EXCELLENCE IN THE THIRD MISSION: VALORISING THE HUMANITIES, ARTS & SOCIAL SCIENCES


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**Introduction.**

Valorisation is at the centre of many debates on the future of academic research. Valorisation encompasses all activities that contribute to ensuring that the outcomes of scientific knowledge add value beyond the scientific domain. It includes making the results from academic research available or more easily accessible in order to increase the chances of others – outside academia – making use of it, as well as the co-production of knowledge with non-academic groups (cf. Bryson, 2000). Valorisation therefore is about transfer and uptake of knowledge, and is broader than the idea of commercialisation, which is engagement activity motivated by making a commercial profit. Despite this definition, valorisation has largely become understood in terms of universities’ economic contributions through patenting, licensing, spin-off formation and technology transfer. This therefore has the potential to overshadow the much wider set of contributions which universities make more generally to their societies (OECD, 2007).

This more limited view of valorisation originates in the natural sciences and engineering, and reflects the reality of knowledge transfer in those disciplines more than in those of the humanities, arts and social science (HASS) disciplines (AHRC, 2005). This limited view of ‘valorisation as commercialisation’ is further reinforced by the fact that the valorisation impacts of HASS are often far more diffuse and hence far harder to measure than those of the physical and engineering sciences. Consequently, policy-makers, research funders and university boards have prioritized pursuing the immediate returns of commercialisation in the ‘hard sciences’ over the more intangible, longer-term returns of activity in the social sciences (Barnett, 2003).

A key element of the growth of commercialisation is the fact that it has become thoroughly understood and professionalized (Howells & Wood, 1993; OECD, 2002, 2003). This has in part been driven through organisations such as the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM), the Association of University Research and Industrial Links (AURIL) and the University Companies’ Association (UNICO), which have developed a well-defined and clearly understood set of commercialisation outputs which are easily compared through instruments like the AUTM survey (e.g. 2007). Barnett argues (2003) that the ideology of the entrepreneurial university has been so
successful because of the simplicity and clarity of its message. Compared to these ‘hard’ sciences, the social benefits and services which the HASS produce are more diffuse and less easily enumerated and capitalized; likewise, their ‘clients’ or end-user beneficiaries often are public bodies, non-profit organisations, and other community groups with lower purchasing power (AWT, 2007).

This is not a matter of purely theoretical interest, because there is increasing evidence that it is beginning to shape policy-makers behaviours, and hence reality of the environment within which universities operate. This raises concerns amongst those concerned with the wider societal impacts of higher education that a restrictive version of valorisation is emerging. A recent report by the Dutch Advisory Council for Science and Technology Policy (AWT) concerning valorisation in the social sciences and humanities takes a broader view of valorisation, stressing the societal, cultural and democratic impacts from university research alongside the purely economic (AWT, 2007). This report emphasizes the reliance that a number of important public policy fields have upon universities’ knowledge bases, such as education, politics, health care, and law.

Universities are important drivers of innovation in these domains, thereby making improvements to the overall standard of living. However, policy-makers’ capacities to realize and promote these benefits lag a long way behind their highly professional capacities to effectively promote commercialisation in disciplines like engineering, natural sciences, information technology and medicine (and/ or life sciences). The Dutch Hydrocarbon Funds, the UK’s Knowledge Transfer Partnership Programme and the Swedish VINNVÄXT programmes have been largely focused on university/ business interactions, rather than with university/ society relationships more generally. Only recently in the Netherlands has the concept of “Leading Social Research Institutes” (Maatschappelijke Topinstituten) been launched to stress the importance of HASS for innovation¹. In the UK, the HASS research councils are beginning to look seriously at professionalising their valorisation activities (AHRC, 2006; ESRC, 2007).

Ultimately, the attention we see for the wider contributions of universities to society is part of a revision of the social contract between higher education and society under which universities receive public funding and their relative privileges (Barnett, 2000;
Neave, 2006). The discourse on the role – or ‘the idea’ (see: Rothblatt, 1997; Barnett, 1990) – of the university has shifted since the post-war years (Geiger, 1993) reflecting a shift in the nature of knowledge production which some authors have described as a shift from mode 1 to ‘mode 2’ (Gibbons et al., 1994; Nowotny et al., 2001). Allen (1989) argues that universities have long pioneered the use of stakeholder management – both internally and externally – if only implicitly, as a way of handling the deliberately ambiguous purposes underlying universities, to prevent open conflict breaking out between different constituent elements (Rice, 1970, Cohen & March, 1974).

The social compact is being redefined in ways that have created university’s responsibilities towards a broader range of stakeholders than just its traditional ones, namely government, students, and the academic community (the ‘peers’). The emphasis on commercialisation changed the relationship between universities and a significant set of stakeholders (Dearing, 1997; Neave, 2006), namely business. This suggests that the problem with HASS commercialisation could be conceptualised as a failure to redefine universities’ social compacts in ways which position HASS users as key “stakeholders” for the university, able to place a call on universities resources. How could valorisation be improved by making HASS stakeholders more central to university’s governance concerns?

In this paper, we address this question by exploring how this increasing emphasis on valorisation is shifting the role played by external stakeholders in universities’ internal governance systems. Our hypothesis is that HASS disciplines’ disadvantage compared to the hard sciences, (lesser policy attention and funding for commercialisation) is a result of the poorly-quantifiable nature of their outputs along with the relative impoverishment of their key stakeholders. Our key research question is whether there is value in using a stakeholder approach to highlight these problems both in terms of the conceptualisation, but also the development of policies which improve, university valorisation of its HASS knowledge base. We will firstly develop a working hypothesis drawing on stakeholder theory, and explore that with reference to three different policy attempts to improve HASS valorisation which have given external stakeholders some power to shape universities’ internal agendas.
University decision-making and stakeholder theory.

As recipients of public funding, universities have to be accountable in the sense of providing an account of the activities and achievements to government and the wider society. However, increasingly they have to demonstrate that the wider benefits arising from their research are in line with the budget they receive from their funding agencies and are ‘value for money’ (e.g. HEFCE 2007). Universities, like other sectors that perform public tasks (Reed & Stanley, 2005), are transforming into something similar to social enterprises, organizations which link their production of goods and services to a social mission (SEC, 2003). Whereas conventional businesses distribute their profit among shareholders (i.e. owners), in social enterprises the surplus is reinvested in the organisation to promote those social aims. The “social dividend” therefore comes through the delivery of publicly-beneficial services improved by the reinvested surplus. Where organisations seek to restrict the public benefit from this private dividend, then this calls into question the protected legal status and privileges which social enterprises often enjoy (S&TC, 2002).

