governments to develop infrastructures and train highly skilled human resources were given impetus during those years when energy was devoted to developing a project of national scope, that is to say during exceptional regimes. The National Science and Technology Council (CNPq) was founded under the last Vargas government (the Vargas governments were noteworthy as periods of industrialization and as part of a nationalist and populist project) in 1951, in the same year as the Capes (Coordination of Training of Higher Education Staff). These two organizations were responsible for putting in place a more extensive system of higher degrees, which now produces more than 8,000 PhDs and some 20,000 Master’s degrees annually.

In the 1970s under the military regime (1964-1986), the Brazilian government launched a major effort for the nation to transfer scientific and technological knowledge into the national infrastructure, as a way to gain control of and develop the bases for new industrial processes and products. Public universities were the sole institutions that could be used to direct this effort, first because they had qualified staff available and second because given the total protectionism which surrounded the home market, the industrial sector had not been encouraged to innovate. This policy began institutionalizing research by economic priority, and the project gave priority to universities as the loci of publicly funded research.

Today, Brazil has some 15,000 research groups distributed across 268 institutions. Almost 90 percent of all research groups come under the responsibility of universities, isolated colleges and research centres.

Table 1 illustrates the trend over the past 10 years, during which there has been a remarkable numerical growth in institutions.

Funding for this system, where universities predominate (70 percent of all scientists and engineers are employed in universities), is provided by agencies such as the CNPq and the Finep – the latter created in 1967 to fund applied research through instruments and
procedures managed at the national level. The most important of these is the National Fund for the Development of Science and Technology (FNDCT), created in 1968 to fund the Strategic Development Plan. This Plan was the first to identify science and technology (S&T) as critical to Brazilian growth. After a period of plenty during the 1970s, the FNDCT faced almost two decades of leaner resources. Instability in the sources of finance, above all in the national Treasury, became the bane of Brazilian research. Indeed, instability in research funding for some time was viewed not a sign of volatility but rather as a normal state of affairs (Guimaraes, as cited by Schwartzman, 1995).

Table 1. Number of institutions, research groups, researchers and PhD holders in Brazil, 1993, 1995, 1997, 2000, 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1993</th>
<th>1995</th>
<th>1997</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2002</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutions</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>4,404</td>
<td>7,271</td>
<td>8,632</td>
<td>11,760</td>
<td>15,158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers (C)</td>
<td>21,541</td>
<td>26,799</td>
<td>34,040</td>
<td>48,781</td>
<td>56,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD holders (D)</td>
<td>10,994</td>
<td>14,308</td>
<td>18,724</td>
<td>27,662</td>
<td>33,947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(D)/(C) em %</td>
<td>51.04</td>
<td>53.39</td>
<td>55.01</td>
<td>56.71</td>
<td>59.67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CNPq 2004, http://www.cnpq.br

Since saving the entire research infrastructure was not possible, the FNDCT and its decision-makers opted for a funding policy based on groups of excellence, and avoided the alternative of massively diluting resources. The federal government, in the absence of a solution to the problem of instability, launched programs to fund the best and most productive research groups. These programs were clearly a matter of presentation and polemics; their focus on excellence placed all new or non-consolidated research groups in a situation where stagnation would have been one of the optimal outcomes. Yet even this selective funding has become deceptive. Instability continues to be a major problem, which affects all agencies and very especially CNPq and Finep. In 1999 the government launched the so-called sectoral funds, financed through levies on the turnover of the private sector and on royalties and taxes on imported technology. In other words, funding no longer depends for its resources on the traditional flows of budgetary revenue: all sectoral funds, with the exception of the fund for telecommunications that is
managed by the Ministry of Communications, are grouped within the FNDCT, and Finep and CNPq share the task of managing the project funding. Finep funds infrastructure and running costs, whilst CNPq funds scholarships.

Research and other activities financed from sectoral funds seek to remove bottlenecks in the sector from which each fund draws its finance. Funding is allocated through a call for tenders which each of the funds’ management committees puts out. Representatives of government, the particular industrial sector concerned and the scientific community make up these committees. Table 2 provides a list of the sectoral funds created, and their outlay over the period 1999-2004.

Table 2. Disbursements from sectoral funds, Brazil, 1999-2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sectoral Funds</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004#</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>245.7</td>
<td>91.4</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>82.1</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>71.8</td>
<td>56.8</td>
<td>112.4</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verde-Amarelo</td>
<td>48.6</td>
<td>86.1</td>
<td>180.3</td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Energy</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IT</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agribusiness</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>24.2</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biotechnology</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aeronautics</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amazonia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>109.4</td>
<td>297.8</td>
<td>283.3</td>
<td>275.0</td>
<td>564.3</td>
<td>181.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# January to August 2004.
Source: http://www.mct.gov.br
Total Disbursement by all funds was slightly over a third of the amount originally envisaged. When the Brazilian government launched the new funding formula it was held that by 2002 the total disbursement would be more than BRL 1 billion (http://www.mct.gov.br).

Sectoral funds brought a major increase in research funding. Data on the CNPq show that between 1999 and 2000, the amount invested in research more than doubled, from BRL 50 million to 102 million (http://www.cnpq.br). Infrastructural investment showed increases of a similar order.

Policy during the 1970s favoured those institutions best prepared to benefit from investment. At the time, public higher education accounted for approximately 50 percent of undergraduate enrolment and almost all doctoral students in the country. By comparison in 2003, the public sub-system accounted for less than 30 percent of the 3.9 million higher education students in Brazil (http://www.inep.gov.br). This situation goes far in explaining why scientific infrastructure was located in the public university sector, and more particularly where a very large group of federal universities is concentrated. An analysis of research groups registered by the CNPq shows this dominance very clearly: the 10 largest universities (roughly six percent of all universities) account for almost 40 percent of both research groups and researchers with a PhD degree. Of these 10 universities, all of which are public, three are universities of the Sao Paulo State system and the remainder are federal universities. The first private university ranks in 15th place.

It is hardly surprising that public universities were well-placed to benefit from the new form of research funding, which contributes to further concentration of research capacity in terms of both infrastructures and research staff. Lahorgue (2004) analyzed the case of two federal universities with very good performances in the context of sectoral funds. Taking only one of the sub-programs in the Petroleum Fund (CT Petro) and within that sub-program, only that element which in 2001 dealt with industry links, the Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ) and the Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS) were granted more than twice the amount of investment that was available in that year from budget resources. The university budget includes all fields and disciplines, but CT-Petro projects are more restrictive. Engineering, geology and chemistry are the 'league champions' of this fund. Industry-driven funding also
brings concurrent benefits (like new equipment, closer university-industry relations and more money for the current expenditure of laboratories) and institutional costs. In terms of its general impact at system level, the performance of the same two universities (UFRJ and UFRGS) in 2003 shows another feature of this kind of funding: the increasing concentration on a few institutions. Table 3 shows the actual disbursements by FNDCT for the year 2003, comparing UFRJ and UFRGS with the aggregate of their home States (Rio de Janeiro, or RJ, and Rio Grande do Sul, RS).

Table 3. Disbursements by FNDCT (sectoral funds), 2003, UFRJ and UFRGS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of institutions (*)</th>
<th>Disbursement in BRL 1 million</th>
<th>Participation in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RJ</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>43.774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFRJ</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RS</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>27.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UFRGS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.261</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*) All candidates for the grants, as a proxy of all the institutions that could compete (HEIs, research centres, State laboratories, etc.)


Brazil has 1,859 higher education institutions (http://www.inep.gov.br, 2003), and 163 universities. So the above two institutions account for 1.23 percent of the total number of universities, and 3.74 percent of the total disbursement of sectoral funds (see Table 2). Against the internal imbalance, there is an external impact through the historical trend of concentration around a few institutions, in the southeast region of the country and in certain areas of scientific research. For example, the social sciences are far away from the core of the tenders; bioscience domains are also not very well covered. In 2003, UFRJ and UFRGS had almost 100 sectoral funds projects, though only eight were from the bio areas (biology, biotechnology and environment).

RESEARCH FUNDING AND AUTONOMY

At a recent meeting of the Conference of Italian University Rectors it was stated that there is no autonomy without funding: ‘... financial autonomy is the necessary feature of every form of autonomy that is wished for’ (Tosi, 2004: 14). Evidently, the volume of funding is not enough. But the institution must also be free to decide where to invest,
and this is not to endorse a total dissociation from societal needs. The Humboldtian university is no longer the answer, and the self-centred organization has no future. Governments and society are not willing to support something that they cannot shape, and that does not enter into dialogue with them. Rather, universities must be open to the expectations and influences of their environments, be responsive to their needs and effective agents of local and regional development. Universities have multiple missions that include teaching, research training, basic research and transfer of knowledge to industry and to society. As institutions, they have an important role to play in filling the gap between teaching, training and research and regional development policies.

The new funding formula in Brazilian research introduces a much bigger awareness of industrial bottlenecks to the academic community, and the last few years have seen major efforts from the university to intensify university-industry relations. Higher education institutions are creating technology transfer offices, incubators and science parks at an accelerating pace: Brazil has more than 30 transfer offices, some 400 incubators of all sorts (technology-based, traditional, social) and 10 operating science parks. All the signs point in the same direction: contractual research and commercialization of technology as new sources of institutional funding. Yet international experience demonstrates that very few universities have substantial revenues from contractual research with the private sector or from technology commercialization. Stanford University or MIT are exceptions in a group of hundreds of research universities worldwide. Nonetheless, fashion points towards industry-driven research.

THE DANGERS

There are dangers in fashion-driven research. In Brazil and since sectoral funds are practically the sole source of major research funding, there is a strong movement towards abandoning basic research in favour of applied research. This trend can impoverish the nation’s capacity to innovate, because research groups seeking to ensure a flow from the available funds could be tempted to do more of the same thing, thus blocking the way to new paths of research. Brazil possesses another feature that could reinforce this trend: the sectors (and firms) involved in the new funding formula are mainly traditional, and quite stable from the point of view of their technology. Table 1 shows that frontier
technologies’ (IT, health, biotechnology and aeronautics) account for only 6 percent of FNDCT disbursements from 1999 to 2004.

From this framework two levels of concern arise in relation to autonomy. One is the institutional level and its survival in the long run, and the other is the level of the national system where S&T development is critical for national autonomy. From the institutional point of view, autonomy is the ‘north star’. The Brazilian Constitution states that universities are autonomous academically, administratively and financially. But with respect to federal universities that declaration is yet to be realized, as financial and administrative autonomy are often non-existent. For the staff management, federal universities must follow extremely narrow rules that forbid, for example, the hiring of personnel without a ministry recommendation and decision. University funding by the federal government always lags behind the rapid expansion of activities. For federal research universities, sectoral funds have been welcome because they meant new money; but as the author has shown, only a part of the scientific field has benefited from these funds. For ‘competitive’ research groups, sectoral funds finance their renewal in terms of equipment, software and buildings. For the ‘non-competitive’ groups there is always the university budget to be fought over.

In this situation institutional management, which is responsible for the present but also for the future, must try to escape from the ‘research trap’ that fashion has set. A balanced portfolio of research would be a good tool to avoid fashionable research, to ensure sustainability and to protect the long-term advancement of knowledge. At the institutional level, much depends on freedom of choice and on the autonomy achieved. Without proper public funding, the question remains how a university may counter the trend to do ‘more of the same’. It is not just a case of balance between various forms of funding, but rather the need to have sufficient public funding tied to goals defined by government and the university itself. Such funding must also look to the future, and improve institutional capacity for foresight and vision. When survival in the short run is the main concern, institutional autonomy remains a faraway ideal.

A recent paper from the UNCTAD (2004) discussed the role of S&T in the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a set of targets and indicators for combating poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and gender discrimination.
They include, halving the proportion of people suffering from hunger, achieving universal primary education, gender equality, and halving the proportion of people without access to safe water. Most of these targets are to be achieved by 2015. UNCTAD states that:

Progress towards achieving the MDGs has been slow. Most developing countries will face serious challenges in meeting the goals by 2015 without building a solid science and technology base that would address national needs and contribute to development effectively. The most important elements of such a base include investment in science and technology education, the setting up of centres of excellence, facilitating the diffusion and use of new scientific and technological knowledge … The widening technological gap between nations is one of the causes of the rapidly expanding socio-economic gap between rich and poor nations. (UNCTAD, 2004: 3)

UNCTAD recognizes the efforts made to increase innovation and the application of technology in developing countries, and stresses the need for a large participative process in the creation of science and technology capacity. This process includes players such as academic institutions, R&D centres, enterprises, financial institutions and government bodies. For governments the target is to create ‘… a policy environment and institutions that are supportive of technology development and diffusion’ (UNCTAD, 2004: 4). Thus developing countries are invited to master more complex technologies, create their own capacity to understand the principles involved and innovate so as to take part in high-value-added activities. However one can use technology without knowing how it works, but it can be very costly and time-consuming:

With sophisticated technologies the number of possible reasons why a technology does not work quickly gets so large that trial and error investigation becomes economically unfeasible. However, the ability to explain behaviour greatly reduces the trial and error nature of this problem-solving by reducing the number of experimental dead ends that are followed, which in turn can generate economies of scale, scope and speed in R&D. (Nightingale, 2004: 17)

PRE-CONDITIONS
To advance understanding is to open the path for the advance of science. It is a process that requires a ‘division of labour’, and clearly
defines the role of the productive sector and the role of universities. The funding of the effort to understand must be primarily public, because the results must be of general, public use. Funding university research along these principles can generate the skills, artefacts and explanations that may take many years to build up or which must be adapted to local conditions (as in the case of agricultural science, for example).

In conclusion, S&T policies ought to take account of the future and the coming generations. Funding ought accordingly to be not only industry-driven, but also responsive to a more pro-active role of Brazilian public universities in the national autonomy. A broader understanding of production needs is called for.

REFERENCES
INTRODUCTION: GLOBALIZATION, HIGHER EDUCATION AND GENDER EQUITY

This Chapter looks at the university as a site of globalization, where the playing out of the global information economy, transformed notions of knowledge, work and equity – with positive and negative possibilities for the position of women – can be observed. What are the implications for women as part of the gendered system of higher education (Chanana, 2003; Brooks and McInnon, 2001)?

In their study of Australia, Canada, the USA and the UK, Slaughter and Leslie (1997) mention four critical implications of globalization for higher education. Of these, two are pertinent to this discussion: the reduction in public funds and the growing importance of techno-science and subjects related to international markets. The third critical implication lies in the stratification of disciplines between arts and sciences, the expansion of applied/professional subjects, the private sector as a critical player and shifts in the study choices of women. According to McInnon and Brooks (2001) central to globalization are

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1 Globalization means many things to many people. According to some colonialism was globalization, while others refer to modernization as globalization. This author refers to it as the impact of economic liberalization in India since 1991, with special reference to higher education.
information technology, advanced telecommunications and innovation etc. Yet social movements representing civil society question the dominance of technology in higher education. They also question the formulation of research agendas around new technologies and the marginalization of social issues and social policy research areas in which women academic staff members and students are disproportionately represented.

Globalization is accompanied by a closer focus on techno-science which has gendered implications: women are less likely to be involved in those areas which are frontrunners in the new economy and the market; they are also likely to be at lower levels; and they may not be able to adjust to the time-space compression that IT demands or fosters (Harvey, 1993). Those located in more reflective areas and who can quickly respond to the call of the market will react differently to these changes. Do women have the time to join the race for procuring funds for research or for running departments? How do they fare in the race for promotions if the latter are linked to funds? Further, wealth creation replaces a traditional concern with the liberal education of undergraduates (Sassen, 1997: 37) – a majority of whom are women. Women academics involved in feminist critiques are generally located in the humanities and the social sciences, and are likely to be affected by the homogenization of research within and across disciplines; this, according to Marginson, is an effort ‘… to make the butterflies fly in formation’ (2000: 192). According to McInnon and Brooks, feminist scholars wish to disrupt these ‘formations’ and would like to fly in quite contrary directions (2001: 6).

Such new developments have devalued precisely those disciplines which women took up – the humanities and the social sciences, subjects perceived as dispensable by the Vice Chancellor and ‘his’ team of managers. They are concerned more about the bottom line than about equity goals. How are women’s choices affected by this development?

Globalization has changed the world into a global market, unrestricted by geographical boundaries. Direct ties between industry, the corporate world and higher education have altered the skills that new jobs require. The boundaries between arts and science subjects have seen a corresponding change: stratification between arts and sciences has been strengthened further, while the sciences are subdivided into applied/emerging versus pure; natural/pure sciences are valued lower
than applied sciences and professional skills. Academic courses related to bioscience — molecular biology, microbiology, biochemistry and biophysics — have preference over biology, physics and chemistry. In the hierarchy of disciplines, new disciplines such as management, media and mass communications, fashion technology etc. have taken their place towards the higher end of the spectrum. Private institutions are very quick to respond to these demands. Until the early 1990s in India, women entered colleges and universities mainly in general education or in arts subjects. Now, they enter private self-financing institutions and study in both new and traditionally labelled ‘masculine’ disciplines. The gendered impact of such changes deserves attention if the goal of social change and gender equity is to be achieved. Effectively, the study of gender is the study of inequality (Thomas, 1990: 2) and social differences are critical to understanding women’s disciplinary choices.

UNDERSTANDING WOMEN’S DISCIPLINARY CHOICES

This Chapter is based on the premise that the family and educational institutions are sites of social reproduction, which communicate the binary opposition of femininity and masculinity and its evaluative components of ‘inferior’ and ‘superior’ respectively to infants, girls and boys who grow up interiorizing this difference. When they enter school, this message is conveyed in several ways. Again, the ideologies permeating socialization in the family and the home also underlie educational structures and organizations. This Chapter highlights the need to look at women within the regional context, while also emphasizing diversity and heterogeneity across the Indian subcontinent. Although one may talk about Indian women at one level, it is important to look at inter-regional differences and variations as well as at women belonging to different castes, tribes and social strata. These too have interlocking systems of domination (hooks, 1989: 22).

Researchers working on gender and education initially assumed that increased participation of girls in education would eliminate inequality if their underachievement and under-representation were taken care of (Megarry, 1984). It was also suggested that sex role socialization and consequent stereotyping of the ‘feminine’ role impacted upon girls’ educational situation. Initially, the underachievement of girls and their segregation into the humanities and arts (and boys into science) were also concerns at the school level. Later, subject choice and
its relationship to gender in higher education also received attention (Acker, 1994; Harding, 1986; Thomas, 1990; Keller, 1983; Becher, 1981; and Hudson, 1972). It was argued that the clustering of women in specific subjects led to their occupational segregation later in life (Sharpe, 1976; Deem, 1978; and Wolpe, 1978). ‘Understanding the gender-specific connotations of certain fields of learning is crucial, to comprehend the process which produces gender inequality in education’ (Thomas, 1990: 7). According to Becher (1981), ‘… academic subjects are not neutral; they are cultures, each with its own way of perceiving and interpreting the world’ (as cited by Thomas, 1990: 7).

Imbalance between the arts and sciences at the school level, or lower enrolment of girls in comparison to boys in science subjects, has been a major concern. Girls tend to cluster in the arts, humanities and social sciences. Sociologists contend that this imbalance in subjects has to be redressed to remove inequality (Kelly, 1981; Harding, 1983; and Whyte, 1986). They stress that not only should more girls enrol in science at school, they must also do well. The explanation given is that girls tend to opt for specific subjects because of their socialization, which relates feminine roles to feminine subjects. In India, the gender bias against science in schools was removed through policy intervention when as a follow-up of the New Educational Policy of 1986 science was made compulsory for all students up to the Xth standard to ensure that all girls read science.

Thus, the disciplinary choices of women have focused the debate in the feminist discourse on education and gender. Much has been written on the patriarchal imprint on the disciplinary choices of women in higher education, and on the feminine and masculine dichotomy of disciplines (Acker, 1994; Thomas, 1990). Since masculinity and femininity are social constructions (Kellner, 1997) the underlying assumptions about subject or disciplinary choices have to be uncovered along with their close connection to women’s place in society (Harding, 1986). Thomas mentions (1990: 5) three important assumptions. First is the demarcation of science from arts, or physics from biology. In other words, what is the meaning of science and how are scientific subjects demarcated? The second is related to the belief that science is more difficult than humanities and that within science, physics is the most difficult. The third assumption is related to the belief that science is good. Thomas sees this as the most debatable and important assumption, one recently falsified by evidence that science has been
used for warfare and armaments (Rose, 1986). According to Millett (1983), this assumption perpetuates male dominance in science. Why is it prestigious to take up science and mathematics? Why are science and mathematics difficult? Subjects are considered masculine not because of the numerical preponderance of men. It is the other way around: science is viewed as masculine, therefore more men take it. “To both scientists and their public, scientific thought is male thought – in ways that painting and writing, also performed largely by men, never have been’ (Keller, 1983: 188).