Stakeholders are actors – organizations, agencies, clubs, groups or individuals – who may gain or lose from an organization’s activities (Ackoff, 1981; Allen, 1989). They have in other words an interest (a stake) in the organization’s performance. The term ‘stakeholder’ for a university refers to those potentially positioned to benefit from these social aims (Freeman, 1984). If universities wider social aims are changing, this implies that new classes of partners will be recipients of these benefits, creating new classes of stakeholders in the universities. But stakeholders, like shareholders, are not just passive recipients of the benefits or profits of their holding; they can ensure a more active voice in the organisation’s running to improve the value of their share and their benefits. But just as not all shareholders in a company are equal, some stakeholders interests are more influential on universities’ decision-making that others.

In terms of stakeholder theory this requires the identification and classification of stakeholders distinguishing between them according to their relative importance or salience, (cf. Mitchell et al., 1997), and, having done that, understanding how their importance influences universities’ decision-making processes (Jongbloed and
Goedegebuure, 2001). If social stakeholders genuinely become more ‘salient’ to universities, then it would be expected to see this reflected not only in improved performance in terms of excellent research articles or generating external income (i.e. of outputs that are valuable to the universities), but also by the universities themselves being demonstrably more socially relevant (creating outputs of wider social value).

**Identifying stakeholders in universities’ social missions**

The success of a university depends on its capacity to secure resources to achieve its core missions, and as a research organisation an important element of that is justified by creating ‘useful knowledge’ and embedding that in people, technologies, books and networks (Spaapen *et al.*, 2007; Marginson, 2007). In this process, universities have a number of stakeholders who define the value of that knowledge in terms of its quality, utility and relevance. The way in which a university (or indeed its many constituent parts, disciplines and communities) identifies, prioritises and engages with its stakeholders reflects the value they place on that knowledge. Universities’ capacities to identify and engage with stakeholders determines their evolution, and their chances for survival. There is a plurality of stakeholders with which universities are engaging or with whom they have the potential to engage, and the nature and salience of those stakeholders are changing over time, in response both to internal changes within the university (within the constituent communities) as well as to external changes in the more general social importance of these stakeholders.

The main stakeholders for universities generally speaking consist of the international scientific community, industry, politics, the public sector and the general public (Jongbloed *et al.*, 2007). Table 1 (adapted from Burrows, 1999, p. 9) presents the various stakeholder categories connected to a typical higher education institution (HEI), exemplifying specific groups within the various stakeholder categories that could conceivably exert pressure on an HEI’s actions, behaviour and policies. The table is therefore a list of actors or groups to which an HEI manager could pay attention, and the degree to which each actually are actually of core concern in practice will vary.
Table 1 Stakeholder categories and constitutive groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholder category</th>
<th>constitutive groups, communities, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governing entities</td>
<td>state &amp; federal government; governing board; board of trustees, buffer organisations; sponsoring religious organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administration</td>
<td>president (vice-chancellor); senior administrators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees</td>
<td>faculty; administrative staff; support staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clienteles</td>
<td>students; parents/spouses; tuition reimbursement providers; service partners; employers; field placement sites …</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suppliers</td>
<td>secondary education providers; alumni; other colleges and universities; food purveyors; insurance companies; utilities; contracted services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competitors</td>
<td>direct: private and public providers of post-secondary education potential: distance providers; new ventures substitutes: employer-sponsored training programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donors</td>
<td>individuals (includes trustees, friends, parents, alumni, employees, industry, research councils, foundations,…)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communities</td>
<td>neighbours; school systems; social services; chambers of commerce; special interest groups…</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government regulators</td>
<td>Ministry of Education; buffer organisations; state &amp; federal financial aid agencies; research councils; federal research support; tax authorities; social security; Patent Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental regulators</td>
<td>foundations; institutional and programmatic accrediting bodies; professional associations; church sponsors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial intermediaries</td>
<td>banks; fund managers; analysts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint venture partners</td>
<td>alliances &amp; consortia; corporate co-sponsors of research and educational services</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Like for any other business, the ultimate goal of a university, an academic department, or a disciplinary community is being successful on the “market”, securing sufficient
resources to achieve its desired ends. As HEI resources are becoming increasingly
dependent on market decisions an metric allocations rather than block grants, universities
are facing an increasingly complicated choice of which stakeholders’ interests to
prioritise and how to reconcile contradictory stakeholders interests within a single
institution (Greenwood, 2007). Stakeholder management is a means to that end (Jawahar
& McLaughlin, 2001), but university stakeholders are not passive recipients of
universities’ attention, and have a capacity to exert demands or conditions on the
university in return for their resources. This means that the identification of the most
important stakeholder groups is not a straightforward exercise. Clearly not all of the
stakeholders in the table will be – or can be – equally important. Universities also
potentially face mission overload, ‘trying to be all things to all people’, risking spreading
resources too thinly across activities, undermining their quality and value to recipients
(Jongbloed et al., 2007; ESF, 2008).

The salience of stakeholders to universities

Different stakeholders can have different stakes in or a different influence upon the
organization and understanding their impacts on universities’ decision-making depends
on making that influence more explicit. Freeman’s definition of stakeholder (1984, p.46)
is very broad, ‘any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement
of the organization’s objectives’. Perhaps a better approach is to begin from the question
of which characteristics make an external party significant to an institution, in this case a
university. Several researchers have narrowed down this broad definition, among them
Mitchell et al. (1997), who distinguished three defining attributes of stakeholders:-

1. the stakeholder’s power to influence the organization. A relationship among social
actors in which one social actor, A, can get another social actor, B, to do something
that B would not have otherwise done. In the case of higher education, one can think
of the growing pressure from students, parents and legislators to force universities to
adopt more cost-conscious operating principles.

2. the legitimacy of the stakeholder’s relationship with the organisation. A generalised
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
definitions. Today, the university’s traditional stakeholders (e.g. students and governments) have been supplemented by, amongst others, local industry, growth coalitions and property developers (cf. Barnett, 2003).