THE INDIAN CONTEXT
Several aspects have changed in India since 1991. The most important is in the position of the government, reflected in reduction of State funding to higher education, the entry of private players, the increase in the individual cost of higher education i.e. the self-financing of higher education, the entry of foreign institutions, the large number of Indian students who go abroad on a self-financing basis, changes in the academic environment of higher educational institutions, the impact on teachers’ conditions of service, the transfer of efficiency and accountability from management discourse to educational discourse, the overwhelming dominance of professional and techno-science subjects, etc. All need to be analyzed from a gender perspective. However, the expansion of professional education and changes in disciplinary choice are the most visible. The author seeks here to gauge the influence of economic liberalization and market demand on women’s access to higher education as well as on women’s choices of subjects. A perceptible change in women’s choices is visible, at least in India’s metropolitan areas where women flock to the new ‘professional’ courses – management, fashion design, computers and human resource management. How far are these trends reflected at macro-level? Is the data sufficient to demonstrate trends?

Social Stratification in India
Indian society is divided along caste, class, religion, region and sex. Caste is the most pervasive parameter, especially for Hindus who form nearly 82 percent of the population; it imparts an extremely hierarchical nature to Indian society, and non-Hindu groups also share several features of the caste system. In Hinduism, caste or jati, refers to an endogamous group; membership in a caste is hereditary. Castes are
arranged hierarchically, and it is easy to identify the castes at the top and the bottom. More difficult however is to identify a nationwide hierarchy of castes because of their roots in regional culture.

Broadly, there is a difference between the twice-born castes and the untouchables (or the Scheduled Castes). People are divided into ‘clean’ and ‘unclean’ castes on the basis of purity and pollution. Untouchables have the lowest ritual standing and economic position, and suffer from severe social and civic disabilities. They are often associated with the most degrading and unclean occupations such as scavenging, sweeping and hide and leather work. They are also artisans such as weavers, washer men, toddy tappers, etc. A caste, such as weavers, may not be considered untouchable in all regions. Moreover, a large majority has given up the stigmatized occupations but may still not enjoy a status equal to the high castes. While caste is determined on the basis of birth, it in turn determines the distribution of income, health and education. They are referred to as ‘Scheduled Castes’ in this chapter. In addition to the untouchables, who form nearly 15 percent of the population, there are tribes (Scheduled Tribes) in central India, mainly the States of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh and in the North Eastern Hill States. Though characterized by geographical isolation and low economic status, these tribes are distinct in several ways. The tribes in central India are impoverished and are the most backward; they have suffered the intrusion of the Indian mainstream, and of the pan-Indian model of the State, society, economy and culture. The new forces released during the colonial period affected them adversely, and led to the denial of their traditional rights to land, forest produce and other natural resources. They were unable to benefit from changes in either economics or politics. The tribes in the North Eastern Hill States, though heterogeneous, are distinctly different. They are not as poor or oppressed as those in central India, and have had more education due to a longer exposure to missionary activity. In these regions, the tribal members were the majority; however, they share marginalization with other tribes, who together form 7.5 percent of Indian population.

The regional context reveals diversity and heterogeneity in the Indian subcontinent. While one may talk about Indian women at one level, inter-regional differences and variations among women belonging to different castes, tribes and social strata are also important.
Women in Indian Society

Indian women too are divided by caste, tribe, class, region and religion. Generally, they do not enjoy parity in status with men, and the dimensions of caste, class, etc. represent a cumulative disadvantage: theirs is a burden of multiple inequality. Inferior social status, retrograde social customs such as sati, child marriage, the prohibition of widow remarriage, dowry and lack of education attracted the attention of social reformers and Indian national leaders during the colonial period. The question of women became intermeshed with social reform, and most social reformers focused on the education of girls. To eliminate these disadvantages, education was viewed in the Indian Constitution as an instrument of social change, individual mobility and social equality for all social groups to be achieved through social justice, integration and mainstreaming. While minorities needed to be brought into the mainstream, Scheduled Castes (SC) and Scheduled Tribes (ST) required social justice and equality. Women, on the other hand, deserved equality.

HIGHER EDUCATION, ACCESS AND EQUALITY: POLICY FRAMEWORK

Higher education was entrusted with protecting the constitutional provisions for positive discrimination. The commitment to broaden the student base was reflected in the financial incentives provided to SC/ST students such as hostels, post-matriculation (secondary school) scholarships, etc. Special administrative units were set up in universities to monitor the entry/progress of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe students, staff and teachers. Over time and through political intervention, the reserved categories came to include the disabled and other backward castes (OBCs). There is no gender-based positive discrimination in education or employment, although some provinces and institutions made separate provision for women.2 Since higher education was responsible for promoting social change, until 1991 the leitmotif in most policy documents was that universities should develop scientific and technical knowledge, and through its

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2 The one measure which universities have recently been asked to take in favour of women is to set up committees against sexual harassment. This directive of the University Grants Commission has been fulfilled by some universities, whether or not such committees are effectively functioning.
application eliminate hunger, disease and ignorance (India, 1962: 33). These are the important parameters of ‘social development’, which is increasingly linked to literacy and primary education. The State had full responsibility for the growth and development of higher education, and kept the private sector out of its purview.  

Since reforming the social condition of women was central to the independence movement, the development strategy of independent India in the 1950s included women, especially their education, in the Five-Year Plans. The Report of the Committee on the Education of Women, 1956–58, Government of India made extensive recommendations, but disparities in the education of men and women continued. These were substantiated by the Report of the Committee on the Status of Women (1974) and in the Sixth Plan linked education to the participation of women in development. There was a shift from a welfare approach to making women active partners. The National Policy of Education (1986) later underscored the role of education as an instrument of women’s equality and empowerment. The National Perspective Plan, 1988–2000, reiterated this point; it stated that women themselves must overcome their handicaps. A careful articulation of education for equality for women is reflected in the educational policy discourse of post-independence India.

The latest trends in the enrolment of women in different faculties and disciplines are the prime focus of this Chapter. Has the subject

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3 It may be noted that while higher education was fully State-funded, private schools were allowed to continue operating. The government was criticized for this since it allowed the dual system to operate at the school level.

4 This report was entitled Towards Equality and is better known by that title. The committee was appointed by the government of India after the declaration of 1975 as the UN Year for Women. The committee submitted its report in December 1974, and covered all aspects of the status of women in post-independent India. The report was a landmark in that it substantiated a decline in the overall status of Indian women, and shook the Indian intelligentsia, political leaders and women out of complacency. It would be no exaggeration to say that it set the agenda for the contemporary women’s movement in India.

5 The statistics published by the University Grants Commission and Ministry of Human Resource Development are based only on enrolment (which is of uneven quality). For instance, the UGC annual report for 1996–1997 merges the enrolment figures for women in agriculture with those of medicine and several other disciplines. This may highlight the paucity of statistics on higher education in general and on women in particular.
choice of women shifted during the last 50 years? Data on marginal groups such as the Dalits\(^6\) and tribes are also included, and regional disparities are analyzed. While disciplinary choice is the main focus, the participation of women at different levels, namely, undergraduate, post-graduate and research is also examined. What are the chances of their staying on and progressing from one stage of higher education to another?

**THE INDIAN HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM**

Higher education occupies a dominant position as a promoter of economic growth and technological development, and as an instrument of equal opportunity and upward social mobility. The establishment of special institutions of national importance, of the Indian Institutes of Technology and Management, all contribute to the excellence of higher education in India’s development. Prior to 1991, expansion of higher education coincided with public discourse and policies on equal opportunity. Policies concentrated on public sector institutions, which provided education and employment. The emphasis on equal opportunity reflected the social importance of higher education, and the concern of government to ensure the participation of first-generation students; it also reflected the rapid coalescence of social justice around the issues of caste, tribe, class and gender. Given public concern on equality and excellence, higher education had the full support of federal and provincial governments. However despite very low fees, ‘reservations’ and affirmative action, women and the disadvantaged have either been excluded from, or had a negligible representation in, the Nation’s best public institutions.

After 1991, policies have changed the seemingly privileged position of higher education. The government proposed to remove public support for higher education, and to make it self-financing by privatizing it. Higher education became a ‘non-merit good’. Since the early 1990s, private autonomous institutions have been set up although without a clearly defined policy for their regulation (Anandkrishnan, 2004: 210). In India the link between universities and the private sector is not new, nor is the nexus between higher education and the economy. What is disconcerting is the nature and speed of change, the

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\(^6\) ‘Dalit’ means the oppressed and the exploited. Today, Scheduled Castes prefer to be referred to as Dalits.
motives of those establishing private institutions, the ad hoc approach to new developments and the lack of a considered response from the federal government. The policies of the Indian government since 1991 effectively restructured the economy and the education system. The existing system had become too large, ineffective and characterized by only a few high-quality institutions at the top; the majority were of poor or indifferent quality. They did not meet rising social demand for higher education or for skill-oriented professional education. To meet the pressure, government allowed private sector, fee-paying and self-financing institutions to put on specific courses.

Private Higher Education

Private institutions levy hefty tuition fees, with or without the approval of State governments and even though State governments and the judiciary have intervened in setting fee levels. Increasingly, such colleges seek ‘deemed university’ status, which gives them freedom to determine their curriculum, set their examinations and decide on their mode of student evaluation. Along with the financial exploitation of students, the quality of their education is also suspect, as is their motivation (Anandkrishnan, 2004). Private institutions are sold land at subsidized rates and in return they are expected to reserve places for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes; but there is little monitoring of these measures and no statistics are publicly available on reserved places.

As the private sector grew, so public universities post-1991 have been downsized, which is likely to exacerbate gender inequalities (Allen and Castleman, 2001: 151). Provincial universities are deeply affected by these changes, both in their program provision and subject coverage. Subjects with market demand are being introduced. New programs in most public universities are student-funded, thereby increasing the individual cost of education. Since provincial governments are not adjusting funding to keep pace with the cost of running universities, self-funded courses become a regular source of income for universities.

India’s Higher Education Profile

India’s higher education system is one of the largest in the world. It consists of colleges, universities, institutions of national importance (Indian Institutes of Technology, Indian Institutes of Management and Indian Institutes of Science etc.) and autonomous institutions with the status of ‘deemed universities’. There are two kinds of
universities, unitary and affiliating; unitary universities undertake teaching in university departments, while colleges are affiliated to the latter. In 2002-2003 there were 300 universities, of which 183 were provincial, 18 federal, 71 ‘deemed’ universities, five established through central and State legislation and 13 institutes of national importance. Some 9,227,833 students were enrolled, namely about 8 percent of the relevant age group. There were 436,000 teachers in 2002-2003 as against 457,000 in 2000-2001; of these, nearly 83 percent are in affiliated colleges and 17 percent in universities. The University Grants Commission does not provide data broken down by gender. However in 2001-2002 the MHRD provided information on women teachers in 12 open universities who accounted for 18.4 percent, and for 21.5 percent in institutions offering correspondence courses.

Since 1991, a large number of self-financing private colleges have been set up and these have increased rapidly. The private technical education system in India is the largest in the world, and the growth of higher education in the last 15 years has been mainly in the private sector (Anandkrishnan, 2004). Growth in private education has increased undergraduate enrolment in higher education, mainly in the colleges of arts and sciences that offer application-oriented science and management courses in microbiology, biochemistry, business administration, computer science etc.

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7 In 2002-2003 there were 15,343 affiliated colleges. Of these 1,650 (10.75 percent) are exclusively for women students. While the number has gone up from 1,600 in 2000-2001 to 1,650, the proportion has reduced from 12.7 to 10.75 percent. Although the Indian system of higher education is huge in its numbers, it remains small in terms of the participation range of the relevant age group, which is about 7-8 percent.

8 In addition, 632,214 students are enrolled in distance education and 1,123,344 (36 percent of them women) in correspondence education (MHRD, 2001-2002).

9 For example, in Tamil Nadu the number of self-financing colleges in arts and sciences increased from 54 in 1993-1994 to 247 in 2000-2001, while the government colleges increased only from 56 to 60 and aided colleges from 132 to 133 (Bhattacharya, 2004: 218). The proportion of women also increased from 42.89 percent to 51.07 percent in the private colleges during this period. The self-financing engineering colleges in Tamil Nadu increased from 71 in 1996-1997 to 212 in 2001-2002, while the number of government (7) and aided (3) remained the same. The enrolment in the private colleges increased from 20,250 to 55,500. The other States where private institutions account for more than half of enrolments are Goa (58.5 percent), Punjab (52.68), Andaman and Nicobar Islands (57.77), Chandigarh.
WOMEN IN HIGHER EDUCATION

The focus here is on enrolment of women and men in higher education, of women across faculties/disciplines or subjects, across levels/stages, and at the undergraduate, graduate/post-graduate and doctoral/research levels.

Differences in Enrolment in General and Professional Education

The period covered is from 1950-1951 to 2002-2003. For specific examples, statistics from 2001-2002 have been used because of their non-availability for later years. The author concentrates on enrolment during the 1990s, with data from the preceding 40 years serving to illustrate trends and developments. In 1950-1951 women as a proportion of all students in higher education were 10.9 percent. By 2002-2003, women were 40.04 percent – a significant increase. Thus, the numbers of women entering higher education today increased from 1,685,926 in 1991-1992 to 3,695,964 currently.

Table 1. Women’s enrolment in higher education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Total (women + men)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>3,695,965</td>
<td>40.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>2,191,138</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>1,685,926</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>748,525</td>
<td>27.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>655,822</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>170,455</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>43,126</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


(55.5) and Pondicherry (52.60). Those with the lowest proportion are also the most backward, namely Bihar (23.81), Jharkhand (30.40), Chhattisgarh (36.70), Rajasthan (32.33), Uttar Pradesh (38.40) and Madhya Pradesh (37.20). In these provinces the proportion is below the all-India average of 40.05 percent.
Women’s choices of disciplines changed as well, and furthermore wide disparities exist in enrolment by region, caste, tribe and gender. They have particular impact on women from disadvantaged groups. These trends are discussed below.

Table 2. Proportion of women students to total enrolment (as a percentage)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>44.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>22.1</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng./Tech</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>21.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>22.8</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet. Science*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>20.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>38.3</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Agriculture, veterinary science and others are merged for the years 1950-51 to 1980-81.

Sources: UGC, 2002; 1995.

Enrolment in General and Professional Education

India’s higher education divides programs into ‘general subjects’, arts including social sciences and humanities, and pure sciences on the one hand, and ‘professional courses’ such as engineering (including architecture), medicine, teacher education, agriculture, law etc. on the other. Feminist scholars also distinguish between ‘masculine’ and ‘feminine’ disciplines; the arts, social sciences, humanities and teacher education are viewed as feminine disciplines; commerce, law and engineering are masculine disciplines. In India and unlike Western countries, medical science has not been a male preserve; as in the rest of South Asia the practice of female seclusion required that women patients be treated by women doctors, who had to be trained. Accordingly, women entered the medical profession from the start.
(Chanana, 1990). After Independence the proportion of women in some of the male-dominated disciplines was miniscule, and remained so until the 1980s, with the exception of commerce (Chanana, 2000) where the proportion of women (0.5 percent in 1950-1951) increased to 15.9 percent in 1980-1981. Thereafter it rose steadily, and in 2002-2003 stood at 36.7 percent.

In Engineering/Technology courses and as above, women accounted for 0.2 percent of enrolments in 1950-1951; 3.8 percent in 1980-1981; and currently 22.3 percent of those studying in this field. In law, their proportion increased similarly from 2.1 percent to 20.8 percent. In education, women were 32.4 percent even in 1950-51, and today stand at 50.6 percent. In medicine, their share – 16.3 percent in 1950-51 – is now 44.7 percent. In arts, women in 2002-2003 were 44.2 percent, a figure that has been growing steadily since 1970-1971 (the proportion of men during the same period fell from 83.9 percent to 54.6 percent). In teacher’s education, another ‘feminine’ discipline, the proportion of women rose from 32.4 to 50.6 percent. Science, a ‘masculine’ discipline, provides an interesting insight on the disciplinary choices of young women: the proportion of men – 71.2 percent until 1980-1981 – dropped to 59.8 percent by 2002-2003. This was the period when natural science was at a premium, especially physics and chemistry which up to the 1980s were the first choice of male applicants; competition for places forced women out. It is also possible that science was not a first preference for young women, whose parents perceived marriage as a priority over higher education. An undergraduate degree, of any kind, helped in the marriage market by raising social status. A science degree, however, required a longer investment of time and money and therefore was not desirable. Young women were also socialized to perceive higher education from that viewpoint. Nowadays, studying the natural sciences is less preferred by men; it does not command a high salary, and requires several more years of study than engineering, IT or a management degree. More women are staying on to research in natural sciences (Bal, 2004: 3653).

Thus, the proportions of women and men almost balanced in the sciences during the last decade. The differential importance of general science for women and men over time has to be understood as a background to certain shifts in disciplinary preferences in the recent past. Nowadays young persons, both men and women, are
impatient with just pursuing ‘studies’; they like to earn as soon as they can, even while in school. This revolution in values cuts across strata, *i.e.* even young persons from upper and middle strata want to earn as early as possible. The daughters of city-based professional parents, especially if they are without brothers, have seen their socialization change radically as parents today give the best education to their daughters, and expect them to be independent and follow careers. This revolution in values contrasts with those which dominated prior to the 1990s, when education and its early linkage to the job market were set aside for men needing jobs. It was certainly not so for women. The priorities of women have also changed, and wanting professional education, they too enter the so-called ‘masculine’ disciplines. This may be illustrated by the percentage of women distributed across different disciplines.

**Which Disciplines? What Subjects?**

As a proportion of all women enrolling in higher education, fewer women are opting for teacher education or medicine. In teacher education, considered a women’s profession, the proportion of women’s enrolments decreased from 3.1 percent in 1950-1951 to 1.8 percent in 2002-2003.

Medicine also has seen a decline in the proportion of women enrolling, from 5.8 percent to 3.6 percent. Commerce provides an interesting contrast: the percentage has increased from 0.4 percent in 1950-1951 to 11.8 percent in 1980-1981. Most of the expansion seems to have taken place during the 1970s, a period when commerce became a stepladder to management and chartered accountancy etc. After 1980-1981, growth continued steadily to 16.5 percent in 2002-03. In engineering and technology we see significant increases, from less than one percent in 1950-1951 to 4.2 percent in 2002-2003, as in the case of law from 0.7 percent to 4.2 percent. Two simultaneous trends appear to be present: clustering/concentration and dispersal. Both are evident in the participation patterns of women in higher education. During the three decades following Independence, women clustered in the general disciplines of arts and sciences (nearly 90 percent). Male participation was also characterized by clustering in arts and sciences disciplines, but also by dispersal around commerce, engineering and law. More recently, women’s participation is also marked by clustering as well as dispersal.
Table 3. Percentage distribution of women by discipline, 1951-2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arts</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>70.2</td>
<td>64.3</td>
<td>56.2</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>51.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>21.0</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eng./Tech.</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vet. Science*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Agriculture, veterinary science and others are merged for the years 1950-1951 to 1980-1981.

Sources: Chanana, 2004; UCG, 2002; 1995.

Enrolment by Level/Stage

Once women enter higher education, do they move on to the graduate level and research? Table 4 shows the distribution of women by level/stage of education.

In 1991-1992, 1,479,231 women were enrolled in undergraduate programs, which increased to 3,285,544 in 2002-2003. At graduate level 169,267 women were enrolled in 1991-1992 compared to 355,893 women in 2002-2003. Similarly, research program enrolments totaled 19,894 in 1991-1992 as compared to 23,609 in 2002-2003. During this period, the proportion of women in all student enrolments rose from 32.8 percent to 39.9 percent at undergraduate level; from 34.7 percent to 42.0 percent at the graduate level; and from 37.1 percent to 38.0 percent in MPhil and PhD programs. The proportion is highest at graduate level, whilst in research programs it dipped from 39.2 percent in 1995-1996 to 38.0 percent in 2002-2003. Women who enrolled for research degrees increased to 8,780 in 1980-1981 (Chanana, 1993: 12). By the end of that decade their number nearly doubled, to 15,018 in 1988-1989. In 2002-2003 it stood at 23,609.
Table 4. Proportion of women by level/stage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Undergraduate</th>
<th>Graduate</th>
<th>Researcher</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002-2003</td>
<td>39.93</td>
<td>42.04</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996-1997</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-1996</td>
<td>34.1</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-1995</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>38.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1994</td>
<td>33.02</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1993</td>
<td>32.43</td>
<td>35.63</td>
<td>38.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>34.70</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980-1981</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>28.2</td>
<td>27.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970-1971</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>20.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-1961</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>15.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-1951</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>14.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UGC Annual Reports for relevant years.

Regional Disparities

The division of the Indian Union reflects social, cultural and economic differences. Consequently, growth and expansion of women’s education varies over time across different provinces (Chanana, 1988). Time and again, official committees and commissions appointed in the post-independence period have referred to these disparities. The Committee on Women’s Education 1956-1958, the first to tackle this issue comprehensively, noted that the four southern provinces of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala displayed better female literacy rates than the northern, Hindi-speaking provinces. Towards Equality, the Report of the Committee on the Status of Women (1974) also remarked that regions and cities with high populations of Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes and Muslims had low literacy rates. These trends persist, and the enrolment of women varies from province to province. Kerala has had the highest enrolment at 60 percent, i.e. there are more women than men in higher education there. Apart from pro-women cultural traditions and values, which cannot be explained here, the migration of young men to the Middle East may also have caused this reverse gender gap.
The link between the provinces and professional education is very close, as regional variation is also present in the growth of engineering and technology courses in the four southern States. In 1991 and of 70,481 students in degree courses, 4,419 (6.3 percent) were women – a rise from 3.9 percent in 1983 (IAMR, 1995). A majority of women were from the southern (1,989) and western (608) regions (Chanana, 2000: 1016-1017). Even in 2001-2002, the enrolment in undergraduate degree programs such as BE/BSc (Eng.)/BArch was highest in the four States where the maximum number of private colleges have been established. The number of women is also the highest in these States, e.g. Maharashtra (24,710); Karnataka (22,287); Andhra Pradesh (22,615); and Tamil Nadu (10,722) which works out to 20.6, 20.1, 30.4 and 18.7 percent of total enrolments in engineering/technology respectively.