3. the urgency of the stakeholder’s claim on the organisation. The degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate action. A good example would be the greater emphasis put on research in health fields at the expense of research in other sciences.

Stakeholders can be classified according to their degree of salience to the organisation, which we define as the degree to which the leadership (of these organisations, in our case HEIs) gives priority to competing stakeholder claims (Mitchell et al., p. 869). Stakeholder salience is positively related to the cumulative power of the three attributes perceived to be present, in this case by the managing board of the university. Following Mitchell et al. (1997), stakeholder salience can be classified into various bands depending on the number of characteristics the stakeholders have which are perceived to be significant for the university. The more attributes those stakeholders hold that are deemed important by the universities (i.e. the greater their salience), the greater influence they play on the university’s internal decision-making processes (see figure 1 below). Those with only one form of attribute can be classified as ‘latent’, those with two attributes as ‘expectant’, and those with all three attributes, power, legitimacy and urgency, are ‘definitive’ stakeholders.
It is important to note that under the conditions of Mode 2 knowledge production, the attributes of power, legitimacy and urgency are not static, but are increasingly dynamic. Particular stakeholders can move between classes through a gain or loss of attributes. Although the government remains the most important source of funds for higher education institutions – making it a definitive stakeholder – other stakeholders may move between latent and expectant statuses. Combined with the fact that an increased share of HEI funds derives from contract research and that government expects higher education institutions to contribute (through teaching and research) to economic development and society in general, this transforms some businesses and employers organisations into definitive stakeholders. The emergence of the knowledge economy has certainly changed the salience of business, adding the attribute ‘urgency’ to the attributes legitimacy and power this stakeholder already possessed through representation of business and industry on Boards of Trustees, faculty boards, accreditation committees, and professional associations. Indeed, renegotiating the social contract may lead some non-stakeholders to become stakeholders for the first time (by imbuing them with legitimacy).
It is possible to add an additional dimension of complexity to this analysis by noting that higher education, in contrast to the business world from which the model was developed, is far more fragmented in terms of its governance centres and decision-making processes (May, 2007). This means that in reality it is not only central managers active in identification of stakeholders, but that various layers within the university have their own stakeholders (Jongbloed et al., 2007). Indeed, Benneworth (2007) noted that businesses used working with (and becoming stakeholders of) academics and service departments to build trust with senior university managers, and hence increase their longer-term salience with respect to the university as a corporate entity. It is important to note that some internal stakeholders may actually be less salient to university managers than definitive and emergent external stakeholders (e.g. S&TSC, 2005).

In this paper, we are primarily concerned with how one group of external stakeholders (national government policy-makers) have attempted to make universities (as corporate bodies) more responsive to other (traditionally overlooked) external stakeholder groups to improve valorisation of HASS activities. For this reason, we adopt a simpler, more restrictive version of the model, to consider how particular policy instruments have affected the way that universities have reconsidered the salience of community stakeholders in their HASS research agendas.

**Stakeholder theory and valorisation in HASS**

Our hypothesis can be modified with reference to stakeholder theory to become

“HASS stakeholders have, because of their internal characteristics, failed to become salient stakeholders to universities”.

Consequently, universities have paid little attention to the valorisation of their HASS research base for example by designing ‘exploitability’ into the work programmes of academics, research groups and faculties. This relative lack of salience could conceivably reflect the absence of a number of distinct drivers by which the situation could conceivably be changed. Firstly, universities could internally decide to place a higher priority on engaging with HASS users, just as a number of universities in the early 1980s adopted without significant external pressure a more entrepreneurial orientation
(Clark, 1998). Secondly, potential HASS users could themselves become more powerful, or attract more resources and legitimacy, in the particular national (higher education) contexts. Thirdly, other external stakeholders (particularly national and state governments and funding councils) could demand that HEIs have more regard for HASS users in their wider socio-economic engagement activity.

Using the stakeholder framework, we can identify that in each of the three salience dimensions above, the types of stakeholders who might wish to exploit university HASS knowledge are typically disadvantaged with respect to stakeholders who exploit the ‘hard’ sciences. This explains why universities and external stakeholders have failed to regard them as serious partners for valorisation. In terms of power, HASS valorisation has received less attention and support from central policy-makers and funding bodies, in part because of its less tangible and measurable outputs. The kinds of stakeholders who might catch universities’ attentions as users of the HASS research are often less high-profile and less well-configured than large-intensive companies with their own scientists and R&D laboratories. As Barnett (2003) notes,

“The clients of the entrepreneurial university have to be able to afford its service: the entrepreneurial university is not inclined to put its capabilities at the service of just any client. A local community group might wish to take advantage, one evening, of the universities heated but underused rooms, but it will have to be able to afford the going rate”. (p. 69).

The lack of sophistication, the lack of resources, and the lack of tangible output measures arising from engagement have reduced universities interests in HASS valorisation in the face of more pressing demands from better conditioned knowledge-users (Greenwood, 2007).

This lack of salience for HASS stakeholders is surprising given the increased social stresses threatening a number of advanced economies at the moment across a variety of fronts. One perspective is that governments and HEIs have together formed a cohesive research community focused on evidence-based policy-making in which the beneficiaries of universities’ research are seen as being governments rather than the wider society or particular excluded communities (SFC/US, 2006; Diamond, 2007). In such
circumstances, instruments to encourage universities to engage better with community stakeholders should increase community stakeholders’ salience to universities directly, rather than, assuming community interests are effectively mediated through Government, a claim which Goddard (1999) exhaustively debunks.

Increasing the legitimacy of HASS users appears superficially perhaps the easiest task to directly accomplish by university funders. In the 1970s, in response to social unrest, national governments across Europe and American compelled universities to open up their governance structures to students and social partners (Daalder & Shils, 1982). Requiring increased participation of HASS users in university decision-making processes in a comparable way would give HASS users more of a direct voice over university strategies. But in reality, university decision-making is shaped by a range of drivers, imposed by research and teaching funding agencies, internal research and teaching committees, evaluation and accreditation bodies and their strategic scientific collaborations. Commercialisation imperatives (such as secrecy, contracting and monetization) have to some extent closed off the university to its social partners (Delanty, 2002; Barnett, 2003; Charles et al., 2007). It is hard to see how simply giving HASS users more of a voice on universities’ decision-making procedures will address their relative powerlessness given the urgency and resources associated with other stakeholders’ demands.

Increasing the urgency of HASS users’ concerns may also be relatively easy for governments to accomplish, in declaring particular social issues of national significance and mandating or funding universities to address those issues. The recent identification of a range of policy themes to which HASS disciplines can contribute, from terrorism and security, through multi-culturalism, identity and democracy, to the decline of manufacturing, social cohesion and urban renewal (PPP, 2008), suggests that this light touch guidance approach can be accomplished. Given the persistence lack of investment in HASS disciplines, however, it is not clear whether any new resources will be sufficient to increase the regard paid by universities to HASS valorisation, implicitly at the expense of other disciplines.
The issue of *power* is also more complicated than purely providing funds for particular social partners to commission research work from universities in an analogous manner to “innovation voucher” schemes. Universities’ commercialisation policies have often been shaped by the need to deal with large, well-configured industry users well able to negotiate and articulate their needs, forcing universities to change their behaviour (Jongbloed & Van der Sijde, 2008). One potential reason that HASS users have not forced universities into changes is that they lack capacity to interact with HEIs. This suggests that capacity-building amongst potential users could be important to create lead partners for universities whose demands help those HEIs to consider how best to reconfigure their activities.

It is also clear that these three dimensions do not evolve in isolation; providing funding to HASS users to build capacity whilst making core project funding dependent on valorisation and engagement can produce both internal and external university reconfigurations in which HASS users appear more salient to universities partnerships. Likewise, if there are other fields or topics which become urgently important (such as sustainable energy), they can crowd out universities’ strategic interests and attention paid to HASS valorisation. This hinders exploring the policy consequences for promoting HASS valorisation, because one instrument may have many impacts whilst one dimension of salience may be simultaneously affected by several drivers.

To answer these questions, we review how three different policy instruments, adopted to improve the valorisation of HASS by universities, have impacted upon the salience of the stakeholders to the universities themselves. Because HASS valorisation has been a relatively neglected field, there are only a relatively limited number of instruments to choose from, and we have chosen three relatively dissimilar measures. All are from Anglophone higher education systems, for which there is a comparably high volume of reliable secondary material available to understand the ways that particular policy instruments have impacted on universities’ perceptions of the legitimacy, urgency and power of HASS users as key university stakeholders. To simplify this complexity, and to focus more directly on our initial research question, we operationalise our interest into four sub-questions:-
• Who has taken the decisions shaping universities’ changing responses to HASS stakeholders?

• How are funding criteria for teaching and research being shaped by particular policy interventions?

• Which community stakeholders are involved – are they particular lead stakeholders, collective representatives or interested parties?

• How have universities responded by redefining their institutional approach to social engagement?

**Policy interventions aiming to shift stakeholder salience**

We now turn to consider three areas where governments have attempted to intervene directly with policy measures to increase the effectiveness of university engagement and valorisation in humanities and social sciences. We have chosen three very different policies that differ in terms of their size as programmes, their mechanism, and their applicability. We then turn to consider how these types of instruments have affected the legitimacy, urgency and power of HASS users, and also within that, which types of HASS users have benefited from that, in order to develop a bigger picture of how different valorisation instruments produce different institutional responses, and ultimately increase the voice of HASS users in the science governance system.

**The Community University Research Alliance (CURA) programme**

The CURA programme is a large collaborative research investment programme funded by the Canadian Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSHRC). The programme provides long-term funding (up to seven years in total) to “research alliances”, partnerships of universities and community groups, to undertake a programme of research of demonstrable community benefit. The alliance must encompass a range of partners, and those partners must have a significant structural way of influencing the research agenda of the lead body. The CURA provides three stages of funding, capacity funding for writing a full bid, five years of core funding (C$1m pa) and two years of
completion funding. This programme has been repeatedly evaluated and the evaluations have been relatively positive (inter alia SSHRC, 2001; Kishchuk, 2003).

The project was developed by the SSHRC; although a very similar idea was proposed by the Canadian Academy for Arts and Humanities, the SSHRC shifted the emphasis from CAAH’s desired outcome of funding for university-based HASS transfer offices to creating relatively large, collaborative research centres. This programme has been very attractive, it helped SSHRC to make the case to the Federal Government for a large increase in university funding in Canada after a long funding squeeze. In 2002, funding doubled in return for a promise to treble universities’ impacts on the host societies – the CURAs represented part of this ‘promise’. The scheme was designed to focus a university’s attention on one Alliance, by restricting them to leading only one proposal. As part of the 2002 deal, universities were required to publish a five-yearly statement on their social impacts, and the CURAs formed an important component of their statement on the value of HASS research to Canada (AUCC, 2005).

The CURA programme has been relatively large scale in Canadian terms, particularly given the relatively long period of under-funding which universities historically faced. The scale of that funding proved attractive for universities, and in the competitive bidding process, bidders had to show how their core teaching and research activity would be shaped by the Alliance, and hence how the CURA would have a more general institutional impact. The CURAs funded a number of research centres which were free to generate other funding, including bidding for additional third stream and research funding. The CURAs have therefore become a meeting place for the engagement of universities with communities.

The communities which have been involved are those direct users of the research, which have tended to have a pre-existing link with the university research centre, and the CURA proposal has provided a means to formalize and strengthen those links. Community groups are also permitted to lead consortia, and in the first round, 4 of the 15 successful projects were led by community organizations, Kamloops Art Gallery, Research and Education for Solutions to Violence and Abuse, the Canadian Forum on Civil Justice, and Community Services Council of Newfoundland and Labrador (SSHRC, 2001). The
effect has been to favour partnerships where there are ongoing relationships between universities and other partners, which are primarily in the social sciences, with around 90% of all the funds being spent on social sciences and 10% on humanities.

The universities have responded enthusiastically to the proposals – in the first round, there were 120 proposals of which 15 were successful. What did vary between universities was the degree to which the external stakeholders became central to the research governance of the universities involved in the partnerships; the evaluation found that the more central the stakeholders were in the steering bodies, the greater influence they exerted on the research, but that the degree of closeness they were permitted was determined by the academics involved; some allowed their partners to be closely involved, whilst others did not (Kishchuk, 2004). This did reflect the past linkages with community partners, and some of the CURAs such as the Saskatchewan Community University Institute of Social Research was able to use the programme to formalize its relations with external partners, and make the university acknowledge the validity of those links (CUISR, 2004). The results have been seen more in a shift in university emphasis as part of broader approaches to increase valorisation of HASS research.