Similarly, in medicine Maharashtra has the highest enrolment followed by Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat and Karnataka. Women’s enrolment too is high in these provinces. In Maharashtra, the proportion of women is 48.0 percent (17,471). It is 38.4 percent (6,206) in Tamil Nadu, 46.3 (6,066) in Andhra Pradesh, 37.8 (4,173) in Gujarat and 33 percent (2,367) in Karnataka. Though the number of students in MBBS is nearly the same as in Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the proportion of women in the last two provinces is lower at 23.6 and 16.6 percent respectively. In commerce too, enrolment is highest in the States of Maharashtra, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Bihar and Tamil Nadu, and similarly for women – 39.6 percent in Maharashtra, 41.7 in Andhra Pradesh, 44.9 in Tamilnadu and 31.2 in Karnataka. These States add to the increase in the proportion of women at the all-India level. The same is true for the degree programs in engineering.

Several factors account for regional differences, including the earlier start of formal education in the southern as compared to the northern region during the colonial period and the large number of private engineering colleges established recently. There are also socio-cultural practices and the positive attitude of parents towards higher education for their daughters; these influence women’s access to professional education. This latter difference is, to a large extent, due to the practice of female seclusion in the north and its absence in the south (Chanana, 1988).
Caste, Class, Gender and Region

In 2001-2002, the proportions of SC/ST students were as follows: Scheduled Castes 11.5 percent (1,016,182) – women: 3.5 percent (309,813); ST students 4 percent (351,880) – women: 1.3 percent (114,168). MPhil/PhD programs enrolled a total of 53,119 students, of which 36.3 percent (19,299) were women; 5.9 percent (3,133) SC students; and 1.80 percent (951) ST students. There were 824 SC women and 344 ST women – 4.3 percent and 1.8 percent respectively of all women research students. Despite a clearly defined policy of positive discrimination, the presence of SC/ST students is not adequate and the proportion of women is negligible. Generally, they take general education courses and are denied access to elite courses and institutions.

Socio-economic factors influence disciplinary choice, especially in the case of Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe students whose participation in higher education remains marginal. But they, too, are better represented in States where women are better represented and where higher education facilities expanded in recent years. Thus, the proportion of Scheduled Caste women to total SC enrolment is 34.1 percent in Maharashtra; 39.7 in Tamilnadu; 32.2 percent in Andhra Pradesh; and 24.5 percent in Karnataka. Similarly, the Scheduled Tribe women are 29.4 percent in Maharashtra; 22.6 percent in Karnataka; 32.0 percent in Andhra Pradesh; 41.2 percent in Gujarat; and 33.7 percent in Madhya Pradesh. This trend continues across disciplines: in 2001-2002, the proportion of all women students in BE/BSc (Eng.) and BArch courses was 24.8 percent. The representative proportion of all SC students was 7.4 (38,935), and of STs 3.5 percent (18,644). While the percentage of SC women was 1.9 percent of the total (that of ST women was 0.4), the number of tribal women increased four-fold since 1995-1996 (then 575). Thus if we consider the proportion of SC/ST women vis-à-vis the total number of women in engineering courses, SC women constitute 7.5 percent and ST women 1.6 percent.

The proportion of women vis-à-vis the SC/ST students as a whole also reflects the same trend. For example, the proportion of SC women as part of total SC enrolment was 28.2 percent in Andhra Pradesh. 

10 The populations of Scheduled Castes and Tribes vary from province to province. This is an additional factor that requires attention.
11 The total enrolment was 651, of which 332 were women and 319 men.
Pradesh, 29.2 percent in Karnataka, 24.6 in Tamilnadu and 39.4 percent in Kerala. A total of 61.6 percent of SC women students in engineering courses are enrolled in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu. If only the information had been available for Maharashtra, the proportion would be much higher. Similarly, the proportions of ST women are also high in the same provinces, for example 23.4 percent in Karnataka and 18.7 percent in Andhra Pradesh. If we look at the enrolment in the three States of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh, 55.3 percent of women are enrolled in engineering courses in the three provinces. In medicine the situation is similar: 60.8 percent of SC women (4,035 out of 6,637) in medicine are in the four States of Maharashtra, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Also in medicine, 68.2 percent (4,577 out of 6,849) of ST women are enrolled in Nagaland, a tribal majority province in North-Eastern India.

DISCIPLINARY CHOICES AND CAREER OPTIONS

Availability of disciplinary courses, and women’s ability to enter them, are not directly related; nor are they dependent on women’s academic achievement. In India girls’ academic performance is generally better than, or on par with, boys’ on finishing school. Yet when they enter college, it is not necessarily to study the subject of their choice. While the shortage of places, lack of intake capacity in specific academic programs, or failing the entrance tests may be ostensible reasons, these are not sufficient explanations. A large majority of women may be prevented from exercising free choice at school level (being discouraged by family from taking up science subjects, for instance) or from attending expensive, private, ‘good quality’ schools. After schooling they may not have financial backing in coaching/tuition for entrance tests (coaching classes for IIT entrance tests are selective) given the expense involved, and socially, women are not expected to work and earn before marriage.

What are the implications of new disciplinary choices for the participation of women in the job market? Disciplinary boundaries

12 No doubt, the competition for seats in ‘good quality’ institutions is high and young women and men have to clear the entrance tests before they can gain admission for a subject of their choice. Nonetheless, in the absence of any information about the aspirations of women and men and about how many men and women sit for and succeed in which entrance test, one can only talk about enrolment data; this is quite inadequate.
limit choices. They are also dependent on the future options of ‘life chances’ of women. Whilst higher education for young women is taken for granted nowadays among the urban upper and middle strata, it is still not viewed as an immediate investment in their careers. For the majority, education is an investment to fall back upon in the event of the daughter being widowed or deserted (Chanana, 1998).

Poorer parents have another problem: education is expected to provide immediate returns. Professional education excludes the poor because it requires several more years of study and expense than general education. But general education does not ensure a job; so general education is useless and professional education unaffordable. Besides, role models are lacking. Women from such backgrounds are the most affected by the stratification of disciplines, programs and institutions. In addition there are social and economic disparities, reflected not only vis-à-vis caste and tribe but also at regional level, i.e. in different provinces.

Social and gender role expectations also affect women’s aspirations in other ways. In the patriarchal social structure, parents are not expected to use their daughters’ income. Thus, even educated daughters are not encouraged to work. If they do, it is for a short period before marriage; after that, the groom’s family has the right to decide whether she will work or not. For a majority of young women, higher education is not linked to careers, and this is why women study the arts and humanities: the latter are cheaper and shorter than professional courses. Yet, the numbers entering professional subjects are growing. The general trend moves away from general courses, to professional courses leading to jobs and careers. Some of the popular new courses are not treated separately in the statistics. Still, demand for vocational courses at undergraduate level is considerable. Of the specializations offered in management, women seem to prefer human resource management (HRM) and development (HRD). It is likely that jobs involving public relations, personnel management, marketing and advertising in the corporate sector, such as the banks, IT firms and BPO companies are becoming feminine jobs and specializations. Are women moving from disciplinary choices to specializations within disciplines?

13 Some institutions such as the XLRI, Jamshedpur, Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Mumbai, offer full programs in HRM/HRD. Several others have followed.
Specialization
The post-1991 years could be seen as a period of increased social demand for specific types of professional education, especially skill-oriented undergraduate degrees linked to careers and jobs. Earlier, an undergraduate degree, except in engineering and medicine, was a step to further higher education; it was not a terminal degree. Young men and women were not expected to work and earn soon after undergraduate education. Those who did belonged to the lower middle strata and needed to work to support themselves and the family. The middle and upper strata, by contrast, could postpone income-generation until after further education. This was applicable to most women across social strata: they were not studying to earn for a job. It was an investment in social status, as well as an additional quality for marriage. This may still be true for a large majority of women and their parents, who do not expect their daughters to earn after receiving a degree. Yet the expectations of parents and of young women in big cities are changing, mainly to do with ‘push’ factors in the shift of disciplinary choices during the mid-1990s. A change in values was mentioned earlier, and this is also a response to market demands: more women are enrolling in engineering and law, but the preference for management and computer-related degrees and skills is clear. These subjects are available in the fast-expanding private sector, which responds quickly to unmet demand for specific skills. Computer applications and software computer engineering are popular among women, but it remains to be seen whether women receive professional training that leads to jobs and careers.

To answer this question, the necessary micro-level studies are sparse indeed. Certainly, there are differences in specializations within disciplines that have career implications. For example, Human Resource Management requires interaction with the public, as does call-centre telemarketing, or the front desks of hospitals and hotels. Many of these jobs are short-term, contractual and thus suitable to the social role expectations of women.

Teaching
As for teaching, the latest statistics available for colleges and universities relate to 1993-1994 when the proportion of women teachers in higher education was 18 percent (average of 21 percent in affiliated colleges and 11.6 percent in universities). The proportion in distance education is no better in 2001-2002, from 18 percent in open universities to
21 percent in correspondence courses. Moreover after women join, they still face barriers to gender equity in universities in both the social sciences and natural sciences (Chanana, 2003; Bal, 2004). It is also anticipated that private institutions offering contractual, low-paid, short-term jobs, in the long run may develop substantial numbers of women faculty, leading to the feminization of teaching in private higher education.

**Women in Science**

A study of women scientists in the biological sciences in central universities and national laboratories concluded that, compared to those with research degrees, there are fewer permanent women staff. Researchers join as faculty members when in their early thirties, a time when women are either married or to be married soon; they need time out to raise a family. After the break they cannot compete with men in research and professional experience, and more women than men hold junior faculty positions (Bal, 2004). The presence of women students in technology and engineering has also increased. Yet a study of women engineers by Parikh and Sukhatme (1992) showed that the specializations most preferred by women were electronics and electrical and civil engineering. Computer science and chemical and mechanical engineering also followed, in that order. Parikh and Sukhatme also noted that there are fewer women students in elite institutions such as the IITs and the regional colleges of engineering.

**Management**

Management is a professional field, offered by expensive private institutes. Women are joining them. Why do they seek these degrees? In the absence of any study, this author will draw on a visit to a women’s college in Chennai, Tamil Nadu, a few years back. It is a private, unaided, self-financing college with programs in arts and management and about 60 students are admitted each year to undergraduate and graduate management programs. Informal discussions with the college principal and some students suggested that only some 30 percent have career goals. For others, the degree improves marital prospects or provides a waiting period before marriage. This is because the first degree is taken for granted, as a qualification for young women and would-be brides among the urban middle and upper strata. In such a milieu, counselling for subject choice and career guidance is either unavailable or is not gender
sensitive. Yet the 30 percent of women with career goals is also a symbol of change. In other words while shifts in disciplinary choice seem to reinforce tradition through acquiring modern skills and education, new disciplines provided in the public and private sectors (often exclusively in the latter) seem to meet the aspirations of a minority of young women and their parents in metropolitan areas to be professionally qualified, to have a career, to earn and to be independent. ‘Career before marriage’ is now socially accepted. In this case, gender and class combine to overcome traditional barriers to women’s education.

CONCLUSION

Though higher education has been inexpensive or almost free during the first four decades after Independence, access has not been easy for women. It has been denied to disadvantaged groups, and especially to their women, on social and economic grounds. When higher education becomes self-financing, what is the gendered impact of higher costs?

This Chapter has explored the access and participation of women students in public and private institutions of higher education. The comparison with private institutions has two very pertinent justifications: first, these institutions offer mostly ‘masculine’ subjects; second, they are very expensive. A long-established understanding of the social situation of women suggests that a majority of parents are reluctant to invest in the education of their daughter because her income goes to the groom’s family. Would women enter anyway? In what proportions? In which specializations? The author has not been able to answer these questions directly in the absence of relevant data. Instead she has assembled information that highlights changes in higher education and the place of women in it.

Statistics on higher education in India are very poor. Private institutions lack transparency, and do not provide any. As yet, there is no separate information on private, self-funded or unaided institutions. Hardly any effort is made systematically to document either the extent or form of the developments that are changing universities’ work culture, still less to assess the impact, gendered or otherwise, that such changes have on teachers, staff and students.

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14 The public sector does no better. Even the all-India bodies such as the UGC, MHRD and AICTE either do not give any statistics on the enrolment of women and men institution-wise, level-wise, or discipline-wise, or are not gender sensitive.
Nevertheless, the private sector has met the demand for specific subjects and increased its intake capacity in the most sought-after disciplines – at a cost. Wherever there has been expansion of higher education and the number of students has increased, women seem to have been the beneficiaries of this expansion; this is also true of the provinces in which private professional education has expanded. In those provinces, not only has the enrolment of women increased, but the enrolment of marginal groups such as the SC and ST and the women among them has also gone up. However it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion in the absence of separate gender-based enrolment data for private and public institutions, for each individual discipline and academic program. One is reluctant to give credit to private institutions because they are too expensive.

The unbridled and unregulated expansion of expensive private institutes is also disturbing. Most do not offer good-quality education, and are very expensive. The best institutions are still in the public sector. Moreover pure science, social sciences, the arts and humanities, which are the preferred disciplines of women, remain confined to public institutions. Has the earlier trend of concentration of women in these disciplines been reinforced? Additionally, even though women are enrolling in professional education in larger numbers, which institutions, private or public, are they joining and in what proportions? Would parents spend on expensive private higher education for their daughters? The policy implication of the current condition of women is that a broad-based database on higher education, which is gender-sensitive, is required. At present, the database is scant and it is not gender-sensitive. It is a sorry state of affairs that a country which boasts so large a higher education system does not consider it necessary to collect data about students and staff in public and private institutions. Information on students, namely enrolment and out-turn by level, discipline, specialization and institution are necessary for any understanding of the system.

Issues of equality, social access and quality of education have been pushed to the background at a time when only eight percent of the relevant age group enters higher education. The government ought to have a vision which both encompasses the governance of the public and private sectors and keeps concerns about gender in focus. The present ad hoc approach, with no conceptual framework, is fraught with negative implications for the access of women to higher education.
REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

Across the world, many higher education systems are currently in flux. From different quarters, diverse pressures challenge academic traditions, structures and principles. Today, universities are expected to be more accountable and transparent to government and society, to be entrepreneurs in their search for diverse budgeting sources, to teach more students with heterogeneous backgrounds and abilities, to incorporate the new information and communication technologies at various levels in their operation and to be attentive and adaptive to emerging political and societal changes (Kogan and Hanney, 2000; Neave, 2000; Sporn, 1999; UNESCO, 2003). Some changes increase horizontal or vertical diversity; others aim at decreasing them.

The range of diversity and homogeneity in higher education depends on various factors. Each national higher education system has external and internal boundaries that define its horizontal and vertical structure across different levels. External boundaries define which institutions are included in, or excluded from, the higher education system. In some national systems, tertiary level professional institutes are not considered part of higher education because they do not
award academic degrees. This is both a vertical (status) and horizontal distinction (differentiating between various types of institutions). In others, very prestigious institutes, academies of science or renowned research institutes are not considered an integral part of higher education. The right to grant degrees is not a definite criterion for including or excluding institutions from the higher education system. Extensions of foreign universities, operating across different national settings, do grant degrees, but of their own national institutions. They are neither considered part of the national settings where they operate, nor part of their mother institutions. In some countries they form a very strong component of the higher education system. By depicting the external boundaries of higher education systems, one may grasp the size and basic structure of each, as well as the vertical and horizontal structure of its institutions. From time to time, external boundaries change when, for instance, non-academic institutions are upgraded to academic status, or a new higher education law alters the status of tertiary-level institutions or research institutes.

Internal boundaries reflect the horizontal and vertical structures within a higher education system. They relate to a variety of variables: overall structure (unified, binary or segmented into several sectors), ties between public and private sectors, access policies, study programs, budgeting profiles, research and teaching policies, academic traditions and cultures, evaluation, accreditation, etc.

The changes that took place over the last decade act at the international level, some at national level, others at institutional level. This overview examines those changes bearing on the horizontal and vertical structures of higher education systems at all three levels. It analyses recent reforms that are reflected at a continental level (mainly the Bologna Process, which seeks the harmonization of European higher education systems); at national level (focusing mainly on four Central and Eastern European countries); and at institutional level. This Chapter moves on to examine the impact of some leading trends in higher education upon horizontal and vertical patterns of diversity across higher education systems. It focuses on trends in widening access to higher education, changing modes in research, funding and government-higher education relationships, the impact of information and communication technologies, and the influence of globalization, accreditation, quality assurance and trans-national policies on the structure and roles of higher education systems.
CONTINENTAL REFORM: THE BOLOGNA PROCESS

The past decade has seen wide-ranging reform in Europe to consolidate and integrate its different national higher education systems into a comparable and balanced ‘architecture’ on a continental scale. One of the most successful of these projects has been the ERASMUS program, the flagship of European cooperation in the 1990s. ERASMUS placed student exchange on a different scale, with thousands of students moving annually between European universities and other higher education institutions (Teichler and Maiworm, 1997). ERASMUS’ ability to draw different systems together rested on the commitment of teachers from different European countries, ready to compare their courses with those in other countries and to adapt teaching so that home and guest students could study together.

Against this general setting, another marker development took place in May 1998 at the Sorbonne, in celebration of the 800th anniversary of the University of Paris.¹ The French Minister of Education invited his British, German and Italian counterparts to sign a declaration, urging institutions and governments in Europe to bring academic services and university provision closer together. The structure of higher education in these four countries differs markedly, and the academic degrees each awards display immense diversity (Jablonska-Skinder and Teichler, 1992). And such diversity reflects on academia as a real ‘Tower of Babel’.

A year after the Sorbonne Declaration, the Italian Minister of Education hosted a similar meeting in Bologna in June 1999, attended by representatives of 29 European countries. The Bologna Declaration, signed on 29 June 1999, enlarged proposals in the Sorbonne Declaration and set off a process of intense consultation aimed at establishing a joint Higher Education Area of Europe by 2010. In the follow-up meetings of the Bologna Process that took place in Prague in 2001 and in Berlin in 2003, some 33 countries agreed with the goals of the Prague and Berlin Communiqués (Commission of the European Communities, 2003).

¹ And, at the same time, the 30th anniversary of May 1968, an event all the more remarkable not merely in the change it brought about in Western European universities but that it also demonstrated, as indeed did the Velvet Revolution, that change of enduring consequence does not always need either bureaucrats or policy-makers until much later!
The Bologna Declaration set out the means to achieve its goal: a common two-tier degree structure (BA and MA), the Diploma Supplement, the European Credit Transfer System, quality evaluation and the Europeanization of academic curricula. For centuries, many higher education systems in Europe had been based on a five-year (or even longer) first degree – equivalent to a North American MA degree. Among other things, the long degree involved high drop-out rates during study. Though many European countries’ university-level studies were – and in some are still – provided without tuition charges, the percentage of graduates remains relatively small. In many, less than 20 percent of a relevant age cohort completes academic studies (UNESCO, 2003). Restructuring academic degrees across many national jurisdictions has initiated deep changes in many countries.

Each stage in the Bologna Process requires sustained commitment to the commonality of purpose and action so that, by 2010, higher education services will flow freely from one side of the continent to the other, like material goods do today (Altbach and Teichler, 2001; Barblan, 2002; Commission of the European Communities, 2003; UNESCO, 2003). Students of all ages will draw on the most suitable services relevant to them in terms of intellectual interests, career development or social commitment. For learners, and administrators, the freedom of movement in a common European intellectual space will offer equal opportunities of access to many providers and users of higher education, equal conditions of assessment and recognition of services, of skills and competencies, and equal conditions of work and employment. The instruments of the Bologna Process are intended to make European higher education sufficiently strong to be attractive to the rest of the world and particularly vis-à-vis the American model.

As a Declaration, the Bologna Declaration is not legally binding, and thus the policy that followed stressed mainly the tools of adaptation rather than setting out and requiring specific changes of substance. It stimulated a flourish of new initiatives – at institutional, regional, national and European levels.

The Bologna Process seeks to increase the mobility of students and faculty, and to strengthen cooperation between higher education institutions in designing academic programs. As such, it makes for decreasing diversity in Europe’s higher education systems. By 2010, it is expected that all higher education systems in Europe would offer BA and MA degrees; though it is just as likely that implementing the
Bologna Process in some countries may take longer. Most likely, the Bologna Process will greatly contribute to convergence in all European systems of higher education.