**Scotland: a suitable cultural development strategy**

In Scotland, the Scottish Higher Education Funding Council (SHEFC, now part of the Scottish Funding Council, SFC) increased its expenditure on funds for knowledge transfer, from 2000 onwards. They initially experienced problems in achieving their goals, noting that knowledge transfer in the arts was relatively unprofessionalised, and yet is highly dependent on the calibre of the people responsible for its transfer (inter alia SQW, 2002; Hamilton & Sneddon, 2004). SHEFC therefore created a very small fund in 2005 (£0.6m) allocated between its 14 institutions, depending on their size, to part fund co-ordinator posts to work to improve HASS valorisation. The only burden on the universities for these funds was a very short (2 page) application for which they received one-year grants between £20k and £60k.

The proposal was extremely light touch, and allowed universities to decide their own strategies, with those strategies focused on making more systematic the kinds of things that they are already doing. The fund provided a relatively small sum, and the idea of
creating particular posts within universities to valourise HASS research had very limited scope to change either teaching or research, taking a very post hoc and linear model. This embodied a light-touch iterative model, enlightening staff about the potentially untapped resources within their research from which they might potentially benefit in the longer term. Against this, during this period there was a chance that a part of the core grant to universities from SHEFC might have become dependent on HASS outputs, and so university successes in this period were symbolically important in exploring whether this approach might succeed.

This policy approach created relatively few direct opportunities for external stakeholders to engage with the university and become more salient to its intentions; the universities designed their own strategies, with no requirement to actually prove the involvement of community partners in their (required) examples of good practice. Beyond that, the key stakeholders beyond the university within this policy instrument were the funding council themselves, and then to a lesser degree, the HASS community in Scotland more generally (representing the academics as much as the potential research users) through peak interest organisations. There was a shared interest amongst this community in ensuring that HASS received sustained levels of governmental funding, including that share provided by the funding council for arts infrastructure. The universities became a representative for the ‘arts’ community more generally in discussions with the government, building the more legitimacy of arts as a subject for public investment.

Universities’ responses were conditioned by the fact that they were almost uniformly strongly opposed to attempts to allocate core funds on the basis of commercialisation metrics - including in HASS disciplines. The universities all developed strategies, as a condition of the grants they received, but as all universities in Scotland had a number of strategies, the question remains whether this strategy was sufficiently corporately significant to affect universities overall decision-taking. That question requires further exploration, although a search of the 14 university websites in early 2008 revealed that none of the universities had a ‘community office’ that represented commercialisation interests in HASS, whilst the majority of community offices were primarily focused on technological commercialisation. However, the process of drawing up the strategies at least made all the universities aware of their involvement with external stakeholders: all
the strategies were compelled to have a section on their existing good practice (section 6). This could have created the pre-conditions for this strategy to become more central to the university interests.

**Professionalising the Arts and Humanities Research Council**

The Arts and Humanities Research Council is the newest of the UK’s research councils, created in 2005 from a predecessor board which was only responsible for allocating grant funding, whilst ARHC has a wider remit including research valorisation. AHRC itself regards valorisation as a key way to demonstrate its success as a research council, and has created quite a substantial knowledge transfer fund comprising about 7% of its total budget in 2006. The initial focus for knowledge transfer by AHRC was to address the culture of ‘cheap research’ in arts and humanities by funding research and valorisation on a full cost basis as well as developing new models for commercialisation in HASS. In its initial focus there were four main approaches, an innovation voucher scheme, collaborative studentships, collaborative research projects, and research exploitation schemes (AHRC, 2006).

These funds were made available through the standard research council route: individual academics (or teams) bid for those funds. Because of the relatively low level of past investment in HASS research in the UK, AHRC decided that research funded from any source is eligible for its commercialisation grant, in contrast to other UK research councils’ awards which primarily involve commercialising and valorising their own research. The AHRC also recognized that many universities have a well-developed commercialisation infrastructure for social and harder sciences focused on accessing available funding sources, such as through dedicated business development managers. The AHRC therefore also targeted the ‘business development’ offices of universities to make them more aware of the commercialisation opportunities in HASS which their funds create.

The signal that any high-quality research with potential applications could be eligible for the grants targeted all arts & humanities researchers to consider valorisation as a route to receive funds for discovery activities. This could potentially have impacted significantly on universities’ research strategies at the departmental/disciplinary level, and shaped the
way that universities invest their recurrent arts & humanities income (related to research excellence) so their research groups increase their overall expenditure through winning AHRC valorisation grants. This would help AHRC to demonstrate that it has become a more professional science council, contributing to wider government interests in creating more social added value from research investments (cf. STSC, 2006).

The key stakeholder in this policy was the AHRC, who were keen to demonstrate their professionalism by investing funds in universities to produce visible outcomes and transferable policy tools. The size of the investments were small but their intention appeared to be to sensitize universities to opportunities for HASS valorisation, by creating competition for knowledge transfer grants. However, the grants also clearly created new salience for other types of stakeholders, both large companies such as the BBC and city council archives who were able to collaborate on “Impact Awards”, but also for much smaller firms and community organisations to get involved through collaborative studentships and innovation voucher schemes. These funds were only available with the active collaboration of a community stakeholder, and so those individuals did play a role in shaping their academic partners’ research agendas. A final notable stakeholder was the UK Finance Ministry, the Treasury, who sought evidence concerning the effectiveness of their investments in the science base, and were potentially very receptive to persuasive evidence from AHRC.

The responses from universities were very promising; individual academics who submitted bids in the first round came with effectively identified social partners shaping the particular research activities. Although universities corporately may have been somewhat sceptical about HASS commercialisation, the universities were even more sceptical about proposals to allocate so-called “third-stream” (HEIF) funding for the arts and humanities according to metrics, even accepting the governments implicit slogan “no metrics, no money” (RKTTG, 2004)³. Therefore universities were also corporately keen to explore other approaches in order to foreclose the possibility that HASS metrics will be imposed as they will be in the harder sciences. It is not clear whether these changes will lead to a larger shift in university behaviour, but they are laying the possibility for behavioural changes on at least two levels, the individual academics and within commercialisation offices.
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Shaping university interest in HASS commercialisation

Although the case studies are all very different in their scope and scale, there are some degrees of comparability between the three areas. These are summarized in table 2, where we set out the key attributes of the policy areas, and the impacts that these had on the way that the salience of outside stakeholders to universities was affected by these policy changes. Although the three policies had very different impacts, table 2 does show that there are some interesting similarities between the policy areas, and this might help to understand how HASS stakeholder relationships are operating in contract to the rather simplistic model in figure 1. In this section, we use the three case studies to address the four questions posed initially, and then attempt to develop a better representation of stakeholder relationships operating in the field of HASS commercialisation. This helps to provide a better sense of what needs to be done in order to better promote HASS valorisation.

The first question asked who had taken the decisions shaping universities responses to the HASS stakeholders. In all three cases, the decisions were taken by funding councils responsible for providing universities’ core grants. These funding councils are already in all three contexts definitive stakeholders in university, and so these organisations had the necessary capacity to take decisions and then compel universities to respond to them. However, what is also significant is that these stakeholders also had a very strong interest themselves in satisfying their own stakeholders, either finance ministries or the federal government, and the demands being placed on those bodies. The funding councils were variously interested in justifying their budget increases, ensuring that HASS remained well-funded more generally by government, and in proving that a newly created funding council was functioning effectively. In such circumstances, the funding agencies had a strong interest in changing the behaviour of universities to better deliver commercialisation agendas.

Conversely, because the key locus of decision-making lay with the funding councils, universities were able to shape the decision-making as important stakeholders in those funding councils. The funding councils were under pressure from their definitive stakeholders to deliver HASS valorisation activity, whilst the universities tended to be
keen that it would be light touch, reflect research expertise and avoid following inappropriate metrics. The ideas that came out therefore all avoided the imposition of metrics on the universities, and represented an interim, experimental solution in which the two interdependent partner groups, the universities and the funding councils, both attempted to meet their own interests around valourising HASS activities.

The second question was how the funding criteria for teaching and research were being shaped by particular policy interventions. The immediate answer to that lies in the interdependency between the universities and the funding agencies. In none of the cases were core grants to universities made dependent on valorisation of their knowledge, and instead, valorisation was made something discrete and additional to what the HEIs were already doing. However, it is clear that at the level of those delivering teaching and research, their behaviour was influenced in a direct way by the availability of these various funding streams. In particular, the CURAs and AHRC’s funding instruments directly rewarded those researchers willing to reorient their own agendas towards building valorisation more centrally into what they were doing. The Scottish Cultural Engagement Strategy approach was a direct approach to encourage universities to change their behaviour, by creating a strategy against which the board could be held accountable. However, the main impacts on teaching and research activity were delivered by the individual academic staff rather than the university senior managers, highlighting the importance of internal stakeholders within the university for driving a process of change. This is of course a precondition for institutional level change by creating significant activities around which universities can reconstruct themselves.

The third question related to the kinds of stakeholder involved, and it is significant to note that in no cases were community representatives involved or mandated a greater say in universities’ high level decision-making processes. Rather, two types of community stakeholder were involved, with two quite different rationales behind their involvement and their modes of influence. The first were “well configured lead stakeholders” who worked with universities and helped them to develop their own systems to better engage with other community partners. These types of stakeholder were analogous to the well-configured large company with R&D departments and contracting departments able to handle ongoing relationships. In some cases, because of the size of the research
proposals which emerged, such as the CURA, they were able to exert a significant influence on the decision-making by university partners (Kishchuk, 2003).

The other type of community stakeholders were those - primarily evident in the AHRC approach - who became involved as humanities researchers became accustomed to working with community groups. The AHRC attempted to create a norm that funding should be provided in return for a commitment to valorisation via an agreed community user. These potentially had a much greater chance to influence universities’ behaviours because they could become engaged with particular universities in much larger numbers than the lead stakeholders. However, their connections came primarily through the academics rather than influencing the university senior management; academics who wanted to take the opportunities to explore new kinds of research domain could more easily access resources by involving research partners; this gave the research partners an influence over university trajectories. However, as May (2007) and Greenwood (2007) state, university structures do not always evolve to rationally reflect and support the engagement activities and interests of their internal academic stakeholders.

The fourth of our questions related to how universities responded by redefining their institutional approach to social engagement. Two features emerged across the three policy areas; the first was that social engagement was not a strong enough interest for research funders to force universities to introduce social partners as central stakeholders through for example a voice on the university board, in contrast to widespread changes introduced across universities in the 1970s. This left universities free to decide their approach internally, as it did not have to respond directly to community demands.

Secondly, university responses appeared to be driven by a desire to do what was sufficient to access particular funding streams whilst preserving their autonomy. Changes emerged when there was a confluence of interests within the university between academics who desired being able to access additional research streams, senior managers who wanted to develop their institutions in particular strategic directions, and people (business development managers) who understood valorisation in the HASS context.

These answers together define a quite different set of relationships responsible for shaping university behaviour, between different stakeholders inside and outside of the
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university institutional boundaries, and also inside the boundaries of what could be considered ‘government’. The determining relationships within this policy-making process appear to be primarily between government and university stakeholders, attempting to change universities behaviour so that universities themselves choose to define relationships with HASS users as more central to their mission. The Funding Councils concerned are strongly driven by their sponsor ministries to get better ‘value for money’ out of HASS investments; the universities corporately were driven by a desire to meet their academics’ requirements for winning funding streams without disrupting other missions. Against that, the power of the HASS stakeholders has only altered marginally in this process, and to some extent this has depended on voluntary – and at best marginal – changes made by the universities themselves.

Figure 2 Stakeholder relationships in changing attitudes to HASS valorisation

This model has implications for the development of policy models to influence universities to improve their HASS valorisation. The first is the importance of academics in changing universities’ behaviour – although institutional-level changes are important,
they come about in response to academics demanding changes, and the presence of commercialisation staff who offer suitable models and a degree of certainty that those changes will not be excessively disruptive. However, the rise of the corporate university has in some cases undermined the freedom of academics engaging with communities to continue working with particular partners in favour of central corporate relationships (May, 2007). Likewise, if HASS valorisation becomes seen as the wrong kind of commercialisation then this may reduce universities willingness to take the activity seriously.