Though decreasing the diversity between higher education systems, the architects of the Bologna Process stressed from the outset the considerable importance that attaches to the legitimacy of institutional diversity and heterogeneity in academic cultures. They insisted on the preservation of diversity, even if convergence and issues of common concern should move forward (UNESCO, 2003). Diversity is considered as Europe’s hallmark, to be preserved as an attractive and sustainable feature of its higher education systems. Arguably, the drive towards convergence does not abolish this inherent diversity. Institutions in all their variety will continue in all national settings, and will display both vertical differences (based on various hierarchical and ranking criteria) and horizontal differences (targeted to different student clientèle). However, in the future institutes such as ‘world-class’ research universities will come to resemble each other more and more (Altbach, 2004; European Commission, 2004).

NATIONAL REFORMS

At the national level, the Bologna Process has speeded up reforms in many European countries. Accordingly, this section focuses on changes in four Central and Eastern European countries: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. Expanding higher education boundaries in Central and Eastern European countries in many respects resembles expansion of higher education in Western Europe. It also differs, and the main differences are set out below:

- The significant increase of higher education students in Central and Eastern European countries took place in a very short time.
- Some changes required to meet rapid growth have also been implemented extremely quickly, leaving insufficient time for higher education institutions to steel themselves to accommodate new demands.
- Decision-makers in all of the Central and Eastern European countries were used to a long-standing tradition of strong central governance at all administrative levels. The term ‘State central governance’ expresses a type of a management fully subordinated to
political leadership, bereft of any meaningful grasp of institutional or educational autonomy. This situation is very different from many Western European countries, exposed to the notion of a ‘benevolent State’ planning, where there ‘... seldom has been an atmosphere of absolute distrust or overt rejection’ to the new State regulations (File and Goedegebuure, 2003).

Legislation
In all four Central and Eastern European systems legal reform has been undertaken, changing the general frame in which higher education functions, restructuring and expanding its intake capacity. Far-ranging legislation was promulgated in the Czech Republic and in Poland. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Czech Republic was considered the most extreme example of reinventing government, though in a manner both democratic and organized. One of its first actions involved approving legislation that completely overhauled higher education in the first months of 1990 (File and Goedegebuure, 2003).

In Hungary and Slovenia the changes were less dramatic, and to some degree built upon earlier initiatives. In Hungary, elements of democratic and decentralized reforms were affected prior to 1990. In Slovenia, only two big universities then existed. In all four lands, legislating for higher education occupied an important place in changing the structure of their systems of higher education. Their restoration to the community of States in Europe from 1990, and the Bologna Process after 1999, spurred on further legal enactment and the drawing up of important framework documents at national level.

In the Czech Republic, the new Higher Education Law of 1998 laid out a new status for institutions of higher education in a system now decentralized. It confirmed their autonomy, academic rights and high level of self-governance and through an amendment subsequently introduced in 2001 made the three-tier Bologna model mandatory. In Poland, laws applying to higher education were amended and/or radically changed (DWM in cooperation with DSW and Socrates/Erasmus Agency, 2002). In Hungary, a legal amendment tied in with the goals of the Bologna Process; it set up a new network of higher education institutions following mergers at the institutional level (Hungarian Ministry of Education, 2002). Slovenia, however, took some five years to determine the ways and means to implement the Bologna recommendations. Slovenia is a small country with only three
universities\(^2\) where rapid change cannot be accepted without problems. Even so, provisions of the 2004 Higher Education Act made the three-cycle structure compulsory. It also made compulsory and introduced the European Credit Transfer System, credit accumulation, credits transferable from lifelong learning courses in post-secondary vocational education, and new mechanisms of quality assurance and financing.

**Structure**

Before 1990, the structure of higher education studies in all four countries was broadly similar. Most study programs lasted on average five years and led to the same level of academic degrees. After a certain reluctance to take the recommendations of the Sorbonne and Bologna Declarations seriously, the four countries have begun implementing the three-tier system of Bachelor, Master and Doctoral study programs.

The Czech and Slovenian approaches to introducing vertical stratification in higher education study structure reveal interesting differences. Czech legislation introduced the three-tier degree structure in 1998. The amendment of 2001 made it compulsory, with exceptions requiring agreement from the Accreditation Commission. In Slovenia, as we saw, the process was more protracted.\(^3\)

The Hungarian dual system sees universities and colleges existing side by side, each offering different study programs. The process of merging higher education institutions, initiated by amendment to the Higher Education Act in 1996, is specific to Hungary alone. Further amendment and the adoption of the Act Restructuring Institutions of Higher Education of 1999 continued merging institutions with the fundamental purpose of ‘Extending educational opportunities by establishing multi-faculty, multidisciplinary institutions, improving facilities for research and development, setting up regional intellectual centres and strengthening the relationship between institutions and their environment’ (Hungarian Ministry of Education, 2002).

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\(^2\) Of these one is a completely new university, in addition to which are several small, free-standing institutions.

\(^3\) On the other hand, the Czech Republic presumed there was no need to incorporate the detailed objectives of Bologna – ECTS introduction, modular studies, credit accumulation, etc. directly into legislation. Rather, it encouraged their assimilation through policy documents and different types of incentives. In Slovenia, however, most of these provisions were specified in the Higher Education Law and given the force of law.
Implementation was not easy in the face of reticence from university leaders and academics, and of fears of losing former identity, status and repute. Even so, the new network of higher education establishments – horizontally structured – was officially in place by January 2000.4 At the Berlin meeting of the ‘Bologna Process’ in 2003, the Hungarian Report suggested the duality between higher education institutions should be gradually dissolved (File and Goedegebuure, 2003) and the Bachelor and Master pattern of programs and degrees set up.

In the Czech Republic, the Higher Education Act of 1998 stipulated the defining framework for different institutions. Those of university type provide all levels of study program, while the non-university type caters primarily for Bachelor-level programs. Some non-university institutions may offer Master level study programs, but not doctoral programs. The type of each institution must be approved through the expert opinion of the Accreditation Commission (Act No.111, 1998). The Czech approach takes into consideration some criteria similar to those used to define institutional types in Hungary – types of study programs, number of professors – but the decision of classifying which institution corresponds to which type is left to the Accreditation Commission. It is not laid down by the Higher Education Law. Hence, diversification occurs at the level of study programs.

Horizontal diversification is operationalized around different criteria. For example, types of institutions can be either public or private. In particular instances, e.g. military or police academies, they are also State institutions. Horizontal diversification derives from different institutional profiles – for instance, multi-faculties or one/several cognately linked fields of study brought together in higher education institutions. It is also the product of an institution’s function in the region (local, national, international), or of its research profile etc. Clearly, older, multi-field institutions of university type focus mainly on the research function. Those smaller and often relatively new institutions are usually closely connected with their immediate region.

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4 It included 18 State universities, 13 State colleges, 5 church universities, 22 church colleges and 12 private and foundation institutions (Source: http://www.om.hu) and carried the hope that ‘… a stable institutional network has been established for the next few decades which, based on international examples, may be affected by minor changes but the basic structure of which will accompany in (sic) the next millennium’ (Hungarian Ministry of Education, 2002).
In both Hungary and the Czech Republic the tertiary system of education is composed of higher education institutions as above and of other educational institutions that provide study programs which are non-degree awarding. Thus, a vertical diversification exists among degree programs provided by higher education institutions and vocational higher education in Hungary, or tertiary professional studies in the Czech Republic, as well as among relevant institutions. In both countries, most of these latter institutions work closely with industry, with the employers of their graduates, and with regional authorities etc. The extent and level of their collaboration with the external environment differentiates them at the horizontal level.

Certainly, vertical diversity exists within this sector, as it is designed to help students find their own curricular pathways. At the same time, it presents a negative example (hopefully to be improved in the near future) of how diversity can block student mobility and the implementation of the Bologna recommendations.

Compared to Hungary and the Czech Republic, the situation in Poland differs again. In principle, all Polish institutions of higher education – including vocational higher education establishments – offer all levels of study programs though this depends on the qualification level of their teaching staff. Thus, higher education institutions are classified first on the way they are founded and organized as State or non-State institutions (mainly higher vocational schools), which amounts to horizontal diversification. Another important criterion in Poland divides higher education institutions according to the degrees they award. Universities have the right to provide doctoral programs and to award the appropriate degree. Others provide Bachelor’s and Masters programs in keeping with the qualifications of their teaching staff.

Until recently, the main difference between Slovenia and the three other systems of higher education was the length of its degree study programs. Certainly a three-tier structure similar to the Bologna model existed, though each phase was significantly longer. Undergraduate programs at university lasted from four and a half to six years, while professional programs were three – or exceptionally four – years. Graduate study programs required two additional years (for some professional programs, one year). Doctoral programs, leading to a degree comparable with a PhD, required an additional four years. The Higher Education Act of 2004 brought significant
changes to the duration of all three cycles (Higher Education Act, 2004), and brought them into alignment with the terms of the Bologna Declaration.

Similar to the Czech Republic and Hungary, vocational colleges exist in Slovenia since 1996 as part of tertiary education and to represent a further step in vertical diversification. The colleges are usually established in co-operation with industry, providing two-year programs which lead to a professional diploma. Horizontal diversification allows secondary school graduates to embark either on academic higher education or professional vocational education (determined by the type of final secondary education certificate awarded), and thus combines with vertical diversification. Students may accumulate credits from different types of study programs (horizontally diversified) and use them to transfer between sectors – a most attractive possibility.

**Staffing Problems**

Significant increases in the number of students in higher education, and the corresponding increase in the numbers of institutions, primarily private, exacerbate problems of staffing. Staffing shortages have been discussed vehemently in Poland, and almost *sotto voce* in the Czech Republic. In Poland, suggestions have been aired for simplifying the academic degrees, dropping the *habilitate* (higher) doctoral degree to retain only the PhD. This is strongly opposed on the grounds that such a step would drastically reduce the academic quality of staff (File and Goedegebuure, 2003).

**INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENTS AND INITIATIVES**

The Bologna Process, not to mention other large-scale reforms in higher education, has put many universities to the challenge and caused them to redefine their goals and ways of working. The general trend in many higher education systems nowadays, as has been demonstrated above in discussing the national-level reforms, is to set a unified monitoring framework that applies to the operation and overall evaluation of all higher education institutions. At the same time there is a noticeable tendency in many higher education systems to provide greater degrees of freedom to each institution to shape its own policies, both in academic and in administrative matters, in the framework of its budget.
Among leading research universities, an intense effort is being made to establish themselves as ‘world-class universities’ (Altbach, 2004). Excellence in research underpins the claim to this status – research recognized by peers and that advances the frontiers of knowledge. Academic freedom, plus an atmosphere of intellectual excitement, is also central to the standing of a world-class university. Its reputation builds upon the outstanding record of its staff and the high potential of its students. Obviously, those recognized as top universities are proud to set themselves apart from lower-level establishments in the world of higher education – clear evidence of vertical diversification. Some scholars (such as Altbach, 2004) believe that the debate about the criteria for this glorious ‘world-class’ appellation has important benefits. The debates focus attention on academic standards, on their improvement, on the role of universities in society and on how academic institutions fit into national and international systems of higher education. Striving for excellence enhances competition. Competition between universities sparks improvement.

WIDENING ACCESS TO HIGHER EDUCATION

Alongside the bid for reward that competition brings, recent decades have seen a rapid increase in the broadening of access to higher education on a planetary scale.5 With a few exceptions – France and Germany, for example – since 1995 participation in higher education grew in almost all countries in Europe and very particularly so in Central and Eastern Europe. Of late, most of these States have expressed the intention to move toward a policy of universal access and to raise the participation rate in higher education to upwards of 50 percent of the relevant population cohort. The Slovenian Master Plan for higher education clearly stated that ‘50 percent of each subsequent generation should enrol in some form of tertiary education’ (Ministry of Education, Science and Sport, 2003). Similar aims are contained in the Czech White Paper on higher education: ‘In accordance with one of the main goals of the Czech educational policy, it is necessary to enable half of the 19-year-olds in any year to enter some type of tertiary

5 For a parallel account of this development in Latin America, see the Chapter by García Guadilla in this volume. For a policy-maker’s view of some of the problems generated at system level, see the Chapter by Badat, also in this volume.
education by 2005’ (Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports, 2001). In the near future, demographic trends suggest however that further increases in student enrolments are less likely, and that in most European countries demand is levelling out.

Along with the expansion of higher education have come changes in the ages of students and in admission criteria, the flourishing of new types of institutions, both private and public, etc. In most systems of higher education, the student population corresponds less and less to the ‘classical’ student age cohorts (the group of 18 to 24 year-olds) (Coffield and Williamson, 1997; Scott, 1995; Sporn, 1999; Trow, 2000).

The Place of ‘Bologna’

The Bologna Process has influenced the shaping of certain dimensions of access by its emphasis on cross-system mobility. By their very nature, access policies represent both vertical and horizontal aspects. Different conditions of access to elite institutes versus others, to highly prestigious and much sought-after fields of study versus less popular disciplines, reflect a clear hierarchical differentiation. Enrolment quotas to some institutions are an interesting variable in the vertical structure of higher education institutions. Different entry requirements for technical universities as compared to comprehensive universities, or access policies across myriad disciplines and study fields, however, involve horizontal diversification.

Access policies over the last 30 years have changed dramatically. Many higher education systems have become mass-oriented, and some even attained universal access (Trow, 2000). Graduation patterns reflect the relations between democratization of access and effective study requirements and persistence. Drop-out rates in some higher education systems are astoundingly high and, in some instances, reflect the persistence of elitism amongst academic staff. Very often, mobility across institutions of different types is an important pointer to the degree of flexibility in higher education systems. It appears that European systems of higher education, under the impetus of the Bologna Process, are moving towards more flexible patterns of mobility inside the Nation’s provision of higher education and across national

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6 The student population in Poland has risen from 789,440 in 1995 to 1,800,500 in 2002/2003. In Hungary, it has increased from 179,563 to 381,560; in the Czech Republic from 191,604 to 259,280 (source: statistical offices of the respective countries).
jurisdictions. Yet linguistic diversity presents an immense problem, and needs to be addressed if the inter-system mobility of students and academic staff is to progress.

**Private Sector Higher Education in Europe**

The widening of access to higher education, above all in Central and Eastern Europe, is also linked to the multiplication of private higher education. In some countries of Central and Eastern Europe which faced enormous increases in student numbers, the number of private institutions as a proportion of all establishments of in a country’s provision is remarkably high.7 The blooming of these private initiatives drastically changed the external and internal boundaries in many higher education systems, and affected both horizontal and vertical patterns of diversity. Unlike well-established private universities in the USA, most private providers in Europe and in many other countries have weak infrastructures and relatively unstable full-time academic staff, and operate mainly for profit.

**CHANGING THE RESEARCH MODE**

In Western Europe, research is not only an essential – and definitional – activity of most universities. It also defines their hierarchical status within the national system of higher education: the more prestigious a university in its research, the higher its reputation and status. If in many countries universities are responsible for most of the basic and applied research, there are others where the most renowned research institutes operate outside the formal framework of higher education. The Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in France and the Max Planck Institutes in Germany are two such instances. In many Central and Eastern European countries prior to 1990, academies

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7 In Poland, private institutions constitute 63 percent of the total number of higher education establishments; in Romania, 60 percent; in Hungary, 52 percent (UNESCO, 2003: 5). The majority of these private universities and colleges are small, and teach mainly in high-demand subjects – business administration, economics and sundry other social science subjects. The Czech Republic provides a good illustration. Permission to establish private higher education institutions was granted in the Act of 1998. Hence all are relatively new, still in development. Despite their large numbers (36 private establishments in comparison with 25 public and State institutions), private higher education currently (2004) caters for less than five percent of the total number of students.
of sciences fulfilled the exclusive role of research institutions; higher education, *stricto sensu*, focused on teaching. This situation has changed. Currently, research is an integral part of the responsibilities of higher education, though academies of sciences still constitute high-level research institutes outside the university. This, however, is not the only development. International corporations and commercial firms also own research institutes, which serve their purposes and supply them with expertise. And likewise ties, links and working together bring the academic world and the corporate world into closer proximity (Commission of European Communities, 2003; Enders, 2004; Gibbons *et al.*, 1994; Gornitzka, 2003).

More than a decade ago, some students of science policy argued that both organization and practice in research were evolving rapidly (Gibbons *et al.*, 1994). They suggested that such changes would in turn affect universities, the internal organization and structure of their research institutes and, last but not least, the way doctoral students were prepared for research and by research. Traditional research they labelled ‘Mode 1’. ‘Mode 1’ was grounded in disciplines, with a research agenda determined by the scientific community inside academia. There was, Gibbons and his colleagues contended, a new type of research, which they named ‘Mode 2’. Research in ‘Mode 2’ is carried out in the context of application, is trans-disciplinary in nature, conducted by *ad hoc* teams and gleaned from both within and outside universities. Research is problem-oriented, often locationally independent. ‘Mode 2’ was the shape of things to come, and the way leading universities would conduct research if they were not doing so already.

This change in research modes affects the university research infrastructure considerably. New fields in science – nano-technology, bio-technology –, in social science and elsewhere bid fair to change the disciplinary structure of departments and faculties and thus modify both research and teaching practices as well as posing the delicate issue of what are the optimal ways of training research students and developing their careers. Over the past few years, a number of European countries – France, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and the United Kingdom – have take vigorous steps to structure doctoral studies (often reflecting various aspects of the North American ‘graduate school’) to define new conditions for doctoral studies and to develop post-doctoral fellowships etc.
The Max Planck Gesellschaft – An Exemplar

Germany’s Max Planck Society has taken a number of initiatives, amongst which creating new and innovative research schools for doctoral students. This provides an illuminating example of how change in the mode of research brings about radical reform in preparing young researchers.

The Max Planck Society is a non-profit organization. Some 95 percent of its expenditure is funded by the Federal Government. In 2004, its budget was 1.33 billion Euro. The Max Planck Society maintains today 78 institutes, research centres and laboratories and employs approximately 12,300 scientists and scholars. In addition, it employs thousands of doctoral candidates, and post-doctoral fellows from Germany and abroad. Recognizing major shifts in the way research is conducted today, the Max Planck Society launched in 1999 an ambitious new program for educating junior scientists, destined to become the scientists of the future. In collaboration with universities, research centres and other research organizations inside and outside Germany, it has established so far 29 International Max Planck Research Schools (IMPRS) in such innovative and inter-disciplinary research fields as molecular biology, neuroscience, demography, law, plasma-physics etc. The program involves 34 Max Planck Institutes, dozens of universities, libraries and other research institutions. The partners participate in the funding of the schools from their own operating budget8 (Max Planck Society, 2004).

Such initiatives may well go far in changing the hierarchical status of many research universities, shaping both their reputation within their national jurisdiction and their international standing. The drive to differentiate between high-level research universities and

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8 The IMPRS cater to graduate students studying for their PhD. A major feature of the new research schools is their focus on international cooperation, based on the principle that foreign students account for at least 50 percent of graduate students in any one school. Furthermore as in the North American model, doctoral studies are structured around students, whose research lies in different fields, working together. The schools provide a first-class, inter-disciplinary education, develop scholarly links between the young scientists and their mentors and advisors, and emphasize research across and between disciplinary boundaries. Graduate students are familiarized with research facilities in Germany, with the idea of boosting the future cooperative activities of international scientists with German research institutes. Students may choose between doing their PhD exam at a German university or at another university in their country of origin.
other universities is already underway in Germany. In March 2004, the Federal Minister of Education and Research declared the government’s intent to identify five to six top research universities, comparable to leading research universities such as Harvard and Stanford in the USA. A short-list of 10 will be announced by the end of 2006. The initiative is a drastic and dramatic departure from German academic culture, and will definitely affect other higher education systems in Europe.

**FUNDING AND GOVERNMENT-HIGHER EDUCATION RELATIONS**

Relationships between government and higher education for most of the past decade or more have been subject to sustained revision, in almost all higher education systems worldwide (Huisman et al., 2001). Funding remains a major problem. Redistribution in the funding of higher education from the public to the private sector mirrors a certain convergence, toward mixed funding and the alteration of public modes of intervention in higher education. Governments’ cutting higher education budgets is a shared and global experience and so is its corollary, the encouragement of university entrepreneurialism to mobilize funds for their operating budgets. Together they affect greatly the operation of universities and their status, irrespective of which national system is involved.

The practice of donations, grants and endowments by private parties and the corporate world to leading universities in the USA is an American exception. Most higher education systems are funded mainly by government. True, the notion of entrepreneurial universities started to make headway in Europe towards the end of the 1990s, as many higher education institutions sought to be innovative both in their internal management and organization of studies and in cooperating with industry and the world of work. Such a development is closely linked with broadening access to higher education, as unprecedented expansion in the sheer size of the student Estate put great strain on traditional ways of funding. With their revenue for social expenditure declining, many countries, though at very different stages of development, attempted to limit growth in public expenditure

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9 For an economist’s perspective on this issue see Tilak’s Chapter in this volume.
funding, particularly on higher education. Nowadays, higher education is expected to do more with less.\(^{10}\)

**Tuition Fees**

Until the mid-1980s, a clear distinction existed between countries where higher education charged substantial tuition fees and those applying the principle of free higher education. In Central and Northern Europe, the only contributions asked of students were of a social or administrative order (enrolment fees, examination fees, sports and union dues) or for specific services other than education. Since then, tuition fees have been introduced or greatly increased in a majority of European countries, particularly Spain, The Netherlands and Ireland in the 1980s, and Portugal, Italy, Austria and the United Kingdom in the 1990s, not to mention the Central and Eastern European countries, where they were introduced almost everywhere.