The second is that relationships within government are important in determining how the policies develop. Ministries of Education can be influenced by the demands of finance Ministries, not just in budgetary terms, but in setting the expected norms for kinds of investment. In the UK, for example, AHRC was driven to develop a professionalization agenda not just because the science ministry encouraged it to do so, but because the science ministry was under general pressure to justify science budgets in terms of commercialisation outcomes. Pressure to commercialise knowledge therefore became an unspoken norm for all seven science councils, and consequently, the concrete proposals emerged to professionalise knowledge transfer activity in the ‘humanities and arts’. So it is not just that the science councils or education ministries which are stakeholders, but also the finance ministries in setting the ‘rules of the game’. This highlights the fact that there may be other regulatory and rule setting stakeholders who indirectly influence the science system and the conditions under which HASS stakeholders become salient.

The final point is that the effects were temporary – although salience was elevated for a period, once focus shifted away from the novelty of the instrument, there is little evidence that there were institutional changes which were themselves foundations for more general HASS salience. No universities had appointed community representatives to their boards, to better realise the potential highlighted through the particular policy activities. Nevertheless, some of these activities opened a ‘window of opportunity’ for more systemic change which were all for a variety of reasons not taken. If those opportunities could be consolidated in a more systemic manner, then it may be possible to realise some of the potential of HASS stakeholders to be more salient to universities.
Discussion and concluding remarks

In this paper, we have been concerned with three fundamental questions:-

(i) Can a stakeholder approach conceptually illuminate why there are apparent problems with the valorisation of research in the humanities, arts and social sciences?

(ii) How do particular instruments work in practice when viewed from a stakeholder perspective?

(iii) What needs to be done differently in the light of these reflections in order to improve HASS valorisation in practice?

The initial hypothesis we stated was that HASS stakeholders have, because of their internal characteristics, failed to become salient stakeholders to universities, and therefore universities have paid little attention to the valorisation of their HASS research base, for example by designing ‘exploitability’ into the work programmes of academics, research groups and faculties. Whilst there might be a lot of rhetoric around valorisation through engagement with community stakeholders, there is no evidence to suggest, as Jongbloed et al., (2008) that community engagement has taken the step that commercialisation has.

“The growing chorus over the role of universities as economic engines has elevated the debate beyond rhetoric and into the realm of policy action”.

We observed temporary improvements in the stakeholders’ situation, associated with a short period when universities felt pressured or compelled to involve those stakeholders more closely in their decision-making. However, when the pressure receded, then the stakeholders drifted to the periphery of university concerns. The question then becomes how to conceptualise this set of changes in terms of the stakeholder framework we are using. The key point here is that it is not just stakeholders’ direct salience to universities which is important – the way that other leading societal/ policy actors regard them plays a key role in defining the limits to how salient they will be found by universities.

There were some examples of external bodies providing consistent pressure on universities to be more mindful of HASS stakeholders’ concerns, and this helped anchor the HASS stakeholders closer to the university. Rather than just drifting away from the
universities after a one-off intervention, these held the stakeholders closer to the university (in terms of their salience) for a prolonged period of time. The stakeholders become part of a coalition which is collectively important to the university for some period of time. From the case studies above, there appear to be four kinds of mechanisms which universities’ leading stakeholders deploy to change universities’ attitudes:

(i) Providing long-term funding for projects involving community groups as significant partners in the research (e.g. CURA),

(ii) Providing the resources to professionalise university attempts to valorise HASS knowledges through things like business development managers (like the AHRC),

(iii) Encouraging universities to set valorisation as a strategic goal, and to open themselves up to being held to account to those missions (SFC), and

(iv) Inviting HASS stakeholders to hold them to account in terms of the overall institution impacts through valorisation activity.

Fundamentally, the salience of stakeholders is defined through their relationships not just with universities, but the way that these stakeholders relate to universities’ most important stakeholder groups. These relations in turn are shaped by wider networks and relationships by which the societal valuation of valorisation is determined. Salience changes when a stakeholder set is temporarily brought closer into the university sphere of interest, and then interventions on other dimensions consolidate the one-off, instrumental change into a more systemic shift, exemplified in figure 3 below. Figure 3 uses the same salience framework as in figure 1 above, distinguishing between latent, expectant and definitive stakeholders. The research suggests that if more definitive stakeholders put pressure on universities to pay continued attention to the HASS stakeholders, then these stakeholders may be in a stronger position – have more capacity to respond to – future attempts to valorise.
The main contribution of this paper is to show that a stakeholder approach is useful, but that stakeholder relationships for universities have to be considered more systematically than might have been the case. This has issues for the way that stakeholder theory is used
to analyse universities, for the way that policy for valorisation is developed and for improving university valourisation performance. This paper concludes with a discussion of those areas.

The importance of systematic stakeholder analysis

This paper raised the question of whether stakeholder analysis was of value in understanding why HASS valourisation did not proceed smoothly. What the studies have shown is that a stakeholder conceptualisation is indeed very useful to understanding how universities take decisions, and can explain HASS valorisation’s low prioritisation within higher education.

However, the mechanism that we have explored for changing salience was too simplistic: the case studies suggested that it is not possible to simply increase stakeholders’ salience for universities. Rather, their salience is constructed within a wider network of relationships. Analyses which are interested in changing stakeholder salience as an explanation of changing university behaviour must therefore consider the wider systemic relationships by which salience is defined.

Systemic policies for HASS valorisation

This systemic construction of stakeholder salience has important policy implications. The policies we explored aimed to directly increase salience, but when the interventions ended, then the general systemic tendencies reasserted themselves with the result that HASS stakeholders drifted to the periphery of university interests. If salience is constructed within higher education systems, then more systematic changes are necessary to influence universities’ desires to prioritise HASS valourisation. We identified four dimensions which could initiate changes, and potentially concatenate into systemic changes, namely university strategic changes, professionalization of HASS, making core research and teaching grants dependent on valorisation, and allowing HASS stakeholders to hold universities to account for their commitments.

Taking a systematic approach to HASS valorisation as outlined above involves a significant effort. This demands participation from a wide range of the actors identified above, delivering the four dimensions of activity listed on page 27. This would include
actors such as universities, funding councils, sectoral organisations, community groups, academics, BDMs, BDM sectoral organisations, finance ministries, and science & education ministries. This highlights the magnitude of the endeavour, and helps explain why progress to date has been so patchy. It is important to stress that shifting towards a system which favours HASS valorisation is not ‘all-or-nothing’. Systems evolve slowly, and of course in systems there are unintended consequences, so there may be changes to funding regimes that shift the systemic salience of particular groups with respect to universities without that necessarily have been initially intended. A platform or intermediary organisation may well be necessary to bring these partners together, understand what need to be done to rebalance universities’ priorities towards valourisation, and moderate a range of policies.

**Internal university shifts**

The final element is the importance of the university in these arrangements. Systemic approaches risk making actors seem powerless in the face of large and unchallengeable structures. The point above is that universities are not all-powerful – they cannot simply change their priorities – rather changing priorities happen within the context of universities’ shifting relationships with other key stakeholders. But of course, universities themselves partly determine those relationships, both through their bilateral relationships with other system actors, and also through branch organisations such as Universities UK or the Dutch VSNU. If HASS stakeholders’ salience is constructed through their relationships with other actors, then those other actors will in turn be influenced by what universities and university branch organisations tell them about where they see the potential for HASS valorisation.

Indeed, the message emerging here is that the university itself must start to speak for these community stakeholders, and encourage government and other system actors to imbue them with legitimacy, resources and urgency. Once that is done, the experience with entrepreneurial universities and business stakeholders suggests that universities themselves will be willing to take HASS knowledge users much more seriously as research users. This could potentially create a far more fruitful environment for the
valorisation of HASS research, and help universities further to fulfil their promise to enrichen their host societies.
Table 2 The policy impacts on universities’ HASS stakeholders in the three case studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrument size</th>
<th>CURA</th>
<th>Scotland’s Cultural Development Strategy</th>
<th>Knowledge Transfer Grants in the Arts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instrument size</td>
<td>Large scale, long-term programme funding, eye-catching and prestigious for institutions</td>
<td>Very small scale funding for a new strategy and someone to join up university’s cultural contribution</td>
<td>Standard project grant funding levels for research grants, knowledge transfer partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scientific articulation</td>
<td>Creating a stream of research (and possibly teaching) in which community partners have strong influence on the chosen themes</td>
<td>No direct influence over academic decision-making and research trajectories; creating a boundary point and community of interest</td>
<td>Depends on academics to choose for engagement. Creates research projects in which valorisation or co-inquiry are integral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource significance to universities</td>
<td>Large: high-levels of long term funding, plus a mechanism to achieve their commitment to demonstrably treble their research outputs</td>
<td>Very low in terms of overall budgets of individual institutions. Opportunity to get someone ‘free’ who may win new resource streams</td>
<td>Moderate; projects are regular research council size but large for humanities. Creates a funding goal worth universities chasing as ‘hard sciences’ have long had.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novel stakeholders involved</td>
<td>Individual community groups are the direct beneficiaries, getting research funding and influence.</td>
<td>Cultural groups and users of cultural facilities now have a point of contact within the university if they have a query or request</td>
<td>Makes any group with sufficient resources in humanities a potential co-collaborator. AHRC need the schemes to work to prove they are a ‘real’ research council.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy impacts</td>
<td>Part of SSHRC/ Federal Government statement that social engagement important. Highlights role of community stakeholders in actively shaping teaching, research.</td>
<td>Creates a point of contact in the university for the cultural sector; statement that they have a voice to be heard. Does not give the cultural users the opportunity to shape university decision-making</td>
<td>Clear signal that HASS are valid research users and provides access to new research resources and opportunities for research in collaboration with HASS users. Prestige of winning these grants apparently high because of high tuly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urgency impacts</td>
<td>Relatively few impacts on HASS users not directly involved. The impact exercise creates urgency to prove value and helps universities to show responsiveness, but not improving HASS</td>
<td>Urgency driven by wider HASS community in Scotland, fear that losing share of resources to the commercial sectors. Universities also worry that forced to accept HASS metrics so engage with the policy as an</td>
<td>Limited urgency in the approach – the idea is to slowly build up idea of humanities valorisation by users and universities, not to achieve it immediately.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Valorisation policies for the humanities, arts and social sciences: origins, policies and implications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Power impacts</th>
<th>avoided strategy.</th>
<th>Hands quite a lot of power to individual humanities users to influence academics’ research opportunities by giving them control over access to these resources. Universities may respond to this by being more systematic about cultural commercialisation activity.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>representation generally</strong></td>
<td>Gives particular stakeholders potentially large power to set the research agenda for a university group and to build its own network, which may also benefit the university.</td>
<td>Very minor; slight re-balancing of power if universities choose to let stakeholders become involved but no degree of additional compulsion.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall stakeholder impacts</strong></td>
<td>Particular individual community organisations have become expectant stakeholders in a number of Canadian universities.</td>
<td>‘Culture’ is a latent stakeholder for Scottish universities, something that universities have to be aware of and refer to.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Any cultural sector organisation with sufficient resource can become a close stakeholder of individual academics, but the overall institutional effect remains uncertain.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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1 The name leading Social Research Institute reflects the idea that this type of institute is to be oriented on social themes and social innovation, instead of solely on technological innovation. In 2005, the Minister of Education (through the Dutch research council, NWO) made funds available to support three research initiatives (on, respectively Pensions & Ageing, Urban Innovation, and International law).

2 We use the phrase business development manager to describe university employees whose primary function is helping to develop contacts between academics and external partners with the intention that this will bring some resource back into the university. In the case of HASS, BDMs might not actually be developing business, but might be negotiating collaborations and strategic partnerships with external cultural bodies such as museums and theatres.

3 This is what happened – in HEIF 3, a 10% quantum was made available to universities to fund reach out activities that would be captured in narrow commercialisation metrics, pending the introduction of appropriate metrics for wider social impact. In failing to identify suitable metrics, the quantum was withdrawn, and a number of universities shifted away from seeking societal impact in their HEIF 4 bids.

4 Or at least funders behaved as if they expected universities to be primarily response to funding changes in a rational way.