Some countries adopted selective tuition fees, adjusted for different student categories. In some German Länder, students who remain enrolled in a university beyond the legally prescribed length of studies (Regelstudienzeit) pay a fee of 500 Euro per semester. Several categories of students are required to pay a full tuition – foreign students, for example. Most countries in Central and Eastern Europe operate a mixed system, in which the government sets aside a number of State-financed places in public higher education institutions for the best students, while other students pay tuition fees. Exceptionally, in the Czech Republic, students are asked to contribute only for specific services – as in Northern Europe: payment for entrance examinations, studies in foreign languages and studies beyond the standard length, (akin to certain German Länder). Private institutions of higher education, whose livelihood depends on tuition revenues, naturally charge fees (UNESCO, 2003).

**The Sale of Services**

The sale of services, whether these are directly associated with an institution’s educational activity or not, represents an increasing part

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\(^{10}\) The cost per student related to GDP per capita in most developed countries fell. Between 1995 and 1998 only Italy and Greece, among the OECD countries, witnessed an increase in the expense per student greater than the revenue per capita (Chevaillier and Eicher, 2002). Private expenditure for higher education increased in 17 OECD countries, sometimes a great deal as in Turkey and Italy.
of higher education’s resources. For the North American universities it accounts for some 20 percent of their resources, whether the institution is private or public. More and more universities exhibit signs of an entrepreneurial spirit (Clark, 1998), as they vary their funding sources and reduce their dependence on government. Often they have created new units, designed to interface with the economic and social environment; they are professionally managed, obeying a commercial logic similar to that of the firms and businesses with which they deal; and theirs is often the responsibility for marketing research results, and for translating technological or experimental activities into practical application. This generates additional money, and fuels the established tasks of teaching and research. Further money is to be had through selling the university's programs overseas. Thus while foreign student enrolment shows healthy growth, many American, British and Australian universities are also opening branch campuses in Asia, Africa, Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.

While it is often admitted that higher education has to accept the reality of competing for scarce public resources, given the current reality in which higher education operates there is also much concern that out-and-out deregulation will eventually involve reneging on the social agenda of broadening access; this is a concern that finds echo in the debate over higher education as a 'tradeable' commodity. Whether higher education is held to be either a 'public good' or a 'tradeable good' is today a heated and controversial topic in higher education, and the fate and status of many establishments of higher education will certainly be affected by it. Re-defining higher education as a 'public good' becomes central once the task of providing mass higher education of quality across all levels has been set, from top elite research universities through community colleges and on to professional tertiary-level institutions.

THE IMPACT OF THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES
Information and communication technologies have had a huge impact on the world economy and corporate management, and stand as

11 For a more detailed examination of this activity less from the standpoint of those who give than from those who receive, see García Guadilla's analysis for the Latin American region in this volume.
12 Some of the consequences are explored by Fuller, in this volume.
a constituent element in the drive towards globalization. Theirs is a tremendous potential, namely to reshape study environments in both conventional and distance teaching institutions. These technologies have created ‘virtual’ universities, urged forward the creation of consortia between universities and other partners from outside academia, and convinced many campus universities to put them to a wide variety of uses for both distance teaching and for their resident students. New digital technologies have contributed to the diversification of many higher education systems (Carneavale, 2004; Guri-Rosenblit, 2001; 1999).

E-learning will greatly contribute to growing flexibility in academic study patterns (Bates 2001; Collis and Moonen, 2001; Collis and van der Wende, 2002). Flexible learning offers students many opportunities to adjust their interests, needs and learning styles to a variety of learning settings and media combinations. Hybrid courses, combining various components of face-to-face encounters with online provision, will assume an increasing significance in academic institutions. Online teaching as a stand-alone pedagogy, however, will only have limited use. In effect, most e-learning will serve add-on functions in teaching and learning processes (Bates, 2001; Carneavale, 2004). The majority of students in campus universities will prefer to attend classes, or will choose to spread their college experience over residential campuses, commuter colleges and online courses. More graduate or postgraduate students will study online, whilst the majority of undergraduates will prefer more conventional face-to-face encounters.

E-learning will stimulate both academic trade and academic philanthropy. More universities and new, for-profit companies will export academic and professional programs as a commodity to a variety of student populations. In fact, differences are already discernible in national policies. Australia, the UK and Canada are oriented more to the international market (Ryan, 2002); their universities seek to sell their higher education wares as a commodity to ‘Third World’ countries. American universities are more ‘inner-directed’, generally preferring campus-based integration of digital technologies and with a few examples of purchases and partnerships in physical campuses overseas. In many European countries the new technologies play an important role.

E-learning also exerts global outreach. In an international market, students are able – and will be more so in the future – to approach any university where access policy encourages international
students. This will be particularly true of the professional training and postgraduate fields. On a global level, outreach of universities to international student clients could function at different levels, from enrolling individual students from different countries, through joint ventures with other institutions (universities or business enterprises), to working on common projects with governments, international corporations and intergovernmental organizations. Involving such central agencies is essential for implementing the new technologies into higher education systematically, efficiently and on a large scale. Global outreach by its very nature, however, increases mobility. It also contributes to decreasing diversity between institutions of the same type across different countries.

GLOBALIZATION, ACCREDITATION, QUALITY ASSURANCE AND TRANS-NATIONAL PATTERNS

‘Internationalization’ and ‘globalization’ are new, cult words in higher education and practice. These two terms underscore the undeniable fact that the boundaries of what were relatively closed national systems are increasingly under pressure from common international trends (Enders and Fulton, 2002; Guillen, 2001). Universities are engaged in the drive towards globalization: students, academic staff and curricula are exchanged between institutions, and accreditation agencies are prompt in accrediting previous experiential learning and previous academic studies. Governments append their signatures to cooperative projects in higher education. Strengthening agreements between academic institutions within a country and across national borders will be central to the mobility of adult students. Students are seen increasingly as consumers or customers, and universities market themselves to clientèles, national and international – a trend that encourages both horizontal (elite versus mass establishments) and vertical diversity (different types of institutions catering to different types of student clientèles).

Quality assurance is a prime concern in higher education systems. While the tradition of accreditation is well-developed in the USA and Canada, until lately there has not been such a tradition in most European countries (UNESCO, 2003). A different situation could be found in a number of Central and Eastern European countries in that in

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13 Again, Fuller’s analysis reveals this in a different light.
the last decade, these countries have established accreditation agencies in the context of the systematic changes to their higher education systems, in particular with regard to the rapid development of private higher education establishments.

Nowadays the strengthening of the accreditation process in higher education, against the background of the Bologna Process, is gathering momentum across Europe. The building up of mutual trust among universities is a most important aspect, as quality assurance is the first priority of the European Higher Education Area. Developing shared criteria and methodologies for quality assurance, combined with the commitment to safeguard diversity of European higher education systems and institutional autonomy that is tied in with accountability, is one of the basic challenges in Europe today (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 2003). All countries have quality assurance mechanisms in one form or other. They vary greatly in terms of purpose, focus and organization (Middlehurst, 2001; Schwartz and Westerheijden, 2004; Vlasceanu et al., 2004). Within the Bologna Process, the vital importance of defining quality assurance procedures for the recognition and accreditation of studies across a variety of higher education institutions is recognized by all participating governments.

In this regard, some hold that the main coordinator and facilitator of developments in the field of quality assurance should be the European Network for Quality Assurance (ENQA), drawing on the results and expertise of other quality assurance associations and networks being established at the European level. Among these are the Joint Quality Initiative, established in 2001 to increase the awareness and transparency of the first two cycles of higher education; and the European Consortium for Accreditation, set up in 2003 to investigate how decisions on accreditation at bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels may be recognized (European Ministers Responsible for Higher Education, 2003; Sebkova and Munsterova, 2003). Quality assurance and accreditation have a central bearing on the international recognition of academic qualifications. In Europe, a pan-European network of national information and recognition centres (the ENIC/NARIC network) are expected to forge close links with quality assurance agencies at national and international levels; the cooperative link with ENQAA is illustrative of this process (Campbell and Rozsnyai, 2002).

The ‘Erasmus Mundus’ program is also one such initiative that is based on mutual trust. To receive a European Master’s degree,
students must study at two European universities. Only universities cooperating with others can participate and are eligible for European Union funding. The hope is to create ‘islands of cooperation’ that will grow into the future (European Commission, 2004). Given the need to extend student mobility, curricula and academic faculty across different national jurisdictions, the possibility cannot entirely be ruled out that trends in globalization may reduce diversity and encourage more homogeneous and balanced higher education systems. Such trends may bring greater homogeneity to study programs, accreditation procedures and cooperation in research projects. Trans-national education is a potent force in the impact of globalization upon higher education, and may be the most significant.

Within the Bologna Process in Europe, the dimension of trans-national education affects every important aspect in higher education: national control over higher education, institutional autonomy, lifelong learning, the domain of recognition and quality and the funding of research. Currently, trans-national education is regarded as both a threat and a benefit by various national higher education systems (Altbach and Teichler, 2001; Barblan, 2002; Curry and Newman, 1998; Enders, 2004; Enders and Fulton, 2002; Guillen, 2001; Huisman et al., 2001; Scott, 1998; and van der Wende, 2002; 2001). The trans-national dimension emerges in various organizational forms, including franchising, branch campuses, joint programs, corporate universities, various international institutions and various forms of distance teaching and virtual universities (Guri-Rosenblit, 2001; UNESCO, 2003).

Positive Aspects
Amongst the positive aspects of trans-national education are: a widening of learning opportunities at various higher education levels through the provision of more choice for citizens in given national jurisdictions; challenging traditional education systems by introducing more competition, innovative programs and innovative delivery methods; helping make higher education more competitive; assisting in diversifying the budgeting of higher education; and benefiting through links with prestigious institutions (mainly in the case of developing countries).14

14 For instance, several prestigious American universities are operating currently in Qatar through the funding of the ‘Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and
The initiation of a new research centre near the Dead Sea constitutes an additional example of the potential merits of trans-national education. Cornell and Stanford Universities are planning to develop one of the Middle East’s most advanced scientific research institutes at the invitation of the ‘Bridging the Rift’ Foundation, a private non-profit organization (Castillo, 2004). This organization undertook the mission of building an effective bridge between people in conflict-affected areas by demonstrating the benefits of collaborative programs involving economic development, cutting-edge research and advanced educational opportunities. The centre will focus on the life sciences, and its primary activity will be a project called the ‘Library of Life’ to establish a catalogue of all of the world’s DNA research; the initial phase will start in the Dead Sea area. Since September 2004, Cornell and Stanford Universities offer four to six PhD fellowships to Israeli and Jordanian students. Once the centre is fully operational, each participating university will expand its fellowship program to approximately 20 places. Doctoral students will do their coursework in the USA, carry out fieldwork at the centre, and return to one of the universities to write up and defend their dissertations. Such an operation serves both academic and political goals.

It is most likely that trans-national education will grow in the future, and that it will accelerate competition between various types of higher education providers. At the same time, greater attention will be paid by national higher education authorities and international organizations to monitoring and defining appropriate quality assurance regulations. This is necessary to ensure the quality of the higher education provided by trans-national providers, as well as to secure and preserve the traditional values of higher education.

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Chapter sought to provide a synthetic overview of the trends, over the past decades and across various higher education systems, that have affected horizontal and vertical structures. Higher education today faces
a period of profound transformation, urged on by economic, social, technological and cultural changes in society at-large. Some take place at an international or continental level, and those in higher education in European countries during the last decade are most remarkable. The pressure for a complete overhaul of higher education systems in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989 mobilized all European countries to start serious policy debates about the need for reform, and the time was ripe for a large-scale initiative to achieve more convergence in European higher education. The Bologna Process, which now involves governments, higher education institutions, students, and international organizations, has turned out to be the most effective lever for change Europe has known for centuries.

Profound changes affect all higher education systems world-wide – the widening of access, the change of higher education funding, the rise of new and innovative research modes, the emergence of digital information and communication technologies and the interconnectedness of the world ‘global village’. These phenomena affect different dimensions in the traditional roles of higher education at international, national and institutional levels. Traditional establishments of higher education, even the most prestigious, cannot ignore the challenges of ongoing economic, social and political developments, and the emergence of new types of higher education provision – corporate and virtual universities amongst them. They are obliged to attend to these changes when shaping their policies.

The past decade witnessed a trend of continued autonomy, especially in financial matters, for higher education institutions, coupled with a demand for increased accountability. Higher education has to compete for public financial support against a wide range of other activities covered by public/government budgets. The move by many higher education systems to charge tuition fees, combined with a system of appropriate cost-recovery and providing applicable support, is evident. More and more universities have become entrepreneurial in their quest for money, sponsorship and support.

Paradoxically, both trends – growing competition between higher education institutes as well as growing collaboration – are likely to occur in the future. They will affect both research and teaching in academia. Universities will compete with one another for funds, students, academic

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15 On autonomy and accountability, see Fuller’s contribution in this volume.
staff, prime ranking by evaluators, etc. At the same time, they will also collaborate in both research and teaching matters. International bodies encourage, and even condition funding of research projects on, collaboration between several higher education institutions, preferably from different countries. In the future higher education will be even more diverse, with new providers established and various consortia and partnerships between universities set up for purposes of research and/or teaching. The mobility of students across frontiers will lessen horizontal diversity between many systems of higher education, particularly in Europe. Quality assurance mechanisms and the definition of clear ‘academic currencies’ and diploma supplements will provide a more homogeneous and articulated degree system, which will enable easy comparison of diverse degree requirements and structures. Research patterns will blend between different countries, and more joint work will develop both in preparing doctoral students and in conducting joint projects.

REFERENCES


INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s Tanzania re-introduced a policy of cost-sharing, aimed at slowly shifting some of the costs of public higher education, which until recently had been borne wholly by the Government, towards the beneficiaries of higher education – students, their parents, non-governmental parties and other stakeholders. The Government’s principal objectives for re-introducing cost-sharing were to expand access and participation in higher education; make the beneficiaries of higher education contribute to its costs; recover the costs of board and accommodation; establish a legally protected student loans scheme; and make the higher education system more responsive to the labour market.

This Chapter focuses on the Government’s principal objective of expanding access and participation to higher education through cost-sharing, using the proxy indicators of: admission and enrolment rates, enrolment of privately sponsored students at the University of Dar es Salaam, total enrolments in private universities and colleges, and students’ socio-economic status and religious affiliations. These indicators would determine whether or not re-introducing and implementing cost-sharing did effectively expand access and participation in higher education to all segments of Tanzanian society, as envisaged. Cost-sharing in higher education is defined as ‘... a shift
in the burden of higher education costs from being borne exclusively or predominantly by government or taxpayers, to being shared with parents and students’ (Johnstone, 2003: 351). Johnstone (2004; 2003) identified various forms of cost-sharing adopted in both developed and transitioning countries, including:

- The introduction of tuition fees where public higher education was formerly free.
- Sharp increases in tuition fees where public higher education tuition already existed.
- The imposition of user charges to recover the expenses of formerly subsidized food and accommodations.
- Reduction of student grants or scholarships.
- Increases in the effective recovery of student loans. And,
- The official encouragement of a tuition-dependent private higher education sector, where it did not exist before, to absorb some of the spiralling demand for higher education.

Tanzania has adopted the first, third and sixth options.

**SOME ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INDICATORS**

Tanzania attained political independence on 9 December 1961. For the first seven years after independence (1961-1967), it continued the free market economy inherited from colonial rule. A fundamental and radical shift in Tanzania’s development, economic and educational policies was made in 1967 with the Arusha Declaration.¹ According to the Arusha Declaration, access to the scarcest resources such as education was to be regulated and controlled so that it could be reached by all Tanzanians regardless of socio-economic status, ethnic origin, religious affiliation or gender. Within these principles, the Government formulated several egalitarian-oriented educational policies aimed at equalizing access and participation in education between ethnic/regional, religious, social and gender groups. The major objective of these policies was to eradicate regional/ethnic, socio-economic, gender and religious inequalities of access to education in post-independence Tanzania. Notable among these policies were the following:

¹ The Arusha Declaration was a political blueprint, intended to make Tanzania a socialist and economically self-reliant country.
• Universal Primary Education (UPE).
• Differential cut-off points for girls and women for entry into public/government secondary schools, universities and other tertiary education institutions.
• The introduction of a quota system for selection into public secondary schools, to ensure parity and ethnic representation of districts and disadvantaged ethnic groups.
• Abolition of school fees at all levels of public education.

Some Basic Facts
Some 51 percent of Tanzania’s population lives on less than US$ 1 per day; 42 percent live in absolute poverty, i.e. on less than US$ 0.75 per day (UNDP, 1999: 1). On the Tanzanian mainland, 45 percent of the population is Christian, 35 percent Muslim, and the remaining 20 percent follow traditional religious beliefs. In Zanzibar more than 99 percent of the population is Muslim.

Adult Education Levels
The highest levels of education attained by adults in mainland Tanzania by 2000/2001 are set out in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Highest levels of education achieved by adults by 2000/2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level Achieved</th>
<th>% Adult Population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No education</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult education only</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary education</td>
<td>65.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course after primary education</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education (Ordinary Level)</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary education (Advanced Level)</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course after secondary education</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other certificate</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diploma/university education</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: adapted from United Republic of Tanzania, 2002a: 33.
Higher Education Profile

Higher education in Tanzania is highly elitist. Until 2000, only 29 percent of applicants obtained admission to Tanzania’s flagship university, the University of Dar es Salaam (Luhanga, 2000). The university-age cohort participation rate is 0.27 percent in Tanzania, compared to 1.47 percent for Kenya and 1.33 percent for Uganda (UDSM, 2002a: 17). Participation in tertiary education as a percentage of the relevant age group was 1 percent in Tanzania in 2000, compared to 3 percent for Uganda and Kenya respectively (World Bank, 2003: 81-82). In the 2001/2002 academic year, the total undergraduate enrolment in four public universities was 16,112 and 1,779 in private universities (URT, 2002b: 1-7).

Cost-Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania: Background

Cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania is not a new policy, it existed even before independence (1961). In 1956, the colonial government established the Tanganyika Education Trust Fund, with a mandate to receive money and real property provided by public authorities, other organizations and private individuals for the higher education of inhabitants of Tanganyika (URT, 2002c: 32-33). The Fund was used to establish, build and maintain higher education institutions and provide scholarships and bursaries. During the colonial period, tuition fees in higher education applied to all citizens of Tanganyika regardless of socio-economic class or race. The colonial government provided bursaries for students who could not afford higher education.

Following independence in 1961 and until 1964, students in public higher education continued to pay tuition fees, though those from poor families were assisted by government bursaries. The bursaries, in effect disguised income-contingent loans, were recovered through deductions from monthly salaries after graduation and subsequent guaranteed employment in the civil service and other public sectors (URT, 1998: 75). Galabawa (1991: 54) also notes that a student revolving loan scheme operated in Tanzania in the 1960s and 1970s, but collapsed because of a lack of supervision and commitment. This interest-free loan scheme was recovered through monthly deductions from salaries of graduates over some 18 months after they started employment (ibid.). In 1974, the Government abolished the bursary system and assumed all responsibility for paying the total cost of public higher education.
Re-Instituting Cost-Sharing in Higher Education in Tanzania

Cost-sharing in higher education was officially reinstated in the late 1980s as a result of the severe economic crisis, as part of wide-ranging economic and social reforms under the IMF/World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program (SAP) and due to the Government’s decreasing ability to finance public higher education. The Government first adopted cost-sharing for higher education in 1988, but for political expediency reasons made its announcement formal in January 1992. In the Government’s view, the re-introduction of cost-sharing in public higher education became necessary in order to maintain the quality of academic programs, improve access to higher education,² and contain government fiscal expenditures in public higher education (URT, 1998: 76).

Specifically, in re-introducing cost-sharing in higher education the Government had the following objectives:

- To arrest the decline in access to and quality of public higher education due to under-funding, by requiring the beneficiaries (students and their parents) to contribute to the costs.
- Rationalize the level of Government contribution to higher education.
- Introduce a legally protected student loan scheme.
- Require students to recognize that higher education secures higher private returns than social rates of return, and hence an obligation on their part to contribute to its costs.³
- Make higher education more responsive to the labour market (URT, 1998: 76).

Implementing Cost-Sharing

The Government implemented the cost-sharing policy in three phases. Phase I became operational in the academic year 1992/1993, when students were to pay for their transportation costs from the

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² The Government of Tanzania defines access to higher education as availability and affordability of higher education to more people than before, a definition referring to enrolment expansion.
³ Available evidence suggests that in Tanzania the private rates of return from higher education are at 15 percent greater than the social rates of return. This is more than three times higher than in Latin America or the industrialized countries, and 15 times higher than in Asia. See United Republic of Tanzania, 1999: 15.
place of residence to their higher education institution. In addition, students were also to pay for the following: to cover breakages, loss of institutional property, registration and application fees, and student union and examination fees. Phase II was implemented during the academic year 1993/1994, and in this phase students were required to 'pay' for the following direct costs: food and accommodation, to be paid through the interest-free, income-contingent loans guaranteed by the Government for every student admitted to public higher education institutions under its sponsorship. Also, during this phase an out-of-pocket allowance paid to every student admitted under Government sponsorship in public higher education institutions was eliminated.

Phase III of cost-sharing in higher education, which had not yet begun by the beginning of the 2004/2005 academic year, will require students and/or parents to pay for tuition fees, books and stationery, special faculty-specific requirements, field practice expenses and medical insurance in addition to the items paid for in phases I and II.

**Forms of Cost-Sharing in Higher Education Adopted in Tanzania**

The implementation of cost-sharing in higher education in Tanzania has so far taken the following forms, also articulated by Johnstone (2001: 3-4): (a) imposition of user charges on lodging and food, albeit heavily subsidized by the Government; (b) introduction of a very limited tuition fee in public higher education institutions (a 'dual track' tuition program); (c) abolition of students’ stipends and allowances; (d) official encouragement of a tuition-dependent private higher education sector (as of 2004, still very limited); and (e) introduction of various revenue-diversification activities and the commercialization/privatization of students’ municipal services in public universities. In the following sections and subsections, the author presents some research findings on the impact of cost-sharing policy on access and participation in higher education in Tanzania. This is done through the case study of the University of Dar es Salaam, by using the proxy indicators of undergraduate admission rates vs. applications; total undergraduate enrolments; enrolments of privately-sponsored students; socio-economic status of undergraduate students; and trends in undergraduate enrolments in the very limited private higher education sector as of the 2003 academic year.
THE IMPACT OF COST-SHARING ON ACCESS AND PARTICIPATION: THE CASE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM

The principal objective of cost-sharing in higher education, as pointed out earlier, was to increase access and participation to all institutions of higher education including the flagship institution, University of Dar es Salaam. However, there has been only a slight increase in undergraduate admission rates, and a modest expansion in total undergraduate enrolments, at the University of Dar es Salaam for the past 11 years of implementing cost-sharing policy. The tentative beginnings of cost-sharing seem not to have had any impact on admission rates and general enrolments, either positive or negative. In fact, these slight increases do not even reflect the increasing numbers of secondary school graduates (which almost doubled from 5,058 in 1991 to 10,670 in 2001, an increase of 111 percent) or the increasing numbers of applicants with minimum qualifications for admission; nor do these slight increases generally reflect the Tanzanian population’s growth from 23.1 million in 1988 to 34.6 million in 2002. The current admission rates at the University of Dar es Salaam also do not reflect the increase in total student enrolments in secondary schools (public and private), which constitute potential university students and increased from 10,562 in 1991 to 24,807 in 2001 (an increase of 135 percent). Table 2 shows trends in the University of Dar es Salaam’s undergraduate admissions vis-à-vis applicants with minimum qualifications, from 1989/1990 to 2003/2004.

The data in Table 2 reveals generally low admission rates at the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). Admission rates have oscillated between decline and modest increases. In fact, if we assume that the UDSM did not admit privately-sponsored students in the 2003/2004 academic year, admission rates declined by 27.6 percent, from 3,531 undergraduate students in 2002/2003 to 2,555 students in 2003/2004. At the same time, the number of secondary school graduates with minimum and maximum qualifications for admission into the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities increased from 4,148 in 1991 to 8,773 in 2001, an increase of 111.4 percent.

Admission rates in public non-university institutions and private universities are also very low. For example in 2001/2002, the 15 public non-university institutions admitted a mere 2,475 students in their undergraduate programs, while the 11 private universities and colleges
admitted 787 students. Thus, the number of potential students who do not gain admission either at the University of Dar es Salaam or in other public universities in each year is too large to be accommodated by the public non-university institutions and private universities, implying that access to higher education in Tanzania has in fact not improved during the implementation of cost-sharing policy. Table 3 shows trends in undergraduate enrolments at the University of Dar es Salaam and other public universities in Tanzania from 1992/1993 to 2001/2002.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Applied</th>
<th>Admitted</th>
<th>% Admitted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989/1990</td>
<td>2,578</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>40.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990/1991</td>
<td>2,850</td>
<td>994</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991/1992</td>
<td>2,644</td>
<td>1,081</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1994</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>1,097</td>
<td>29.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1995</td>
<td>3,058</td>
<td>1,105</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1996</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>34.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/1997</td>
<td>4,100</td>
<td>1,339</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>4,233</td>
<td>1,607</td>
<td>38.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>4,992</td>
<td>1,805</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>5,132</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>2,950</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002/2003</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>3,531</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003/2004</td>
<td>8,000</td>
<td>2,555</td>
<td>32.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: University of Dar es Salaam, Admissions Office, May 2003

While data in Table 3 seems to suggest that undergraduate enrolments at the University of Dar es Salaam have statistically increased from 2,992 in 1992/1993 to 7,801 in 2001/2002 and therefore that access to higher education has improved or grown, the fact that this is an increase over a period of 10 years makes it insignificant. In fact,
the total enrolment of 7,801 students reached by the University of Dar es Salaam in 2001/2002 academic year was only 0.02 percent of the total population of Tanzania’s mainland, and UDSM’s total enrolment plus the total enrolment in other public universities (7,246 students) in 2001/2002 was only 0.04 percent of the total population.

Table 3. Undergraduate enrolments at the UDSM and other public universities, 1992/1993-2001/2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>UDSM</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/1993</td>
<td>2,992</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/1994</td>
<td>2,968</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/1995</td>
<td>3,869</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/1996</td>
<td>4,308</td>
<td>3,996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/1997</td>
<td>4,519</td>
<td>4,851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>4,920</td>
<td>5,853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>6,848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>6,073</td>
<td>6,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>6,674</td>
<td>7,313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>7,801</td>
<td>7,246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


One possible explanation for low admission rates in general, which translate to low enrolment rates at the University of Dar es Salaam as in Tables 2 and 3, is the University’s inadequate accommodation and teaching and learning facilities, and insufficient staff as compared to the increasing number of potential students. For example since its establishment as a national university in 1970, the University of Dar es Salaam did not construct or procure new/additional student hostels or lecture theatres until 1998, when it procured two student hostels, constructed one new student hostel through an external investor, and constructed two new lecture theatres. Even with these added facilities, anecdotal evidence suggests that residential facilities, classrooms and libraries are still congested. Furthermore, available research evidence shows that between 1990 and 1999 the University of Dar es Salaam lost through ‘brain drain’ a total of 85 members of the academic staff, and that by 1999/2000 the University had 307 approved, but unfilled,
academic staff vacancies (60 professors, 54 associate professors, 87 senior lecturers, 69 lecturers and 38 assistant lecturers) (UDSM, 2002b: 5–6). The above findings points to the fact that the implementation of cost-sharing through revenue diversification at the University of Dar es Salaam has had very little impact on improving access and participation in higher education.

**Expanding Access through Privately Sponsored or Fee-Paying Students**

Data shows that enrolments in this critical program for expanding access to higher education have remained dismal, and that there is no indication that enrolments in this fee-paying program will rise soon. Yet, as Johnstone (2002: 5) argues tuition fees are an important component of revenue diversification and cost-sharing in higher education. Table 4 shows available data on the number of students enrolled in privately sponsored programs at the University of Dar es Salaam’s Main Campus and its two constituent colleges.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number Enrolled</th>
<th>% of total enrolment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1992/93</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993/94</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994/95</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995/96</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996/97</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997/98</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/99</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/00</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/01</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/02</td>
<td>289*</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data is for the Main Campus only.

Despite the weak enrolments in privately sponsored programs as revealed in Table 4 above, anecdotal evidence from the University’s documents shows that institutions and non-governmental organizations (local and foreign), and not households/families and individuals, purchase most of the privately sponsored places at the University of Dar es Salaam. Total admission on a privately sponsored student program basis in the four public universities was 677 or 6.4 percent of all candidates (10,552) in 2001/2002, implying that Tanzanians are not positively responding to the privately sponsored students program in public universities.

The above situation poses an important critical question concerning cost-sharing in higher education through privately sponsored or dual-track tuition programs in Tanzania. Why are Tanzanians, when compared to their neighbours in Kenya\(^4\) and Uganda, not positively responding to privately sponsored student programs in public universities while a large number of applicants for university places are not selected for admission, and of late, a large number of qualified applicants are not admitted to Government-sponsored places? Part of the explanation for the above situation, although not very convincing, may lay in the fact that the majority of Tanzanian households are unable to pay for the tuition and other related costs charged by public universities because of low household incomes; this said, documentary evidence suggests that even rich parents would like their children to get ‘free’ higher education in a public university.

To a great extent, cultural values and certain ‘hangovers’ of the socialist expectation of free social services militate against paying tuition fees and other related costs. It is because of the ‘free higher education expectation’ among Tanzanians that the University of Dar es Salaam Council’s Chairman recently urged all Tanzanians to cultivate the habit of paying for their children’s higher education; he observed that this is how Kenyans and Ugandans managed to expand access to higher education. The Chairman further warned Tanzanians that if his call goes unheeded, Tanzanians should not be surprised to see large

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\(^4\) Data from the literature reveals that in the 2002/2003 academic year, the University of Nairobi enrolled 10,902 students (49.5 percent) of the total number of students (21,992) enrolled in that year under privately sponsored students programs, commonly known as ‘parallel degrees’ programs.

**Expanding Access and Participation through a Tuition-Dependent Private Sector**

In implementing its policy of liberalizing the provision of higher education in Tanzania to expand its access, and as a strategy of implementing cost-sharing in higher education policy, the Government amended the Education Act No. 25 of 1978 and replaced it with the Education Act No. 10 of 1995. This new Act provided for the establishment of a private higher education sector, and consequently private universities and colleges officially started to operate in Tanzania in 1997 (although one of the current private universities, St. Augustine University of Tanzania, has existed as a private Catholic tertiary education institution since 1960). There are currently 11 private universities and colleges in Tanzania, mainly offering first degrees and advanced diplomas in business studies, accounting and related fields, health sciences, education, journalism and mass communication and religious studies. Most of these institutions are affiliated to religious organizations in and outside Tanzania.

The contribution of the private higher education sector to the expansion of access and participation in higher education is almost negligible, mainly due to its limited capacity and as manifested by inadequate accommodation and teaching-learning inputs, an acute shortage of academic staff and financial instability due to almost complete dependence on Government-controlled tuition fees and foreign donations. Most of the private universities and colleges in Tanzania were formerly small tertiary institutions, and simply elevated themselves to university status when the Government allowed private higher education institutions to operate. This elevation did not go in tandem with expansion or construction of new educational infrastructure, hence most private universities and colleges operate from rented premises and buildings. Table 5 shows trends in undergraduate student enrolments in private universities and colleges from 1997/1998 to 2001/2002.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Enrolments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997/1998</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998/1999</td>
<td>1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999/2000</td>
<td>1,289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000/2001</td>
<td>1,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001/2002</td>
<td>1,779</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Despite the low enrolments in private higher education sector as revealed in Table 5, non-Tanzanians constituted 18.5 percent of all total enrolments in undergraduate programs in all private universities and colleges in Tanzania in 2001/2002; the percentage of non-Tanzanians per private higher education institution ranged from 0.8 to 57 (the latter at one institution which charges tuition fees and other costs in US Dollars for both Tanzanians and non-Tanzanians) (URT, 2002b: 171-176).

Socio-Economic Status and Access to Higher Education

To find out students’ socio-economic status, parents’ occupations as stated in the students’ birth certificates and application and registration forms in students’ personal paper files were used as rough proxies. Findings are summarized in Table 6 below.

Table 6 shows that children of professionals, administrators, and managers accounted for 39.7 percent in the father’s occupation category and 23.2 percent in the mother’s occupational category, while children of peasants/farmers (agriculture) – 80 percent of the country’s total population – were represented by 51.1 percent and 68 percent respectively of father’s and mother’s occupational categories in the sample. Professionals, administrators and managers as occupational categories, i.e. occupations/jobs requiring a university degree or equivalent qualifications as a basic entry qualification, form 0.4 percent of the total adult population (see also Table 1). Table 6 reveals a disproportionate representation of children from upper- and middle-class families at the University of Dar es Salaam, and certainly in other public higher education institutions; again, this implies that for the poor, cost-sharing has not improved access. The Government
has admitted that the very poor have only the most remote chances of entering higher education institutions, and that the benefits of public expenditure on higher education accrue to the richest 20 percent (URT, 2002d: 45).

Table 6. University of Dar es Salaam students: parents’ occupations (N=2,757)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Father</th>
<th></th>
<th>Mother</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FQ</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>FQ</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional/Technical</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>35.6</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative/Managerial</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical &amp; Related Workers</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sales Workers</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Workers</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>1,408</td>
<td>51.0</td>
<td>1,875</td>
<td>68.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment Operators/Labour</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>2,757</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Furthermore, research findings point to an association between enrolments in/admission to prestigious degree programs at the University of Dar es Salaam and the father’s socio-economic status. Generally, the findings suggest that higher socio-economic status influences admission/enrolment to prestigious, high private return-degree programs such as medicine, computer science, engineering and law; the representation of children of farmers/peasants was below 50 percent in medicine, computer science, and law, and slightly closer to 50 percent in engineering. Unequal access to different degree programs, along socio-economic class lines, has long-term implications for unequal access to prestigious and high-status jobs and occupations in Tanzanian society.

Religion and Access to Higher Education

Table 7 below outlines enrolment in undergraduate degree programs according to religious affiliation.
Table 7: University of Dar es Salaam students: religious affiliation (N=2,754)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicine</td>
<td>177 (85%)</td>
<td>30 (14.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comp. Science</td>
<td>147 (82.6)</td>
<td>28 (15.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arts/S. Sciences</td>
<td>658 (82.6)</td>
<td>93 (12.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce</td>
<td>385 (85.4)</td>
<td>65 (14.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>164 (94.3)</td>
<td>10 (5.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering</td>
<td>599 (90.3)</td>
<td>63 (9.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>284 (86.3)</td>
<td>44 (13.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,414 (87.6)</td>
<td>333 (12.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The participation/representation of Christians – some 45 percent of the total population of Tanzania’s mainland – in seven degree programs at the University of Dar es Salaam ranged between 82.6 and 94.3 percent. The representation of Muslims (accounting for 35 percent of the total population in Tanzania’s mainland and more than 99 percent in Zanzibar and Pemba) ranged between 5.7 and 15.7 percent. The overall representation of Christians was 87.6 percent and 12.1 percent for Muslims. These findings show religious inequalities in access to higher education at the University of Dar es Salaam, and probably in other public and private higher education institutions. This problem has some historical explanations and roots.

CONCLUSION

This Chapter sought to shed light on whether re-introducing cost-sharing to higher education policy in Tanzania in the late 1980s had any impact on the expansion of access to higher education at the University of Dar es Salaam, as the Government envisaged. Findings suggest that so far the policy has had very little impact on expanding access and participation in higher education, mainly because of dismal enrolment in privately sponsored student programs and of the University’s inability to embark on the full-scale income-generating activities which would
have enabled it to enrol more students. The findings presented here show that access and participation in higher education at the University of Dar es Salaam – Tanzania’s flagship university – is still influenced by what Johnstone and Shroff-Mehta (2000: 18-19) termed ‘unacceptable correlates’, amongst which religion and socio-economic status. These correlates appear to militate against any meaningful impact of cost-sharing on higher education access.

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PART THREE

SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY, UNIVERSITIES AND THE FUTURE
UNIVERSITIES AND THE FUTURE OF KNOWLEDGE GOVERNANCE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY

Steve Fuller *

SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY AS CRITIC OF THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY AND DEFENDER OF THE UNIVERSITY

Social epistemology is concerned with how and what we should know, given how and what we already know. The subject matter corresponds to what pragmatist philosophers call ‘the conduct of inquiry’ and what may look like an abstract form of science policy. Social epistemology advances beyond other theories of knowledge by taking seriously that knowledge is produced by agents who are not merely individually embodied, but also collectively embedded in certain specifiable relationships that extend over large chunks of space and time. Moreover, for the social epistemologist, the ends of knowledge need to be established, not taken for granted. Words like ‘validity’, ‘reliability’, and even ‘truth’ itself, do not refer to ends inherent to the conduct of inquiry. Rather, they refer merely to constraints on inquiry that still leave wide open questions concerning the ends of knowledge: What sort of knowledge should be produced, by whom, and for whom?

The need for social epistemology arises from an interdisciplinary gap between philosophy and sociology: philosophical theories of knowledge tend to stress normative approaches without considering their empirical ‘realizability’ or political and economic consequences. Thus, philosophers are much better at providing definitions of knowledge (e.g. ‘justified true belief’) than telling us which practices

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provide better and worse access to knowledge so defined. Sociological theories suffer the complementary problem of capturing the empirical and ideological character of knowledge, but typically without offering guidance on how knowledge policy should be conducted. Indeed, the sociological literature often leaves the impression that knowledge is valid only if it serves the knowledge claimant’s interests. In this respect, social epistemology aims to transcend both philosophy’s abstract aloofness and sociology’s concrete cynicism. Social epistemology operates with a generally sceptical attitude toward what is often celebrated as our ‘Knowledge Society’. The ‘Knowledge Society’ refers mainly to the increasing role that science and technology play in societal governance and economic production. It is a tendency that has been observed by an ideologically wide range of observers since the 1970s, including Daniel Bell, Alvin Gouldner, Jean-Francois Lyotard, Francis Fukuyama and Manuel Castells. Knowledge Society theorists typically valorize the progress of information technologies, the specialization of scientific knowledge and the intermediation of expertise in everyday life. These theorists, generally associated with a ‘postmodernist’ or at least post-Marxist political sensibility, tend to draw quite selectively on the history of capitalism to model the emerging social order. On the one hand, they highlight the conversion of knowledge work to ‘intellectual capital’ (or, more generally, ‘human capital’) that can be developed and even accumulated. On the other hand, they downplay the routinization and commodification of knowledge, as epitomized in the reduction of expertise to trainable skills that may be ultimately simulated on advanced computers, which indirectly serves to de-professionalize the ‘knowledge workers’, perhaps ultimately rendering them redundant. Social epistemology draws attention to these less salutary consequences, which in many respects exacerbate the worst features of capitalism.

The Knowledge Society is what advanced capitalism looks like to intellectuals, once they have been assimilated into its mode of production – a classic case of what economists call the ‘internalization of negative externalities’. The dawn of the Knowledge Society has been marked by the massification of academia, from the budgets for scientific research to the number of students in search of credentials. At one level, it would seem that in our post-modern political economy, knowledge has replaced labour’s centrality in classical political economy. That may well be true – and the historical precedent should give us pause for
thought. However, Knowledge Society discourse has given rise to a field, knowledge management, whose very name is a piece of Orwellian Newspeak that epitomizes the topsy-turvy political economy of the so-called Knowledge Society.

In earlier times, the very expression, ‘knowledge management’ ('KM' to its friends), would have been heard as an oxymoron, since knowledge has generally been valued as something worth pursuing for its own sake, regardless of its tangible costs or benefits. However, now it would seem that knowledge needs to be ‘managed’ so as not to be left unused or allowed to grow profligate in a ‘wild’ state. Academics may continue to assert that knowledge is produced by hard work that is never fully rewarded, the fruits of which are nevertheless distributed as widely as possible. For economists, this is what marks knowledge as a public good, a distinctive product of the modern university that it manufactured by converting esoteric research into new topics for the curriculum. But for the ‘KM guru’, this ‘public good’ conception of knowledge merely shows that universities are not very economical in ordinary market terms. Consequently, universities are advised to disaggregate their research and teaching functions so as to acquire the ‘lean and mean’ spirit associated with, on the one hand, a corporate R&D division and, on the other, a vocational training centre.

The application of knowledge management to the university results in what, after John Ziman, is sometimes called a ‘post-academic’ conception of knowledge, which levels traditional differences between knowledge and ordinary economic goods. In particular, the ‘public good’ conception of knowledge is dissolved into intellectual property rights and credentials acquisition. From the standpoint of social epistemology, this signature development of our so-called Knowledge Society serves to erode the autonomy of knowledge as an ideal. At a sociological level, the development corresponds to the increasing proportion of (especially younger) academics on short-term teaching and research contracts. Under the circumstances, they are more inclined to adopt what might be euphemistically called a ‘flexible’ and ‘adaptive’ attitude toward a wide range of potential employers than defend the integrity of that increasingly fickle employer, the university.

The demystified – perhaps even debased – conception of knowledge in today’s Knowledge Society has been accompanied by considerable semantic innovation, a ripe target for social epistemological inquiry. Perhaps the best display of Knowledge Society Newspeak is found
in the glossary of *The New Production of Knowledge*, a multi-national collaboration led by Michael Gibbons and Helga Nowotny that over the past 10 years has arguably become the single most influential academic work in European science policy circles since the end of the Cold War. The notoriety of this book rests largely on the distinction between ‘Mode 1’ and ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production as a roughly two-stage process that marks the transition from ‘internal’ to ‘external’ drivers of knowledge production. In Figure 1 below, this author has listed the major terms in ‘Modespeak’, alongside their prima facie innocent meanings (‘not this …’) and their more sinister practical ones (‘but that …’).

Modespeak pre-supposes what might be called a ‘folk history of science policy’ implicitly shared by many scientists and policy-makers. It says that ‘in the beginning’ (be it ancient Greece, the Scientific Revolution of the 17th Century, or the rise of academic specialization in the 19th Century), knowledge was pursued for its own sake by pure inquirers who decided if and when their knowledge was suitable for public consumption as ideology and technology. Failure to respect the prerogatives of pure inquiry led to the scientific and political enormities associated with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. This fixation on the epistemic value of pure inquiry is indicative of ‘Mode 1’ knowledge production.

However, so the folk history goes, pure inquiry generates its own kind of dysfunctionality when allowed to operate with impunity, what economists call ‘diminishing returns on investment’. In other words, as a research program matures, it costs more – in time and resources – to make progress comparable to that of the past. Problems previously finessed now return to haunt the research community and typically reveal limitations in its fundamental assumptions that ultimately lead to its downfall. This captures the natural trajectory of what Thomas Kuhn called a ‘scientific paradigm’, an amalgam of theoretical vision, methodological principles, and solved problems that set the agenda for subsequent researchers. However, already in the 1970s, German philosophers of science under the influence of both Kuhn and Jürgen Habermas – the so-called finalizationists – began to suggest that a proactive science policy might pre-empt this tendency by channelling research effort toward standing social problems. This was the beginning of ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production in its contemporary guise (‘contemporary’ because analogous arguments were made by German science policy thinkers at the end of the 19th Century, the
previous period marked by an ‘end of science’ mentality. They resulted in the Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaften, the forerunners of today’s Max Planck Institutes).

Figure 1. ‘Modespeak’: Knowledge Society Newspeak

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MODESPEAK</th>
<th>NOT THIS…</th>
<th>BUT THAT…</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘Codified/Tacit Knowledge’ (Conversion Principle)</td>
<td>Performance/Competence</td>
<td>Fixed/Variable Capital (Knowledge Management)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Context of Application’</td>
<td>Applied Research</td>
<td>Client-Centred Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Globalization’</td>
<td>Universalization</td>
<td>Specialization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Heterogeneity’</td>
<td>Anti-Homogeneity</td>
<td>Anti-Autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Hybrid Agora/Forum’ (University Redefined)</td>
<td>Knowledge Unifer</td>
<td>Knowledge Advertiser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Informatization of Society’</td>
<td>Knowledge Mediates Social Relations</td>
<td>Knowledge Alienated from Individuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Knowledge Industries’</td>
<td>University Privileged</td>
<td>University De-Privileged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Massification of Higher Education’</td>
<td>Knowledge Adds Value</td>
<td>Knowledge Devalued</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Pluralization of Elites’</td>
<td>Knowledge Workers Respected</td>
<td>Knowledge Workers Modularized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Reflexivity’</td>
<td>Critical of Context</td>
<td>Adaptive to Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Social Capital’</td>
<td>Public Good</td>
<td>Corporate Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Social Distribution of Knowledge’</td>
<td>Integrated Unit (Institution)</td>
<td>Dispersed Network (Interaction)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Socially Robust Knowledge’</td>
<td>Universally Resilient Knowledge (Science)</td>
<td>Locally Plastic Knowledge (Culture)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Technology Transfer’</td>
<td>Academia Legitimates Industry (19th C.)</td>
<td>Academia Services Industry (21st C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Transdisciplinarity’</td>
<td>Interdisciplinarity</td>
<td>Antidisciplinarity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Over the past quarter century, Mode 2 has migrated across the ideological spectrum from social democracy to neo-liberalism. Thus, the original finalizationist proposal to harness mature science for the public good metamorphosed into an invitation for various interest groups to define more explicitly what is truly ‘useful and beneficial’ about the research they would wish to fund. What Jerome Ravetz originally called ‘post-normal science’ has now turned into ‘science made to order’. In this brave new world, the Achilles Heel of Nazi and Soviet science was merely the prematurity with which science had been applied to policy, not that policymakers ultimately called the shots.

Generally speaking, the Mode 1-2 approach distinguishes between inquiry governed by strictly academic interests and socially relevant interests. But in practice, the scope of ‘Mode 1’ is much narrower than the university – closer to a discipline or research program – and ‘Mode 2’ is much more diffuse than ‘relevance’ normally connotes – closer to a ‘market attractor’. Indeed, the university is reduced from an institution with the aim of unifying knowledge to a convenient physical space that enables the ‘communication’ of various knowledge interests. Once again, reflecting the ideological ambivalence of Mode 2, ‘communication’ doubly resonates of a Habermasian ‘ideal speech situation’ for establishing consensus and a Hayekian ‘clearing house’ for setting prices. Not surprisingly, then, the overall impression the reader should receive from the tableau of Modespeak presented in Figure 1 is that Mode 2 discourse conceals some recognizably capitalist, and even pre-capitalist, forms of domination with a pluralist rhetoric that disperses power and responsibility.

Indicative of the workings of Modespeak is the translation effected in the first row of Figure 1: ‘codified/tacit knowledge’. What academics routinely celebrate as our capacity ‘to know more than we can tell’ appears as a nightmare to managers trying to maintain the corporate knowledge base in the face of mobile workers in a flexible economy. When academics advise managers that our competence is not reducible to our performances, managers conclude that they must find ways of replacing that competence with a more reliable source of performances that can be made a permanent feature of corporate memory, or what Marx called ‘fixed capital’. In that case, employees appear as transient sources of knowledge – or ‘variable capital’ – that need to be ‘captured’ while they are still on site. Toward this end, computerized expert systems have offered much promise to a business
world that has tended to model the human mind only on a need-to-know basis. However, business is hardly alone in this regard. In fact, the succession of fashions in artificial intelligence research uncannily tracks the major models of organizational theory, starting from Herbert Simon’s bureaucratically inspired ‘General Problem Solver’ that prevailed during the heyday of the Welfare State to Friedrich Hayek’s market-based parallel distributed processor model of the brain that has enjoyed a revival since the ascent of neo-liberalism in the 1980s.

For another example of the occlusions of Modespeak, compare ‘social capital’ with a concept already raised that captured the imaginations of social scientists and policymakers in the previous generation: ‘public good’. The US economist Paul Samuelson invented the concept in the 1950s for goods that the State had to provide because they would never be provided efficiently in a pure market environment. These goods turned out to be those that epitomized the Welfare State over the next quarter century: healthcare, education, utilities and transport systems.

The defining feature of a public good is that it would cost more to restrict access to the good to just those who paid for them than to allow everyone access. Several reasons have been given for this feature of public goods. One rather traditional, but ultimately not very persuasive, reason is that some goods naturally flow to fill the available space, so that concerted effort is needed to arrest it. Thus, knowledge is sometimes treated as a natural resource like air or water. A more persuasive account of public goods is that they require an infrastructure that is most efficiently implemented and maintained on a mass level, regardless of the capacities of particular individuals: imagine the amount of police and judicial work that would be needed to restrict, say, access to books on nuclear physics to people who are seen as having ‘paid their dues’ by having acquired the right academic credentials or even the right liberal values.

Moreover, public goods may allow for prima facie free-riders to pay for their consumption by generating private and public goods of their own. For example, the flow of pirated software is both monitored and tolerated because communication among the pirates proves to be the most efficient means to discover bugs in the software. More to the point, however much it may have cost to provide the education, facilities and salaries for the medical scientists who develop a technique for treating a deadly disease, it would cost society more to restrict access
to the treatment to just those who could pay market-driven prices for it than to distribute the cost across the entire society through taxation so that the treatment is free at the point of delivery. Nevertheless, public goods appear highly unattractive as investment opportunities to self-interested economic agents precisely because an investor would not be able to capture, or even regulate, the flow of profits. Of course, it would be in everyone’s interest to pay someone to produce these public goods. That ‘someone’ turns out to be the State, which has the power to extract taxes from the egoists so as to provide the capital required to produce and maintain public goods.

Although the concept of social capital was not developed to replace the idea of public good, it has effectively done just that. The decline of the Welfare State and the corresponding rise of neo-liberalism are once again implicated. An intuitive sense of the hidden benefits of free-riders has been replaced by a more explicit ‘pay-as-you-go’ sensibility. Social capital may be seen as an attempt to simulate some of the old collectivist sensibility by showing how solidarity can be in one’s self-interest. The concept’s popularity testifies to a profound change in our conception of who and what matters in the social order. Neo-liberalism has broken with the Welfare State assumption that full employment is necessary for efficient economic growth. This, in turn, has diminished the sense of urgency with which new knowledge should be made available to everyone. Thus, the State now assigns a lower priority to the maintenance of the infrastructure for public goods, as evidenced in the decline in schools, hospitals and roads. A society (so it is now thought) may prosper even if many of its members lag behind the market leaders.

But the impact of the State’s withdrawal from the regulation of civil society does not end there: market leaders may find it more convenient to pool their resources with people outside their own societies, causing the social fabric to disintegrate still further. This is a perennial source of deep class divisions in the developing world, whose elites identify more with First World elites than the masses of their own countries. The advent of computer-based information and communication technologies has only exacerbated the tendency, serving to further weaken already feeble nation-states. The concept of social capital was designed partly to halt the evacuation of money and talent associated with these trans-national networks by fostering a bottom-up form of economic protectionism that does not require a
The exact appeal of social capital depends on where you live. Social capital promises the poor in the developing world an oasis of economic self-determination in a desert of de-regulation or outright lawlessness. In the developed world, however, social capital satisfies a longing for an integrated lifestyle in these centrifugal post-modern times – the promise of higher profits from deeper socializing, or ‘playmates as workmates’. Nevertheless, in the end, the concept of social capital is crafted with an eye to competitive advantage – specifically, the return to investors vis-à-vis non-investors in a suitably dense social network. In this respect, social capital exemplifies what the economist Fred Hirsch originally called a ‘positional good’, that is, a good whose value is principally tied to the exclusion of specific consumers – the exact opposite of a public good. This point has ramifications throughout society. On the one hand, it justifies cooperative businesses that charge preferential prices to investors. On the other, it encourages stronger informal links between academia and industry that result in jointly owned inventions or companies that are protected by intellectual property legislation. The perniciousness of these set-ups may not be immediately apparent but may become so in the long term, if they exacerbate existing social inequalities (compare Pierre Bourdieu’s related but negatively tinged expression, cultural capital). In more moralistic times, this intimate linking of social and economic interests so valorised by social capital thinking had a special, albeit now unfashionable name: corruption.

The social-epistemological slippage between the concepts of public good and social capital casts serious doubt on the idea that knowledge that isn’t private is ipso facto public. Both philosophers and economists tend to think that knowledge flows so freely that special efforts are required to restrict its movement, be it censorship or intellectual property legislation. They also tend to believe that these efforts are at most temporary, and that eventually knowledge becomes available to everyone, increasing the general level of freedom and well-being. How exactly this is supposed to happen is never made clear, though some following the US legal theorist Edmund Kitch have suggested, rather metaphysically, that knowledge is inherently ‘self-protecting’, that its meaning or power can never be captured in just one form of words or technological medium. There are always other modes of access to the same insights into reality or other ways
of achieving the same practical effects. Of course, such ‘substitutability’ can help explain technical progress as the succession of increasingly efficient substitutes to fill standing needs. However, acknowledging the problem of exclusion is not itself a guarantee of universal inclusion. Special efforts must be taken to make knowledge universally accessible, otherwise – as in the case of a deregulated market – only those who had been previously excluded for ideological, but not material, reasons are bound to benefit.

Ultimately, the two most insidious features of Knowledge Society Newspeak are: (1) the devaluation of ‘knowledge’, such that all organizations are now said to be in the business of producing ‘knowledge’ in the same sense. (2) The assimilation of democratic processes to market processes, as symbolized in the Modespeak use of the words ‘agora’ and ‘forum’, the Greek and Latin words for the physical space in ancient cities where both business and politics were conducted. This image of a common space is then used to create a blurred image of the public character of knowledge, leading to the following confusions: free speech is confused with advertising, criticism with ‘niche differentiation’, the public interest with an array of ‘revealed preferences’, voting with trading, power with sales, rationality with efficiency, and progress with profits. What is perhaps most striking about all these elisions is that they happen effortlessly, largely as a by-product of the devolution of the State, as in the gradual replacement of ‘public good’ with ‘social capital’.

**THE BUSINESS OF UNIVERSITIES: THE CREATIVE DESTRUCTION OF SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL AUTONOMY**

When KM gurus want to persuade academic administrators to run their institutions more like businesses, they highlight the frustration that pioneering scientists in the 20th Century felt within the disciplinary confines of their home universities. Major corporations sponsored much of the innovative research that, by the end of World War II, had turned America into the unchallenged global leader in scientific research. The KM gurus recall this history to draw attention to the supposedly reactionary nature of universities, as reproducers of obsolescent knowledge designed to maintain illegitimate elites. It is an image first popularized during the Enlightenment, some of whose champions (e.g. Leibniz, Diderot) proposed ‘academies’ that were the ancestors of the
‘science parks’ favoured by today’s KM gurus. Moreover, academic administrators are inclined to admit openly – out of pride or shame – the inevitably ‘traditional’ character of the university’s approach to knowledge. But such a response is unnecessary, false and counter-productive. The KM gurus can be handled much more assertively.

Notwithstanding today’s fixation on ‘innovation’, novelty isn’t the most important thing when it comes to knowledge production. What happens after the novelty wears off matters more. It was only the establishment of academic departments and degree programs that ultimately ensured that the 20th Century’s flagship interdisciplinary, or even trans-disciplinary, fields – say, molecular biology and artificial intelligence – remained in the public domain as scientific knowledge, and were not parcelled out as trade secrets and other bits of intellectual real estate. The combined commitment to efficiency, systematicity and publicity points to the institutional uniqueness of the university. These virtues are most clearly exemplified in an aspect of academic life that tends to be underrated today: curriculum design, or the art of translating individual novelty into collective utility.

Even business firms have begun to appreciate the virtues of curriculum design, as they suffer from what knowledge managers call ‘corporate amnesia’, the negative by-product of quickly formed, flexibly organized associations of providers and clients. While the existence of these nimble networks has enabled the business community to adapt to a changing competitive environment, the only knowledge traces they leave are those embodied in their joint products. For, once its mission is accomplished, a network’s human nodes simply disperse and connect with other nodes to form new networks in pursuit of new projects. The precedent for this diabolical situation is captured by the phrase ‘market failure’, which is the economist’s way of talking about goods that markets fail to generate because no one finds it in their interest to produce them. This is because the cost of producing the goods can never be completely recovered in profits. In welfare economics, market failure defines the frontier where State provision of public goods begins. Similarly, we may speak of the role of universities in redressing ‘network failure’ by reproducing and extending knowledge that might otherwise be lost through network dispersion.

Knowledge managers have yet to realize the full significance of universities in this capacity because they tend to diagnose network failure much too locally, as mere instances of ‘knowledge hoarding’. The
idea here is that companies become dependent on the services of certain employees – often information technology personnel – who do not make their knowledge directly available. We are then asked to envisage these human nodes as blocking the flow of information in the network by refusing to share what they know with the other nodes. Thus, the knowledge hoarder appears as a moral failure who needs to be taught greater concern for her colleagues. Little is said about the emergence of knowledge hoarding as a defensive strategy for remaining employed or even employable in the knowledge economy’s volatile labour market.

The targeting of the individual knowledge hoarder by knowledge managers aims to ensure that firms receive an adequate return on their ‘knowledge investments’, as measured by the clients, contacts or web links that employees accumulate. It is very much the point-of-view of managers trying to keep their firms afloat. However, from social epistemology’s more global perspective, the tendency of knowledge to escape from its formative networks may be seen as a positive market mechanism for counteracting the corporate hoarding of knowledge, which could result in that ultimate blockage of free exchange, a monopoly. In this context, universities are designed to permit ‘knowledge escape’, thereby redistributing the advantage accumulated in the staff, databases and intellectual property of corporate entities like firms, States and even academic disciplines themselves. To appreciate this crucial point, let us return to a key point overlooked by Knowledge Society Newspeak: the integrity of the university as a whole is greater than the sum of its constituent departments. The key lies in the university’s status as an – perhaps even the original – ‘entrepreneurial’ institution, one perpetually engaged in the creative destruction of social capital. This Schumpeterian turn of phrase speaks to the university’s classical mission of unifying teaching and research.

Research is a natural generator of social capital because those who invest their own capital or labour in its production are the primary beneficiaries. It takes further effort – often charged to others as rents, royalties and fees – to make that capital more generally available. This usually involves reducing one’s own market advantage. However, that is precisely what teaching does when it makes previously esoteric research accessible to students, which then enables them to use or contribute to it. Indeed, curriculum design has traditionally involved synthesizing disparate cases from their original contexts of knowledge production and inferring larger explanatory principles, which are then subject to
further study and ultimately dissemination through pedagogy and publication. In practical and technical settings, the goal of teaching goes beyond contemplating nature’s design to ‘troubleshooting’ and ‘reverse engineering’ products that may lead to their improvement and ultimately even their replacement. Precisely because their original advantage is destroyed through teaching, researchers are continually motivated to generate new research that will confer on them a temporary market advantage. That cycle constitutes a socially ‘progressive’ force if each successive generation of researchers is drawn from at least slightly different social class backgrounds. In any case, the cycle is the surest way to secure the integrity of knowledge, yet also the one most clearly under threat in today’s so-called Knowledge Society.

These post-modern times tend to overrate the significance of self-expression as an aim of free inquiry. They reveal the extent to which the limits of our knowledge have come to be identified with — and hence restricted to — the nature of our being. Such a sense of ‘free inquiry’ amounts to an exclusive authorization to pronounce over the domain of reality you happen to inhabit (in your own body or kind of body, in the case of class, race or culture). Thus, just as no one else can speak on your behalf, neither can you speak on anyone else’s. The de-colonization of the mind seems to have been accomplished through the provincialization of thought. As a result, the collective benefit of free inquiry is lost. Among the disadvantages to such a restriction on the concept of free inquiry, nowadays often associated with ‘identity politics’, are the following: (1) it disallows ‘oppositional consciousness’, whereby an outsider can claim a privileged perspective by virtue of not sharing the same interests of those under investigation. (2) It disallows speaking one’s mind with impunity — specifically, speaking against one’s own interests if that is where the truth seems to lie. The classic arguments for a property requirement for citizenship were partly based on the idea that people could not authentically participate in the polity if they always had to worry how their votes impinged on their livelihood. Similar reasoning influenced the institution of lifetime tenure for academics and senior judges. In both cases, free inquiry is meant to encourage risk-taking with minimal individual loss and maximal collective benefit. From the standpoint of social epistemology, this is tantamount to institutionalizing a sense of ‘representation’ in which one might turn out to be wrong about the world without thereby invalidating one’s capacity for judgement.
In short, ‘freedom of inquiry’, properly speaking, amounts to the right to be wrong. This is not a right lightly granted, for it entails an obligation to publicize what one has learned, however counter-intuitive or unpopular it turns out to be. Consequently, candidates for tenured academic appointments have had to endure a stiff probationary period, successful passage through which materially safeguards them for fully exercising their right to be wrong. To be sure, limits have been historically placed on how this right may be exercised. They are epitomized by the adage, ‘Don’t bite the hand that feeds you’ – be it that of the State, the university’s administrators, its board of trustees or corporate sponsors. Purported violations of these limits have been often cast as straying beyond one’s competence, though interestingly the plaintiffs tend to represent not the competence in question but the potentially affected population, were the knowledge claim treated as true. The problem here, it would seem, is not that academics may speak falsehoods but that those in power may believe them too easily and hence act on them too quickly. This would seem to justify that the State and other policy agents exert a sense of reciprocal autonomy that licenses them to disregard or contest new knowledge claims that come their way. Given the nature of our alleged ‘Knowledge Society’, this point cannot be stressed too much.

Of course, matters are complicated when academics do not simply produce knowledge that policy-makers happen to find useful, but openly offer their services to policy-makers. Here policy-makers are attracted to not simply the provocative and experimental nature of the academic’s ideas but also the authority these ideas carry by virtue of the academic’s institutional affiliation, prior accomplishments, etc. Wealthy private US universities have substantially influenced policy around the world in just this fashion. Harvard, by far the world’s wealthiest university, has made the largest interventions, which unsurprisingly have resulted in the greatest successes and failures. One recent example follows.

From 1974 to 2000, Harvard’s Institute for International Development (IID) seeded programs in Latin America, Africa, Asia and post-Soviet Eastern Europe. At its peak, the IID operated in 40 countries with 188 staff and an annual turnover of US$30 million. To enable the IID to function more flexibly on the international stage, Harvard gave it the right to raise its own funds and discretion over how they were spent. However, Harvard has been sued by the US
government for failing to monitor how US$50 million was spent on failed Russian economic reforms (it was on the advice of the IID that the US Agency for International Development had invested in these reforms). Cases like this argue for universities carrying insurance policies (the cost which may or may not be passed on to prospective clients) in the event that advice given in their name does not go to plan. This would be preferable to universities either prohibiting academics from marketing their knowledge or dissociating themselves from failed advice emanating from their academics. To be sure, universities would vary in the amount of insurance coverage they could reasonably provide, but that could become one more factor for potential clients to weigh when considering academic consultancy.

That a social science unit should exemplify the excesses to which autonomous academics are prone is not surprising. The legal definition of ‘academic freedom’ historically emerged from the incorporation of the social sciences into the universities of the late 19th and early 20th Century for the obvious reason that their research findings would be of most direct relevance to current affairs. Thus, inspired by related German social science debates, the American Association of University Professors was formed in 1915 by a joint resolution of the main professional bodies of economists, sociologists and political scientists. Originally the main concern was for academics to be free to pursue research that did not dovetail with government policy or (in the case of US universities) boards of trustees. However, as the 20th Century progressed, wealthy private US universities led the way in converting this negative sense of freedom into a positive mandate to improve the human condition, with Harvard’s IID an extreme case in point. Notwithstanding the problems that befell the IID, this positive mandate is likely to become stronger across the university sector in the 21st Century – a point revisited in the final section.

Finally, to foreshadow another issue raised later, the strong sense of academic freedom discussed here is not historically associated with work conditions of ‘basic’ – as opposed to ‘applied’ or ‘mission-oriented’ – research in the natural sciences. Inquiry into the ‘nature of things’ in the broadest and purest sense has been traditionally tied to a political economy of leisure, specifically the capacity to spend resources with impunity. This is what originally made such inquiry the prerogative of the wealthy – or those fortunate to enjoy their patronage. Until the third quarter of the 19th Century, most of this activity occurred
outside the university and hence without the obligation for research findings to be ‘publicized’ in the widest possible sense – that is, through incorporation in the curriculum. Of course, in exchange for enjoying their freedom, researchers provided their patrons with privileged, if not exclusive access, to their findings.

The sense of ‘free inquiry’ to which natural scientists have aspired is animated less by the prospect of a discovery with the potential to disturb the status quo through widespread publicity than simply the luxury to take longer than expected to discover anything of interest at all. Of course, particular natural scientists have wanted freedom in both senses, but the different motivations need to be kept in mind in order to understand how natural scientists so often seem to have found ‘freedom’ in military and industrial research settings in the 20th Century. Often these scientists were trying to escape teaching obligations and hence equated the sense of ‘freedom’ they sought with the bare civil liberty to act as one wants without external interference (i.e. from students and academic administrators). In practice, they simply wanted to be allowed to publish their findings in technical journals of limited circulation, an activity not likely by itself to threaten national security or intellectual property regimes. In contrast, social scientists aspired to a more robust sense of freedom that carried the obligation to teach. This much riskier sense of freedom has typically required collective recognition in a union or professional organization rather than simply a benevolent relationship with those who fund or manage the research environment.

No discussion of university autonomy is complete without a consideration of affirmative action, which is often held to undermine university autonomy. This complaint is typically raised by academic leaders who feel restricted by State demands that traditionally disadvantaged groups be allowed relatively easy access to student places and faculty posts. They ask: ‘Why not simply go for the best?’ However, this simple question reveals a university’s lack of autonomy, specifically its failure to control the terms in which the institution is evaluated. After all, left to his or her own devices, what responsible university leader would reduce his or her institution to a collection point for ‘high achievers’? That would shift the role of the university from a producer of knowers and knowledge to an investor in things and people whose cognitive and epistemic virtues had been acquired elsewhere. Under the circumstances, the university is rendered little more than a showcase.
Economists have characteristically had no illusions about the ease with which universities would allow market forces to turn them into glorified ‘screens’ and ‘signals’ in the labour market.

One straightforwardly ‘technical’ answer to complaints about affirmative action is to use performance measures that valorise the outcomes preferred by affirmative action (e.g. the ‘value added’ by university matriculation to prior schooling, whereby the ‘best’ institutions are the ones that raise their students the most). But behind these concerns lies the deeper worry that universities are being asked to achieve goals – however worthy – for which they are not suitable vehicles, especially the redress of past injustices. But affirmative action can be justified in terms of the university’s forward-looking, universalistic aspirations, which in economistic terms include improving society’s overall stock of ‘human capital’.

Here it is worth recalling that in medieval Roman law the original status of universities – along with churches and guilds – as universitas (normally translated in English as ‘corporation’) rested on their pursuing ends, typically the perpetuation and elaboration of a set of practices whose value extends beyond the interests and lifetimes of current practitioners. The idea was that each new member would undergo a ‘rebirth’ (e.g. a baptism) through examination or election that would confirm their lifelong commitment to the universitas. It is telling that in the United States former students are still called alumni, whose Latin meaning, ‘foster sons’, captures well the new sense of identity acquired in the process of academic ‘matriculation’, itself Latin for ‘mothering’.

That the members of a universitas exchanged their hereditary standing for new identities conferred on the institution a legal right to raise its own funds. Such self-subsidization typically involved past matriculants voluntarily contributing to the mission of spreading the good work done by the universitas, not least by the recruitment of new members. Like church membership, matriculation amounted to a lifelong commitment to the institution’s spiritual mission beyond whatever transient, job-related skills that students managed to pick up from their coursework. Moreover, the maintenance of a university’s ‘spiritual mission’ was understood to involve ongoing adaptation to environmental changes that could be generally entrusted to the university’s current administrators. In other words, matriculants have understood the university’s autonomy as like that of an organism: it is
more important for the institution to maintain a certain relationship between itself and its environment than simply to maintain a certain image regardless of its environment.

This legal framework, and its accompanying sensibility, discussed here as ‘affirmative action’ was previously epitomized as the ‘creative destruction of social capital’. Historically it provided the basis on which cities and later entire States were constituted as legally sanctioned entities, with the ‘naturalization’ of citizens taking the place of matriculation. Indeed, to borrow Max Weber’s terms, we might see national income tax regimes as ‘routinizing’ the ‘charisma’ embodied in alumni endowments to universities. After all, the national university systems that began to emerge in the 19th Century were publicly financed not because taxpayers expected that they or even their children would be matriculants. Rather, they thought they might benefit from applications of the knowledge produced and distributed in universities, say, through improved healthcare, living conditions, products and production processes, arts and culture and even civil administration. To be sure, the exact benefits accrued to particular members of a society are bound to vary widely. However, in keeping with the classical conception of knowledge as a public good, it would cost more to allocate benefits in exact proportion to tax payments than simply to admit that it is less personally risky for everyone to contribute what they can afford to support an institution – the university – whose role in social progress is both incontrovertible and indeterminate.

THE EMERGING SHAPE OF UNIVERSITY GOVERNANCE: ACADEMIC CAESARISM AND ACADEMIC IMPERIALISM

In the 21st Century, universities will become more State-like. They will expand their governance functions across society, with the more ambitious ones taking on global governance functions, ranging from the certification of overseas degree programs to the establishment of physical campuses on the model of ‘spheres of influence’. At the same time, rank-and-file academics will cede more institutional control to the university’s chief executive, whose own legitimacy will rest on the ability to insulate academics from the day-to-day need to justify their existence. All of these developments will occur against the backdrop of States that encourage everyone to get academic accreditation before entering the labour market, and most to return for more accreditation over their employment history. Moreover, States will depend on universities
to provide the intellectual infrastructure for the next wave of wealth production. The official rhetoric may convey the impression that States will be placing greater burdens on universities, but universities will be filling the institutional space evacuated by States. States will continue to encourage universities to become more self-funding, despite the historic role of the public tax base in building up national university systems.

Can universities retain their institutional autonomy through these changes? No doubt, they will appear more powerful, simply by virtue of the personnel and resources concentrated in them – and the role they will play in structuring the labour force and even its products, which in turn will have a greater impact on people's lives. However, universities may perform all of these functions reasonably well and yet fail to remain autonomous, if they take their marching orders from more dominant sectors of society. The specific fate of university autonomy depends on the maintenance of the link between research and teaching, in the face of external pressures to prise them apart. Only then will the university remain a whole greater than, and even apart from, the sum of the demands increasingly placed upon it by various constituencies. As someone who believes that universities may well retain their autonomy as they increase their power, this author shall focus on the Faustian bargains involved. Two phrases resonant of ancient Rome sum up his concerns: 'Academic Caesarism' and 'Academic Imperialism'. The former phrase points to changes in the internal structure of universities, the latter to changes in the university's relationship to the rest of society. Both are based on American precedents, since the United States has presented the world's best testing ground for the possible configurations of institutions of higher education.

'Caesarism' was the term Max Weber used in his later writings to characterize the principle of leadership in mass democracies, which he believed would be ascendant in the 20th Century. The term alludes to Julius Caesar, who was elected dictator to save the Roman Republic. Students today know Caesar as the author of The Gallic Wars, a commentary still read in the original Latin. The book is part historical chronicle, part political philosophy and part inspirational literature. Books of a similar nature have been penned by the 'Academic Caesars' who have led American higher education over the past century. That the USA should be the home to such Caesars reflects the anchoring of American conceptions of the university in a strong sense of autonomy inherited from the wealthy Protestant dissenters who established the
earliest universities before the country was consolidated as a nation-state (indeed, the student ‘fraternities’ provided the crucibles in which the American national identity was originally forged). Still more ambitiously, Academic Caesars claim to personify the defining values of their institution they then endeavour to spread throughout the world.

Harvard has been the spiritual home of Academic Caesarism, with such visionary university presidents as Charles William Eliot, A. Lawrence Lowell, James Bryant Conant and Derek Bok leaving a significant mark not only in their home institutions but also primary and secondary schools and even public intellectual culture. The initiatives undertaken by these figures – who Conant dubbed ‘social inventors’ – were of the sort that would have been associated with adventurous national education ministers in, say, Germany or France. To be sure, like most countries with developed higher education systems, America’s is also primarily in the public sector, but Academic Caesarism flourishes there as well, e.g. the University of California’s Clark Kerr and, more recently, the University of Michigan’s James Duderstadt.

The following traits constitute an ideal type of the Academic Caesar (AC). No single individual has embodied all of these traits, but Academic Caesarism is promoted by people who combine most of them in their governance of universities:

- **ACs** are university presidents (rectors, vice chancellors) who regard their role as comparable to a chief executive officer of a major corporation, *i.e.* an agent ultimately responsible to a set of principals including academics, students, alumni, the general public and, where relevant, a board of trustees and/or state legislature. The AC is not a *primus inter pares* but in a class of one.
- **ACs** believe that only someone in their position is competent to take decisions concerning overall university policy. Both positive and negative evidence can be adduced for this conclusion. On the one hand, the AC enjoys an epistemic advantage over more discipline-based academics in a scaled-up competitive environment incorporating many more non-academics and even academics not especially motivated by disciplinary imperatives. On the other hand, despite the traditional standing of academic self-governance, divisiveness, if not outright fecklessness, better characterizes academic attitudes to university governance, which then produces the vacuum of leadership that the AC gladly fills.
• ACs tend toward increasing their distinctiveness from – and hence power over – other academics by expanding the university’s constituency, say, through affirmative action programs of admitting students and hiring faculty, philanthropic donations and large industrial contracts. The newly included groups provide an insurance policy against potential complaints from more established academics about the university’s direction.

• The AC is dedicated to enabling the various principals to pursue their interests freely, as long as they do not interfere with the AC’s efforts to maintain the material conditions of their freedom.

• The AC may ‘channel’ the interests of principals so that they don’t interfere with the AC’s tasks: a strategy of ‘bread and circuses’. Thus, when alumni demand a greater say in university governance, they are offered surveys whose influence on university policy is indeterminate, or sports teams whose matches serve as a safety valve for expressing their commitment to alma mater.

• The AC is also not above pitting academics against each other. Done cleverly, this strategy appears to have been generated by the academics themselves. Thus, if a natural science faculty claims that its social worth is not sufficiently recognized by the university, the AC can propose that all faculties seek external funding and then, once the natural scientists prove their point, subsequently hold the other faculties to a standard that requires external funding.

ACs are masters of grand gestures that can appear to solve many of their institution’s problems in one fell swoop, say, by attracting a large donor who then allows many academics to pursue research without the burden of having to seek external funding. However, this is invariably a Faustian bargain, since the AC’s academic constituency – including some who might benefit directly from the donation – may have concerns about the donor’s own use of the research, even if no formal restrictions are placed on its dissemination (for ‘donor’ substitute ‘biomedical industry’). Moreover, as the last point suggests, to maintain power in internal university struggles, the AC may be tempted by a large donor’s attraction to only part of the university to undermine the financial policy of cross-subsidization, i.e. that a certain percentage of any department’s external income is redistributed across the entire university to enable all units to carry out their academic mission. This
policy is necessary to maintain the university’s autonomy as discussed in the previous section. However, as was also observed with respect to natural \textit{vis-à-vis} social scientists, not all parts of the university have an equal spiritual investment in this principle. In this respect, ACs bear a special responsibility for not letting an expedient course of action undermine the integrity of their institution.

‘Academic imperialism’ refers to the university’s historic tendency to perform State-like functions, again in keeping with its ‘corporate responsibility’ as a \textit{universitas}. In some cases, universities have performed quasi-legal functions that would be later incorporated into the State apparatus. Perhaps the oldest is the university’s policing of the behaviour of its staff and students, \textit{in loco parentis} in the latter case. However, equally significant has been the university’s role as a second-order regulatory agency that establishes codes of conduct, quality control of products, and site evaluations of professional and vocational schools, as well as primary and secondary schools. In this function, universities complemented, substituted for, and sometime seeded full-blow national research and education ministries. The universities became more directly involved in regulating the flow of knowledge in society in the 19\textsuperscript{th} Century partly as a defensive measure, to protect the institution from the changing market for knowledge that had already displayed some of the characteristics nowadays associated with ‘Mode 2’ knowledge production.

In the case of the UK, the Cambridge theologian and geologist, William Whewell, realized that universities were not equipped to compete with the mechanics’ institutes that were training the inventors and entrepreneurs who were front-line contributors to the Industrial Revolution. His solution, which was epitomized in his coinage of the word ‘scientist’ in English around 1840, was to reinvent the university as a second-order institution for certifying credible instruction in the new techno-scientific arts. This helped to standardize the knowledge needed for industrial growth. At a curricular level, it meant insinuating theoretical subjects at the core of practical training: engineering required physics, medicine required biology, etc. In many cases this resulted in the assimilation of professional schools within the normative structure of the university. As was just noted with regard to the threat to cross-subsidization, the problem now is the exact opposite: that the capitalization of professional schools – especially medicine – will come to dominate the university, potentially skewing the institution’s academic mission.
As the State itself grew, universities were created to reach into difficult-to-govern regions. In the USA, whose Constitution explicitly refers to the State’s responsibility to foster (though not dictate) the growth of knowledge as a means of improving the commonwealth, so-called land-grant colleges extended agricultural and industrial techniques into economically backward regions, and sometimes even exerted quasi-juridical powers in local disputes (however, they also unintentionally enabled ambitious rural natives to succeed in the cities). These institutions allowed researchers to experiment on a relatively large scale with the local wildlife and other natural resources, including people. This particular expression of the unity of teaching and research is often overlooked but became increasingly important in the 20th Century. For example, local residents might be given routine or even experimental medical treatment at a low cost, or even free, in exchange for allowing themselves to be treated by a student or the details of their case registered in a database for further study. In this respect, knowledge and governance were literally co-produced in university facilities.

As States have become financially overextended, universities have assumed greater governance functions, going beyond the regulation of healthcare quality, as Whewell might have anticipated, to the actual operation of local hospitals and clinics. Moreover, this tendency has a built-in expansionist character that makes the term ‘imperialist’ appropriate. An entire region may come to be remade in the university’s image as it is populated by ever-more academics and the natives themselves become academically trained or otherwise incorporated into the university’s business. An extreme example is Cambridge, Massachusetts, an old industrial city of 100,000 people which also houses Harvard and MIT. The two universities’ security services are larger and more visible than the city police force – an investment that blurs the distinction between the altruistic and the selfish, as Cambridge’s identity comes to merge with that of Harvard and MIT. Like other historic empires, academic imperialism simultaneously generates goodwill with many natives and conflict with locally elected officials and interest groups.

What most distinguishes Harvard from other universities is not simply its financial capacity (seven times that of all Oxbridge, if endowment and annual income are combined) but also its enthusiasm for academic imperialism. The locust classicus for this enthusiasm is
Beyond the Ivory Tower: Social Responsibilities of the Modern University (1982) by Derek Bok, Harvard’s President from 1971 to 1991, a period marked by the eclipse of the Welfare State and other socialist initiatives by neo-liberal capitalism. This geopolitical point highlights the vacuum of political leadership that provides opportunities for universities. As exemplified by IID’s heroic ambitions, Harvard has had no qualms about seizing the opportunity.

Bok believes that universities should boldly go where States fear to tread. He describes and justifies Harvard’s multiple constructive engagements even with authoritarian regimes, not always with the complete approval of the US government. Bok defends himself classically, treating the university’s corporate autonomy as an amplified version of each tenured academic’s autonomy: What is the point of universities enjoying a legally and financially protected status, if not to test the limits by which knowledge can be advanced and the public good be done? Testing these limits requires dealing with issues and people in situations that others in less secure positions cannot or will not do. Indeed, Harvard attracts the financial support it does precisely because of this adventurous but responsible spirit, which can absorb losses and repair damages when things go wrong (50 percent of Harvard alumni make donations, compared with 20 percent of other US alumni and 5 percent of UK alumni).

A serious objection to this otherwise endearing defence of academic imperialism concerns just how comprehensive one might imagine the replacement of States by universities could become. Consider Max Weber’s definition of the State as a legally sanctioned entity whose monopoly on force enables its will to be regularly realized. Can and should universities aspire to this full sense of ‘state-ness’ in a time when existing States are shedding more of their responsibilities? What enables a university like Harvard to be as effective as it is? Is it merely that people recognize Harvard’s track record of good works (including those done by its graduates) and honest dealings? Or is it also because Harvard – however indirectly – has the backing of the US government and hence subtly trades on the superpower’s ‘monopoly of force’? This latter possibility is obscured in Bok’s presentation. These questions are not new to historians who will be reminded of the source of the authority exercised by the Roman Catholic Church in the heyday of Christendom.
FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS

We have come full circle. This author originally argued that universities are losing their autonomy because a weakened State exposes them more directly to the market, where they seem to be coping, so to speak, all too well. The conversion of this liability into a disguised virtue has been the work of Knowledge Society theorists who dominate much of contemporary science policy discourse – to such an extent that they have generated their own Newspeak. However, this ‘marketization’ of knowledge production amounts to a form of mass disorganization that threatens the status of knowledge as a public good and universities as autonomous institutions. After elaborating the conceptions of public good and autonomy at risk, and the need for the university to recover its role as the ‘creative destroyer of social capital’, the author finally turned to the somewhat ambiguous but generally positive signals of a way forward offered by Academic Caesarianism and Academic Imperialism. Here are four concrete recommendations for policy-makers and researchers:

- A category of ‘para-governmental organizations’ (PGOs) is needed for entities that mimic and assume governance functions traditionally performed by the State. Universities – and of course many churches – deserve to be treated this way. They differ from NGOs in terms of the generality of their remit and the specificity of their relationship to existing States.
- Metrics need to be developed that present universities as producers of more than simply paper (i.e. academic publications, patents and diplomas) in order to capture the full extent of their governance functions. The political economy of universities needs to be compared with that of States: e.g. the flow of private investment away from States and toward universities. One would also need to model the de facto jurisdiction of the wide-ranging activities in which universities are increasingly involved, since a university’s sphere of influence may extend well beyond its founding campus.
- Metrics need to be developed that integrate the university’s teaching and research functions in cycles of creatively destroying social capital. A discipline’s achievement needs to be more closely tied to the enrolments and career trajectories of its students, stressing the impact of academic knowledge outside academia.
Teaching and research currently tends to be judged by standards that pull against each other, thereby destroying the university’s institutional integrity.

- Degree programs in academic administration need to be sensitive to the distinctive nature of universities. The most important concession to make to Academic Caesarism and Academic Imperialism is that being a career academic is not sufficient to run a university. However, it does not follow that anyone competent to run a non-academic organization of a comparable scale and scope will also be competent to run a university. The emerging field of ‘research ethics’ provides a promising rubric for navigating between these two extremes in search of a normative sensibility worth imparting to aspiring academic administrators (especially Norway’s).
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The unfolding of the ‘knowledge society’ is crucially important for governments, the world of learning and research, and society at large in the 21st century. This volume explores the ramifications of the knowledge society in its special relationship to higher education. At stake is a deeper understanding of how to ensure sustainable human development in the future.

Although the knowledge society is a central construct, each discipline interprets it according to its own conceptual framework, intellectual territory, operational criteria and specific vocabulary. As the contributions to this book make clear, genuine dialogue across varied fields and intellectual paradigms must draw on scholarly heterodoxy and real diversity. In determining the research agenda in higher education, the dimensions and dynamic at the heart of the knowledge nexus should be explored in a way that does justice to global trends while accounting for their local implications.

Balancing the reflective and the provocative, Knowledge, Power and Dissent tackles these challenges through careful scholarship and grounded case studies setting the local impact of global trends in context. In setting forth the operational issues that the knowledge society lays before higher education, it opens a pathway for future scholarship, dialogue and analysis across national, disciplinary and substantive frontiers.

This book results from the 2004 Global Colloquium on Research and Higher Education Policy of the UNESCO Forum for Higher Education, Research and Knowledge.

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